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Phenomenology , in all of  its forms, has constituted one of  the fundamental trends of  intellectual life 
for almost a century. Any account of  the philosophical legacy of  the 20th century must weigh the 
contributions of  phenomenology, and any attempt to look forward in philosophy assess its claim to the 
future. In fact, it is the promise of  a renewed future for philosophy that remains a central legacy of  the 
“breakthrough” of  phenomenology in the work of  Edmund Husserl. What is the status of  this legacy 
today? Does phenomenology—above all in its Husserlian form—remain a viable, living philosophical 
promise? Or has phenomenology become merely “classical” phenomenology, having matured into a 
legacy of  influence, a chapter in the history of  thought interesting only for the purposes of  a historical 
narrative of  ideas? 
The truth may be something in between. The influence of  phenomenology, and the different forms it 
has taken, is so varied and complex that the horizon of  phenomenology can no longer be taken in at a 
single glance, as it were. If  the promise of  a renewed idea of  and commitment to philosophy remains 
alive, it is surely mediated by a remarkably diverse intellectual embodiment, one that is not without its 
tensions. Phenomenological philosophy is a living philosophy that finds its home in territories far 
beyond the institutional field of  philosophy, which even within academia is not always the center of  
activity. On the other hand, if  the promise for a renewal remains salient to the meaning of  the 
breakthrough of  phenomenology, then it is doubtful that the ongoing development of  ever more 
sophisticated “phenomenological perspectives” in more and more areas of  intellectual and cultural 
activity is in and of  itself  the fulfillment of  this promise. Phenomenology must, to be both a tradition 
and a philosophy, reflect on its breakthrough, precisely in order to be able to look ahead. It needs to ask 
the fundamental question of  its sense, for it is only in this way that a tradition can look ahead of  itself. 
This third and last installment of  the internet project On the Future of  Husserlian Phenomenology 
features an introductory essay by Professor Dr. Dieter Lohmar of  the Husserl Archives at the 
Universität Köln. We would like to thank Professor Lohmar, as well as all of  the contributors who have 
shared their diverse and engaging perspectives on the prospects and promises of  Husserl's 
phenomenological philosophy. 
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On the Future of  Husserlian Phenomenology
Sebastian Luft 
 Introduction
   For many reasons, ours is an exciting time for Husserl research! To be sure, this excitement is not 
fueled by the same motives some one hundred years ago, when the first phenomenological societies 
were formed in Göttingen and Munich, driven by a truly pioneering spirit and an initial zeal of  getting 
back “to the things themselves.” At the beginning of  the 21st century, it is rather a sense of  endurance, 
of  what remains at the end of  the day, now that the movements of  post-modernism, post-structuralism 
— and whatever other “post”-phases might have been declared in the latter half  of  the 20th century — 
have swept over us and as the “cold war” between Analytic and Continental philosophers is thawing. 
Now is the time to see what has been swept asunder in the tides of  times, and what remains.
   Indeed, taking stock of  the last century and taking a look at the current scene in philosophy, it is fair 
to say that phenomenology, especially Husserlian phenomenology, emerges as a tendency in modern 
philosophy that is clearly here to stay, and is even becoming stronger in recent years. Surely it is no 
longer the case that one speaks of  a “Phenomenological Movement,” which demands a commitment to 
this “School” and its “doctrines” and a disavowal of  other philosophical doctrines. In this sense, 
Husserl and his pupils and followers stood in the midst of  opposing philosophical tendencies in their 
time; an opposition whose mutual hostility seem almost incomprehensible today. Today, the 
“Phenomenological Movement” in its original shape and its organized form is dead. Nevertheless, 
phenomenology is alive and well in a different sense. Husserl’s phenomenology stands for a type of  
philosophy, of  philosophizing, that has remained intact since its inception a century ago. I believe it is 
not trivial to point out that this is largely due to the honest nature of  Husserl’s philosophical quest, the 
manner in which he was willing to question the foundations of  his thought as well as their 
consequences and his very approach, always testing new avenues of  thought — and not due to fixed 
results that one could identify as particularly “Husserlian.” What distinguishes Husserl’s philosophy 
from most other schools is not a commitment to any factual premises or doctrines, but to the very style 
in which philosophy is carried out. What remains of  Husserl’s phenomenology is precisely its sense as a 
method. 
   At the same time, Husserl had the philosophical genius that provided us with insights that spawned 
whole philosophical schools in his aftermath, and be it only that they radically opposed him, developing 
their own thought motives as anathemata to Husserl. It is this history of  effects of  Husserl’s 
phenomenology, which propels him far into the 21st century, not as the dated founding father of  a 
school that has allegedly long moved beyond its inceptor, but instead as watchful guardian, whose 
warning gaze anybody should feel upon him/herself  who believes s/he has found fixed results and 
reached firm ground. More than anything, Husserl has infused future philosophers with an ethos, a 
working morale and professional attitude that is, to be sure, not new in the history of  Western thought, 
but is carried out with an unprecedented rigor and all too often forgotten and neglected — and mocked 
by less serious scholars.
   So why is the present time a particularly  exciting moment for Husserlian phenomenology? It is so 
because we are witnessing radical changes in our current philosophical landscape. These changes 
concern, most importantly, the new openness on the part of  Analytic philosophy on the one hand, and 
the fading away of  postmodernism that dominated much of  Continental philosophy, on the other. In 
this tectonic shift continents begin to converge, and a philosophy with its intrinsic character of  
methodological openness, of  searching, of  probing and describing — rather than declaring, bold 
announcing and groundless speculating — is exactly what is called for. This is precisely the spirit of  
Husserl’s phenomenology, and it is this sense in which, I believe, the time is rife for this ageless 
philosophy to reassert its role in the present; a present, which is once again ready for inspirations and 
more than ever open for dialogue. 
   In what follows, I will briefly lay out the areas, in which I think Husserl can assume a dominant voice 
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in the orchestra of  contemporary philosophy. But first I shall give a short assessment of  Husserlian 
phenomenology in the context of  20th century philosophy. This narrative will provide the backdrop 
before which one can understand its timeless — or timely, depending on how one chooses to see it! — 
contribution to philosophy; it also helps explain why some aspects of  Husserl have faded into the 
background. In some cases, it is, ironically, precisely those aspects that Husserl considered some of  the 
most important, which, I believe, ought to better be forgotten in order for phenomenology to be 
“free.” I will conclude with a list of  topics that are to be found in more recent volumes of  the 
Husserliana that either complement and expand the known scope of  Husserl’s oeuvre, or point to 
interesting new themes, where phenomenology has traditionally played little to no role. As our 
knowledge of  Husserl’s oeuvre expands and deepens, his genius becomes ever more awe-inspiring and 
recognized.
Locating Husserlian Phenomenology in the History of  20th Century Philosophy: After Postmodernism
   The history of  20th century philosophy is largely a history of  “supersedings.” This is to say, many of  
the great philosophers of  the last century defined themselves precisely through their “departure” or 
“overcoming” of  the philosophical “establishment” of  their time. Certainly the main target, at least on 
the European continent, were, besides Husserl, the neo-Kantians, though Husserl was, ironically, 
oftentimes regarded as one of  them as well. Husserl was revered as the founder of  a new movement, a 
new style of  thinking, but was dismissed in the same instant as having laid foundations that were, well, 
just this: foundations, some of  which were faulty or misconceived at that. This is the way Husserl was 
treated most famously by Heidegger, his erstwhile closest pupil, as well as some philosophers in other 
countries, where phenomenology took hold. Heidegger’s project of  a “destruction of  Western 
metaphysics” is probably the most important source for postmodernism and its critique of  traditional 
Western philosophy (e.g., in Derrida, as “metaphysics of  presence”). Heidegger’s philosophy 
inaugurated the many attempts to “overcome” the establishment in philosophy. The result of  this move 
was that Husserl, among others, was mainly seen as a philosopher who, though on to the right thing, 
was still caught up in “Western” paradigms that were seen as obsolete or (at the very least) in need of  
redefinition. It was mainly the simplifying label of  “Husserl the Cartesian” that accounted for him 
fading into the background. (1) The result was that Husserl was usually passed over, despite the 
ongoing publication of  the Collected Works (the Husserliana), which betrayed this label with nearly 
every volume. Husserl’s rather sluggish reception after the War was, furthermore, due to the fact that 
most books published by him were out of  print and the Husserliana did not get under way until the 
mid-1950s. The shadows of  National Socialism, during which Husserl as a Jew was considered non-
existent, still lingered after 1945.
   Meanwhile, as Continental philosophy developed in the decades after the war, postmodernism — and 
with this I mean very generally the numerous tendencies of  “overcoming” inaugurated by Heidegger 
— got caught up increasingly in its idiosyncrasies and detached itself  from classical discussions in the 
traditional philosophical canon. Consequently, less and less attention was being paid to it in the 
philosophical mainstream, especially in North America. While it would be premature to speak of  a 
“collapse of  postmodernism” in the way in which one has spoken of  a “collapse of  Idealism” around 
the middle of  the 19th century, it is safe to say that the heyday of  this movement, to which also some 
analytic philosophers contributed (e.g., Rorty), is history, just as, on the other side, traditional Analytic 
philosophy in the tradition inaugurated by Wittgenstein is dead. So what has remained?
   Both Analytic as well as Continental philosophers have since attempted to reassess their origins and 
understand their respective roots, some of  which before the “parting of  the ways” turn out to be 
identical. This is not especially astonishing but noteworthy nevertheless, especially for Analytic 
philosophy, which has traditionally been indifferent to history. Here one can mention the Anglo-Saxon 
philosophers of  the Enlightenment (Locke, Hume, etc.) and, on the Continent, the towering figure of  
Kant. A look at more recent common origins has, furthermore, unearthed thinkers at the end of  the 
19th century, such as Frege and Brentano, who have shaped the scene upon which Analytic philosophy 
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took a stand in the 20th century. This period now brings us into the vicinity of  Husserl. The latter 
stands squarely in the midst of  discussions and topics, which were discussed by Frege, Lotze, and the 
Brentano School, the latter essentially comprised of  philosophers in Austria. In many respects, Husserl 
synthesized some of  their key issues and paved the way for new developments. Here one could 
mention Husserl’s famous rebuttal of  psychologism, his anti-metaphysical stance opposed to traditional 
speculative theories (the call “to the things themselves” was mainly a battle cry calling philosophers 
away from transcendental-subjective questions), and finally his sketch of  a science of  subjectivity 
informed by the Brentanian (Scholastic) paradigm of  intentionality. In many ways, Husserl stood at the 
end point of  developments at the end of  the 19th century and at the helm of  new ideas that were to 
become dominant at the beginning of  the 20th. This peculiar stance is what made it possible for him to 
be recognized as the “father” of  a new philosophical school. This position has been recognized all 
along by historians of  European philosophy of  the 20th century and has been newly discovered by 
philosophers writing the history of  Analytic philosophy (e.g., Dummett). It is as if, as both tendencies 
retraced their steps in order to understand their respective roots, they arrived at common figures, one 
of  them being — Husserl! To occupy this seminal role cannot be said of  other philosophers who might 
seem more known or “important,” such as Heidegger or Wittgenstein, since they not so much 
inaugurated novel schools, but instead synthesized existing tendencies into original philosophical 
approaches or methods. Heidegger and Wittgenstein were, of  course, highly influential, but they had no 
following like Husserl did. It is, I think, in this “inaugural” stance that Husserl stands out, next to 
Hume, Kant, and Brentano, in modern philosophy.
   Now, what are the philosophical issues themselves that render Husserl so foundational for modern 
philosophy and where Husserlian phenomenology can play a significant role in contemporary thought? 
Let us first consider Husserl’s vision of  phenomenology as a foundational discipline itself.
Philosophy and Science I: Phenomenology as Foundational Discipline or “First Philosophy”
One problem in the reception of  Husserl’s thought has been to take Husserl at face value in the way in 
which he himself  conceived of  phenomenology as foundational discipline or “first philosophy.” Of  
course this is only natural in applying the principle of  charity to an author at first read. The problem is 
the position in which, Husserl thought, phenomenology should stand vis-à-vis other (scientific) 
disciplines. In most of  his publications, which are introductions and only touch the surface of  his 
thought, Husserl insists on the fact that phenomenology is “first philosophy” and is “foundational” for 
all knowledge. Indeed, it is Husserl himself  who probably took the neo-Kantians more seriously than 
they themselves did in posing the problem of  “ultimate foundationalism” (Letztbegründung) and 
insisting that phenomenology be that very foundational discipline upon which all cognition could be 
grounded. Presenting phenomenology in this manner is, from Husserl’s standpoint, understandable—
and yet regrettable. Hardly any philosopher or scientist would go along with this proposal nowadays, 
and yet this is where Husserl is most adamant about promoting the achievements of  his 
phenomenology. (2) So let us be uncharitable for a moment and consider another sense of  
“foundationalism,” which is to be found in Husserl as well, though somewhat hidden.
   Indeed, the sense in which phenomenology can be “foundational” in a plausible manner is much less 
emphatic. In many respects, Husserlian phenomenology lends itself  as a philosophy of  science and 
provides a plethora of  conceptual tools for the internal workings of  positive sciences, mainly natural 
sciences. This type of  foundationalism has also been ridiculed — in the context of  a critique of  the 
neo-Kantian paradigm — in the phrase of  philosophy being demoted to the “handmaiden of  the 
sciences.” This critique, issued by Scheler and Heidegger (and since repeated like a mantra), goes 
against the neo-Kantian interpretation of  transcendental philosophy and targets Husserl as well. In this 
light, there is a clear alliance between the neo-Kantians and Husserl, but the critique is most unfair and 
incorrect. What is at stake is not an ultimate foundation of  knowledge in some remote, abstract Ego, 
but a sense in which philosophy can be an ally and partner in scientific progress. It is never about 
“reducing” philosophy to the role of  the handmaiden. Instead, it is one purpose of  philosophy to 
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scrutinize and police the sciences for their activities; be it on the level of  their conceptual work, 
drawing the correct inferences and conclusions from their findings; or be it on the meta-level, where 
scientists’ work is assessed as to its efficacy and moral permissibility. Nobody, especially not Husserl, 
would have said that this is the only or even main purpose of  philosophy; but it is one task of  
philosophy next to others, and no unimportant one at that. It also conveys a sense of  cooperation, 
solidarity and collaboration standing behind this ideal. Philosophy and science are not and should not 
be opposites, having no relation to one another — as, e.g., Heidegger and many philosophers in his 
following have claimed, without ever providing good reasons, as far as I can tell. Instead, philosophy 
needs to remain informed about the sciences’ progress and current level of  research in order to have 
any meaningful and relevant role in contemporary debates. This is more important today than ever, if  
one thinks of  debates, e.g., about the moral status of  stem cell research and other “hot button topics” 
in the sciences that pervade politics. And the sciences need to be checked, scrutinized and criticized by 
the “experts for generalities,” which the philosophers are by definition since Western philosophy’s 
inception. Husserl is committed to this type of  collaboration with the “applied” sciences. 
Phenomenology’s specific focus of  foundationalist reflection is, to be sure, on the conceptual work, but 
more specifically on intuition and evidence as prime “methods” of  scientific progress. Phenomenology 
can help scrutinize scientific insights and evidences as to their veracity, intuitability and intersubjective 
plausibility. And, it provides the ontological groundwork that supports and informs specific “regional 
ontologies” in addressing their conceptual issues, such as concept-formation and grounding 
foundational concepts (Grundbegriffe). Lastly, if  one recalls Husserl’s analyses in the Crisis, genetic 
phenomenology gives an account of  how science arises out of  the pre-scientific life-world; moreover 
— given this history — it clarifies how ordinary (pre-scientific) agents and researchers belong together 
and even need each other in a democratic discourse that respects human nature and retains a sense of  
origin and destiny that is rationally “authenticatable” (ausweisbar). This is the connection between 
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and the notorious topic of  the life-world.
Philosophy and Science II: Phenomenology and Cognitive Science
   A scientific field that has amassed fascinating results over the last decade and has, consequently, 
attracted lots of  attention lately is cognitive science. While this discipline has arisen out of  a positive 
science — neuroscience — it has become clear that this new and exciting field poses many challenges 
for traditional philosophy, that attempts to explain the workings of  the mind. Several crucial questions 
arise out of  this approach: Is the mind reducible to the brain and its neural structure? Is, hence, 
freedom an illusion? What do these new findings mean for a “science of  the subject” Can we as 
philosophers seriously continue with the ideal of  transcendental philosophy with the claim to a priori 
findings? Or will our thoughts on these matters forever be reduced to contingent claims about the 
human brain at a certain state of  the evolutionary process? In short, what kinds of  challenges does 
cognitive science pose for what has traditionally been called “psychology”? It is here that 
phenomenology, by definition a science of  subjective lived-experience, has the potential to be of  vital 
importance and can potentially be a partner in this ongoing research. This is witnessed by a whole new 
field of  research that has vowed to “naturalize phenomenology” and has recently founded a journal 
dedicated to “Phenomenology and Cognitive Science.” 
   I do not want to comment on the prospect of  “naturalizing” phenomenology, but I do think that it is 
in this scientific discipline that phenomenology must invest and watch closely what new findings are 
brought to bear on matters of  the mind. It seems to me that it is here, more than in any other scientific 
discipline, that phenomenology’s results, methods and insights can be of  methodological help for the 
science itself  on the one hand, and where phenomenological themes and topics culled from reflection 
and introspection can be cashed out in scientific results, on the other. One must not forget that Husserl 
studied closely the experimental psychology of  his day (through his teachers Wundt and others), and 
that many of  his theorems are direct consequences of  these experimental scientists. It is especially in 
Husserl’s early phenomenology, where he deals with topics such as perception, attention, where his 
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analyses are oftentimes undistinguishable from scientific discussions. It is here that Husserl’s eye for 
detail and his keen insight into the workings of  the mind — be it construed physically as brain or 
subjectivity on an eidetic level — are exemplary cases of  “scientific” analysis. If  there is one prime 
discipline that can aid the development of  cognitive science and prevent it from falling into the pitfalls 
of  reductionism, it is Husserl’s phenomenology. It remains to be seen how cognitive science will 
develop. Yet there is no doubt that the systematic progress it can achieve, both methodologically and in 
terms of  factual results, and the extent to which it will be able to communicate with traditional 
philosophy will be at least in part owed to phenomenology.
Philosophy of  Mind: Towards a Science of  the 1st Person Perspective
   It was Thomas Nagel’s influential The View from Nowhere that proposed a novel philosophical or, for 
that matter, scientific discipline, which should stand in opposition to the paradigm of  modern science. 
This was not the first attempt at such a discipline; however, it was an original approach that surprised, 
especially coming from the tradition in which Nagel stood, namely Analytic philosophy. Modern 
science, he argued, stood under the assumption, or the ideal, of  a truly objective science, a science, in 
other words, that increasingly eliminate the subjective, human standpoint in order to strive towards a 
“view from nowhere.” While there is nothing intrinsically wrong with such an approach, it leaves 
something missing. Hence, opposed to this ideal he proposed a science of  the first person perspective. 
Only in this manner of  consideration will one be able to ascertain “what it is like” to be a subject with a 
certain viewpoint on the world. This “novel” science of  the subjective was greeted by 
phenomenologists and in general Continental philosophers almost with a sigh of  relief, in the sense 
that traditional Analytic philosophy was finally making steps into the right direction. Indeed, such a 
science is, especially to Husserl scholars, nothing novel at all. It was precisely what Husserl had in mind 
all along: Husserlian phenomenology is a rigorous (eidetic) science of  the first person perspective; it is 
decidedly a discipline that takes its starting point from this first person perspective and, while it strives 
for general results, never abandons this perspective.
   It is in this sense that there has been a mutual approach between phenomenology and Analytic 
Philosophy of  Mind. Indeed, the parallels and common themes are astonishing: be they intentionality, 
perception, or self-awareness, (3) topics, which were part of  the traditional canon of  Analytic 
Philosophy of  Mind, but that had been dealt with by Husserl and his school at all times, if  perhaps 
under different terms and methodological assumptions. As the editors of  a recent volume on 
Phenomenology and Philosophy of  Mind assert, one can demonstrate “how work in phenomenology 
may lead to significant progress on problems central to current analytic research, and how analytical 
philosophy of  mind may shed light on phenomenological concerns. … [T]hese different approaches to 
the mind should not stand in opposition to each other, but are mutually illuminating.” (4) It is, once 
more, this sense of  collaboration which captures the true spirit of  phenomenological philosophizing in 
the Husserlian heritage. Contrary to Husserl’s view, transcendental phenomenology ought not to have a 
primacy or play a foundational role in a quasi-Cartesian schema; instead, phenomenology (Husserlian 
or otherwise) and other methods are called upon to work together on the perpetual issues of  the mind 
and enter the “rich bathos” of  problems that can be accessed from different perspectives and with 
different methods. Phenomenology can offer, with confidence of  its abilities and knowledge of  its 
limits, one more voice in a field, which is devoted to what Husserl himself  called the “enigma of  all 
enigmas,” the mind and its manifold content. What is nowadays called “Philosophy of  Mind” in the 
Analytic tradition is a continuation of  transcendental philosophy in the Kantian tradition, before some 
Continental philosophers decided to “overcome” the latter. If  phenomenology in its original sense of  
“method of  the mind” manages to reassert and reinsert itself  into these discussions — which it is 
destined to do if  it adheres to the spirit of  its founding father — and if  contemporary Analytic 
philosophy continues to open itself  to other traditions and other discourses, the way is paved for a 
most fruitful discussion and collaboration between philosophy of  mind and the Husserlian tradition in 
the decades to come.
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The Complete Husserl: Challenges for Scholarship in the Next Decades
   Last not least, one should point to the unpublished and only recently published texts of  Husserl, 
which pose a tremendous challenge for future scholars. It has been a tired trope in phenomenological 
circles to assert that since the important Husserliana volumes which appeared in the 50s and 60s — 
tomes that did indeed change scholars’ view significantly — nothing fundamentally new has emerged 
from the unpublished material. Nothing could be further from the truth. While it is true that some of  
the texts that appeared in the last two decades “merely” filled in anticipated gaps in rather detailed 
aspects of  Husserl’s work, there have appeared new volumes and texts in the past decade that open up 
whole new horizons and spheres of  phenomenology in the Husserlian style. While some long-lived 
prejudices about Husserl can easily be shunned at this point—Husserl the cognitivist, the detached 
theoretician — there are others that can be at least relativized and put in perspective; and, there arise 
some new images and faces of  Husserlian philosophy, which have not been seen at all. Let me, in 
conclusion, mention some topics where I believe scholars are bound to find a great deal of  novel 
inspiration for the future of  phenomenology:
   Ethics: Husserl’s ethics has been nearly ignored in scholarship. Just recently Husserl’s ethics lectures 
of  the 1920s have appeared (Hua. 37). These later reflections on ethics are significantly different from 
those of  the pre-war years (Hua. 28). These later thoughts stand in conjunction with questions 
concerning the state of  culture and society in the interim period between both World Wars. While some 
of  these reflections are known through Husserl’s articles written for the Japanese journal “The Kaizo” 
(published in Hua. 27), these lectures are yet much more detailed and also let us see how Husserl 
interpreted and criticized other ethical theories in the history of  Western thought. Given that common 
opinion has it that phenomenology, as a purely “descriptive” discipline, has no relation to, or bearing 
on, moral issues possibly involving normativity, it is to be seen how Husserl imagined phenomenology 
contributing to moral philosophy. The entirety of  Husserl’s thoughts on ethics needs to be assessed and 
has been studied in detail by only few scholars.
   The Nature of  the Mental: The first shape of  a full-fledged phenomenology that Husserl envisioned 
was a full account of  consciousness on all of  its cognitive, volitional, affective etc. levels. Only a 
fraction of  these analyses have appeared thus far. Husserl’s studies on perception, attention, passivity, 
mood (Gemüt) and willing still await publication and will provide us with a phenomenological account 
of  consciousness as a whole in a breadth that has not nearly been achieved by other phenomenologists. 
Not only do they fill in many details on the nature of  the mental in the Husserlian perspective; they will 
also yield many insights in areas where other philosophers of  mind and cognitive scientists are currently 
working.
   Transcendental Phenomenology and Idealism: It is still an open question in which sense exactly one 
can speak of  Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology as transcendental idealism and how one has to 
construe this type of  idealism vis-à-vis that of  Descartes, Kant and other idealists (Fichte, Hegel). 
What kind of  subject are we talking about that “constitutes” the world? Is it just a mental phenomenon 
or is it part of  this subject to be necessarily embodied? And in what sense is the positing of  a 
transcendental subject that is not part of  the world a possibility (conceivability) or a factual necessity? It 
is these questions that Husserl ponders in his “proofs” for transcendental idealism in recently published 
texts in Hua. 20/1 and Hua. 36. Anybody interested in the specifically phenomenological sense of  
transcendental idealism and its similarities and differences to those of  Kant and German Idealism will 
find a wide array of  interesting texts dealing with these issues. As the question of  philosophy as 
transcendental idealism is still an ongoing topic of  discussion, e.g., in Kant scholarship, one can find 
fascinating convergences and overlaps concerning this “metaphysical” topic. And, the relation between 
“critical” and “phenomenological” philosophy is still a topic of  interest for scholars on both sides of  
the spectrum.
   The Character of  the Life-World: Though Husserl has provided a sketch of  an “ontology of  the life-
world” in the Crisis and other texts of  his late philosophy, there has been much speculation of  how this 
life-world phenomenology would actually be carried out in detail. Indeed, many of  the texts that 
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Husserl wrote on the issue of  the life-world have thus far not been published and will be published 
shortly. These detailed texts, rather large in quantity, will fill in what is arguably one of  the most famous 
aspects and themes of  Husserl’s late thought.
   Teleology and Theology: Phenomenology at the Limits. It is another trope that Husserl was so caught 
up in his own parameters and paradigms that he never questioned the very foundations and limits of  
his thought. This, too, is an unfortunate mistake, but again an understandable one, judging from the 
writings published during Husserl’s lifetime. Indeed, already as of  the first decade of  the 20th century, 
Husserl penned manuscripts that he himself  considered “metaphysical” or “unphenomenological” in 
the common understanding of  the word. These texts were later collected in a section of  his Nachlass, 
entitled “Teleology, Theology and Phenomenological Metaphysics.” In these texts Husserl ponders 
questions at the limits of  his phenomenology, probing these very limits. Here we see Husserl engaged 
in the kind of  speculation that is known from, e.g., mysticism, neo-Platonism or German Idealism — 
no doubt with the intention of  shoring up the impression that he only considered the “dry” issues in 
the context of  his other analyses concerning intentional consciousness. Many of  the issues that are 
being discussed, e.g., today in French phenomenology, as to the question and status of  givenness itself  
and questions regarding other (spiritual) accesses to transcendental life, find their “Husserlian 
equivalent” here. Speculation was not introduced to phenomenology by, e.g., Fink, but already much 
earlier by Husserl himself. These texts, also still mostly unpublished, will show Husserl working beyond 
the limits of  what he himself, as he once says to Cairns, found acceptable for public consumption.
Notes
(1) In this context, Landgrebe’s famous article on “Husserl’s Departure from Cartesianism” is an 
interesting piece, as an article that attempts to show how Husserl, just like Heidegger, said farewell to 
Cartesianism in his late phenomenology in the Crisis manuscript. This was an almost desperate attempt 
to relocate Husserl in the philosophical landscape after World War II and is to this day an important 
piece concerning the history of  the effect of  Husserl’s philosophy. It also did a lot of  damage to the 
image of  Husserl’s phenomenology, which remains to this day. For, Husserl was not a Cartesian in the 
way that Landgrebe portrayed him, nor did Husserl overcome his own paradigms in his late phase. That 
Husserl would move close to Heidegger in this last phase is a fatal misunderstanding.
(2) I leave aside highly interesting attempts at transcendental philosophies or theories of  science, which 
have used Husserl’s model of  foundationalism for their efforts. One philosopher-scientist who has 
attempted this was Hermann Weyl, and there was a significant amount of  attention paid to these 
attempts in the early 20th century on the part of  contemporary philosophers of  science. Here I would 
like to mention the work of  Michael Friedman and Thomas Ryckman.
(3) On the relation between Phenomenology and Philosophy of  Mind, cf. the new volume, ed. by D. W. 
Smith and A. L. Thomasson (Clarendon: Oxford, 2005).
(4) Ibid., quoted from the back cover.
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The Living Future of  Phenomenology
Nicola Zippel
The future of  phenomenology is inscribed within phenomenology itself. Indeed, phenomenology is a 
philosophy of  time, because it moves within a temporal shape. 
    The continual development of  Husserl’s reflections on the meaning of  phenomenology involves an 
ontological and theoretical growth of  thickness of  phenomenological consciousness, which correlates 
with the concept of  time. The study of  the phenomenological subjectivity, that becomes increasingly 
more accurate, deep and critical, shows not only that the subject as consciousness is temporal by 
essence, but also that this temporality transcends the subject in a transcendental meaning, to be precise, 
in a constituent meaning. Because it gives itself  originally as temporal, consciousness becomes part of  a 
genetic process. The relationship between subject and time seems to assume the form of  an original 
asymmetry: Time founds in original and permanent way the subject, namely, it constitutes the subject 
because it confers sense to the consciousness-being of  the subject. It must be considered what is meant 
for the subject as consciousness to obtain sense from its own temporal-being, in accordance with the 
authentic meaning that Husserl gives to the concept of  transcendental. 
    In the whole process of  its self-reflection, of  its Selbstbesinnung , the Ego remains ever included in the 
permanent – and transcendental – shape of  temporality. As Husserl explains in an important passage 
of  Cartesian Meditations, this process develops in “levels, all of  which fit the universal persisting form, 
temporality, because the latter itself  is built up in a continual, passive and completely universal genesis, 
which, as a matter of  essential necessity, embraces everything new” (Hua I, tr. by D. Cairns, 1960, p. 80, 
first emphasis mine). Through the way of  the phenomenological reduction, the subject reaches the 
heart (Kern) of  its being, i.e. its existence by the form of  a temporal being, from whom, with an 
historical-genetic route, it develops itself  through the concrete forms of  intentionality and constitutes 
itself  as Monade-Ich with its objective-wordly system. In the 1920s, i.e. at the beginning of  the genetic 
turn of  his thought, Husserl writes about the transcendentality of  time and its connection with the life 
of  subject: “Ich, das transzendentale Ich, lebe ein transzendentales Leben, das sich in kontinuierlicher 
transzendentaler Erfharung in einer eigenen transzendentalen Zeitform  darstellt» (Hua VIII, 1959, p. 
86, emphasis mine).
    Husserl calls the urtümlicher Kern by the name of  lebendige Gegenwart, whose originality is such, only if  it 
is possible to consider the living present as the structure of  consciousness-stream, and, for this reason, 
as anterior to the Ego’s intentionality itself, as its condition. Nevertheless, I do not intend to say that 
there is in Husserlian philosophy any dimension without the Ego; and yet, if  there is a temporal 
permanent form for which the Ego has to be suitable, regarding its self-constitution as original 
temporality, it is possible to see an asymmetry between time and subject; this asymmetry does not mean 
the disappearance of  Ego, but makes it difficult to understand in which sense the subject is still 
original. The Ego, in the original movement of  self-constitution as lebendige Gegenwart, assumes the 
temporal form and in it, only in it and by it, achieves its own irreducible transcendental unity. So, the 
intentionality of  the subject derives from the original gesture of  Selbst-Zeitigung , which is an Ur-Faktum 
that precedes any constitutions and, for this reason, is the Ur-Quelle for each sense and meaning. 
    The enigma of  lebendige Gegenwart, as  Klaus Held correctly called it (see Held, 1966, pp. 94-122), has 
its origin in the ambiguous relationship that develops between time and subject within the 
phenomenological horizon; an enigmatic situation, where, nevertheless, it seems clear that the subject, 
when revealing itself  originally as temporal, becomes part of  a genetic process, that is dominated by a 
diachrony; the subject is not able to determine this diachrony,  but, on the contrary, it has to be suitable 
for it. The consequences of  this diachronic asymmetry could be serious for phenomenology, because 
they concern its theoretical and methodological premise, that has an eidetic perspective, which is the 
origin of  the subjective apriori. The premise of  phenomenology is the un-historical ideality of  
constituent sense; nevertheless, the subject is temporal by essence and, in its original development, it 
moves within temporality. This temporality transcends the subject in a transcendental meaning, to be 
precise, in a constituent meaning. The temporal being of  the subject means its innate historicity 
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(Geschichtlichkeit), which contradicts the essentialist request of  phenomenology. Instead of  the irreell 
motionless eidos, subjectivity seems to move ab initio within the strömend-werdend shape of  time and 
history, that are an apriori that the reduction reveals, but does not determine.  
    Time, as the original form of  passive genesis, is the transcendental history where subjectivity always, 
immer schon, finds itself. As a transcendental history, time is the ultimate genesis; nothing else lies beyond 
this dimension. Within time, every reality constitutes itself  and finds its sense, because first of  all the 
subject, chief  reality, constitutes itself  and derives its sense of  being within the temporal historical-
genetic shape. What does it mean that time is anterior to subjectivity? Does it bring into question the 
intentionality of  the Ego? The subject’s passivity, namely its being suitable to a genetic process, means 
first of  all that you have to recognize the existence of  a non-intentional shape, or, as Husserl says, a 
nicht-ichlich, Ich-fremde shape. Does this outcome represent the subject’s overcoming along with its eidos 
itself ? It seems a paradox, an insuperable aporia. Or, on the contrary, could the phenomenological 
method, just as a method, in the strict sense of  meta+hodos, of  “through the way”, allow to cross this 
blind alley? I believe the answer belongs to this paradoxical essence of  consciousness, i.e. to its 
temporal being.
   Under the way of  the reduction, temporality constitutes the transcendental ground on which the 
subject’s life moves and this time resists the act’s reductive power. Once the reduction revealed (in the 
sense of  a-letheia) the inner structure of  subjectivity, then time allowed the Ego to keep a lively memory 
of  what is revealed. The will of  the subject cannot intervene in time’s ultimate articulations, rather, it 
has to suit them; nevertheless, by the help of  these articulations it can take possession of  what always 
belongs to the subject itself. This appropriation occurs within an infinite and constant retention. 
According to this point of  view, reducing means remembering, in the peculiar sense of  German word 
Er-innern, i.e. an interiorizing movement (see Derrida, 1984, tr. by A. Bass, pp. 207-271). The flowing 
life of  the Ego exists by the original shape of  living present; this life goes before the awareness that the 
subject has about it once the reduction is carried out. In this sense, the Lebensstrom is vor-ichlich. And 
nevertheless, in an other sense, the I, as it returns on itself, through a methodological and 
transcendental self-reflection, gives a specific sense to the being of  the original flow, and, in this way, 
the subject carries out the inmost and fundamental Sinngebung. As Husserl writes: „Das Leben geht 
immer vorher des auslegende Methode, und die Methode ist selbst Leben usw. Aber die denkende 
Auslegung stellt dies erst fest, dass es so ist, das ist ihr Ergebnis, und so geht sie dem Sein im Sinn der 
Wahrheit voraus“ (Hua XXXIV, 2002, p. 175, emphasis mine). That is the originality of  the Ego. The 
asymmetry and diachrony of  time and subject mean therefore a relationship which is based on an 
original alterity; the same structure of  the Ego is relational, because of  the feature of  essence, in 
accordance with which the I is fundamentally consciousness-of, Bewusst-von, namely it is articulated by 
the intentional manners of  relationship. This structure emerges in awareness only on the level of  the 
phenomenological attitude and reveals the Ur-Form of  the subject’s life: the relationship between 
temporality and consciousness. Because of  the subjective root of  this relationship, its two poles are 
determined in their actual reality only a subiecti, through that Sinngebung, which allows the possibility to 
recognize the relation itself. The phase displacement between time and subject is therefore functional 
to the phenomenological method, which works in the wake of  this original alterity.  
    Uncovering the relational being of  subjectivity allows to understand its relationship with the world. 
Indeed, through the reduction to its authentic being, the I sheds light on its own original articulation 
and, from that, it returns to the world, which is grasped in its essential correlation to the subject. Only 
phenomenology, through the method of  reduction, sees the inner connection between world and 
subject and grasps its hearth in the temporal structures of  the consciousness field, whose study 
becomes necessary as the true way (hodos) to the genuine understanding of  reality.  The concept of  
“constitution” that refers to the activity of  the subject’s intentional-temporal Sinngebung, is the link on 
which the relationship I-world takes roots. The phenomenological descriptions, which retrace  the 
Ego’s structures to the original sphere (Kernsphäre) of  living present, culminates in the recognition of  
the correlation between subjectivity and world; this correlation is based on the unique apodictic premise 
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of  phenomenology: the thinkable-being of  the world – in accordance with the consciousness 
structures. This premise is what presses the philosopher to go all over the ways of  self-reflecting 
method and it proves its validity by the discovery of  constitutive subject’s relational-being, i.e. 
intentionality, which means the Ego’s theoretical opening to the alterity of  transcendence. At this point, 
the subjective structures become the filter through which it is possible to read the sense of  the world. 
So, the concept of  time, though it corrodes the proposition of  supremacy of  the subject, develops the 
authentic possibility of  phenomenology, because temporality is finally the origin and the structure of  
subject, which is the being that makes the transcendental - phenomenological turning as its theoretical 
and ontological fulcrum.
    Hence, the future of  phenomenology is inscribed within the phenomenology itself, since the subject 
is structured so as to develop the phenomenological method and, once the reduction is started, the 
subject cannot have forgotten what appeared to its look, namely its origin, which is at the same time an 
infinite history. As a method, phenomenology means going back up the various ways of  this history, 
through a continual reflection, a constant return on itself, which assumes the form of  specific 
anamnesis in order to try to cure the Krisis of  our being-in-the-world. The phenomenological attitude 
seems to be moved by a philosophical nostalgia, which presses to undertake a recherche du temps 
perdu. But this nostalgia does not become poetry, rather it aims to gain the features of  a rigorous 
science, which has the endless consciousness field as object and, in a fertile paradox, as also subject of  
research. Studying the inner life of  subject, its living present, entails a philosophy in touch with a living 
present that shows the topicality of  phenomenology as a method of  research, also with regard to the 
new sciences which study the questions of  mind, consciousness and brain (see, e.g., Marbach, 1993). 
   Husserl taught us that understanding the subject means understand its temporal being and 
understanding its temporal being helps to understand its being-in-the-world. 
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Husserl’s Total Theory of  Intentionality: An Outline
Jitendranath N. Mohanty 
 
  Now that most of  Husserl’s writings are accessible in print, it is incumbent on us Husserl scholars to 
take a complete look at his thinking about intentionality. This is even more needed because most 
writers on Husserl, including this author, have restricted themselves to some phase or phases of  his 
thinking about intentionality. It is only after we have gained a total picture of  the theory that we can 
evaluate it. It is this writer’s conviction that the theory, in its principal components, is pretty well 
sustainable, and defensible against his critics.
The Formal Theory of  Intentional Acts
   In this part of  the theory, the acts, per definition, are considered as satisfying the Brentano thesis, and 
the sentences containing the main verb, which stand for such acts, as satisfying the Chisholm criteria. 
Such analytic philosophers as Chisholm, who accept the Brentano thesis, make one major mistake, and 
we must here warn against it: they misread the Brentano thesis as giving a way of  distinguishing the 
mental from the physical (including the bodily). It is worth emphasizing that Brentano’s “physical 
phenomena” are neither bodily states, nor material objects nor events of  nature. Brentano’s own 
examples are colors, sounds, warmth, etc., also landscapes, which in his view, exist only phenomenally 
and intentionally. They are primary objects or intentional contents of  mental acts. This was certainly his 
view in the Psychologie, but later on, he seems to have interpreted his position differently by considering 
his intentional objects as being “things” in the ordinary sense. An interpretation that is more plausible 
is of  Aristotelian heritage: what is an immanent content, and so “inexists” in the mind, is only the 
“form” (of  the horse I am thinking of) and not its matter. This, however, is not the place to discuss the 
question how best to interpret Brentano. With this in mind, let us turn to Husserl.
   Husserl discovered intentionality via Brentano and Twardowski after distinguishing between 
representations in which the object is not intuited, and an intuitive presentation of  the same object. 
This distinction brings out a Spannung between the given and the not given, a “striving” towards a 
transcendent object, accompanied by a feeling of  “lack.” In knowledge, there is a resolution of  this 
tension. Husserl’s thinking about intentionality begins with a perception of  this complex phenomenon, 
and at the end of  his life he returns to it in the lectures on “Passive Synthesis.” Thus, the theory begins 
with a psychology of  cognition, then — after the rejection of  psychologism — moves to a theory of  
meaning (Investigations I & II), which is taken up into a phenomenology of  knowledge (Investigation VI), With 
the discovery of  the “epoché” (1905), the same intentionality (Ideas I) becomes constitutive of  the object 
that is intended, and eventually of  the “world.” This complex theory may be articulated in the following 
propositions, in that order:
P1: An intentional act refers to its object through an ideal content.
P2: As meaning-intending, it constitutes an ideal meaning. 
P3: The meaning-intention is fulfilled when the object intended is itself  presented
precisely as it was intended, and therewith known.
P4: With the bracketing of  the object intended, the intentional act is discovered to have a structure of  
correlation between noesis and noema, the former being a real, temporally individuated act, the latter an 
ideal, non-temporal meaning.
P5: “Noema” is the product of  the noesis giving meaning to sensory stuff  or hyletic data.
P6: Identity of  an object is constituted by overlapping noemata which enter into a synthesis of  
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“coincidence” (Deckung).
P7: “Existence,” “non-existence,” “possibility,” “fictional,” etc., are properties of  the noema, which 
correspond to the appropriate thetic qualities of  acts.
P8: The thing itself, or true being, is the correlate of  the idea of  perfect and final fulfillment. “Being” 
and “Truth” coincide.” 
P9: Intentionality is a temporal process of  striving after truth but exhibits at its core a logical structure, 
as described in P1- P7.
Intentionality and Time
  This core theory must now be inserted into a phenomenology of  time and, without disturbing the 
central structure, allowed to undergo necessary expansion and modification. The elements which are 
most susceptible to “temporalization” are: the ego (so long not mentioned above), the hylé and the act. 
The temporality we are talking about is obviously not the objective time in which transcendent things 
and processes of  the world take place but the immanent, phenomenological time of  immanent acts and 
contents, this latter time having been disclosed by an appropriate epoché. It is in this immanent time that 
we shall find, through reflection, the genesis of  the hyletic data, the acts, and the ego — in fine, of  active 
intentionality. Let us recall the thesis, advanced in the 1905 lectures on time-consciousness, that the 
immanent flow of  consciousness is constituted by the retentions and protentions, and by the double 
intentionality, the so-called longitudinal and transversal intentionalities. 
   Now we can formulate the following structures, which Husserl gradually came to discover in the 
Bernau and the C-manuscripts:
P10: In the “original” process of  time-consciousness, every presentation as a now is a fulfillment of  an 
expectation-intention. 
P11: There is a continuous distancing from the source point of  the now as a new now emerges — one 
is the primary retention, the other is a presentification of  it as a presenting of  the past.
P12: Protention is a tendency, a passive expectation. Retention also has its protentional element. 
Retention and Protention — penetrate each other.
P13: There is no absolute beginning, no Ur-datum which is not a fulfillment of  a prior protention. We 
are always in the middle of  an endless process. Any arbitrary point can be treated as a null-point.
P14: In every phase of  it, consciousness is both intention towards something, and also intention away 
from something (which appear as positive and negative tendencies). Intentionality has now to be 
studied in the sphere of  passivity prior to the emergence of  the active ego with its acts.
P15: To the passive sphere belong the intentional associations, tendencies, drives, and affections of  
feelings.
P16: Originally ego-less within the “living present,” the I first appears as the“functioning” I, not yet as 
the subject-pole; then as a “place” where the original stream and constitution of  the world takes place; 
and finally an entity constituted in reflection. Sartre is partially vindicated.




P18: Empathy, as an intentional act, presents (to the empathizing ego) a new kind of  transcendence, the 
other (the empathized) ego.
This transcendence is very different from the transcendence of  things given in sensory perception. The 
latter are constituted meaning-unities, the former are not, but exist in themselves. The transcendence of  
the other ego is a stronger transcendence. (Note that Levinas does not see this in Husserl.)
P19: My  ego and the other egos do not have any real connection. Their only connection is intentional.
P20: The community of  egos, through its “communalized intentionality,” constitutes one identical 
world as its ideal correlate.
P21: The process by which the child builds up his idea of  the world corresponds to the reflective 
delineation of  the steps of  constitution of  the world. Genetic phenomenology and developmental 
intentional psychology are correlates.
P22: Empathy with the other ego may lead in either direction: either “I take over” his position by 
identifying with him, or I may distance myself  from him.
By the former, a common world, between him and me, is constituted. However, I cannot “take over” the  
practical intentions (desires and willings) of  others. 
P23: The world is the horizon of  possible consistent coincidence with the others.
P24: A community is constituted by personal acts of  “intimation” and “sharing,” through an intuitive 
presentification, in empathy, of  the other egos. Mutual empathy is a presupposition of  successful 
communication, whose basic form is “addressing” the other who understands me as so addressing, 
such that the meaning content of  my communicative intention reaches into the other who understands 
me as so intending. A “we “ in a special sense is being thereby constituted.
P25: Social acts are so constituted that a personal act takes part in the life of  the co-members, actual or 
potential. A “many-headed” subjectivity (of  a social unity) is thereby constituted, which is such that 
even if  there is no continuity between the streams of  consciousness of  the egos, one ego intentionally 
contains the other egos.
P26: A special category of  intentionality of  the ego is the sexual desire, at first indeterminate, then 
having a determinate correlate in the other, reaching its fulfillment in a being-in-one-another of  two 
fulfillments.
P27: The sexual drive leads to “generations” and “cultural traditions,” an important step in the “self-
mundanisation” of  the transcendental ego.
Husserl’s critics need to take this entire theory into consideration, just as his followers have to build on 
it through a process of  internal, phenomenological critique.
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¿Tiene un futuro la lectura de Husserl hoy?
Rosemary R.P. de Lerner 
¿Por qué leer a Edmund Husserl, el iniciador del movimiento fenomenológico, precisamente hoy? 
¿Tiene un futuro el desarrollo de la fenomenología husserliana? Ante el notorio curso de la tradición 
fenomenológica en el siglo XX, que se aleja en múltiples direcciones de la fenomenología trascendental 
de Husserl, queda en muchos la impresión que el “retorno” a Husserl tiene sólo un sentido 
“arqueológico” o, en el mejor de los casos, histórico-crítico, para fines que se hallan más allá de la obra 
del maestro. En este texto me arriesgo a proponer algunos motivos para leer a Husserl hoy, con el 
objeto de tomar conciencia de cómo la obra de este filósofo aparentemente anacrónico –o quizás 
provocadoramente renovador– pone en nuestras manos, a través de un método inédito, posibilidades 
inesperadas en muchos frentes concebibles de la interrogación filosófica. En un inicio, lo más difícil es 
vencer las prevenciones de nuestra época contra un proyecto filosófico de aparente corte “clásico” que, 
a diferencia de otros extraordinarios filósofos, poetas o escritores cuyas obras sí invitan a inspiradas 
travesías intelectuales y literarias, no parece ni a primera vista, ni luego de lidiar algún tiempo con sus 
textos, particularmente amable o atractivo.
Por ello, lo primero que se me ocurre es una miríada de razones que, al parecer, dificultan la lectura de 
Husserl hoy. La obra de Husserl no es particularmente amable a la lectura; pero durante décadas, desde 
antes de su fallecimiento en 1938, los principales textos que la interpretaban o introducían, sea 
globalmente, sea desde ciertos aspectos de la misma, eran aún menos amables con ella. Desde 
aproximaciones parciales, se solía tejer frecuentemente lecturas de conjunto –llenando arbitrariamente 
los aparentes vacíos con elementos extraños a ella, extraídos muchas veces de la tradición, cuando no 
de la imaginación.
Estas críticas –mucho más intensas en las décadas de 1960 y 1970– que ignoran el corpus inédito de la 
obra de Husserl, aunque todas se apoyan en cierto privilegio del lenguaje, provienen de tradiciones muy 
disímiles entre sí, como la filosofía analítica, la teoría crítica social y el deconstruccionismo. Aunque 
apropiándose diversa pero calificadamente de determinados elementos de la fenomenología husserliana, 
a la vez que desembarazándose de su teoría y su método, coinciden en interpretarla crítica e 
integralmente como una filosofía de la “representación” que rescata la tradición racionalista e 
intelectualista del cartesianismo y del neokantismo. Atribuyen el interés husserliano de fundar la 
filosofía fenomenológica como ciencia rigurosa universal, de fundamentos últimos, a un rezago de su 
cientismo enraizado, fruto de su formación matemática. Opinan igualmente que esta formación 
determina sus extrañas concepciones acerca de la intuición intelectual y del carácter eidético o esencial 
que deben exhibir las investigaciones, fundamentalmente descriptivas, de la filosofía. Se ha supuesto, 
así, que hablar de “intuición eidética”, de “esencias” o eide consiste en explicar todo desde una suerte de 
universalidad e idealidad congeladas –more geometrico–, ergo desde una exigencia de exactitud para el saber, 
que no se condice con las condiciones de la vida y de la experiencia humana fáctica, histórica, temporal 
y perfectible. Asimismo, se le reprocha el adoptar el punto de vista del sujeto, o aun el de un idealismo 
subjetivo –especialmente desde que los discursos des-centrados y los múltiples relatos adquieren cierto 
lustre y renombre de pasarela– pues todo lo “egológico” resulta para los críticos sinónimo de 
“solipsista”. A los calificativos atribuidos a su obra, de “subjetivismo-relativista”, “solipsismo”, 
“logocentrismo” y hasta “eurocentrismo”, se ha sumado frecuentemente el reproche de que el ideal 
filosófico de Husserl es, en última instancia, el ideal de un proyecto fundamentalista de corte moderno, 
cuya inviabilidad ya ha sido ampliamente demostrada hoy, tanto por sus discípulos –que consideran 
ellos mismos haberlo superado– como por sus más tradicionales adversarios. Así, habiendo ya caído en 
la habitualidad trivial y en desuso el llamado decimonónico a “la muerte de Dios”, retumba más bien, 
durante la segunda mitad del siglo XX, un nuevo grito de guerra: el llamado perentorio a la “muerte del 
sujeto”.
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Pero hay otros elementos formales que podrían desanimar al lector hispanohablante a habérselas con 
Husserl. Además de múltiples artículos dispersos, de los ocho libros que publicó durante su vida, algo 
disímiles y en apariencia inconexos –meros islotes en un mar o río de pensamiento incesantemente 
renovado durante cuarenta años de investigación–, sólo siete fueron traducidos muy temprano al 
castellano, en versiones que añadieron, a la dureza del alemán de Husserl, la torpeza de un español 
precipitado, acaso plagado de errores –en léxico y en comprensión. Y aunque la obra inédita se viene 
editando y publicando desde 1950 por los Archivos Husserl de Lovaina, Bélgica, en colaboración con 
investigadores de Friburgo y Colonia en Alemania, sólo en los últimos 10 ó 15 años se observan serios 
y muy exitosos proyectos de traducción al castellano de los volúmenes antes inéditos de la Husserliana o 
de fragmentos de ellos, traducciones no solamente muy bien hechas, sino que ponen por primera vez al 
alcance del público hispanohablante elementos antes no suficientemente asequibles en su obra 
originalmente publicada. Éstas todavía no han dado lugar en castellano, como ya ocurre en otras partes 
del mundo, a obras interpretativas de la trama global y sistemática del asombroso pensamiento y 
descubrimientos de Husserl, aunque sí algunos elementos por donde ésta empieza a asomar.
Cabe por ello mirar al futuro con optimismo. Pero no nos refiramos enseguida a por qué leer a Husserl, 
sino primero a cómo leerlo.
Lo primero que hay que tomar en cuenta, entonces, para leer a Husserl, es que la obra que publicó 
durante su vida debe abordarse sobre el trasfondo del material inédito. Es en éste donde se desenvuelve 
y desarrolla, de modo vivo y crítico, el método fenomenológico, la filosofía fenomenológica y el 
conjunto de sus temas y problemas en asombrosa sistematicidad. Esta sistematicidad se va 
constituyendo, sin embargo, en el devenir de los manuscritos. En estos se hallan retomas permanentes 
de lo avanzado, en nuevas estratificaciones donde nuevos temas aparecen enlazados. Este trabajo en 
devenir es el trasfondo de los libros publicados: no está en contradicción con ellos sino que trasunta en ellos si 
uno los lee atentamente y los interpreta desde una perspectiva ajena a los prejuicios modernos, que no 
permiten precisamente ver lo nuevo que ellos aportan. Por ejemplo, si uno toma Investigaciones lógicas de 
1900-1901 (1), Ideas relativas a una fenomenología pura y una filosofía fenomenológica de 1913 (2), y Lógica formal  
y lógica trascendental (3), de 1929, uno observa que, a pesar de las profundas brechas temporales que 
separan a estas tres distintas introducciones a la fenomenología, todas plantean el tema de lo que podría 
llamarse la “razón lógica”. En las tres, luego de establecer el estatuto, por así decir, “ontológico” de las 
objetividades ideales de las matemáticas y de la lógica, Husserl aborda retrospectiva y descriptivamente 
el tema de aquellas experiencias originarias en las que dichas objetividades ideales se constituyen –esto es, 
se dan, aparecen, o son articuladas temporalmente– en su sentido y validez. Pero los dos primeros 
textos, desarrollados desde una perspectiva fenomenológica “estática”, apuntan a una dimensión 
anterior, más explícita en el último texto: una dimensión genética, previa a la experiencia trascendental 
constitutiva del sujeto, a saber, una dimensión de profundidad desde la cual las propias experiencias 
constitutivas del sujeto (la conciencia misma y su temporalidad) emergen –o se constituyen– 
asociativamente. En otras palabras, la constitución de sentido y validez en la vida consciente del sujeto 
no es, de entrada, una capacidad o vivencia disponible desde siempre, lista para ser usada. Más bien, las 
mismas experiencias constitutivas de sentido y validez son constituidas –emergen asociativamente– de la 
vida pre-egológica, pre-consciente, del sujeto. La perspectiva complementaria de los textos inéditos, en 
suma, busca abordar descriptiva y genéticamente esta dimensión pasiva, pre-egológica y pre-objetivante 
de la vida del sujeto, una dimensión en la que la vida fluye inicialmente de modo indiferenciado. De 
modo tal, que el único modo de juzgar globalmente el aporte de Husserl a la historia de la filosofía de 
occidente, será comprendiendo cómo se articulan sus investigaciones estáticas sobre la constitución del 
sentido y validez (por ejemplo, de las ciencias y la cultura) con las investigaciones genéticas que echan 
luz a la dimensión desde la cual tal constitución se vuelve posible.
En cuanto a por qué leerlo, se pueden decir muchas trivialidades al respecto: v.gr. por la inmensa 
influencia que ha tenido sobre prácticamente todos los desarrollos filosóficos del siglo XX, o por la 
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inmensa influencia que ha tenido el método fenomenológico, a nivel mundial, en todas las lenguas, 
aplicado a las más variadas –e inverosímiles– disciplinas: desde las matemáticas a la estética, la 
antropología cultural y la etnología a la arquitectura, desde la inteligencia artificial al Budismo, desde la 
ciencia cognitiva a las disciplinas culturales, desde la danza a la ecología, desde el cine, el teatro y las 
comunicaciones a la hermenéutica, desde la geografía social y del comportamiento a la medicina, desde 
la tecnología a la psiquiatría y la psicología, y así en adelante. Basta una mirada a la Encyclopedia of  
Phenomenology (4) para tener una idea al respecto.
Es cierto también que son ciertas disposiciones personales, innatas o adquiridas, las que lo llevan a uno 
a sentirse motivado por uno u otro filósofo. En mi caso, esa inclinación a releer a Husserl desde 
distintos ángulos y obras –luego de volverse recurrente a lo largo de los años– se convirtió en vocación. 
He aquí un filósofo al que accedí por vez primera hace por lo menos treinta y siete años, y todavía no 
me atrevo a decir que lo conozco a cabalidad, ni siquiera bien. Pero en lugar de desanimarme, en mí 
provoca un entusiasmo y una curiosidad poderosos, e incluso, cuando lo leo, me estimula por el modo 
tan sui generis que en pleno siglo veinte se conecta con temas planteados por toda la filosofía occidental 
desde Platón –con el cual se siente particularmente inspirado. También me motiva porque, al abrir 
nuevas trochas –cual Stanley o Livingston en la “África Negra” decimonónica– nos invita a entrar a un 
terreno muy poco familiar, y una vez en él, a experimentar la verdadera dimensión crítica de la filosofía –
la más auténtica y honesta crítica: la que se vuelca sobre sus propios pasos para desandarlos y 
reanudarlos. (5) Sólo desde esta dimensión es posible entender a este filósofo que hasta el final se 
consideró un “efectivo principiante”. (6) En 1913, por ello, compara su proceder “al de un viajero que 
explora una parte desconocida del mundo, describiendo cuidadosamente lo que se le presenta a lo largo 
de sus caminos no trillados y que no siempre serán los más cortos. (...) Con semejante espíritu –dice 
Husserl– queremos ser en adelante un fiel expositor de los hechos fenomenológicos, conservando por 
lo demás el habitus de una íntima libertad incluso frente a nuestras propias descripciones.” (7) Mirando 
retrospectivamente su obra, escribe Husserl en 1931: “En todo caso, quien durante decenios no 
especula sobre una nueva Atlántida, sino que se ha metido realmente por las selvas sin caminos de un 
nuevo continente y ha hecho los primeros esfuerzos para cultivarlo, no se dejará extraviar por negativa 
alguna de los geógrafos que juzgan de las noticias por sus propios hábitos empíricos y mentales –pero 
que también se ahorran el esfuerzo de hacer un viaje a las nuevas tierras.” (8) 
Pero ¿qué nos ofrece el método fenomenológico, y a qué “tierra prometida” alude y nos invita Husserl 
a visitar? A riesgo de tocar temas poco “populares” en la escolástica husserliana, prefiero abordar el 
centro de la cuestión. Nos ofrece restaurar la idea primitiva de la filosofía, que él entiende como una ciencia 
universal –en el sentido platónico de episteme–, que parte de fundamentos últimos, “o lo que es igual, de 
una responsabilidad última”, como dice en 1931. Se trata, por cierto, de una “idea”, esto es, que sólo es 
realizable en un camino de “tareas infinitas”, infinitamente abierto, “en el estilo de verdades relativas, 
temporales, y a lo largo de un proceso histórico infinito –pero que así es realizable efectivamente”. (9) 
Se trata, pues, fundamentalmente, de una filosofía de los “comienzos”, y del “radicalismo de la 
responsabilidad autónoma”, puesto que el fundamento último, en efecto, no puede ser otro que la vida 
trascendental que anida en todo sujeto, y que no sólo es el presupuesto “de toda teoría”, sino que es la 
fuente de todo sentido y de toda validez concebible, de toda ciencia y de toda cultura, de todo lenguaje y de 
toda cosmovisión, de toda ética y de toda estética. Se trata pues, nada menos que una filosofía que –a 
través de una meditación radical– pretende regresar, con radical seriedad, a las “fecundas honduras de la 
experiencia”, en su riqueza, inmensa variedad y muy compleja estructuración –región de auténticos 
fundamentos últimos detrás de los cuales no cabe buscar otra causa o razón, u otra instancia 
“responsable”. Pero estas “fecundas honduras”, como dice Husserl, comportan también una 
insondabilidad que predetermina el carácter abierto e infinito de su indagación. Refiriéndose libremente 
en la Crisis a la psyché de Heráclito, sostenía Husserl que: “los límites del alma nunca los encontrarás, y 
ello a pesar de que recorras todos sus caminos: tan profundo es su fundamento”. (10) 
21
El método de indagación fenomenológico requería para él de dos presupuestos: primero, que se 
combatiera el naturalismo imperante en las ciencias y la cultura decimonónicas, que pretendieron 
desconocer una dimensión cognoscitiva con derecho propio –el de las objetividades de tipo ideal, a 
priori, como en las ciencias matemáticas y la lógica. Esto significa ir más lejos que los neokantianos, 
quienes reconocen sólo una dimensión de lo ideal, el a priori formal o analítico. Ante el caso de la 
geometría –y otros similares– Husserl sostiene la necesidad de reconocer un ámbito de idealidades 
“materiales”, o de un a priori “material” y sintético. Correspondientemente, el “mundo circundante” con 
el cual tenemos relación, no sólo consta de “hechos” empíricos, individuales, determinados espacio-
temporalmente, sino también de objetividades “ideales” así como de valores, éticos y estéticos, normas, 
y entidades culturales cuyo status trasciende la mera naturaleza física o psíquica. En segundo lugar, pide 
que se reconozca que todo este “mundo circundante”, con su infinita variedad, es precisamente el 
correlato intencional de múltiples y variadas experiencias humanas –actuales y posibles– de donde 
obtiene sus “sentidos” y “valideces”. Y que se reconozca, entre todas las modalidades de experiencias, 
desde las más humildes e intuitivas hasta las más sofisticadas y formales, a la experiencia intuitiva como 
“principio de los principios”, a aquella que “coloca”, por así decir, las objetividades “ante los ojos” –
tanto los físicos como los de la mente. La intuición perceptiva y la intelección constituyen así para 
Husserl una fuente de derecho último, aunque reconocidamente limitada, respecto de toda otra forma 
de experiencia, incluso de las experiencias predicativas, argumentativas y simbólicas. Si esto es así, si el 
mundo circundante y todo cuanto contiene es correlato de experiencias humanas, atravesadas por una 
creencia originaria, básica, universal y tácita, la Ur-doxa de la “tesis general de la actitud natural” –que el 
mundo existe, y está allí para nosotros, independientemente de todo cuanto podamos poner en cuestión 
en él–, entonces se hace imperioso el indagar dicha experiencia correlativa, la vida intencional del sujeto. 
Pero como esta vida intencional, trascendental, en su plena concreción, no es visible desde la actitud  
natural, que tiende a abordar toda relación –incluso la relación cognitiva, etc.– como una relación cósica 
causal, se hace imperioso el “desconectar”, poner entre paréntesis, suspender metodológicamente la  
tesis general de la actitud natural, para examinarla precisamente en su funcionamiento. La epojé, acompañada 
de la reflexión fenomenológica (la reducción trascendental) descubre la vida trascendental, intencional, 
dadora de sentido y validez, del sujeto, que funciona anónimamente en la actitud natural, como su secreto 
motor. Una vez allí, Husserl procede con el primer criterio metodológico: mirando –reflexivamente– y 
fijando –intelectivamente– las estructuras y el funcionamiento típicos de esa vida intencional, de ese a 
priori universal de la correlación en el mundo de la vida.
Lo que descubre de allí en adelante es asombroso. El mismo Gadamer, recordando su paso por las 
aulas de Husserl entre 1921 y 1923, señala que “la intuitividad de la técnica husserliana de descripción 
era verdaderamente asombrosa.” (11) Para resumirlo en unas cuantas palabras, la vida del sujeto, su 
experiencia, tiene como estructura básica la intencionalidad, que, como decíamos, es inmensamente 
variada, y compleja, siempre en correlación con la inmensa variedad de objetos o correlatos de las 
experiencias actuales y posibles. Asimismo, la vida del sujeto entera, y cada experiencia en particular, es 
temporal. Todas las experiencias, desde las más primitivas, aparecen sintéticamente articuladas con las 
demás en la unidad de una conciencia. El método fenomenológico descubre así, en virtud de la 
intencionalidad y la temporalidad de las experiencias, la noción fundamental de horizonte. Por eso dice 
Welton, “Husserl se convierte en el primer filósofo trascendental en confrontar directamente la 
cuestión de los contextos”. (12) Se trata, por otro lado, de experiencias intencionales vividas por sujetos 
concretos, individuales, psico-físicos, esto es, encarnados, experiencias que serían impensables sin sus 
cuerpos orgánicos, en contacto con el mundo físico circundante, con otros seres humanos y animales. 
Es en estas experiencias en donde se da la relación intencional, constitutiva de sentido y validez. 
Debido, entre otras cosas, a esa vinculación con el cuerpo propio, es que Husserl se percata de que 
dichas experiencias son siempre experiencias de un yo, que vive a través de ellas. Son sus experiencias, tanto 
las “activas”, en las que él impera, tomando posición responsablemente desde un punto de vista teórico 
y práctico, cuanto las “pasivas”, en las que vive como afectado a través de ellas. Son suyas dichas 
experiencias, tanto en el sueño como en la vigilia, en la continuidad de una vida temporal desde el 
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nacimiento hasta la muerte. Pero, si bien son suyas, relacionadas con el “mundo circundante” y, en él, 
relacionadas con las experiencias de otros sujetos como él, estas experiencias se descubren inter-
intencionales, mutuamente determinantes, ni externa ni causalmente relacionadas. La vida del sujeto se 
descubre, en dichas experiencias, como una vida inter-subjetiva, compartida, en relaciones mutuas de 
inter-penetración intencional y de co-constitución de sentidos y validez. Es así como se constituyen los 
lenguajes y se fundan las comunidades y tradiciones históricas. Pues surge la idea de un mundo 
circundante intersubjetivo e intersubjetivamente constituido, de personalidades de orden superior, 
donde lo “intersubjetivo” no se restringe al presente, sino que se extiende a las generaciones 
históricamente constituidas, donde el pasado, sedimentado, se reactiva desde presentes siempre 
renovados. De ese modo no sólo se comprende la constitución temporal, histórica, intersubjetiva, de las 
comunidades culturales e históricas relativas, sino la constitución de un mundo común, y a un nivel más 
elevado, la constitución racional, por parte de comunidades científicas, de mundos objetivos, en un 
sentido más fuerte.
Quizás la lectura de Husserl hoy debe tener un futuro, porque nos invita a indagar en las profundidades 
de la vida del sujeto y a descubrir cómo sus experiencias intencionales –incluso las teóricas más 
elevadas– son una forma radical de praxis, de constitución de todo sentido y de toda validez. En ese 
sentido, se puede decir, vale la pena leerlo porque su obra invita a tomar conciencia radical de la 
vocación ética de la humanidad. 
Quizás se mostrará incluso que la actitud fenomenológica total y la epojé que le pertenece 
están llamadas a provocar una completa mutación personal, que cabría comparar, en 
principio, con una conversión religiosa, pero que, por encima de ello, esconde en sí la 
máxima mutación existencial que se encomienda a la humanidad en tanto que humanidad. 
(13) 
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To be a scholar in phenomenology does not mean to be a phenomenologist. To do phenomenology 
does not mean to know thoroughly the precepts of  Husserlian scholarship, but rather to be able to 
apply the phenomenological method to precise analytical fields. This is not to say that scholarship, 
history of  thought, or philological exegesis of  manuscripts are useless; this is merely to say that they are 
quite different things in regard to the actual practice of  phenomenological analysis. The future of  
phenomenology relies on the understanding of  this basic difference.
The Husserlian method requires the purification of  all the unexplored assumptions that underlie and 
support our everyday life. (1) It is the neutralization of  background presuppositions, by applying a 
sophisticated technique of  suspension known as epoché, that allows to access a field of  investigation 
where one should apprehend the “things themselves.” This field of  manifestation is the field of  “pure 
phenomena.” According to Husserl, “to one truly without prejudice it is immaterial whether certainty 
comes to us from Kant or Thomas Aquinas, from Darwin or Aristotle, from Helmholtz or Paracelsus.” 
(2) We have to see with our own eyes and we must not change under the pressure of  preconceptions 
what we plainly see. (3) Here we find, worded in a very precise formulation, the intuitive and descriptive 
nature of  phenomenological method. Nevertheless, while acknowledging Husserl’s thoroughness and 
exactness, there is further room to raise an essential question: is the epoché really able to hit and to put 
out of  circuit all possible presuppositions, completely purifying the field of  investigation from 
prejudices and not yet acquired assumptions? (4) Can we proceed along the path of  phenomenology, 
trusting its method as a well arranged and reliable theoretical tool, or must we begin instead, as 
impenitent sceptics, with an attentive critique of  phenomenology itself ?
These are not new questions, yet they acquire particular meaning for contemporary and future 
phenomenology. The value of  an analytical method, its significance, is located in the ability to transmit 
the method itself  from its founder to other researchers. In this way the method, being employed by 
quite different scholars to carry on new analyses in the field, can be directly verified and proved with 
regard to its function and effectiveness. (5) To test a method, one needs to practice it. This sentence, 
perhaps stating the obvious, may not be the truism it seems. From what other external criteria should 
the query into the phenomenological method be guided? Could phenomenology be submitted to a 
non-phenomenological inquiry? Once again, nothing new: phenomenology, as Husserl used to exhort 
himself, should be submitted to a phenomenological analysis. (6) So, one of  the unavoidable tasks for a 
future phenomenology is to carry out a phenomenology of  phenomenology. How could one approach 
and realize such a paradoxical task? 
Once the epoché is performed and the thesis of  natural attitude has been bracketed, the sphere of  pure 
phenomena offers itself  to the phenomenologist’s eyes. The field of  the originary is open, so the 
analysis and the phenomenological description can finally be developed. Inside the phenomenological 
practice we find intuition, as the so-called “principle of  all principles” teaches us. (7) Intuition is the 
actual core of  phenomenologist’s gaze is. It is the rightly intended intuition, according to Husserlian 
fundamental rules, that would drive us to the exact phenomenological apprehension of  essences. 
In a slightly more technical way, what is phenomenologically originary persists as irreducible after the 
performance of  epoché. Without further reference to anything else, this originary manifests itself  as 
self-givenness (Selbstgegebenheit), as something that a peculiar intuition can grasp as its adequate fulfilling 
(Erfüllung). One of  the questions left open by this theoretic engine is just the phenomenological purity 
of  Anschauungen, of  the intuitions that would hold and corroborate phenomenologist’s work. In other 
words, the rigour and the authenticity of  phenomenological attitude involves a correct singling out of  
24
the horizon of  the so-called originary self-givenness, the Selbstgegebenheiten which are the direct objects 
of  intuition and the sole warranty of  the validity and the consistency of  analysis. To clarify the role of  
intuition would help us decipher the well-known motto “zurück zu den Sachen selbst!” and to finally grasp 
the phenomenological sense of  that movement backwards (zurückgehen) towards the “things 
themselves”. (8) 
Therefore, proceeding phenomenologically into phenomenology itself  primarily implies inquiring into 
the intuitive ground of  Husserl’s method. This is just the task undertaken by Domenico Antonino 
Conci, an Italian phenomenologist whose work is mainly known to a narrow range of  scholars and 
students. Since the seventies, Conci set up a reform of  the classical Husserlian method opening a 
research stream that could be properly named “Radical Phenomenology”. With “Radical 
Phenomenology” one intends a kind of  analysis dealing with phenomenological residues singled out by 
radical epoché: this epoché, unlike the Husserlian one, does not only bracket the natural attitude, but 
also suspends the wider and more complex sphere of  objectivation. This sphere is actually the matrix 
of  some obstacles that turned up to vitiate Husserl’s own research. 
The risk of  aporetic paths inside classical phenomenology has been clearly noticed and then handled by 
other phenomenologists as well. But, it is precisely this “phenomenology of  phenomenological 
method”(9) that managed to display a week point of  the Husserlian analytic, showing how its intuitive 
ground is affected with some presuppositions of  non-phenomenological nature. It has been Conci’s 
endeavour to bring phenomenology to its utmost consequences, radicalizing the epoché and 
suspending what can really be suspended in the field of  presence, without paying hidden tributes to the 
Western philosophical tradition. This is exactly what Husserl did not avoid doing and therefore 
remained imprisoned within what Conci calls “categorial structure” (10). In virtue of  this structure, 
classical phenomenology proceeds to a concealed objectivation of  phenomenological data, identifying 
the origins of  sense with immanent lived-experiences (Erlebnisse) of  a transcendental ego. (11) The 
radical epoché extends the classical Husserlian epoché and thereby suspends what according to Husserl 
was in fact irreducible, i.e., the egological pole, the sphere of  the transcendental I. (12) 
While the distinction between consciousness and the ego has been established by Husserl himself, 
radical phenomenology further suggests that the irreducible residue of  radical epoché is a basic 
impersonal lived-experience. It is a non-ego-centered consciousness that manifest itself  as actual “self-
givenness”, i.e. as a datum that really “gives itself  by itself ” (always into the phenomenological praxis, 
certainly not into the physics or the natural sciences): this is identified as the authentic Selbstgegebenheit. 
(13) 
Schematically speaking, the subject appears to be constituted in virtue of  the structure that remains 
invisible through the Husserlian method: the variation/invariance structure. (14) This categorial 
structure is the basic intentional structure of  Western thought, our objectivating logos. It consists of  a 
functional relationship between an invariant pole (eidos) and a plane made by an indefinite sequence of  
variations (to be intended as individual metamorphosis of  the eidos). The variations get their lacking 
sense, either ontological or logical, from the invariance, meanwhile the invariance works as a principle, 
as a rule, and as a unity of  connection for the whole range of  variations.(15) 
Radical epoché affects each intentional construction and thus also the I that is enclosed therein. By 
striking the assessment of  the ego as an obvious datum, by placing into question the idea that the ego 
would be endowed with absolute and exclusive existence, the radical epoché comes to show how the 
ego is nothing more than the unity pole (eidos) of  the sequence of  numberless activities (variations) 
usually referred to consciousness. The ego-centered consciousness then does not enjoy any preferential 
statute, but rather is constituted like any other object. 
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In virtue of  its radicalization, phenomenology dismantles the idea that the categorial attitude is the only 
possible attitude (16), the unique and absolute form of  consciousness. The Western basic intentional 
structure, underlying our natural attitude, is an objectifying structure. Radical phenomenological 
analysis shows how this logos of  objectivation, ruling both common and scientific cognitive posture, 
comes to effect on the basis of  the variation/invariance structure. So the possibility of  suspending this 
structure within the analytical domain discloses a further huge field of  research. To deal with the 
impersonal consciousness implies a widening of  the traditional phenomenological interests towards the 
domains of  cultural anthropology, ethnology, archaeology, paleoethnology, etc., in other words, of  
every human science that under some respect deals with cultures and human communities far from the 
Western logos, in either space or time. (17) 
In brief, this new phenomenological frontier marks the land of  a transcultural anthropology which can 
be fruitfully explored only through an analytical method that suspends the absoluteness of  Western 
logical and categorial principles. (18) This means trying to analyze sense-structures bound and 
embodied in the most dissimilar cultural signs. After all, the question about the method could be taken 
on and resolved in this way, for in phenomenology there is an unavoidable interaction between method 
and field of  analysis. Usually one begins by employing broad models, and then along the way, tools and 
techniques undergo improvement through the direct comparison with evidences and signs. But to 
assert that phenomenological method forms itself  through phenomenological analysis is also to say that 
the real theoretic and technical value of  the method can arrive at a critical explication as the 
phenomenological field of  observation extends and fixes itself, and vice versa. (19) 
Notes
(1)“Access to phenomenology demands a radical reversal of  our total existence reaching into our depths, a 
change of  every prescientifically-immediate comportment to world and things as well as of  the disposition 
of  our life lying at the basis of  all scientific and traditionally-philosophical attitudes of  knowledge.” Eugen 
Fink, “What Does the Phenomenology of  Edmund Husserl Want to Accomplish?,” Research in 
Phenomenology, 2 (1972), p. 6.
(2)Edmund Husserl, “Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” Husserl Shorter Works, eds. Peter McCormick 
and Frederick A. Elliston (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of  Notre Dame Press - The Harvester 
Press, 1981), p. 196.
(3)Cf. ibid.
(4)Cf. Edward G. Ballard, “On the Method of  Phenomenological Reduction, Its Presuppositions, and 
Its Future,” Life-World and Consciousness. Essays for Aron Gurwitsch, ed. Lester E. Embree (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1972), p. 110. 
(5)Cf. Domenico A. Conci, Prolegomeni ad una fenomenologia del profondo (Roma: Università di Roma, 1970), 
p. 11.
(6)Cf. Enzo Paci, Funzione delle scienze e significato dell’uomo (Milano: Il Saggiatore, 1963), p. 249.
(7)The principle declares that“every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of  cognition, that 
everything originarily offered to us in ‘intuition’ is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being , but also only  
within the limits in which it is presented there.” Edmund Husserl, Ideas, First Book (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1982), p. 44f.
(8)Antonio Zirión Q., “The Call ‘Back to the Things Themselves’ and the Notion of  Phenomenology,” 
Husserl Studies 22 (2006), p. 31f.
(9) Cf. Domenico A. Conci, La conclusione della filosofia categoriale. Contributi ad una fenomenologia del metodo  
fenomenologico (Roma: Edizioni Abete, 1967).
(10) Cf. Domenico A. Conci, L’universo artificiale. Per una epistemologia fenomenologica (Roma: Spada, 1978) 
n. 3, p. 14. 
(11)“This search for an ultimate and final apodictic foundation, which, following the Cartesian 
paradigm, can only lie in the ego (cogito, ergo sum), is never given up by Husserl, no matter how much his 
actual emphasis might be directed at other “phenomena.”” Sebastian Luft, “Husserl’s Theory of  the 
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Phenomenological Reduction: Between Life-World and Cartesianism,” Research in Phenomenology, 34 
(2004), p. 207.
(12)“On what authentically phenomenological basis is the unsuspendable residue to be identified, as 
Husserl would have it, with the sphere of  transcendental subjectivity?” Domenico A. Conci, 
“Disinterested Praise of  Matter: Ideas for Phenomenological Hyletics,” Analecta Husserliana LVII 
(1998), p. 50.
(13)Cf. ibid., p. 52.
(14)Cf. ibid., p. 53.
(15)Cf. Domenico A. Conci and Angela Ales Bello, “Il tempo e l'originario. Un dibattito 
fenomenologico,” Il Contributo, II, 5-6 (Roma 1978), p. 16.
(16)“The logos of  objectivation (…) is a sense structure polarized in an invariant moment (…) and in a 
moment to be understood as an orderable sequence of  individual variations crossed by the invariant as 
the unitary principle towards which all these moments must necessarily converge. Functionally related 
with each other, these polarities constitute an altogether general intentional structure, a structure of  
connection, order and comprehension,” Domenico A. Conci, “Disinterested Praise”, p. 51.
(17)Domenico A. Conci, La conclusione della filosofia categoriale,p. 79.
(18)“Thus, it is quite evident that the phenomenological residue of  a radical epoché is constituted by a 
true ‘cultural continent’ (…) where the elementary lived experiences reveal a morphology and a 
lawfulness of  connection which go beyond those already visualized by classical analysis, which has 
confined itself  to complex Western experiences.” D. A. Conci and Angela Ales Bello, “Phenomenology 
as the semiotics of  archaic or ‘different’ life experiences. Toward an Analysis of  the Sacred,” 
Phenomenology Inquiry, XV (1991), p. 125.
(19)Cf. ibid., pp. 110ff.
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El futuro de la fenomenología pasa por poner unas nuevas bases para reorientar 
la actividad humana causante de la actual crisis ecológica
María-Luz Pintos
Introducción 
Este asunto que aquí se nos sugiere pensar en realidad está co-implicando directamente dos asuntos: en 
primer lugar, la fenomenología husserliana y, en segundo lugar, el futuro de ella. Sin embargo, sólo 
podemos hablar del futuro de la fenomenología si tenemos claridad sobre qué es y cuál es la función de 
la fenomenología en el propio Husserl. Y sólo podremos pensar “en el futuro” si partimos del presente 
actual en el que estamos viviendo como personas y no ya como fenomenólogos. El futuro siempre es 
futuro de un presente, y, en nuestro caso, se trata de este presente en el que estamos en esta fecha de 
primavera del año 2007. El filósofo, como fenomenólogo y, antes, como persona, únicamente puede 
plantearse el futuro desde el presente actual en el que todos estamos inmersos. Por tanto, en mi 
desarrollo sobre “el futuro de la fenomenología husserliana” tomaré como inexcusable punto de partida 
la situación de nuestro mundo hoy. Y esta situación no es otra que la de una profunda crisis ecológica a nivel 
del planeta. Al día de hoy, y desde hace tan sólo unos meses, por primera vez hay consenso entre los 
científicos y por primera vez éstos hablan abiertamente no ya de “cambio climático” –el cual ha estado 
siempre ligado a la historia del planeta– sino de que estamos asistiendo a una “aceleración” del cambio 
climático y de que éste es un factor determinante en esta crisis ecológica. Después de muchos años de 
debate, los científicos han llegado a la conclusión de que esta aceleración del cambio climático no tiene 
una causa “natural” por detrás, sino que más bien está ligada a la “actividad humana”, es decir, a cierta 
orientación de la actividad humana y, por tanto, a una causa enteramente “cultural”. Esta actividad 
humana causante del actual deterioro del planeta es la propiciada desde la cultura occidental. Como 
sabemos, nuestra cultura occidental está toda ella centrada en ciencia objetivista-tecnología-industria-
consumo. La finalidad máxima de las sociedades occidentales es, desde hace unos dos siglos, la de 
vender y comprar/consumir. Todo lo que compone nuestro planeta (mundo inorgánico y mundo 
orgánico: vegetales, animales no humanos y animales humanos) es visto exclusivamente desde el prisma 
de esta finalidad. Y, lamentablemente, esta finalidad hoy está sirviendo de modelo para el resto de las 
sociedades y reproduciéndose a escala mundial.
Pues bien, este tipo de actividad humana occidental sólo es posible porque se apoya en una 
determinada noción conceptual del ser humano:
a) Por una parte, nuestra cultura siempre ha estado vinculada a una interpretación de la realidad y a una 
auto-interpretación de nosotros que son ambas antropocéntricas y especistas: la especie humana se tiene a sí 
misma por soberana y por centro del planeta y sus intereses como especie son para ella los únicos 
importantes y que hay que tener en cuenta frente a los de las restantes especies animales y vegetales y 
frente a la naturaleza. Los humanos occidentales nos consideramos a nosotros mismos los únicos 
“sujetos” y, por tanto, los amos de todo el planeta frente a todos los demás seres, los cuales son meros 
“objetos”, algo, pues, tan “otro” y tan ajeno a nosotros que no hay ningún problema moral en el hecho 
de que los explotemos, de que los maltratemos cruelmente infligiéndoles sufrimientos innecesarios, de 
que los exterminemos como especie, etc.
 b) Por otra parte, nuestra cultura siempre ha estado empeñada en ahondar en las diferencias dentro de 
nuestra propia especie en vez de buscar puntos de conexión, es decir, algo común a todos los humanos. Por 
lo general, esta tendencia a buscar diferencias tiene como objetivo implícito apuntalar a nivel conceptual 
prácticas de desigualdad de trato. Si los humanos no somos todos iguales ontológicamente hablando, 
unos podemos ser más valorados que otros y, por tanto, la desigualdad de trato se deriva de esta 
asimetría por sí sola. Normalmente esta asimetría ha sido ejercida desde el punto de vista del individuo 
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varón, occidental, adulto, bien posicionado socialmente y cristiano. Nuestra tradición ha considerado a 
aquellos individuos no varones, no pertenecientes a la cultura occidental, no de raza blanca, no adultos, 
y no cristianos, de otra categoría más baja: como no “sujetos” o como no plenamente “sujetos”.
Únicamente podremos cambiar el comportamiento que los humanos occidentales tenemos hacia los 
animales no humanos, y hacia todos aquellos otros humanos que en nuestra actualidad están 
malviviendo o llevando una vida indigna ante nuestras miradas indiferentes, y únicamente podremos 
entrever otro futuro distinto a nuestro presente actual y a nuestro pasado, si previamente cambiamos 
nuestro modo de valorar a unos y a otros. En mi opinión, sólo dejando de verlos como “objetos” frente 
a nosotros, los “sujetos”, seremos capaces de valorarlos más. Y, sin duda, cambiar nuestra valoración 
hacia ellos, pasando a considerarlos como “sujetos”, con los derechos que de ello se derivan, favorecerá 
un cambio en nuestro modo de comportarnos hacia ellos. Y, entre otras cosas, este cambio implicará 
cuidar más nuestros ecosistemas para evitar situaciones ecológicas negativas para los vivientes que en 
ellos habitan (destrucción del manto vegetal, contaminación atmosférica, contaminación y derroche del 
agua, urbanizaciones salvajes por doquier, etc., etc.). Por tanto, se trataría de lograr esta sucesión de 
cambios: en las ideas, en los valores, en la conducta. De otro modo, la destructiva orientación de la 
actividad humana que está por detrás de la actual aceleración del cambio climático y, por tanto, del 
deterioro de todos los ecosistemas del planeta y, por consiguiente, de las vidas de una gran parte de los 
seres humanos y no humanos, nunca será reorientada de forma suficiente hacia una armonía con la 
naturaleza y con todos los demás seres vivos. 
La intervención activa de la fenomenología
 
Ante esta situación, el futuro de la fenomenología pasa, pues, por adoptar en este momento la misma 
actitud que adoptó Husserl en su época y por aplicar su método a asuntos tan urgentes y tan actuales 
como el que hoy define nuestra situación presente. Cuando él elaboró su novedoso método lo hizo a la  
vista de la situación cultural, científica e histórica de su momento. La actitud husserliana que está en el origen de 
su fenomenología y que indica cuál es la función para la que ésta nace, fue, pues, la de encarar de frente 
la crisis cultural y científica y, por tanto, el mal rumbo que entonces estaba llevando la historia de 
nuestra civilización occidental. Continuando su actitud, a nosotros nos corresponde hoy, como 
fenomenólogos, encarar la crisis ecológica global en sus causas, ya que es uno de los más grandes 
problemas que nos acompañarán en este futuro inmediato del siglo XXI. (1) Como sabemos, Husserl 
comienza su andadura por lo que para él es prioritario: hacer una descripción de aquello en que consiste la 
vida de todo sujeto humano como existente personal que forma parte de una comunidad cultural 
concreta. Al hacer esta descripción, Husserl descubre como un rasgo universal de todo humano el que 
cada uno, desde su nacimiento, vive en lo que él técnicamente denomina “actitud natural ingenua” y que 
básicamente consiste en tomar como “natural” lo que es únicamente “cultural”. No hay criatura nacida 
de mujer que no traiga ya consigo esta especie de mecanismo biológico que le permitirá poder 
integrarse en su comunidad al ir adoptando como normales y naturales los hábitos culturales de 
pensamiento, de valoración emocional y de comportamiento que rigen en ella. Al hacer la descripción 
de la “actitud natural” vivida en su momento histórico Husserl descubre y desenmascara como uno de 
los hábitos de pensamiento-valoración-actuación más definitorios de nuestra cultura occidental el del 
“objetivismo”. El prejuicio del “objetivismo”, causa primera del mal rumbo de nuestra cultura, más que 
contemplar sujetos contempla meras entidades psico-físicas, cósicas, algunas de ellas con movimiento 
animal pero que son, a fin de cuentas, meras cosas u “objetos”. Este prejuicio hace que valoremos a los 
animales no humanos muy asimétricamente con respecto a nosotros y que los tratemos sin ningún tipo 
de escrúpulos morales, fundándonos en que ellos no son “sujetos”, sino tan sólo “objetos”, y además, 
permite que califiquemos de “otros” a los humanos que consideramos que no son tan “sujetos” como 
nosotros, y que fácilmente incurramos en –o consintamos en– su instrumentalización.
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El descubrimiento husserliano del prejuicio del “objetivismo” le hace ver la necesidad de iniciar una 
nueva actitud científica. Ésta consiste, dice él, en una nueva actitud “para con los humanos y para con 
los animales [no humanos]”. (2) En Husserl se halla un mensaje ecológico sorprendemente audaz que 
tendría que ser todo un modelo a seguir en nuestros días: sus textos ofrecen la fundamentación, a nivel  
ontológico, de una actuación de respeto mutuo de humanos-con-humanos y, también, de humanos-con-
no humanos. Hasta donde yo sé, Husserl no escribió ningún texto con un propósito abiertamente 
“ecologista”, ni ningún texto dedicado íntegramente a la necesidad de tratar con dignidad todas las 
vidas, incluso las vidas de los animales no humanos. Sin embargo nos ha dejado como legado textos y 
más textos fundamentando esta nueva actitud y siendo él muy consciente de que la nueva interpretación 
fenomenológica que promueve lleva a esta nueva actitud ético-política y que no puede llevar a otra. La 
suya es quizás la fundamentación más radical y comprometida de todas cuantas hay en el ámbito de la 
filosofía. Y, sin duda, ésta puede ser una de las mayores contribuciones de la fenomenología a la crisis 
ecológica actual y lo que permitirá que pueda tener cada vez un papel más importante, tanto hoy como 
en el futuro.
Hoy en día son muchos los intelectuales que, desde diferentes áreas del saber, reclaman la necesidad de 
una renovación ético-política que alcanzaría nuestras ideas, nuestras valoraciones y nuestra conducta. 
Pero, en la mayor parte de los casos, su intento carece de una fundamentación ontológico-antropológica 
que sea suficientemente sólida como para, desde ella, basar con toda evidencia esta necesidad de 
renovación; quizás porque no es su misión llegar a establecer esta fundamentación. Sin embargo, sí es ésta  
precisamente la tarea esencial de la filosofía y, desde luego, es la fenomenología la que tiene el método adecuado para  
lograrla.
Husserl centra esta fundamentación ontológica en lo que tenemos en común unos-con-otros: 
humanos-con-humanos y humanos-con-no humanos. Todos los que somos una corporalidad viviente  
animal compartimos, según él, un a priori biológico (3), el cual es el nivel básico en el que todos los 
animales constituimos sentido (pre-racional). Éste es, por tanto, el nivel en donde se asienta la 
subjetividad trascendental. Este nivel y esta constitución de sentido son los que nos vinculan y ligan a 
los individuos de una misma especie y, también, a los individuos de unas especies con otras. Y esto 
ocurre de un modo tan originario y tan profundo que podemos decir que entre todos los animales 
(humanos y no humanos) formamos una trascendental intersubjetividad en cuanto a que todos somos (en 
cada especie a su nivel, pero sin que ninguna deje de serlo) “sujetos” constituyentes de sentido (pre-
racional), es decir, sujetos trascendentales. (4) Por tanto, el mensaje ecológico de Husserl que hoy 
debemos recuperar y seguir ahondando fenomenológicamente es éste: forma parte de la propia naturaleza  
de los humanos un vínculo originario y trascendental de interconexión intersubjetiva, pre-racional, con las otras especies  
animales y, por supuesto, de interconexión intersubjetiva con todos los integrantes de la especie humana (con 
independencia de su edad, sexo, época a la que pertenecen, Lebenswelt concreto, y demás características 
concretas que cada uno tenga). (5)
 
Reconocer esta ligazón entre unos y otros supone estar fundamentando ontológicamente, desde la  
animalidad que es nuestra esencia, una actitud ecológica de trato respetuoso para con todos los seres 
vivos, humanos y no humanos y, así, se pone una base sólida y evidente para un cambio de valores y de 
comportamientos. Y, viceversa, no reconocer esta ligazón entre unos y otros seguirá favoreciendo en 
nosotros una valoración asimétrica y, por tanto, un trato poco digno de los demás seres vivientes, 
humanos y no humanos, y la consiguiente continuidad de una actividad humana devastadora de todos 
los habitats del planeta. Y, en esto, la responsabilidad de la fenomenología actual y futura es evidente.
Notas
(1) Es Lester Embree quien define la etapa de la fenomenología en la que nos encontramos como la Vª 
etapa, caracterizada porque en ella estamos haciendo “fenomenología continuada” al adoptar como 
30
nuestra nuevamente la actitud de Husserl y aplicar su método a asuntos y problemas de nuestra 
actualidad para análisis fenomenológicos y no meramente “eruditos” o “fenomenológicos”. Cfr. el 
“Prólogo para instructores” en su libro Análisis reflexivo. Una primera introducción a la investigación  
fenomenológica / Reflective Analysis. A First Introduction into Phenomenological Investigation, Morelia: Jitanjáfora, 
2003.  Y cfr. también, y sobre todo, la “Introducción” a su libro Fenomenología continuada. Contribuciones al  
análisis reflexivo de la cultura, Morelia: Jitanjáfora, 2007. Tales asuntos actuales para hacer esta 
“fenomenología continuada” pueden ser el feminismo, el extranjerismo, nuestra relación con los 
animales no humanos, la ecología, la bioética, etc. 
(2) Cfr. “Actitud científico-natural y científico-espiritual. Naturalismo, dualismo y psicología 
psicofísica”, en La crisis de las ciencias europeas y la fenomenología trascendental, Barcelona: Crítica, 1991, p. 
320. 
(3) Husserl habla de este “a priori biológico”, por ejemplo, en el Beilage XXIII a La crisis de las ciencias  
europeas y la fenomenología trascendental, en la nota a pie de página número 2. 
(4) Cfr. Javier San Martín  “La subjetividad trascendental animal”, Alter 3 (1995), p. 405. Por mi parte, 
siguiendo a Husserl he trabajado fenomenológicamente este asunto de que los animales no humanos 
son “sujetos” trascendentales en los siguientes ensayos: “La recuperación de la animalidad. Utilidad y 
aplicabilidad de la fenomenología a los cien años de su surgimiento”, en César Moreno  / Alicia Mª de 
Mingo (eds.) Signo. Intencionalidad. Verdad. Estudios de Fenomenología, Sevilla: Sociedad Española de 
Fenomenología / Universidad de Sevilla, 2005, pp. 369-388; “Animal Life and Phenomenology”, en 
Steven Crowell, Lester Embree, Samuel J. Julian (eds.), The Reach of  Reflection: Issues for Phenomenology’s  
Second Century, Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology: www.electronpres.com, 2001 (co-
autor: Javier San Martín);  “Los derechos de todos los seres vivos a la luz de la fenomenología”, 
Investigaciones Fenomenológicas. Revista de la Sociedad Española de Fenomenología 4 (2005) 99-115: 
http:www.UNED.esdpto_fim/invFen4/portadaInvFen_4.html; “Cuestionamiento y redefinición de los 
viejos conceptos de intersubjetividad e interculturalidad. Fenomenología en el siglo XXI”, ponencia en 
el VII Congreso Internacional de Fenomenología: “Interculturalidad y conflicto”, celebrado en la 
Universidad de Salamanca en abril de 2004 (en prensa); “Humanos, inhumanos e non humanos. 
Fundamentación fenomenolóxica da conexión interespecies”, en P. S. Alves, J. M. S. Santos, A. Franco 
de Sá (eds.), Humano e Inhumano. A dignidade do homem e os novos desafios, Lisboa: Centro de Filosofía da 
Universidade de Lisboa (en prensa); “Nuestra relación con los animales no humanos. 
Desenmascaramiento de prejuicios y necesidad de un cambio de conceptos, valores, comportamientos y 
leyes”, Pensamiento Garcilasino. Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, 2 (2006); “La antropología filosófica: 
una obligada mirada hacia los demás seres vivos”, ponencia presentada en el VII Congreso 
Internacional de la Sociedad Hispánica de Antropología Filosófica, celebrado en la Universidad de 
Sevilla en septiembre de 2006 (en prensa). 
(5) Cfr. María-Luz Pintos, “Buscar la unidad por debajo de la diferencia. La contramoda de la 
fenomenología”, en Jacinto Choza, Octavi Piulats (eds.), Identidad humana y fin de milenio, monográfico en 
Thémata. Revista de Filosofía 23 (1999) 287-292.
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The time of  the self  and the other
Anna-Lena Renqvist
What is time? The question is simple, the answer evasive. I would like to approach this very question in 
the phenomenology of  Husserl, duly characterized as “a nest of  problems, among the most important 
and difficult ones in all phenomenology”. A nest, as we should shortly see, yet an highly important one 
since, as Husserl himself  has indicated: “all objectification takes place within time consciousness, and 
no clarification of  the identity of  an object can be given without a clarification of  the identity of  
temporal position” (Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, s. 88) 
The challenge is related to the old problem of  the unity of  identity and difference. Whatever is given to 
us is constantly streaming, ceaselessly changing (in einem beständige Fluss gegeben). “The original 
phenomenon of  the World experience is the Heraclitean flow of  the subjective ‘having of  a world’ 
(Welthabe); which nevertheless stands forth (erschinen) as one and the same World. As a real (substantial) 
world it changes, but in its change it remain identical”. The words are taken from Husserl’s late writings, 
as they reach us in the so called C-manuscript (C2, nr 1).Throughout his different formulations of  the 
intricate relation between time and consciousness, Husserl remains faithful to a conception of  time in 
line with the Aristotelian doctrine of  time such that the “basic unity of  time” is the now. This is due to 
the fact that “whatever is Gegen-ständlisch is also present” (C2, text nr 3, s.7). Time is thought of  as 
rooted in the original object of  consciousness, in terms of  perception (Wharnehmung) since, as it is 
perceived, is always presently perceived, which is to say perceived in a now. Or as he eloquently puts it in 
the PIC: “perception (Wharnehmung) constitutes the now” (s.82). Being perceived is being in time, and 
vice versa, because being perceived is being present and presence is a temporal quality. Recalling the 
title of  this conference, the time we’re here dealing with is the time not of  the self, but of  the 
phenomenon given to the self. In this sense it’s the time of  the other.
 
Due to the natural significance of  the phenomenon within a phenomenological project, the 
investigations will henceforth be circling around the nature of  the “now” of  this very phenomenon. 
Husserl keeps following the Aristotelian indications: the now is above all a limit. A limit which, as such, 
has a twofold function: to separate and to unify whatever it is delimiting – in this case the earlier and 
the later, or as we would also say, past time and future time. According to Aristotle, it is precisely the 
separating function of  the limit that explains the nature of  time: its floating character. But what about 
it’s unifying function? Regarding the latter question, Husserl would dedicate a good portion of  his work 
to complete an análisis which Aristotle left half-done; or if  you prefer, hereafter he will abandon the 
Greeks in favour of  the Africans. I’m referring to Augustine of  Hippo. Because, as Husserl 
economically recalls, in order for the now to respond to the presence of  perception, the now could not be 
considered a knife-edge present but must be something as a “duration-block”. In order for the present 
to give account for the identity of  the manifold, or simply, in order for an “object” to appear, the now 
must be something more than a mere nunc stans of  an ever streaming continuity; it has to have a temporal  
extension, a width able to allow that “wonderful synthesis in which the individual Being is constituted in 
ceaseless flow (beständigem strömmenden Gang)”. In as far as the now is a limit, it indicates differentiation, 
but as far as it is a unifying limit, it reaches beyond, or it transcends itself, implying not one but three 
dimensions, or the three dimensions that we commonly attribute to the phenomena of  time: the past 
and the future by way of  a present. As opposed to a distant past that has fallen into oblivion, and a 
future eventually to be expected, this very close past and future, in terms of  retention and protention, is 
what makes us capable to apprehend the unity of  the manifold. And as a matter of  fact the structure 
of  consciousness – looked at without bias – is dispersed over time. The temporal extension stands 
forth as a quality inherent in the perceived object itself, or with Husserl, “duration is before us as a 
mode of  objectivity” (PIC, s. 90). We could not have a now without retention and protention because 
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consciousness lives in the past and future as well as in the present. As Aristotle indicated and as 
Heidegger later recalled, the now is “ek-static”: it stands outside itself, or rather outside of  the 
momentary “now”. Retention and protention are essential aspects of  this dispersed structure.
 
The perception constitutes the now – and the now is the basic unit of  time. Is this to be taken in the 
sense that time begins with perception? Following Husserl’s own line of  thought, the answer is yes and 
no. Throughout his works Husserl will stay firm to his intuition of  the now as “the basic unity of  
time”; never the less, he would come to vacillate as to the time and place, so to speak, of  its birth. 
Because what about the pre-reflective experiences? Experiences not yet constituted as objects – perhaps 
not even possibly so, as in the eminent case of  self-awareness, in the thematic sense of  the word? As 
Dan Zahavi puts it in his book dedicated to subjectivity and the self: “Although Husserl seems to 
maintain that a pre-reflective experience can not be given as a temporal object, he did claim that self-
awareness has a temporal infrastructure.
 
How is this modification to be understood?
 
In the Bernauer Manuscrips, the question is brought up in relation to the conditions of  possibility of  
perception of  an immanent object in general (s.191). When the object is perceived, it is perceived in a 
constituting process, and here it is, “esse est percipi”. But must it not also be without being thus perceived 
(s.191)? And if  so, if  we are to admit a pre-intentional object (a pre-perception, as is reiterated 
pronounced in the C-manuscript), is it to be considered a timeless layer of  consciousness, prior only in 
a material or logical sense, or is it supposed to be considered prior in the sense of  time? If  that is the 
case, however, it is bound to have a time quality of  its own; with which it would put into question one 
of  the key-stones in the phenomenological edification, because it would put into question the eminence 
given to the “presentification” of  the intentional object and, with that, the selfsame now as the “basic 
unity of  time. (Nor is it of  course coherent with the notion of  the subject as an “absolute timeless 
subject”.)
 
Is there such a thing as non-conscious perception (Vorstellung)? A life of  the I (Ichleben) which is not 
itself  perceived? (BM, 205, note 1). In the Bernauer Manuscrips Husserl formulates the hypothesis of  an 
original process (Urprocess) of  such a kind that it is in principal, or potentially, perceivable even though 
it is not actually perceived. The implications of  this assumption are major. Accordingly we would have 
to consider a constitutional process in different temporal layers. Because, as he goes on arguing, does not 
an original process necessarily belong to every perception as a process that constitutes the giveneness 
of  the temporal object (Zeitgegenstände) but is not itself  perceived? Is not the constituted object virtually 
quite unthinkable without the being of  this constitution (Sein der Konstitution), which, as such, must be 
prior to the object thus constituted? In other words, “does not every grasping conception (Erfassen) 
presuppose a former (Vorgängiges) non-grasping perceiving (Wahrnehme ohne Erfassen)? Doubtless!” (BM, 
p. 191).
 
Within the framework of  phenomenology, where it would be correct to speak of  a “constitution” of  
intentional objects only in a following reflection upon the original process, it seems inadmissible to 
understand the original process as, precisely, a constitutional process of  time-objects (BM, p.203) and, 
with that, to consider it a kind of  intentional consciousness. But then again, when we pay attention to 
the way in which it is given (die Gegenheitsweisen desselbe), this line is a temporal line (BM, p.196). (1)
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According to the Husserlian postulate, the question of  the constitutive function of  the pre-reflective 
original process turns out to be a semi-question as much as a key-one. The independent intentional 
character of  the original process must be denied, yet the original process itself  can not be denied; and 
this process, in relation to the time of  the constituting act, belongs to a non-retentional past. It has 
past, it might be recollected. Which suggests that “the analysis of  temporality requires something more 
than an investigation of  the temporal givenness of  objects, because it requires two – and two quite 
different – orientations within the transcendental reflection: the one that turns to the constituting 
stream, and the other that turns to the constituted line of  events (BM, p.262). Following Zahavi in the 
book mentioned above, Husserl’s analysis of  the structure of  inner time consciousness serves a double 
purpose. It is meant to explain how we can be aware of  temporal objects, but also how we can be aware 
of  our own fluctuating stream of  experiences. (…) Our perceptual objects are temporal, but what 
about our very perceptions of  these objects? Are they or are they not subjugated to the strict laws of  
temporal constitution?” (Zahavi, p. 58)
 
Even though Husserl would come to revise his former position with regard to a pre-reflective 
temporalisation, the question – in my understanding – was to remain unsettled. In as far as the function 
of  the reflective subjectivity is to reveal, and not to create, what is being thus constituted, the now in 
question will be hopelessly turned into past; and not only into the “just” (Soeben) past, but into a past 
that calls for recollection. For much width we would attribute to the present, sooner or later the 
phenomenon in question – the thing reflected upon – can no longer be said to be (part of  the) present, 
with less than its distinctive features – as a non-past and a non-future – having been lost.
A suggestive complement to the Husserlian ambivalence regarding the temporality of  the original 
process is found within the so called real-idealism elaborated by the 19th century philosopher Schelling 
(1775-1854). Well rooted in the idealistic tradition, Schelling shares Husserl’s point of  departure. The 
beginning of  knowledge is to be found in an act of  reflection, moreover, this act must have a “before” 
of  a generically different kind. Whatever is brought to knowledge by way of  reflection is bound to have 
a pre-reflective material or, with Husserl, a “hyletic” underlayer. They furthermore coincide in the idea 
that this “something” (=x) prior to reflection may not be constituted as such until unfolded or grasped 
through a reflective act.
 
The difference between these two, in many ways closely related German philosophers, is to be found in 
the place – and time – assigned to the “presenciating” act in question. While, according to Husserl as 
we know him, this must be a matter of  a reflective act, according to Schelling, it can only be an act in  
between the potential level and the time of  reflection. In as far as this event refers to a moment not of  
separation but of  unification, we are due speak of  an act; but as the very act in between, it is also foreign 
to any distance, oblivious of  any outside, and quite unreachable by way of  a reflective concept 
according to the old dictum determinatio est negatio. And still, it is precisely as such it would be able to 
offer what Husserl so eagerly sought for: “an Halt in the stream of  unconscious life moments through 
which the Uremfindungsdatum could be given to apperception”. (BM, p.201). In other words, both 
Husserl and Schelling presuppose the hyletic process in terms of  what is potentially – as a nacheinander or 
a flow – and both of  them claim the reflective act to be the beginning of  knowledge, but in Schelling’s 
outspoken understanding of  the dynamics underlying the reflective act, we have not one but two stages 
because in-between we have the all-inclusive act in the proper sense of  actualisation; which is to say the 
moment – or the time – when that which was but potentially, as a scattered and differentiated being, 
coincides with its telos as a reconciled whole. As Schelling remarks, the unity of  this act is immediately 
creative (Die Einheit dieses Gesetzes ist unmittelbar schöpferische”) (SW VII, 345-346), and vice versa, it is only 
in virtue of  the unifying force of  this act that all there is, was and will be may come into being: be it the 
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object of  consciousness or consciousness itself  – here Bewusstsein is understood as Bewusstwerden –, be it 
Sein or Seiende or time alike. The intentional constitution of  which belongs to a posterior moment, in a 
posterior time.
 
In terms of  the Aristotelian dynamics the act in question corresponds to the time of  the conjugated, 
unified now: a simultaneous time in which the three dimensions of  time – past, present, future – are at  
the same time, only not as the same time. Such a mood of  time would, surly, betray the flowing nature of  
time because it would be a time at rest (unthinkable within the Aristotelian universe), yet on the other 
hand, as a mood of  time able to embrace identity and difference, it would answer well to the conditions 
of  (its) being. But then again, is this not just another way to pronounce the very act that Husserl himself  
explores in terms of  the spontaneous act of  the anonymous I; the act of  “affection” in which I am not 
directed to myself  but captured by the other, and in which, consequently, the direction of  time is the 
opposite to that of  the intentional act? An “original now” (Urgegenwart), furthermore eloquently 
characterized as “the time of  the original phenomenon to which all transcendental question (Rückfrage) 
in the method of  phenomenological reduction is brought back” If  we are to take this very distinction 
at face-value, the late teachings of  Schelling might serve us. Understood as the instant of  actualisation 
in-between the mere potential level and the act of  reflection, the original now would be at odds with 
the notion of  the “intentional now” for structural reasons. Whereas the latter speaks of  a retentional 
past and a protentional future as the edifying moments underlying duration, the original now assign us a 
past in terms of  a vital history and a future in terms of  an enigmatic aimed for end, unified in the 
manner of  fusion – confusedly exposed within a presence without duration, for a swift moment, yet 
eternal enough to respond to the old image of  the one-and-all, hen kai pan. A non-conceptual totality 
which would grant us not just a Halt in the stream, but a founding event: that of  a new, and ever new, 
beginning – for the conceptual labour to determine whatever was swiftly exposed as such. Moreover, 
recalling the issue of  the present paper, it would grant us a time which is no longer the time of  the 
other but the time of  the inbetween the self  and the other as the time of  it all. Where after follows –we 
may hope – yet some time for reflection.
Notes
(1) As Husserl goes on saying: “Must not these Lebensreihen, in some sense or another, remain either we 
pay attention to them or not. In other words does not the process remain in its (due) time? (p. 204). If  
the latter is the case, we would have to admit something prior in terms of  time to the first stage (erster  
Stufe) of  immanent experience understood in terms of  an unconscious process as a series (Urfolge) of  




The Future of  Husserlian Phenomenology: Time and Epoché
Louis Sandowsky
 
The Intertwining (Ineinander) of  Time and Epoché
 
To ask about the future of  Husserlian Phenomenology at this time is actually quite a natural gesture – 
caught up, as it is, in the anxiety wrought by the difficulties that come with the beginning of  a new 
millennium and the malaise of  the post-modern. Though, it must be borne in mind that it is a gesture 
that simultaneously puts the sense of  ‘naturalness’ into question. It answers to a conscientious zeitgeist 
that seeks to catch itself  in mid-act (between breaths) – as an attitudinal re-orientation, break, or 
moment of  suspense – in order to find its bearings and to re-discover its responsibility as a rigorous 
philosophical praxis. And, as it does so, the history of  the movement of  phenomenology exemplifies 
nothing other than the constant re-iteration of  this turn to momentarily step outside its history (or, at 
least, a naïve, un-reflective attitude to it) in order to re-turn to itself  with greater clarity and precision. 
This is the epoché at the heart of  phenomenology as it unfolds in time. Thus, in order to re-gather itself  
and to re-establish the sense / significance of  its time / history so as to forge ahead, phenomenology 
must perpetually return to its beginnings. This is, arguably, the essence of  the meaning of  
phenomenology as an ‘infinite task.’
 
This infinite task is none other than an infinite re-iteration of  phenomenological questions that always 
remain open to further analysis. Such is the thought of  a ‘phenomenology of  phenomenology,’ which 
traces itself  throughout Husserl's work.(1) 
To ask about the future of  Husserlian phenomenology already problematizes the idea of  a ‘terminus.’ 
If  this elicits panic and alarm in certain philosophic and scientific domains then this is only the effect 
of  an orientation that has not grasped the meaning of  epoché. It is a question of  a change in 
consciousness itself  – a transformation of  the manner of  waiting-towards the not-yet. The apparent 
pointlessness of  what seems to be nothing other than a Sisyphean task is actually the sign of  a naïveté 
that requires examination. Of  course, the issue of  ‘how’ this critique might be conducted is a question 
that remains left over – thus inspiring hope at the very same time that it undermines it. The method or 
way only resolves itself  in the doing. The movement of  unfolding the question, if  conducted 
conscientiously (with rigour), brings with it the true sense of  what it is to ask about the future of  
Husserlian phenomenology and to what extent it may retain its Husserlian trace.(2) 
To this end, which must not be confused with a terminus, Time and Epoché must be thought together. 
As I prepare this writing for the submission date of  February 2007, what is foremost in my mind is that 
it marks the centennial of  the lecture course (of  1907) in which Edmund Husserl first introduced the 
working method of  phenomenological reduction / epoché (later published as The Idea of  Phenomenology  
(3)). Developmentally, it owes a great deal to the remarkable series of  lectures that he presented at 
Göttingen in the winter semester of  1904-5 on the phenomenology of  the consciousness of  immanent 
/ internal time. (4) Though the reduction is not thematized in the time-lectures as such, its trace is 
operative throughout the analyses. 
Dorion Cairns reports in his journal of  1931:
“Husserl said that at the time of  the 1905 time-lectures he had not yet come upon the 
phenomenological reduction, but that these lectures were what urged him on to think of  the 
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phenomenological reduction.” (5)
With the publication of  Husserl’s Ideen 1 in 1913, there ‘began’ a systematic account of  the method of  
epoché, whose elaboration gradually turned into the most fundamental task of  phenomenology. (6) 
Though the question of  temporal constitution took a backseat during this middle-period of  Husserl’s 
writing further application and development of  the epoché inevitably led to questions of  genesis, thus 
bringing time back into the foreground of  his philosophy. It is the interwovenness of  the themes of  
time and epoché that dominate his later and more mature transcendental phenomenology.
 
2. The Time of  the Epoché
 
Existentialism (existential-phenomenology) and deconstruction have had a considerable effect on how 
Husserlian phenomenology is re-read today – particularly in regard to the themes of  time and the 
epoché. It is important to note that Husserl’s egological investigations and the method of  
phenomenological reduction have been severely criticized by other phenomenologists, e.g., Aron 
Gurwitsch and Alfred Shutz, (7) including the existential phenomenologists, Martin Heidegger and 
Jean-Paul Sartre, on the basis of  a common misunderstanding. Allegedly, both elements in Husserl’s 
phenomenology disregard the intersubjective pre-conditions of  their possibility. For Shutz and 
Gurwitsch, the phenomenology of  the Other / social existence / intersubjectivity – as exemplified by 
Emmanuel Levinas’s discourse on alterity and the primacy of  ethics, Martin Heidegger’s thematization 
of  the fundamental role of  ‘Mitsein’ / ‘Being-with’ in the constitution of  Dasein, or Martin Buber’s ‘I-
Thou’ relation, etc. – takes precedence over an egological route of  inquiry into the constitution of  the 
one shared Lifeworld. It is further claimed, according to a purely solipsistic interpretation, that the 
method of  epoché – particularly the transcendental reduction is counter to the whole concept of  the 
Lebenswelt. This is brought out famously in Jean-Paul Sartre’s early work The Transcendence of  the Ego, (8) 
which argues against the notion of  the transcendental Ego and the suitability of  the epoché by 
emphasizing that the structure of  the ego always already implies the Other, not the other way round.
In essence, it may be true that alterity is always already implied by discourse on the ego (from the 
standpoint of  the Lebenswelt) but, at the beginning of  the philosophical turn toward a truly 
phenomenological orientation on this question, it is not so ‘self-evident.’ For it is always ‘I’ the 
meditator / practicing phenomenologist who must first take this step, even if  the outcome – after 
rigorous examination – should be the phenomenological-eidetic-deconstruction of  my particularity to 
the general (communal / intersubjective) structures that permit the possibility of  any ego. The author 
may lose its ontological priority by such a movement, but it wins back its existential authority – in 
constitutional terms – through that which is disclosed by this activity. The interplay of  time and epoché 
is the unfolding of  the alterity that lies at the heart of  the shared Lifeworld to which I belong. It is in 
me just as I am inside it. This interpenetration is vertical as well as horizontal. There is no hint of  
solipsism here – which has always proved to be an impoverished determination of  the meaning of  
epoché. Of  all Husserl’s disciples, Eugen Fink (and perhaps Ludwig Landgrebe) probably came closest 
to understanding the intrinsic complementarity of  egology (which is only one of  the turns taken by the 
phenomenological reduction) and discourse on alterity in Husserlian phenomenology. This is evident in 
Fink’s fascinating Sixth Cartesian Meditation: the Idea of  a Transcendental Theory of  Method, as endorsed and 
annotated by Husserl himself. (9)
The all-embracing theme that binds these issues together is temporality. Jacques Derrida’s various 
deconstructive re-readings of  Husserl’s phenomenology of  immanent time consciousness will, I 
believe, have a profound impact on how his discourse on time will be engaged by the most ‘careful’ 
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philosophers over the next few decades. It is the theme of  time itself  that is, perhaps, the most 
outstanding problem of  phenomenology – to the extent that it is a horizon of  research that is 
inextricably linked to the problem of  the unfolding of  phenomenological methodology itself. On the 
one hand, Derrida’s deconstructive critiques demonstrate that time and its articulation are irreducibly 
tied to metaphysical conceptuality, while realizing that Husserlian phenomenology in its very ‘aim’ – 
through the continuous implementation of  the methodological epoché – transcends or transgresses this 
limitation. Then again, every time that time is subjected to an epoché (in its many similar but non-
identical forms of  suspension, neutralization, bracketing, etc) there is still the time of  the epoché. (10) This 
is nothing other than the most primordial dialectic operating at the heart of  temporality, Being, and the 
relationship between phenomenology and itself. 
Some commentators consider this kind of  formulation to be philosophically absurd. Many 
phenomenologists – and I am forced to use this expression loosely since the practice of  
‘phenomenology’ has come to signify a number of  fashionable, but fundamentally incorrect 
determinations of  its meaning (the same could be said of  deconstruction) – dispute the relevance or 
correctness of  Derrida’s deconstructions of  Husserl’s work. I would like to see more readers in the 
‘phenomenological camp’ re-read both Husserl and Derrida more carefully. (11)
With respect to the theme of  time and the relations between epoché and temporization, I believe that 
the question of  the future of  Husserlian phenomenology is intertwined with that of  the future of  
Derridian deconstruction. This is where the line between the past and futurity finds itself  smudged 
again and again as phenomenology must return to the question of  the task that lies before it after 
deconstruction. (12)
 
3. Time as Epoché
 
Despite the importance of  Husserl’s 1905 lecture course on the Phenomenology of  Internal Time  
Consciousness – which radicalized Western philosophical discourse on time as much as Einstein’s theory 
of  relativity (spacetime) (13) revolutionized the way in which objective time came to be thematized in 
the physical sciences – the text is not well known, especially in the English-speaking world. Husserl’s 
phenomenological meditations on temporality are elegantly complementary to those of  Einstein and 
certainly just as significant philosophically, scientifically, and above all historically. Einstein’s papers of  
1905 that introduced the Principle of  Relativity (or the Special [Specific] Theory of  Relativity), which 
first thematized the exotic forms of  temporal dilation that occur at velocities close to that of  light – 
thus refuting the classical concept of  Absolute time – were published in the same year that Husserl 
presented his lecture course on the phenomenology of  the consciousness of  internal time. When taken 
together, their different orientations – Husserl’s ‘subjective’ discourse and Einstein’s ‘objective’ account 
– fulfil one another in exquisite harmony. This is even more markedly the case with the addition of  
Einstein’s General theory of  relativity (1915/16). Husserl’s phenomenological discourse on Primordial 
Flux expresses the fundamental interplay of  temporalization and spatialization – where successivity and 
simultaneity must be thought together. Heidegger’s concept of  time-space surely finds its inspiration 
here as does Merleau-Ponty’s concept of  chiasm. In extension, Derrida’s use of  the neologism différance 
– which equiprimordially combines space and time as difference and delay – is probably his greatest 
contribution to phenomenological thought on time and the epoché as temporization. 
In every case, the traditional disjunction between time and space has been problematized. 
Temporalizing and spatializing cannot be articulated adequately within the bounds of  the classic dyad. 
The twentieth century stands out as the epoch that truly radicalized discourse on the interrelated 
themes of  spatialization and temporalization – through the many strands of  thought that 
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deconstructed the differences that have traditionally ‘separated’ the treatment of  time (as an order of  
successions) from that of  a spatial order (as an order of  coexistences). In contemporary terms, it is 
rather a question of  intertwining (Ineindander). For example, the conceptual framework of  Einstein's 
theory of  relativity is such that space and time should be treated as one word: spacetime.
Einstein’s Special theory of  relativity demonstrates that it is no longer possible to speak of  an Absolute 
time irrespective of  an observer and their particular frame of  reference while Husserl’s 
phenomenological investigations of  temporal awareness demonstrate the primordial intentional / 
temporal conditions of  possibility by which there can be such a thing as an observer.
Einstein’s post-Copernican reversal in astronomy, which ostensibly places the measuring observer at the 
centre of  the universe, raises the problem of  instantaneity / intersubjective contemporaneity – an issue 
that remains unquestioned in Newtonian theory. Due to the finite velocity of  light (by which things 
make their appearance) anything that is at a distance from the observer actually lies in the past – 
including other observers. The classical substantive distinction between space as an order of  
coexistences and time as an order of  successions breaks down here. For both Einsteinian cosmology 
and Husserlian phenomenology the perennial distinction between things as they are and things as they appear 
owes its intelligibility to a certain temporization / delay. The possibility of  the measurement of  this 
delay requires a radical re-situation of  the meaning of  the present and the notion of  intersubjectivity 
since the rhythms of  objective spacetime do not keep pace to a single universal beat.
The suspension of  the idea of  Absolute time – along with the suspension of  Absolute 
contemporaneous space – has the extraordinary effect of  bringing into the foreground the lived 
temporal-spacing through which they are already interwoven in manifold complexes of  different frames 
of  reference: fields of  relativity. The methodological correlate to this suspension in phenomenology is 
the epoché.
It is fundamental to remember that phenomenological reduction is irreducible to doubt and the 
solipsism that seems to follow from the scepticism that it would otherwise engender. It is rather a 
question of  the ‘suspension’ of  a thesis – a ‘deferment’ of  judgement. The issue of  the solus ipse takes 
on quite a different meaning in phenomenology – and likewise, when considered according to relativity 
– since reality is certainly not reduced to a ‘point.’
The temporization announced by temporalization and its various cognates – e.g., ‘extension’ in the 
sense of  ‘postponement’ as well as to ‘stretch-out’ – performs as the common tie between time and 
epoché. Such expressions of  temporization as ‘to-suspend’ and ‘to-put-off-until-later’ articulate the 
‘how’ of  the reduction. To echo Derrida: it is a question of  différance – where difference of  a spatial 
order and deferral in temporal terms are inextricably intertwined. (14)
This is where the significance of  Husserl’s analyses of  immanent time-consciousness stands out with 
respect to the future of  phenomenology itself. His richly descriptive discourse on the longitudinal and 
transversal intentionalities in play in the temporalization of  consciousness provides us with the material 
to re-think the meaning of  the future of  Husserlian phenomenology in full regard to the rigour of  the 
praxis that it names.
In the lectures on immanent time consciousness the route of  inquiry is not strictly linear. Husserl 
actually spends far more time talking about the essential interplay of  the now and the past (primal 
impression and retention) when describing the constitution of  the ever-flowing present. The reader has 
to wait quite a while before the signifier of  the future is uncovered. It is understandable that some 
readers have arrived at the conclusion that the givenness of  futurity is somehow less original in 
Husserl’s phenomenology. This is by no means the case! Interestingly, the reader has to wait for its 
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signification to arrive through the very theme of  waiting itself. It is in part 26, “Differences between 
Memory and Expectation,” of  the time lectures that it is revealed how expectation, as the futural 
correlate of  reproductive (secondary) remembrance, points to a more primordial form of  anticipation: 
‘protention.’
At first, it seems rather strange that it took Husserl so long to get round to the question of  the 
originarity of  protention, but if  we look at his writing retroactively from the point of  view of  
existentialist discourse on anxiety, then the detour that he takes through reproductive memory before 
disclosing the primordiality of  protention makes perfect sense. Since Husserl is concerned to show how 
objectivities are given – that is, to demonstrate the experience of  the giving of  the given – then 
protention announces the problem of  the giving of  that which does not give itself. This is not to confuse 
such a lack of  givenness with the sense of  re-presentation that merely reproduces / substitutes without 
giving, since it points to a more primordial lack of  givenness that originally motivates it. The original 
coming toward us of  futurity is a waiting toward possibility, which is intrinsically discomforting. Unlike 
expectation, which fills the futural space of  uncertainty that is disclosed by the originary intuitive 
openness of  anticipation with familiar repetitions of  an objective order that create the illusion of  
determined limits / certainty, protention is open and, in a peculiar sense, objectless. Husserl’s own 
narrative strategy and his route of  inquiry had to proceed by way of  the same unremitting tendency of  
consciousness to focus on the given. However, since his analyses traverse the path that leads to the 
question of  the ‘giving’ of  the given, the giving of  that which does not give itself  (objectively) is finally 
permitted, somewhat belatedly, to announce itself  – even though it is, in a certain sense, more 
primordial.
Unlike expectation, which projects determinate (objective) phantasies that await their fulfilment in a 
future now (which is a kind of  extension of  memory into the not-yet), protention is actually open. It 
first unfolds the not-yet as the site in which we may project futural possibilities. This restores the future 
ekstasis to what is none other than the tri-partite union (triumvirate) of  past, present and future in what 
Husserl comes to name as the Living Present (lebendige Gegenwart) – which literally means ‘waiting-
towards.’
Since expectation is a kind of  memorial projection into the not-yet where futurity expresses itself  as an 
extended act of  foreclosure – initiated and maintained in the ever-flowing present – we are to 
understand that it is to wait for something: to await the fulfilment of  an objective. Protention, in contrast 
to the former, is openness upon an ever receding futural horizon of  possibilities whose essence as 
‘surprise’ exceeds any expectational delimitation. The articulation of  this horizon of  excess first makes 
room for that which would be projected into it, often flaunting its transcendence in the face of  any 
naïve hopes of  fulfilment. Protention names a dimension of  intentionality where expectation is built 
upon a more primordial form of  anticipation as the condition of  its possibility.
Protention is the originary opening upon the fissure of  the not-yet through which anxiety pours in as 
the prime indicator of  what it is to exist or to be-thrust-into-the-world. Its objectlessness is what most 
significantly differentiates it from fear, which always has some kind of  object. Protention correlates 
with anxiety as the horizonal opening through which one may first be motivated by one’s expectations – 
fears and hopes. It opens the lived-space of  waiting-towards – that self-transcending sense of  intentionality 
that is intrinsic to the structurality of  the Living Present (lebendige Gegenwart). 
The movement of  phenomenology is an unfolding of  ‘depth.’ It aims at fleshing out the whole. But, 
this holistic telos is actually an ‘infinite task’ – of  foundering – which is irreducible to a foundationalism. 
Husserl's implementation of  the epoché, in its many different phases (all of  which invariably involve an 
eidetic component of  fictionalizing) expresses the fundamental importance of  a form of  recuperation 
through distanciation – for distanciation, also read transcendence as it announces itself  through delay 
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and duration. It also expresses a certain kind of  open-endedness with regard to possible modifications 
in orientation – which may free the 'depth' of  the 'whole' from the 'shallow' limits of  any totalizing 
grasp. In the case of  protention, the movement is that of  'opening' rather than that of  the 'closure' of  
expectation. The epoché is a rip in the fabric of  lived experience from which pours forth the very 
structure of  its own possibility – the opening-up of  structurality. It is a movement of  dehiscence. In 
these terms, it is the methodological analogue to the retentional and protentional interwovenness of  
time in its spacing – where retention passively provides the Other face of  a transformational return, 
which is to be distinguished from memory as an act of  evocation, through which active expectation as  
foreclosure answers to the primal and passive call of  protention as opening.
The temporization in the play of  epoché expresses the profound temporal resonance of  what it is to 
postpone taking up a position / to defer metaphysical speculation. Everything remains left over, though 
a certain delay is in play with respect to any judgement concerning actuality or non-actuality (putting 
into suspense the two extremes of  doubt and certainty). It is a question of  working towards freedom 
by restoring the openness of  protention as distinct from the foreclosure (constraints) of  expectation. And, 
it is precisely through the temporization / deferral of  that which would otherwise beguile us with the 
promise of  completion / totalization that it becomes possible to deconstruct our prejudices; to 
entertain the hope of  achieving true philosophical rigour, thereby extending toward that which is most 
Husserlian in the future of  phenomenology.
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Phenomenology in the Present-Day Philosophy
Denis Seron
In what follows, I will try to answer the question of  what the future of  Husserlian-style 
phenomenology will, or should, look like. I will provide some insights into the present-day situation in 
phenomenology and try to draw conclusions from it as to how Husserlian phenomenologists could play 
a part in the development of  philosophy in general in the following decades. One thus needs to ask: is 
the phenomenological method still significant for philosophy in its current state, and if  so, what 
purpose could it serve?
Husserlian-style phenomenology 
Before answering the question, we should first agree on what is meant by Husserlian-style 
phenomenology. In my view, at least two aspects are important to consider.
1) Firstly, we expect a Husserlian-style phenomenology to be, no matter in what sense, a "scientific 
theory." This condition is to be understood in the broadest sense. I especially do not want to suggest 
that phenomenology should borrow its methods from natural sciences. The question whether 
phenomenology needs to be "naturalized" is a totally different question, to which we will return below. 
Now we just need to note that the foundationalist feature of  the phenomenological project in its 
original form has been interpreted in two different ways. The difference actually rests on a divergence 
in interpretation of  the reduction. Phenomenological research has evolved in two directions, one 
stressing the critical role of  phenomenology within the system of  sciences, and the other one 
emphasizing that the phenomenological reduction leads beyond all epistemic constructions of  sciences 
to a more "original" existential experience that has much more to do with art, poetry, or religion. On 
the one side, phenomenology is considered as being a theory in the strict sense of  the word. Although 
supposedly being a philosophical theory, i.e., a theory aiming to be universal, or perhaps to found other 
sciences, it must, as such, be governed by a norm or a set of  norms addressing scientific theories in 
general. The "principle of  all principles" in Husserl's Ideas I is a remarkable example of  such a general 
norm of  rationality, but of  course many other alternatives are possible, too. On the other side, it is also 
claimed that phenomenological reduction should not be conceived as a technique for foundationalist 
purposes. The reduction thereby becomes something like a borderline experience (like angst, esthetic 
feeling, phenomenal "saturation," etc.) which occurs in the heart of  practical existence. What I here call 
Husserlian-style phenomenology corresponds to the first view.
This approach asks whether Husserl's foundationalism can still be taken seriously in a time when 
foundationalism in general appears to be out of  date. Of  course, this problem is far too large for a 
short paper. I will simply argue here that a looser understanding of  the term "foundation" - as opposed 
to the Cartesian sense - is possible as well, and that this looser sense is plausibly represented in 
Husserl's most significant employment of  the term. (1) The idea is that it must be sufficient, here, to 
emphasize the critical role (in the most comprehensive sense of  the word) of  phenomenology among 
the sciences, without further explaining how and how far this role can be effectively achieved. It is 
important to note that this view does not a priori exclude stronger claims, such as the idea that 
phenomenology needs to be accomplished in the form of  a "transcendental phenomenology" 
functioning as a "first philosophy."
2) The second aspect is more specific to Husserl's teaching. It concerns Husserl's theory of  
intentionality and its possibly "idealistic" implications. One can put the problem in an illuminating way 
in terms of  the distinction between relations and properties. As defined by Brentano, intentionality 
means that the ego (or the mental process) "has" an intentional content. But in what sense should we 
understand the verb "to have" in this context? The question now to be raised is whether a relation in 
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the usual sense holds between the ego and the noema. Should intentionality be regarded as a relation in 
the usual sense, or as a property? In the same sort of  way, we can ask whether the noema is a part 
"intentionally included" in and dependent upon the whole mental process, or whether instead it is an 
"external" entity the ego holds a relation to. The matter seems not too difficult. At first sight, the 
question seems only to pertain to the language one should adopt. But in fact this choice has far-
reaching consequences in regard to a number of  aspects of  phenomenological methodology. 
I confine myself  to mentioning these problems, which have become acute since the late 1960's in 
Follesdal's Fregean interpretation of  Husserl. I want to argue that the very principle of  what I here call 
Husserlian-style phenomenology might lie in Husserl's thesis to the effect that intentionality is not a 
relation in the usual sense. (2) The general thought is that the noema, from a purely phenomenological 
point of  view, can be nothing external to the mental process. It does not matter to the 
phenomenologist whether acts such as perceiving a tree, imagining Pegasus, etc., do correspond to 
something existing in the external world, since his or her whole thematic field, ontically speaking , consists 
in immanent objects. The noema, the object "just as it is given," must be something existing "inside" 
consciousness, something dependent that, as such, stands on an equal footing with psychological 
properties. Despite appearances, "perceiving a tree" is not a relational predicate. That is to say, although 
intentionality is to be regarded as a phenomenal (as opposed to ontic) relation, a predicate such as 
"perceiving a tree" now appears to be, from our point of  view, a one-place predicate just like "being 
happy" or "being scared." These views imply some kind of  dualism, namely a purely phenomenological 
dualism according to which one must distinguish, within the intentional act, between "real" and 
"intentional" contents. (3) This dualism - which also allows us to explain why it is impossible to avoid 
speaking of  intentionality as if  it were an ontic relation - is undoubtedly the chief  thought underlying 
Husserl's transcendental idealism. The phenomenological reduction not only compels us to suspend all 
existence-positing other than purely immanent, but it also opens up an immense, universal field of  mere 
phenomena, whose only existence is that of  their immanent bearer. 
This, however, is just one face of  the coin. The fact that the noema is nothing "external" does not 
entail that it is a real component of  the psyche as are sensations, feelings, acts of  judgment, etc. 
According to Husserl's dualism, it does not make any sense to ask how the ego constitutes mundane 
objects with sense-data. We actually do not constitute anything with sense-data, except within special 
acts in which sense-data themselves become objects for reflexive knowledge. The intentional 
constitution of  "objective senses" appears to be independent from the flow of  hyletic data, although it 
surely can be motivated by empirical contents. That also means that intentional analysis, that is, the 
analysis of  noematic structures of  objects "as they simply appear," must be essentially distinguished 
from real psychological analysis. This distinction is the very principle of  Husserl's battle against 
phenomenalism and logical psychologism. (4) 
To summarize: Husserlian-style phenomenology is meant to be a theory of  subjective experience, 
which not only addresses the real (hyletic or noetic) components of  consciousness, but also its 
intentional contents. There are, of  course, many serious difficulties to be overcome here. For example, 
one can conceive both features - being a theory and dealing with subjectivity - as being exclusive from 
each other. Is not a scientific theory of  individual experiences just like a round square? Does the 
phenomenologist not throw the door wide open to subjective arbitrariness, to the intimate privacy 
where the descriptive probity of  the scientist cannot be guaranteed? One has objected to 
phenomenology that, because a science must in essence be something objective, a science of  
subjectivity is a mere impossibility. This objection is quite convincing. Husserl continuously attempted 
to refute it, and to found the possibility of  an eidetic phenomenology. But his reply, as is well known, 
gave rise to important controversies, and the discussion is far from being closed. (5)
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Perspectives 
Over the past few years, analytic and continental philosophers have taken a renewed interest in 
Husserl's work. On the European continent, this trend is, above all, a response to the recent decline of  
both hermeneutic philosophy and Heideggerian-inspired deconstructionism. Many philosophers, 
especially in France and Belgium, saw in Husserl's phenomenology an opportunity of  escaping from a 
philosophical environment that was becoming more and more unproductive and unreceptive to what 
was happening elsewhere. In contrast with the splendid isolation of  Heidegger and his followers, 
Husserlian-style phenomenology seemed to provide a basis for restoring a dialogue on equal terms with 
sciences and other philosophical traditions, as also for rebuilding some sort of  philosophical 
rationalism on the ruins left behind by "postmodernists." It was in this context that Husserl research 
has made significant progress in acknowledging a common ground between analytic and 
phenomenological traditions. (6) The recent attempt to "naturalize" Husserlian phenomenology in the 
light of  cognitive sciences may be understood in this way as well. (7) It is not only an attempt at 
reconciliation with cognitive sciences (or, conversely, the introduction of  a new level of  explanation in 
cognitive sciences), but also an attempt to make phenomenology more acceptable from the 
(substantially naturalistic) point of  view of  philosophers of  mind. 
This rediscovery of  Husserl's work was rendered easier by the fact that analytic philosophers had for a 
long time been interested in some parts of  Husserl's work, in particular in the fields of  semantics and 
mereology. The revival of  Husserl studies is in fact older on the analytic side. It plausibly originated in 
the 1960's and 1970's when Chisholm and others made considerable effort to rescue the Brentanian 
School from oblivion. Much of  the work of  Simons, Smith and Mulligan, for example, no doubt 
belongs to the same movement of  thought. Yet all this has only the remotest connection with 
Husserlian phenomenology. The interest of  the authors mentioned above was primarily in the realistic 
ontology of  the third Logical Investigation, which they think is Husserl's contribution philosophy, and 
which supposedly later degenerated into a preposterous Kantianism called "transcendental idealism." 
Paradoxically, one of  the most significant upholders of  Husserlian-style phenomenology in analytic 
philosophy might at present be a philosopher who never openly labeled himself  as phenomenologist. I 
am thinking of  John Searle's theory of  intentionality, whose close connection with Husserl's has often 
been stressed by commentators. As David Woodruff  Smith recently put it in the Stanford Encyclopedia of  
Philosophy, "Searle's theory of  intentionality reads like a modernized version of  Husserl's." While 
speaking about Searle's book Intentionality, Smith characterized it as "often similar in detail to Husserl's 
theory of  intentionality, but pursued in the tradition and style of  analytic philosophy of  mind and 
language, without overtly phenomenological methodology." (8) In spite of  obvious divergences, 
especially in the naturalism debate, this analysis looks quite convincing. (9) Actually, I am inclined to 
think that Searle fully satisfies both conditions above. 
Let us now turn back to our original problem. I think the question as to the future of  phenomenology 
only makes sense in a very large context. It cannot be settled purely by considering the advancement of  
research in phenomenology, but must also address the positive contribution to philosophy in general 
that phenomenology can provide in the future. 
First, it is to be noted that Husserl's phenomenological epistemology is remarkable not only because of  
its strong foundationalist orientation, but also because Husserl rejected naturalism in favor of  an a priori 
normative approach. Husserl was actually not very original on this point. His main thesis can be stated, 
somewhat crudely, as follows: if  it is correct to say that the goal of  epistemology is to provide a set of  
criteria for defining when a belief  can be said to be a "valid," "justified," "rational" knowledge process, 
then the problems of  epistemology cannot be solved in terms of  natural causality. We thus have to 
distinguish between natural causes and "motivations," with the result that the question of  rationality 
becomes a matter of  determining whether a given belief  is "rationally motivated" or not. (10) In fact, 
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Husserl's foundationalism can itself  be easily understood in this way. From a phenomenological 
perspective, the foundation of  knowledge primarily consists in showing that beliefs of  a given type, 
whether correct or not, are rationally motivated. Now, this line of  thought is particularly relevant at a 
time when the difficulties raised by "naturalized" epistemology lead many philosophers to embrace 
some form of  normative epistemology. For example, Husserl's notion of  phenomenological 
foundation is quite close to that of  "entitlement" recently introduced by John McDowell. (11) 
Another contribution of  phenomenology might be to provide methods to metaphysics. It is, of  course, 
a controversial question in phenomenology what sort of  relationship it should have with metaphysics. 
Here we can confine ourselves to saying that this relationship is certainly more complex than it first 
seems. That phenomenology somehow opposes metaphysics is clear, but this should not mislead us 
into supposing that it makes all metaphysics impossible. Actually, as Husserl says in § 64 of  his Cartesian  
Meditations, phenomenology does not disqualify all, but only "naïve" metaphysics. (12) Indeed, the idea 
of  a transcendental phenomenology itself  means nothing else than that Husserl's phenomenological 
concern with consciousness and intentionality is in the service of  his metaphysical interest in objectivity 
in general. It is not surprising that, in his latest work, Husserl appeals for a universal science, whose lack 
he holds responsible for the crisis of  the European sciences. Transcendental phenomenology is 
phenomenology now conceived as a theory dealing with the properties of  all objects simply as they 
appear "in" consciousness. To put it briefly, it is exactly what the tradition calls "first philosophy." 
As opposed to an interpretation that has become common today, I suggest that it might be a significant 
advantage of  phenomenological approach in today's philosophical environment, where metaphysics 
most often goes hand in hand with blind realism, to allow for a highly fruitful continuation of  Kant's 
critical project. In my view, phenomenology not only has opened a large field of  metaphysical 
interrogation, but also has a critical, foundational function for metaphysics, which is to be understood 
in a Kantian manner. Phenomenology, in other words, is expected to "prepare" metaphysics. Did 
Husserl not say of  his phenomenology that it was "an attempt to make true the most profound sense 
of  Kant’s philosophy?" (13) However, obvious difficulties arise at this point. The trouble is that the 
phenomenological methodology itself  (as minimally defined by the two conditions above) possibly 
involves some metaphysical assumptions. In this case, phenomenological philosophy, at best, is just one 
metaphysical theory. Or should we rather affirm, just as Husserl did in Logical Investigations, the inherent 
neutrality of  phenomenology with regard to metaphysical claims? I personally opt for the latter view, 
although good arguments have also been given for not accepting it. My hypothesis - which I assume is 
not itself  a metaphysical one - is that the question whether phenomenological methods could be 
helpful in providing foundations for metaphysical research is, to a great degree, independent of  the 
question of  what ontological choices are required in order to practice phenomenology. In any case, I 
regard it as a mistake to think that one can approach metaphysical problems without questioning the a 
priori conditions of  metaphysical knowledge, i.e., without any phenomenological investigation of  the 
corresponding knowledge processes. 
That, I think, is a very important point at a time marked by the renewal of  metaphysics in analytic 
philosophy. However, we should not lose sight of  the fact that these views also involve a decisive 
change of  perspective. If  by "metaphysics" is meant a theory of  objects in the most proper sense, that 
is, a theory dealing with the most general properties of  what exists, then phenomenology is obviously 
not a good candidate for giving foundations to metaphysics. If  the starting point of  a 
phenomenological metaphysics must be the phenomenological analysis of  intentional contents, then 
this metaphysics, strictly speaking, is no longer a theory of  the world in general, but a theory dealing 
with the phenomenon of  the world in general. But how could we phenomenologically account for the 
existence of  an "objective" world, i.e., for a world which is precisely supposed to transcend my own 
phenomenological data? The phenomenologist is not interested in the objective world itself, but in its 
constitution "in" consciousness. The objective world is this very world that everybody deals with, in 
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sciences as well as in everyday attitude of  thought. So a metaphysics of  the objective world being based 
upon noematic analysis should first clarify what is entailed in everybody's consciousness: the 
phenomenon of  the objective world needs to be considered being what appears in a "universal 
consciousness," simply as it appears. The notion of  intersubjectivity is thus called to play a key-role in 
phenomenological metaphysics. (14) 
This brings us to the third point, which is concerned with the methodological aspects of  Husserl's 
phenomenology. Another important reason why I think phenomenology could be very useful for 
research in various areas of  philosophy is its highly-developed methodology. Husserlian-style 
phenomenology has the advantage of  imposing rigorous and clearly defined methodological constraints 
in fields where methodological matters are often understated or even arrogantly disregarded. 
Methodological or "critical" reflection is most often absent in today's both analytic and continental 
philosophy. Some philosophers are suspicious about it just because they consider it incompatible with 
realism. In this view, the investigating of  the validity of  the knowing process itself  is no more than an 
old Kantian quirk that turns us away from the real world. Other philosophers, in confining themselves 
to the history of  philosophy, actually do not need other methods than those of  history and philology. 
Others again seem to think that the method is a feature of  modern thought that has been overcome by 
Heidegger and others. Yet, there are significant exceptions, such as the rich debate over introspection in 
philosophy of  mind, which also generated deep methodological controversies among 
phenomenologists. (15) In any case, I think this is a core aspect of  the role to be played by Husserlian-
style phenomenology in philosophy. Phenomenology does not aim to provide a new worldview, but to 
ground or to properly describe all actual or possible worldviews. It is always preferable to regard it as a 
descriptive method which can be utilized, together with other methods, in all sciences including 
philosophy, where it generally leads to good results. This should lead us to prefer the adjective 
"phenomenological" to the noun "phenomenology." If, instead, the word "phenomenology" is intended 
to refer to a theory having its own content, then it should be seen as an abbreviation for 
"phenomenological psychology," "phenomenological philosophy," etc. 
Of  course, these remarks raise but do not decide the question whether Husserl's phenomenological 
methodology is still relevant today. In my opinion, at least two features that are most characteristic of  
Husserl's methodology need to be discussed today. First, Husserl is clear, in Ideas I, that the method of  
his phenomenology is phenomenal introspection (see Ideas I, § 76-79). This means that the 
phenomenologizing ego must be able to objectify (in the most proper sense) his or her own subjective 
experience, in order to obtain knowledge about it somehow in the same way as the botanist has 
knowledge about plants, or the astronomer about stars and planets, etc. This claim must be understood 
in connection with what has been said above about the rational and "scientific" character of  
Husserlian-style phenomenology. If  the subjectivity itself  is an object as are plants and planets, then it 
is entailed that it must obey the laws of  objectivity in general, and therefore that phenomenology, as 
opposed to art and poetry, cannot escape the laws of  formal logic and must satisfy some very general 
constraints studied in the normative part of  epistemology (which certainly involves circularity, but in 
my view not vicious circularity). The second feature is "eidetic description." Husserl held the 
paradoxical view, actually rejected by practically all his followers, that phenomenology, or 
phenomenological philosophy, must be an a priori science and, at the same time, a science firmly rooted 
in experience. On the one hand, phenomenological knowledge has this in common with empirical 
knowledge that it is, unlike mathematical knowledge, "incomplete," or "descriptive." On the other hand, 
it must consist, like mathematical knowledge, in laws in the strictest sense of  the term, in "laws of  
essence" grounded in intuitive evidences of  a special kind. Although the words "introspection" and 
"essence" sound out of  date today, I tend to think that Husserl's methods are far from having become 
unusable in today's philosophical context. The obvious failures of  opposite phenomenological projects 
such as Heidegger's ontology, which is characterized by its merely descriptive and non-introspective 
(i.e., non-objectifying) method, should at least incline us to think that the phenomenological method as 
47
defined by Husserl is perhaps the best way of  doing phenomenology. 
The three points evoked above are interdependent. First, as already noted, the critical role to be played 
by phenomenology does not prevent it from being a theory on its own account. The fact that 
phenomenology can serve as an instrument for philosophy and sciences does not mean that 
philosophers and scientists should utilize the phenomenological method without taking it seriously as a 
theory. Phenomenology - the phenomenological method in general - should rather be characterized as a 
level of  explanation. Secondly, Husserl considered his "eidetic" method as a condition for phenomenology 
to ground formal sciences such as logic and mathematics without being ensnared in psychologism. 
Finally, I have suggested that both normative and theoretical aspects discussed here have much to do 
with the problem of  introspection. It is presumably the fact that cognitive processes are objectifiable 
that allows phenomenology to rise to the rank of  an authentic theory and, at the same time, to play a 
normative role for other sciences, including metaphysics. 
Of  course, these are questions that deserve a more detailed and extensive examination than has been 
possible in this short paper. To conclude, I believe that Husserlian-style phenomenologists have a card 
to play in present-day philosophy, but also that the future of  phenomenology will depend on their 
capacity to take advantage of  the critical and normative potential of  phenomenology. My contention is 
that this requirement, as defined above, could serve as a guiding line for phenomenological research in 
the coming years.
Notes
(1) Cf. Sebastian Luft's contribution in the same collection.
(2) See Die Idee der Phänomenologie, Husserliana II, 46: "Das Sich-auf-Transzendentes-beziehen, es in 
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obvious alternative is to call it an inherent quality of  mental processes." (D. Cairns, "Theory of  
Intentionality," Journal of  the British Society for Phenomenology, 32/2, May 2001: 2-3, repr. in Phenomenology:  
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and "How to study consciousness scientifically." In J.Searle, Consciousness and Language, Cambridge: CUP, 
2002, p. 22-3, 43-4). The whole argument, Searle said, actually relies on an ambiguity in the distinction 
between subjective and objective. There is a confusion between the epistemological and the ontological sense 
of  "subjective" and "objective." A state of  mind is, by definition, something which exists in the mode 
of  subjective existence, i.e., something whose existence is dependent on that of  an individual 
consciousness. Yet, this subjectivity in the ontological sense in no way entails that a science of  
consciousness—as far as it must be "objective," that is to say: objective in the epistemological sense of  
the term—is impossible. 
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has rightly stressed that his philosophical project itself  is totally different from Husserl's: "From my 
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replies, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 55/216, June 2001: 284.) It is also not to be denied that Searle's 
naturalism is light years away from Husserl's theory of  transcendental reduction. These profound 
divergences, however, do not prevent Searle’s account of  intentionality from being remarkably similar 
to Husserl's. Unfortunately, as Searle himself  admits on page 72 of  the article quoted above, the debate 
is somewhat distorted by the fact that under the rubric "phenomenology" he generally discusses 
Dreyfus's personal views that have not much to do with Husserlian phenomenology. 
(10) Husserl, Ideen I, §136. Husserl often considers normative as opposed to naturalistic epistemology. 
See, for instance, Husserl's Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922-1937), Hua XXVII, 8-9, and the note on the 
concept of  experience in Aufsätze und Vorträge (1911-1921), Hua XXV, 209-10. 
(11) J. McDowell, Mind and World, Harvard UP, 2d ed., 1996. 
(12) Cartesianische Meditationen, Hua I, 182: "To prevent from misunderstandings, I would like to point 
out the fact that phenomenology rules out only naive metaphysics, dealing with the absurd things in 
themselves, but not metaphysics in general." 
(13) E. Husserl, Erste Philosophie, Hua VII, 287. As Kant put it, "the critique is the necessary preparation 
for the advancement of  a founded metaphysics as a science which must be treated dogmatically and 
systematically, so scholastically (not popularly)" (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, BXXXVI, cf. also Kant’s letter 
to Mendelssohn, 8 April 1766, Ak. 10: 71). I have tried to sketch what such a "phenomenological 
metaphysics" might look like in two recent articles in French: "Métaphysique phénoménologique," 
Bulletin d’analyse phénoménologique, I/2, September 2005: 3-174; and "Métaphysique phénoménologique, 
suite," Bulletin d’analyse phénoménologique, II/2, March 2006: 3-75. 
(14) Landgrebe has well exposed the paradox which underlies the idea itself  of  a "phenomenological 
metaphysics." See Phänomenologie und Metaphysik, Hamburg: Marion von Schröder, 1949. Metaphysics, he 
observed, deals with transcendence (p. 156-8), so how could phenomenology, that is a discipline 
confined by reduction to the pure immanence of  the cogito, give access to this transcendence, to any 
metaphysical knowledge? (Cf. p. 159, and also p. 149.) But, for Landgrebe, the paradox vanishes when 
one realizes that the egological epoché, the reduction to the "world for me," is "just a first methodic 
step" (p. 178). At least two conditions must be filled for a phenomenological metaphysics to become 
possible. We first need the intentionality thesis, which allows to preserve a "world for me," a world as 
pure phenomenon, in the reductive immanence itself  (cf. p. 163, 167-8, 172). Second, we also need the 
phenomenological theory of  intersubjectivity, which makes possible an intentional analysis of  the world 
as being the "objective" world. The principle of  all possible contribution of  phenomenology to 
metaphysics must be the notion of  intersubjectivity (p. 168-80), and the phenomenological reduction itself  
can be fully achieved only as a "reduction to intersubjectivity." In this sense, Landgrebe is totally right in 
saying that such a phenomenological philosophy would enable us to get rid of  the Kantian idea of  a 
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world consisting of  unknowable things in themselves. Now, the so-called transcendent world is a 
noematic sphere intersubjectively constituted as existing for each and every ego, as being universally 
valid, or "objective" (i.e., non-"subjective"). The absolute, Landgrebe says, is not the ineffable 
"completely other" (p. 191 et 194). 
(15) See, for example, the recent controversies about Dennett's heterophenomenology in Phenomenology  
and the Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 6/1-2, March, 2007.
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Husserl's Phenomenology of  the Life-World
Andrina Tonkli-Komel
The one-hundredth anniversary of  the publication of  Husserl’s Logical Investigations, which helped 
phenomenology pass on into the 20th century philosophy, was a new opportunity for reconsidering the 
basic elements and goals of  phenomenological investigations as well as its future perspectives. In his 
letter to Levy-Bruhl from 11 March 1935, Husserl promised that, by applying the phenomenological 
method, he would succeed in “grounding some sort of  transrationalism that would overcome the old 
and insufficient rationalism, and at the same time justify its innermost intentions.”
      The limited condition of  the old, i.e. modern rationalism, which Husserl mentions there, does not 
refer to the reason’s capability of  self-restriction but rather to its incapability of  encountering at its 
outer limits anything else than sheer irrationalism. To oppose such leveling is the true meaning of  any 
genuine transcendentalism. “Transrationalism” could be conceived of  as the new transcendentality 
without any absolutist pretensions of  absolving all transcendent being of  the world; as 
transcendentality, which cannot be adverse to the transcendence as absolute relativity. Just as 
transcendentality cannot simply abolish transcendence, transcendence cannot abolish transcendentality. 
A special movement is set free in-between the two, a course of  history, the life-world.
      We should take into account two absolute qualities; the absolute validity of  being as evidenced by 
reason, and relative being in the world of  the revealing life. The correlation between the flowing life 
and the becoming world is not identical with that of  reason and the permanent being of  the world. 
This identification is possible only on the ground of  life in full critical responsibility, i.e. life’s attitude to 
the ultimate truth. Insofar as this ultimate validity of  truth in its absolutistic pretension is in constant 
opposition to the only absolute relative flux, the rational critical responsibility finds as its correlate the 
permanent crisis of  the life-world. It is but the insight into the crisis intruding between the reason and 
life and correlatively, between being and the world, that can radically change the character of  
phenomenological criticism or the transcendental criterion of  this criticism. It does not suffice to 
persist in the name of  strict science in the correlation between reason and being, and in the 
directedness of  life as a whole toward the unconditioned truth secured by science as an infinite task of  
life fulfillment, or unification of  life and science. What is needed is a critical distinction between the 
transcendental in terms of  permanent transcendence of  life striving for ontic fulfillment in the world, 
and the transcendental in terms of  reflective grasping of  the identity of  life and the being of  the world 
evidenced as the life of  reason. Insofar as the reflective critical bearing – as witnessed in Husserl’s 
phenomenological philosophy – is attainable and has already been attained on the basis of  reductionist 
and corresponding constitutional methodical procedures, this distinction needs a methodical indication, 
especially if  phenomenology is to be understood primarily as a method. This opens up the possibility 
of  distinguishing between the transcendental reductive-constitutive methodical procedure and the 
movement of  phenomenological epochē, which don’t exclude each other but rather set each other free. 
In other words, the initial and final moment of  living in critical responsibility (of  the method) is 
freedom. In what way does this become evident from the phenomenological viewpoint?
     The rudimentary crisis of  the unity of  life and science compelled Husserl to seek a renewal of  
rationality, which as transrationality, bridges and overcomes the oblivion of  the life-world in the 
ultimate validity of  the scientific criticism of  being as evidenced by reason. However, exactly in this 
respect it becomes evident that the phenomenologically concealed and thus forgotten unity of  the life-
world is even more genuine than the constructed unity of  life and science, inasmuch it includes a 
distinction between the world and life, which in turn enables the aforementioned separation of  life and 
science as well as all others. Getting a word in edgeways, the “unity of  difference” of  the life-world also 
grounds critical responsibility, which is perhaps even freer than the historically inherited freedom of  
critical responsibility. It is a momentous freedom as the most important achievement of  
phenomenology in general.
     The momentous starting point of  phenomenology also establishes the historical distance between 
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us and the origin of  Greek philosophy and science, which can be compared to both Heidegger’s 
destruction and Derrida’s deconstruction; moreover, destruction and deconstruction are even made 
possible by epochē; Derrida explicitly states that without the “time of  epochē” “deconstruction is 
impossible.” (1) Epochē simply gives evidence of  the movement of  the structure. The advantage of  
Husserl’s momentous structuring (phenomenological analytics) lies in excluding neither corporality, as is 
true of  Heidegger, nor spirituality, as is true of  Derrida. The momentous beginning and the transition 
are marked by the fulfillment of  a life freed in itself, displaying its views as the unity in diversity.
     Despite all this, it seems that already at the starting point such momentous phenomenological 
transition “overtakes” the leap to strict science. The life fulfillment in critical self-responsibility is thus 
felt as some sort of  “overbearing” of  the rational mind bridging the void between life and science. At 
the same time, however, it cannot be denied that in Husserl we are likely to encounter a certain 
structuring which genuinely makes possible “filling” and “emptying”. A radically different outlook on 
his philosophy might open up if  we, from the very beginning, distinguish between the scientific 
reduction to the transcendental consciousness with its rationally constituted ontic correlate, and the 
movement of  phenomenological epochē, which is not reductive but, according to Husserl, re-pro-
ductive, revealing to life the unity of  the world; and it is also pro-re-ductive, giving evidence of  the 
heterogeneity of  life in the world. In the “intermediate being” of  the life-world, which is not the being 
in the objective transcendent or in the subjective transcendental sense, there opens up a dis-tinction of  
life and the world which cannot be unified by way of  transition to strict science, and homogenized by 
way of  rationally evidenced being. As the evidencing of  phenomena, it could be understood as a dis-
play, which both opens the world for life to provide it with meaning, and empties life so that it can find 
fulfillment in the world. This “game” of  the life-world is perceivable in any moment of  our everyday 
life. However, there is a possibility that, for a short moment, it can be momentously displayed. Such 
momentous reconstruction is in itself  productive in terms of  what we may justifiably call the 
phenomenology of  the life-world.
     Undoubtedly, such phenomenology of  the world has important ethical and cultural implications. Is 
there something like an ethos of  phenomenology, or even a phenomenological culture? Husserl’s 
ethical and cultural considerations seem to sum up in an alternative: “Either a collapse into spiritual 
hatred and barbarism or a spiritual rebirth arising out of  the heroism of  reason that will ultimately 
overcome naturalism.” If  we reproach Husserl for his farsightedness, we can, retrospectively, reproach 
numerous contemporary ethical stands for their short-sightedness. The fear of  heroism of  reason is all 
too often an evidence of  turning the blind eye to numerous forms of  barbarism we are faced with 
today – as Europeans!
     Moreover, we need to ask ourselves whether barbarism as a threat perhaps takes its main source 
from where it should be successfully overcome – from the power of  science, which comprises political, 
artistic and religious fields. In Husserl’s criticism of  the modern science movement, a particular 
emphasis is laid on two instances of  oblivion: at the beginning, it’s the human being standing behind 
science and in the end the world extant before science. Science forgets itself  both over its background 
and foreground, and revolves only in itself. It has thrown out both the excellence of  the human being 
and the excellence of  the world. The modern identification of  the world with the mathematically 
calculable nature has moulded the calculable nature of  man.
      The ethos of  phenomenology cannot be reduced to man’s taking part in this world as a 
disinterested spectator, or to letting ourselves be led by some special interest after its change, either out 
of  rational heroism or servile revolt. What can be expected, however, is some sort of  momentous intra-
esse reaching also into the inter-esse of  what Husserl thinks as intersubjectivity. This ethos of  
phenomenology, which acts “from within”, can be joined “from without” by a certain culture of  the 
life-world. Of  course, at this point there also opens up, in a largely modified form, a certain 
momentous possibility of  excellence and extraordinariness joined by manifoldness and multi-
layeredness. 
      The experience of  the (everyday, scientific, artistic etc.) actuality is formed in interpretative 
capabilities, which can be historically concealed or yet unconcealed, overcome, unattained or even 
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unattainable. This dynamic openness of  possibilities characterizes the life-world as such. The 
phenomenology of  the life-world cannot principally stick only to (fundamentally-ontological) speaking 
in favor of  possibility rather than actuality, but has to first of  all carry out a transformation of  critical 
reason into creative one. This transformation is necessary primarily because it is impossible to limit 
reason to critical evaluation of  life practices. The criteria of  reality making possible such an evaluation 
are directly formed in life practices themselves. The main task of  phenomenological rationality is thus 
an explicit unfolding of  basic tendencies of  human life in order to be able to form the world through a 
network of  meaningful identities and differences.
Notes
(1) Derrida J.: Gesetzskraft. Der »mystische Grund der Autorität«, Frankfurt/M. 1991, p. 42 (“Force of  
Law: The Mystical Foundations of  Authority,” Cardozo Law Review: Deconstruction and the 




Francesco Saverio Trincia 
One of  the main features of  Husserlian phenomenology is its opening to an infinite task of  research. It 
should be added that this task is not in any case conceived as systematic. The ethical interpretation of  
the “beginning” is an original commitment and a very clearly spelled out feature of  Husserl’s thought. 
This interpretation, or self-interpretation, has been confirmed after the publication of  the Krisis der 
europäischen Wissenschaften. It is also the result of  the fact that the Krisis has been correctly seen as 
containing the idea of  the possibility of  a rebirth or of  a rethinking of  a philosophical humanism free 
in itself  of  any metaphysical meaning, and intrinsically alien to the tradition of  the idealistic historicism. 
(1) Associated with this general observation is the central role played by the activity of  the evaluating 
and deciding subjectivity in the Husserlian ethics of  1914 (2): a role that is played within the schema of  
the correlation in which both the relationship to the axiological objectivity and to the universality of  the 
practical reason are at stake. This is not without relation to the necessity of  a deep understanding  of  
consciousness and of  subjectivity in what could be called the Husserlian “ideology,” that is the extra-
theoretical use that can be made of  phenomenology as a more o less hidden ethics of  an immer wieder 
returning commitment to begin the phenomenological investigation without any presuppositions. 
There is no doubt that the end of  the 1914 Vorlesungen  and the role there assigned to the “evidence” 
of  a “living” ethical judgement, in which the evident rationality of  the willing subject meets the sphere 
of  values, in some way  prepares the notion of  the universal humanity to which Husserl’s attention in 
the “Kaizo” articles of  the twenties is devoted, and the rational hope of  a new humanity coming out of  
its “crisis” and based on the birth of  a  new kind of  man, being no more a “factual man.” It can be said 
that the distinction sketched in the last pages of  the 1914 Vorlesungen, between an ethical judgement 
based on the statement of  an observer who remains external to the ethical Erlebnis and can pronounce 
itself  only on its Richtigkeit, on the one side, and the “evident  judging” where  the subject who judges 
“lives his authentic duty,” on the other side, is the expression in the  formal vocabulary of  the 
phenomenological ethics of  the distinction between the objective man  of  the scientific, empirical 
psychology (the man in the world), and  the man constituted by the transcendental Ego (the man for 
the world) presented in the Krisis.
    Jocelyn Benoist (3) has very well seen that one of  the meanings of  the “paradox” of  subjectivity in 
the Krisis consists in the form of  the correlation, which permits to “transform in poem” its inheritance 
and to build up a sort of  “invented” history in which subjectivity “meets the possibility or the question 
of  the most extreme universality.” Benoist points out with some irony the orientation of  the 
phenomenological subjectivity to universality. It is interesting to observe that this ethical subjectivity is 
oriented to universality in a “poetic” way, but also through an “invention” of  history which recalls the 
idea of  the “apriori history” (this is the expression used by Hussserl in the famous text of  the Origin 
of  Geometry). This kind of  history may be able to host an ethical subjectivity oriented to universality, 
just because it does not depend on the contingency of  empirical existence – where only “factual men” 
may live.
    Help can be found by an interpreter of  Husserl’s ethics in Rudolf  Bernet’s last book. (4) Bernet very 
well shows which is the general “sense-horizon” within which the evaluating and deciding intentional 
consciousness is to be understood. From the point of  view of  the correlation-relationship between 
consciousness and existence, it appears very clearly that transcendental consciousness also is “already 
contaminated by the same illness that corrodes human existence.” We have remarked that at least the 
surface of  Husserl’s attitude towards ethics (the one that is not expressed in phenomenology’s technical 
vocabulary and is rather a “spiritual atmosphere” of  it) is conditioned by a sort of  humanistic, ethical 
ideology.  If  the hypothesis can be advanced that the building of  a “pure ethics” through Husserl’s pure 
theoretical arguing cannot avoid referring to human existence and to the “persons” that are to be met 
there, we have to recognize that the so called “ideological” side of  Husserlian ethics cannot be put 
aside. It is certainly true that the notion of  “person” which is important in the lectures of  1920-24 (5) 
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should not be considered as the expression of  the man “in the world,” that is, of  an empirical subject: 
the “person” is in any case something “constituted,” and not a natural human being. It is therefore true 
that the “existence” of  which we talk when we say that Husserlian ethics is existence-related is not the 
natural and objective existence. But this does not mean that the phenomenological ethics does not meet 
the phenomenological existence and does not work for the orientation of  (not factual) subjects. This is 
one of  the main differences between the notion of  “pure” ethics as thought by Immanuel Kant, and 
the same notion thought by Husserl. In the first case, but not in the second, “purity” means the 
exclusion of  all content of  the ethical choice, and the isolation of  every influence of  the sensible 
objects on it. This point drives us to say that what could be called  a “care for the world” is one of  the 
main features of  Husserlian ethics – and that  this “care,” in some way unknown to Kant, has to be 
seen as the not paradoxical result of  a  not content-excluding “formality” which is in itself, again, 
different from Kantian “formality.”
    On the one side, in fact, Husserl’s ethics refers to “values” which are seen as “material apriori” (this 
is the side of  the content, which does not lack in it, and which is the way by which Husserl’s ethics 
takes care of  the world and aims to build a certain kind of  human being, not simply a rational being 
acting “by duty”). But on the other side, an equal emphasis should be put on the way in which Husserl 
presents the role of  the subjectivity in ethics. The possibility to fix the degree of  the “utility for the 
world” of  the phenomenological ethics depends on the role of  the subjectivity who “lives through” his 
or her evaluating judgement and in this way meets the duty that is “ready” for the rational and evident 
will, as Husserl points out in the 1914 lessons. It could be said, even more radically, that it is the role 
plaid by the phenomenological subject that allows us to speak of  phenomenology as a “philosophy of  
ethics” and to realize an “apology” of  it which does not accept the charge of  its being an ideological 
construction in contradiction with its main epistemic inspiration. It should be remarked also that the 
“apology” of  phenomenology as philosophy of  ethics does not simply mean that phenomenology 
gives a solid philosophical foundation to ethics – a foundation which is supposed to be stronger than 
others. Were it so, we would obtain the not wanted result of  losing the aspect for which 
phenomenology is not to be reduced to a mere theoretical construction. In any field of  the range of  
action of  the intentional consciousness, and in a very particular way in ethics, phenomenology is not 
the way of  the reduction of  the philosophical content (here the ethical will, and the activity of  
evaluation and of  decision connected to it) to its mere theoretical form.
    It is not easy to find  the right way to express this point, but  one could try to say that 
phenomenological ethics offers the possibility “to live from within” the ethical experience and that  the 
harshness with which Husserl  again and again in the 1914 Lectures explains the  connection and the 
difference between  formal logic and formal ethics, that is between what Kant calls “pure reason” and 
“practical reason,” is the  hidden signal that  his main concern is that of  “saving” the practical reason, 
and the entire sphere of  ethics, form the double risk of  psychologism and of  intellectualism, both seen  
realized, according to him, in Kant’s ethics. Husserl’s aim is similar to Kant’s, but it is not reached at all 
in the same way. And the role of  subjectivity within the formal working of  ethics is no less important 
point of  difference. No subjectivity is necessary in Kant’s ethics. To say that, as a consequence of  both 
being “formal,” logic and ethics are at the same time “parallel” and “interwoven,” means that they meet 
only because the logical judgement offers its voice to the ethical judgement, otherwise destined to 
remain mute. This allows Husserl to build the sphere of  ethics as such that the main link with logic is 
to be seen in their being both “modes” of  the intentional consciousness. The peculiar way in which 
subjectivity works in ethics refers to the common source in the intentional consciousness of  both 
judging and evaluating and deciding, with the theoretical judgement only giving voice to ethics. But the 
opposite is also true: the common intentional source is the basis of  a difference that just by its 
appearing as a “parallelism” must be conceived in such a way that the difference between logic and 
ethics is connected with the feature of  the correlation of  the evaluating and deciding subjectivity with 
its peculiar objects – those objects that, being values, can not be equal to the objects of  the “parallel” 
logical intentionality. It is very clear therefore that no peculiar role of  the ethic subjectivity could be 
admitted, if  the difference between logic and ethics has no assumed the radical feature of  the 
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“parallelism.”
    Jocelyn Benoist gives a definition of  a “subject or rather than of  subjectivity” which is important for 
our argument. He writes that the subject is located “dedans et dehos: il est ce témoin  implicite situé au 
point aveugle du champ visuel, comme aussi bien ce qui se montre en lui à chaque transition qu’il 
ménage.’’ (6) Something crucial for the specific feature of  the ethical intentionality is very well 
expressed in this formulation of  the  problem of  subjectivity: The phenomenological idea of  the  
Doppelseitigkeit, of  the bilaterality, of  the correspondence and of  the correlativity which connects the 
subjective and  the objective side of  intentionality also in its  ethical mode. What is called by Benoist 
the “blind point” of  the “champ visuel”, is at the same time what is supposed to accompany the steps 
that are made within its objective horizon (better: within its horizon of  objectivation), thanks to the 
activity of  the intentional consciousness. The way in which Benoist  expresses the image of  subjectivity 
is clearly fashioned according to the image which closes the important paragraph 95 of  Formale und 
tranzendentale Logik, (7) where Husserl writes that “subjectivity of  everybody” should be thought as 
“this subjectivity (that) I myself  am, the I  who becomes conscious of  myself, about what is  for me 
and is valid for me.” Husserl adds that “the subjectivity is the primary matter of  fact that I have to face, 
and from which I as philosopher can never divert my glance.” It is true that for a beginner philosopher 
this can be der dunkle Winkel, the dark corner, in which the ghosts of  solipsism, of  psychologism and 
of  relativism bustle around. But the true philosopher will prefer to fill this dark corner with light, 
instead of  being scared by it.”
    Husserl is not talking of  the ethical subjectivity. But this description concerns also the ethical 
subjectivity, of  which one must say the same that has been said of  the phenomenological subjectivity in 
general. The circumstance that we understand subjectivity as the blind point of  the “champ visuel” and 
as the “dark corner” on which no light falls, means that we are talking of  a subject that is devoid of  any 
metaphysical and naturalistic consistence. And for what concerns specifically the ethical subject, the 
general feature of  the phenomenological subject forbids us to imagine him as an ethical legislator, 
already present and active in the world. Even if  we admit that the “person” is one of  the last results of  
the Husserlian ethics, we still have to remember that the ethical subject is not a natural person, is not, as 
already said, a man in the world. It is just as important for the subject of  the ethical intentional 
consciousness, as for the subject of  the theoretical intentional consciousness, to accept the task of  
filling the darkness of  subjectivity with light, whose  darkness is the condition of  its not being 
something given in the world – that is of  its phenomenological feature. Light must be thrown on it if  
the risks of  relativism of  the psychological attitude have to be avoided. Therefore, light does not 
transform subjectivity in something natural and worldly. It is discovered that every subjectivity is based 
on his intentional activity on the bilateral structure of  the intentional relationship to the objectivity. 
This is also the structural schema that underlies Husserlian ethics. Husserl’s thought maintains its 
promise of  being the birth of  an infinite research, just because it tries to give the foundation of  a 
formal ethics, which is supposed to be able to “capture” in its formality both  the deciding ethical 
subjectivity and  its intentional objects, the “values.” Also in ethics, as in the whole of  phenomenology, 
the bilaterality and the correlation are formal. It is this peculiar formality that opens the possibility of  
an ethical theory which does not forget the contents of  our ethical activity.
    On the basis of  this interpretation of  Husserl’s ethics (an anti-ideological and anti-idealistic 
interpretation) we can say that the phenomenological discovery of  the phenomenon of  feeling, of  
wishing, of  willing, offers to human beings a new instrument of  an ethical orientation in the world.
Notes
(1) See F.S. Trincia, Che cosa ne è dell’uomo in (e dopo) Husserl e Heidegger?, “Links”, II, 2002.
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(3) See  J. Benoist, L’histoire en poeme, « Recherches husserliennes »,  IX, 1998.
(4) See R. Bernet, Conscience et existence. Perspectives phenoménologiques, Paris 2004, 9.
(5) E.Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920-24, Husserliana  XXXVII, 
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(7) See  E. Husserl,  Formale und tranzendentale Logik, Versuch einer Kritik del logischen Vernunft, 
Husserliana XVII, 1974,  208-210. 
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On the Radical and Erotic Reductions
Roberto J. Walton
Transcendental phenomenology has considered bodilihood as a constitutive dimension of  
transcendental subjectivity (L. Landgrebe). This has lead on to the assertion, from an epistemological 
standpoint, of  the priority of  consciousness as the mode of  access to the world, and, from an 
ontological standpoint, of  a twofold relationship of  reciprocal nonderivability (or irreducibility) and 
relevance (or conditioning) between the body and consciousness (E. Ströker). In a further step, recent 
trends in phenomenology have drawn a boundary between the body, which is the deep dimension of  
subjectivity correlated with the world, and the flesh, which withdraws from the world. On the one 
hand, Michel Henry has given priority to an original flesh, which, at work in the radical immanence of  
an “I can,” takes hold of  the manifold functions of  the organic body that is intertwined with the world. 
Here self-affection is cut off  from hetero-affection, and this is essential to Henry’s “radical reduction” 
to pure immanence. On the other hand, Jean-Luc Marion has also developed the notion of  flesh, but, 
following Emmanuel Levinas, stresses its intersubjective side insofar as my body attains a “face” and 
becomes flesh when it receives from the Other what I do not possess by myself  and at the same time 
the Other receives from myself  the flesh and the “face” that it does not possess by itself. Here hetero-
affection is separated from self-affection, and this is central to Marion’s “erotic reduction” to what 
comes from elsewhere. My argument in this paper is that the so-called radical and the erotic reductions 
should be considered, in terms of  the transcendental reduction, as an attempt to deal with modes of  
surplus within the intentional correlation with the world disclosed by the latter.
    What seems particularly objectionable is the neglect of  the stratification that underlies the contrast 
between the body and the flesh. For the surplus entailed by the flesh does not amount to the vanishing 
of  the body, as both Henry and Marion put it, but rather to the emergence of  a new level that can be 
understood, in terms of  reciprocal relevance and nonderivability, in the light of  the laws of  
stratification and categorial dependence advanced by Nicolai Hartmann. Applied to our subject, the law 
of  stratification leads to the following formulations: something of  the body returns in the flesh; the 
body does not come back as such in the flesh because it undergoes a variation, the flesh entails a 
novelty with regard to the body, and there is a leap leading from the body to the flesh. One could argue 
that the disappearance of  the body in the radical and erotic reductions is due to the overlooking of  
return and variation as well as to the overstressing of  novelty and leap. Furthermore, the following 
statements issue from the law of  categorial dependence: the body is stronger than the flesh; the body is 
indifferent to the flesh; the body functions as an existential foundation for the flesh; and the flesh is 
free with regard to the body. In this respect, the disappearance of  the body is the outcome of  
forgetting force and indifference and overemphasizing existential foundation and freedom. Again, 
misunderstandings arise when the four contentions are not taken together. 
    According to Hartmann, the upper stratum can emerge as an overformation (Überformung), in which 
the lower stratum comes back entirely as a matter that receives a new form, or as an overconstruction 
(Überbauung), in which it operates only as an existential foundation without influence on the contents 
of  the upper stratum. To acknowledge this dependence in the line of  existence instead of  content both 
makes clear the ontological relevancy of  the lower stratum and preserves the nonderivability or novelty 
of  the upper stratum, and, therefore, renders possible the claim of  an epistemological primacy in the 
case of  consciousness and the assertion of  a new mode of  phenomenalization in the case of  flesh. If  
we focus on the strata involved, flesh and “face” are a novelty with regard to body and visible 
countenance. They are phenomena of  excess that appear as something new on the basis of  a ground 
of  being that must be overconstructed. Accordingly, when their function is restricted to that of  an 
existential foundation, body and visible countenance withdraw in the overconstruction of  flesh and 
“face,” but remain, as concerns their existence, indifferent to the upper stratum and do not break 
down. Were it otherwise, the body would be indeed undermined by the flesh.  
    In an ontological analysis, then, a mediation encompassing return and novelty is necessary between 
what belongs to a given statum of  the world and what transcends it. Correlatively, from the viewpoint 
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of  access, a mediation is also necessary between the givenness of  the visible and the modes of  
phenomenalization of  the invisible. Husserl’s view is that the visible body is the expression of  an 
inwardness that can be explicated in a variety of  levels that correspond to various strata in self-
experience and the experience of  the Other. Hence, the disjunction between visibility and invisibility, 
with an exclusive emphasis on the latter in the radical and erotic reductions, not only disregards 
stratification, but also ignores the phenomenon of  expression in which my visible movements and the 
visible countenance differentiate themselves both from a corporeal surface, because they signify an 
inwardness, and from flesh and “face,” because they are visible. In order to show how visibility and 
invisibility are compatible, because there is a necessary link between them within an overconstruction, 
one must regard flesh and “face” within the larger framework of  the notion of  horizonality, to which 
overconstruction provides a specification. For the body as a given level of  being is a theme that points 
beyond itself, and the flesh is experienced through these references that irradiate from it. Flesh and 
“face” are horizons that cannot come forth to visibility, but this “beyond” must be grasped in such a 
way that it cannot be detached from the visibility that intends to it. Their invisibility can be understood 
as a nonintuitable residuum, i.e., as an irreducible surplus, both in the horizon of  self-affection opened 
out by the experience of  the movement of  my own body, and in the horizon of  the Other revealed by 
the perception of  the alien body. It can be recalled here that Marion examines a paradox of  givenness 
because the given withholds the manifestation of  givenness itself. Thus, every datum must be referred 
to its givenness by unfolding its fold. This does not seem to add much to the explication of  an 
apperceptive horizon that, being intertwined with the perception of  one’s own or the Other’s body, 
cannot be wholly laid open.
    The convergence of  invisible self-affection with visible hetero-affection does not rule out a further 
contraction of  self-affection intermingled with hetero-affection into a pure self-affection as that 
described by Henry, or a further expansion of  hetero-affection blended with self-affection into a pure 
hetero-affection as that outlined by Marion. Only in a second stage can self-affection become unraveled 
from outwardness, and hetero-affection become separated from inwardness. Both processes can be 
construed as an unfolding of  horizonality in which we are directed towards an ideal pole. In addition, 
this analysis does not exclude speaking of  an infinite self-affection or an infinite interpellation of  the 
Other, which would enable our living in the world to surpass its narrow limits. Nevertheless, it avoids 
separating them from our worldly condition, so that, even if  they are not manifest within the world, 
they are at least constructed over it. They can be referred back to a dimension of  horizonality that is 
inexplicable or invisible, but announces itself  in intentional modes of  self-affection, and expresses 
itself  through the visible countenance of  the Other. Since this dimension entails a maximum of  
contraction and intensification of  transcendental life in its relationship with itself, as well as a maximum 
of  expansion and estrangement in its relationship with the Other, it accounts for the possibility of  an 
acknowledgment of, and an answer to, infinite self-affection and infinite interpellation. 
    In contrast to the transcendental reduction, which attempts to show the true significance of  the 
natural attitude as the self-concealment of  the transcendental dimension, the radical and the erotic 
reductions establish a realm distinct to that of  the natural attitude. The pregivenness of  the world is not 
considered from a new angle by showing what is implied in it, but rather an attempt is made to disclose 
a different type of  phenomenalization. This leads to set originary flesh against one’s own body and 
alien flesh against the body of  the Other. On the contrary, an inquiry into the true significance of  what 
is pregiven in the natural attitude shows one’s own body as the indication of  an originary flesh tied to a 
transcendental “I can,” which cannot be separated from its body as an organ of  actualization in the 
world, and exposes the body of  the Other as the indication of  a transcendental Other, which cannot be 
detached from its body as an organ of  expression in the world. Only through contraction and 
expansion as modes of  overconstruction in the horizon of  these two phenomena can we have access to 
a dimension of  invisibility. The upshot of  this argument is that the attempt to think beyond worldly 
Being  "the correlation between world and world-consciousness" amounts, on closer inspection, to the 
extrapolation of  an infinite pole for the unfolding of  the horizons of  inwardness and elsewhere 
sustained by the correlation. 
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Phenomenology, Psychopathology and the Philosophy of  Mind
Michael Blamauer 
 
   In the following brief  paper I would like to give a few hints on the actuality of  Husserl’s 
phenomenology and its relevance for the actual interdisciplinary discourse between psychopathology, 
cognitive psychology and the philosophy of  mind. My aim is to point out, that one way into the future 
of  phenomenology maybe lies in the power of  its methodological way to tackle some currently 
discussed psychological as well as philosophical problems. I think that a rediscovery of  some 
Husserlian motifs – especially methodological ones – can be very fruitful for an interdisciplinary 
exchange between philosophy, psychology and psychopathology.
Some phenomenological themes in the Philosophy of  Mind 
   Husserl’s phenomenology had two major aims. The first one was to cure philosophy of  its speculative 
character and  renew it as a “rigorous science.” The second aim was to elucidate the question of  the 
possibility of  scientific knowledge in an a priori way. (1) Therefore the idea of  philosophy as a 
“rigorous science” refers to methodological reflections about the a priori relation between the object of  
a scientific investigation and the investigating subject – a project which had already been enforced by 
Kant in his Critique of  Pure Reason 200 years earlier. These considerations lead Husserl – following Franz 
Brentano – to the discovery of  a fundamental feature of  our consciousness: to be conscious means in 
the main to be conscious of  something. Every subjective conscious act – experiencing, thinking, hoping, 
wishing, judging, etc. – is directed on an object. It makes no difference whether this object is an 
innerworld object, a thought or just a matter of  fact of  a judgment. Thus consciousness is 
characterized through intentionality and therefore the distinction between a pure objective and a pure 
subjective sphere could no longer hold. This paradox that every objective truth is correlated with a 
subjective act in which it is known requires a systematical explanation. (2) 
   As a result of  these insights Husserl saw the first step of  the development of  a scientific philosophy 
in the investigation of  the correlative structure of  intentionality itself  and its meaning  for the 
investigation of  the concept of  reality. His motto could be formulated as follows: If  we want to know 
something about the reality we live in, we need to take a step backwards from the “what we see” to the 
“how it is given” for us. This turn from a naïve directedness towards supposed objective facts to an 
investigation of  the correlative structure between these facts and the subjective constitutive act  is the 
main methodological step of  phenomenological science. This systematic investigation of  the 
constitutive functions of  the subject’s attitude towards the objective world is also of  interest in the 
philosophical discourse today – especially when the topic of  scientific investigation and discourse is 
consciousness itself. 
   When we focus on consciousness itself  the investigated object and the investigating subject are 
inseparable from one another, i.e., science must deal with the tricky methodological difference between 
a first-person and a third-person approach to consciousness. In the actual discourse on this topic 
Husserlian methodological claims are of  special interest, above all in the dialogue between the empirical 
sciences that investigate consciousness and its features (e.g., neurosciences, cognitive psychology, etc.) 
and the philosophy of  mind. David Chalmers points out that although we know a lot about 
consciousness from a third-person perspective (TPP), at the present stage we have hardly any 
formalisms to investigate and interpret data from a first-person perspective (FPP). It was one of  
Husserl’s main contributions that he developed a systematic methodological framework that tries to 
deal with this difference between a first- and a third-person view.
   In the actual debate of  the philosophy of  mind it is exactly the above outlined subjective dimension 
and its importance for phenomenal experience which characterizes the main difficulties in theory 
construction within the project of  a science of  consciousness. According to Chalmers, consciousness 
may be understood in two different ways: on the one hand we have a psychological approach in which 
the mind is characterized by the way it does; on the other hand we have the phenomenal concept in 
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which the mind is characterized by the way it feels. (3) Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl outlines that in the 
phenomenological tradition consciousness is interpreted similarly: the mind is characterized through 
intentionality. That implies two aspects of  conscious experience: first the directedness on something 
and second the present living through of  the experience which represents that something. (4) 
   Therefore, consciousness contains two major properties: phenomenal properties which characterize 
what it is like to be in a specific mental state and representational properties which represent a certain 
intentional content. A science of  consciousness must now deal with the difficult question of  what 
someone refers to when he refers to his mental acts. Because when someone talks about his 
phenomenological constitution, i.e.,  how it is for him to experience the world, he refers to his 
conscious mental states. This reference is different from his reference to any object in the world. Unlike 
his reference to an innerworld object “via an intention that picks out something that [... he is ...] causally 
connected to,” he has direct access to his conscious experiences. He can refer to these “via an intention 
that picks out something that [... he is ...] immediately acquainted with.” (5) This difference in the mode 
of  givenness between an innerworld object and the subjective act directed on an object was — albeit in 
a different kind of  meaning — already emphasized by Husserl: every innerworld object appears in an 
perspectival manner whereas the subjective act is itself  given — so to speak — in an absolute way. (6) 
   This difference between phenomenal and representational properties characterizes the gap between 
consciousness and cognition. It can therefore be understood as an expression of  the so-called “hard 
problem” of  consciousness, i.e., the problem of  integrating phenomenal consciousness in the physical 
worldview. Maybe to revert to a Husserlian account of  this problem can enlighten the debate as he tried 
to develop a universal framework that enables a systematic investigation of  the correlation between 
mind and world. 
Phenomenology and Psychopathology 
  Besides phenomenological motifs in the actual discourse of  the Philosophy of  Mind 
phenomenological approaches could also be found in the field of  psychiatry and psychopathology. 
Husserl himself  was already interested in psychological questions as he intended to substantiate 
empirical psychology in a phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology. This 
examination could be found in diverse writings. (7) Currently there are some interesting attempts to 
work with Husserlian “tools” in the treatment of  psychological/psychopathological questions and 
problems.
In recent years, the impact of  phenomena of  mental disorders on a scientific understanding of  
consciousness has been intensively discussed. On this account some authors locate one of  the main 
causes of  schizophrenic diseases in the disturbed subjective concept that the schizophrenic has of  
himself. This disturbance is often mentioned as a form of  self-disorder or ipseity disturbance. (8) 
Therefore the discussion is led by questions like: given that schizophrenia is interpreted as a form of  
self-disturbance, what is the concept of  “self ” about? In seeking an answer to this question a 
phenomenological perspective on mental disorders such as schizophrenia may lead to new insights in 
the understanding and interpretation of  these phenomena. 
According to this perspective the experiencing subject is — depending on Husserl’s theory of  
intentionality — never an isolated pole but a subject who is directed on and related to objects of  his 
world. Therefore, every subject must always be seen and understood in the fundamental and natural 
correlation with his/her world. In this context schizophrenia — as a form of  self-disorder — is 
interpreted as a disturbance of  the mentioned intentional correlation. An analysis of  the intentional 
structure may support the development of  a framework that enables scientists a better understanding 
of  schizophrenic diseases like delusions and hallucinations.
   After Josef  Parnas and his colleagues, there are three major dimensions that seem to be affected in 
self-disorders like schizophrenia: 1. disturbance of  intentionality, 2. disturbance in the realm of  self  
(“unstable first person perspective”) and 3. disturbed dimension of  subjectivity. (9) The authors 
outlines that patients with schizophrenia rather tend to observe  their experiences than to “live 
through” them.
   In another publication, Parnas et al. furthermore lay stress on the fact that there is a need for a 
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change in the understanding of  the development of  the characteristic symptoms of  schizophrenic 
disorders. This development may not be understood as “a contingent, unexpected popping up into 
consciousness of  ‘primary’ (modular) eruptions from a malfunctioning organic substrate” but rather as 
a “complex temporal vissicitude” of  the unstable structure of  phenomenal (self-) experience. (10) A 
similar model for understanding and interpreting schizophrenic symptoms could be found in the 
psychiatric literature more influenced by cognitive science.
   Psychopathological symptoms of  schizophrenia, e.g., delusions and hallucinations, are often 
interpreted as a result of  a form of  disturbed self-reference (11), which means that a subject is no 
longer able to refer adequately to his/her own mental states as his/her own mental states which may 
lead to delusions of  persecution, thought insertion or thought control. As I outlined above, according 
to the cited authors, schizophrenia and its symptoms must be understood as a form of  ipseity-/self-
disturbance. Again we see the necessity to investigate the phenomenon of  our direct acquaintance with 
our conscious experiences and its relatedness to an objective world. 
Maybe phenomenological analysis, i.e., structural analysis of  the intentional correlation between the 
subject and his/her world as well as the interpretation of  the distortions of  this correlation, enable us 
to understand phenomena of  mental disorders in a more fundamental way.
   In this short outline I did not want to develop a concrete idea of  how the future of  phenomenology 
should look. I rather wanted to give a few hints of  how fruitful an interdisciplinary exchange between 
phenomenology and the empirical sciences might be.
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Phenomenology as a Transcendental Theory of  Consciousness
Wolfgang Fasching 
 
  Following today’s objectivistic paradigm that reality means independence from subjective experience, 
the main endeavor of  philosophy of  mind has for a long time been to work out strategies to reduce 
consciousness to something objectively accessible: if  reality means subject-independence, subjective 
experience itself  must “in reality” consist — if  existent at all — in something objectively verifiable and 
cannot be something only privately experienced. Consciousness has to be integratable into a 
physicalistic view of  the world and explainable as a physical feature of  the material world (e.g., 
according to the various identity theories, as certain brain processes or functions).
   In recent years, however, a growing skepticism has arisen as to whether such a reduction of  the 
psychical to the physical is indeed possible. The critique roughly amounts to the objection that such a 
reduction is based on (re-)defining consciousness in third-person terms from the start, i.e., as a set of  
objectively describable performances, and then asking which physical mechanisms in the organism 
make such performances possible. (1) With this move, consciousness in its first-personal sense (in its 
experiential dimension) actually remains unreduced because it has been left out from the very 
beginning. (2) This experiential dimension cannot be brushed aside as being just the mode in which 
something objective is subjectively experienced, to the effect that the difference between “phenomenal 
consciousness” and functionally describable performances of  the brain would merely be epistemic in 
nature whilst the ontological identity would remain unaffected: the distinction between subjective 
appearance and objective reality loses its meaning when the reality of  the subjective appearance, of  
experience itself  is in question. Consciousness has its existence, its reality, in being subjectively 
experienced (in being conscious) (3), that is: it has a “first-person ontology.” (4) 
   Therefore, today it is a widely held view that consciousness in its subjective sense is an irreducible 
feature of  the mind and that consequently first-personal, “phenomenological” investigations are 
indispensable for its unrestricted inquiry. (5) In contrast to the exploration of, for example, continental 
drift in investigating the mind it is not possible to abstract from how it appears subjectively without 
losing sight of  the subject-matter, because being experienced belongs to the very nature of  
consciousness. In this case, the way it appears subjectively is a genuine and unneglectable feature of  the 
subject-matter itself.
   Herein one could see a certain reconciliation between the positions of  the philosophy of  mind and 
the “continental” tradition of  phenomenology that always viewed itself  as a science of  experience, of  
the appearing, i.e., as a science of  the first-person perspective und therefore always insisted on the 
irreducibility of  the subjective. This could be a chance for phenomenology, indeed, to overcome the 
petrification sometimes observed in text exegesis or jargon and to regain an enhanced problem-
orientedness by entering a discussion that goes beyond the one’s own “school.” But at the same time, in 
my view, a certain caution is necessary. It has to be asked whether with the concession that there are 
irreducible first-person facts, phenomenology as an autonomous, non-naturalizable discipline is already 
vindicated; whether its relevance should be exhausted in a suppositionless description of  experiential 
facts in order to deliver an indispensable contribution to an uncurtailed inquiry of  the mind — or 
whether being pinned down to such a role rather amounts to an integration of  phenomenological 
insights in a naturalistic context and thereby to playing down or even abandoning phenomenology’s 
true claim.
   For whereas Husserlian phenomenology decidedly understands itself  as an anti-naturalist philosophy, 
the whole debate on the pros and cons of  the reducibility of  consciousness takes place within a 
naturalistic framework, if  naturalism is understood in a broad sense that is not restricted to physicalism. 
The question the reductionism debate revolves around is: do only objective, outer phenomena really 
exist, or are there, in addition to that, also irreducibly “subjective” phenomena, that is, rather peculiar 
phenomena that are only privately accessible, not directly observable by any outer sense? But inquiring 
about the place consciousness has in the world of  objective phenomena in this way already 
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presupposes the phenomenality of  phenomena. And this is the thematic field of  phenomenology. (6)
   No matter whether the irreducibility of  consciousness is denied or accepted, the existence of  the 
objectively given is presupposed and the question is how (or if) within the world, amongst the objective 
things, something as unusual as only first-personally observable, “inner,” subjective facts can occur 
(which leads, if  accepted, to a “dualism”). But to presuppose the existence of  what is objectively given 
in this way leaves the givenness of  the objectively given simply unreflected. Thus, posing the question 
in this way means to remain steadfastly within the naivity of  what Husserl calls the “natural attitude.” 
(7) In this sense all theories that conceive of  the consciousness as a part of  the natural world can be 
labeled as “naturalistic.” (8)
In this way, the problem level of  a truly phenomenological theory of  consciousness is not achieved at 
all. From a phenomenological point of  view, there are not objects on the one hand and on the other — 
additionally — subjective experience, but precisely the “being-there” of  objects takes place in 
experience. For phenomenology, consciousness is not a phenomenon (albeit rather special) among 
others (not “the most vivid of  phenomena” (9)) but the place of  phenomenality. Thus, when 
phenomenology speaks of  the non-circumventibility of  consciousness it does not aim at an extension 
of  what might count as real in the world, it does not claim that there are certain further entities and/or 
properties science has not taken into account so far. The phenomenological theory of  consciousness is 
not about a special region within the objectively given world but about the givenness of  the world itself. 
Therefore, its topic is not the subjective as opposed to the objective but objectivity as such. (10) This is 
what makes phenomenology a transcendental theory of  consciousness.
   Consequently, instead of  contributing as a supplement to the investigation of  “outer” phenomena, 
the investigation of  “inner,” only introspectively accessible phenomena, phenomenology’s genuine task 
would rather be to question the presuppositions of  such seemingly obvious distinctions. From a 
phenomenological point of  view it is a peculiar prejudice that there should be outer and inner 
phenomena (if  by the latter we mean conscious experiences) — a prejudice that has its origin, on the 
one hand, in our knowledge that an outer reality exists (which lies constantly before us and which 
science explores), and, on the other hand, in our intuition that there is also our consciousness which 
we, after all, also experience, but which is immediately accessible only to the respective subject: hence 
an “inner” phenomenon. But under phenomenological suppositionlessness it becomes highly 
questionable whether anyone has ever seen outer and inner phenomena, existing side by side. When 
one tries to observe one’s own consciousness one never finds a mere interiority, or just “oneself ” (no 
less than one finds any exteriority “outside” of  one’s consciousness). One never finds consciousness 
but only what one is conscious of. Consciousness precisely consists in its of-ness, that is, in that there is 
something there. Consequently, “inner” and “outer” phenomena do not exist side by side but the so-
called inner phenomena are nothing but the phenomenal manifestation (the phenomenality) of  the 
outer. Certainly, not all objects that manifest themselves in consciousness are “really there,” many are 
“only subjective,” and in this sense one can of  course distinguish between inner and outer phenomena 
— but this is not a distinction between consciousness and outer object but one within the realm of  
objects; and it is certain intraphenomenal relations (a coordination of  “inner” experiences) in which the 
“objectivity,” the “really-there” of  appearing objects is constituted. So in a way there are “inner” and 
“outer” phenomena. However, consciousness is not an inner phenomenon but the being-there of  
phenomena — be they inner or outer.
   Thus, phenomenology does not consider consciousness as an inner region in contrast to an external 
world. The phenomenological distinction between immanence and transcendence actually means the 
difference between “Erscheinendes” and “Erscheinen,” that is between that which appears and its 
coming to appearance, or between what is present and its being-present (its presence). For this reason 
they are not distinct realms of  being but two inseparable aspects of  one and the same.
With regard to this immanence the subject in the sense of  an innerworldly thing (the only sense 
contemporary philosophy of  mind knows) is already something transcendent, as a subject 
substantialized in this way is no less something apperceptively constituted than any outer object, (11) 
and thereby owes itself  to the taking-place of  manifestation as such that hence is prior to itself. 
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Phenomenological immanence is nothing other than the opening-up of  exteriority as such, which, in a 
certain sense, is more “interior” to consciousness in the phenomenological sense than the 
“psychological” interiority of  a substantialized subject. (12)
   Thus the phenomenologically understood consciousness is no interiority, and for this reason exactly 
has no exteriority. That is why Husserl claims against Descartes that the true question is not how to 
infer the external world from my interiority but “whether with regard to the egological sphere an 
‘outside’ has any meaning at all.” (13) With this denial of  an outside of  consciousness, phenomenology 
can be labeled as an “idealism.” (14) It is a phenomenological idealism that does not deny that there are 
things outside of  the subject (insofar there is no substantial “inside” of  transcendental subjectivity at 
all) yet can be seen as the reflection on the fact that any reality we ever refer to is a reality that appears 
in one way or another. (15) 
   Instead of  sweeping this idealist heritage of  Husserlian phenomenology under the carpet in 
embarrassment, it is, in my view, precisely the point that should be put forward by phenomenology 
against the naive naturalism of  the majority of  philosophy of  mind. In my view, the discussion with 
philosophy of  mind is one of  the major tasks of  phenomenology today and I wish to hold that 
phenomenology can contribute highly relevant insights concerning the nature and structure of  
consciousness. However, I think it is important to bear in mind that its sense is not a naive description 
of  inner occurrences, it is no introspective psychology (as philosophy of  mind mostly understands the 
term “phenomenology” (16)), it is rather concerned with the status of  consciousness and its relation to 
objectivity (what makes phenomenology a philosophical discipline in the first place). So one of  the 
central points in the discussion has to be challenging philosophy of  mind’s naturalism and the 
concomitant reification of  consciousness. Phenomenology “does not merely provide an assortment of  
occasionally fruitful insights that can be cannibalised in the service of  naturalism” but is “a coherent 
and plausible alternative to naturalism.” (17)
Notes
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Buch, Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, ed. by Karl Schuhmann 
[Husserliana III/1]  (Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1976), p. 56ff. 
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Phenomenology for the 21st Century
Joanna Hodge 
 
  The vigour of  a discipline can be read off  from its capacity to stage disputes concerning its basic 
conceptuality, and from this point of  view phenomenology can be seen to be flourishing. There are 
three major lines of  dissensus, through which the protocols and techniques of  phenomenology are 
being revisited, reconfigured and the results of  their various applications clarified and refined. There is 
firstly the claim on Husserl’s legacy from those who would reattach philosophy to a thinking of  divinity, 
the connection so scrupulously dissolved by Immanuel Kant. The writings of  Emmanuel Levinas, of  
Michel Henry and of  Jean Luc Marion all incline to this rewriting of  Husserl’s programme, a move 
hotly contested by those of  Dominique Janicaud and of  Jean Luc Nancy. This opens up the difference 
between doing philosophy, as a branch of  theology, and having a religious dimension to philosophical 
enquiry, for which what is in question is not the word of  God, but the manifestations of  the divine, in 
what presents itself  in all the various givens of  intuition. This has put pressure on the adequacy of  
specifications of  what can be supposed to appear, in the domains accessible by consciousness, as 
opened up for enquiry by Husserl. 
   There is, secondly, the programme to naturalise phenomenology, which paradoxically appears to 
reverse the effects of  Husserl’s invention of  bracketing and reduction, in the 1907 lectures, Idea of  
Phenomenology. (1) However, it also reveals Husserl’s commitment to clarifying the status of  scientific 
results. The publication of  this text, separately from that for which it served Husserl as an introduction: 
Ding und Raum, (2) obscures the connection, for Husserl, between theoretical considerations and the 
practical question of  getting clear on how meaning attaches to hypothesised entities. The theoretical 
innovations of  bracketing and reduction reveal the unexamined prejudices of  a Cartesian dualism, as 
still functioning in the activities of  natural scientists, presuming rather than proving access to material 
contents. The radical nature of  this critique of  Descartes should have protected Husserl from the 
misinterpretation that his Cartesian Meditations were intended as an affirmation rather than a 
development of  that critique. Thus the attempt to renaturalise Husserl’s results reveals the contestable 
status of  attempts to attribute to Husserl either a Cartesianism or a Platonism. It also reveals that what 
counts as naturalism is under pressure, for it can no longer be a question of  reducing all natural 
phenomena to the status of  extended substance, or to the simple physicalisms of  positivism. 
   There is a need then for a specification of  the differences for Husserl between a genuinely naïve 
natural attitude, a naturalising attitude, and the attitude laden with presuppositions, for which the only 
entities to be entertained by philosophical enquiry are those which meet the criteria of  a group of  now 
outdated positivistic sciences. Husserl can be seen to be in the vanguard of  the critique of  the latter in 
his insistence on the role of  mathematisation and formalisation in the exact sciences. Thus the result of  
the affirmation of  a naturalism in phenomenology has been a broadening of  what philosophers 
understand to be the possible objects of  the natural sciences, and a question, even so, to the 
exhaustiveness of  these for the relevant regional ontologies. For the phenomena analysed in the 
cognitive sciences are rather more diverse in ontological status than the abstractions more usually 
discussed in a philosophy of  mind, still committed to a naively understood Cartesianism of  a mind 
body relation. This line of  enquiry, along with the emphasis in Renaud Barbaras’ reconstruction of  
Merleau-Ponty’s thought, on the motility of  intentionality, and that in Shaun Gallagher’s mode of  
reading Husserl, as one among a number of  contributors to a discussion of  time, has the salutary effect 
of  reconnecting Husserl studies to contemporary discussion, focusing on issues, rather than focusing 
solely on an unending hermeneutical labour of  proposing readings of  texts and placing them in relation 
one to another. 
   There is, thirdly, a series of  scholarly interventions, concerning Husserl’s texts, which have shown that 
there is a development of  three strands in Husserl’s own enquiries which shift the interpretation of  
those texts away from canonical, but sterile, discussions of  early or late, realist or idealist, descriptive or 
transcendental, to reveal all over again that there never was an ideality of  meaning without inter-
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subjectivity, and without corporeality. The publications of  Natalie Depraz, Dan Zahavi and Donn 
Welton have relayed this work to a wider audience. Thus the construction of  Husserl as committed to a 
mind body dualism, to solipsism and to a Platonism is now demonstrably false, and embedded in a 
refusal to read the texts, as opposed to relying on the first generation of  Husserl’s critics: Ingaarden, 
Adorno, Heidegger, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, indeed Gadamer, all of  whom have quite specific 
reservations about the viability of  Husserl’s enquiries, which then inflects their reception of  them. 
Husserl’s commitment to the embodiment of  intentionality, demonstrable in analyses of  corporeality, 
to inter-subjectivity and above all to the indispensability of  actual judgments for the articulation of  
ideal meanings re-emerge for attention.
   The result is both a fascinating slice of  intellectual history and, more importantly, a refiguring of  the 
main concern for phenomenology, as a need for a re-description of  the notion of  horizon, so 
important for Husserl’s enquiries, but which remains, in Eugen Fink’s phrase, operative rather than 
thematic. This notion of  a horizon has been thought in terms of  the Husserlian reflections on the 
concept of  world, but my proposal is that it should rather be thought in terms of  a primordial non-
simultaneity of  the temporality of  human understanding. This structure is distinctive of  the human, 
and leaves its mark on all human activity, and especially on the structure of  intentionality. It permits the 
articulation of  the operations distinctive of  the human understanding, by contrast with intimations of  
the divine. Only for human understanding can there be a gap between meaning intending, and a 
meaning fulfilment. Husserl’s enquiries into internal time consciousness appear to run into an impasse, 
or to be over swiftly resolved in favour of  a conception of  the lived present, the lebendige Gegenwart. 
However, if  primordial temporality is thought not as lived present, but as an irreducible non-
simultaneity of  intentionality, as temporally distended, the irreducibility of  the time of  superstrings to 
the time of  an experience of  forwards directed history may be respected.
   Thus these various controversies about how to read Husserl and in what context contribute to 
opening out the possibility, and the need, to re-activate Husserl’s questioning of  the adequacy of  Kant’s 
notion of  transcendental aesthetics. Such questioning is both more than a move in intellectual history, 
but rather less than a fully developed set of  descriptions of  meaning intentions, to be fulfilled, or 
disappointed, or left under-determined in the various relevant approximating intuitions of  essences. It 
is worth going back to the two published texts in which the project of  rethinking transcendental 
aesthetics is announced, but not performed, by Husserl. These are Formal and Transcendental Logic (3) and 
Cartesian Meditations, (4) the first five of  which were in draft before the writing of  the former. In the 
closing pages of  Formal and Transcendental Logic the following is to be found, in Dorion Cairn’s 
translation:
“Transcendental aesthetics” — in a new sense of  the phrase (which we use because of  an easily 
apprehensible relationship to Kant’s narrowly restricted transcendental aesthetics) — functions as the 
ground level <in a world logic>. It deals with the eidetic problem of  any possible world as a world given  
in “pure experience” and thus precedes all science in the ‘higher’ sense; accordingly it undertakes the 
eidetic description of  the all embracing/Apriori, without which no Objects could appear unitarily in 
mere experience, prior to categorial actions (in our sense, which must not be  confounded with the 
categorial in the Kantian sense), and therefore without which the unity of  Nature, the unity of  a world, 
as a passively synthesized unity, could not become constituted at all. One stratum of  that Apriori is the 
aesthetic Apriori of  spatio-temporality. Naturally this logos of  the aesthetic world, like the analytic 
logos, cannot become a genuine science without an investigation of  transcendental constitution- and 
even from the constitutional investigation required here an exceedingly rich (and difficult) science 
accrues. (5) 
   The remarks in section 61 of  Cartesian Meditations on transcendental aesthetics can then be 
understood as a clarification of  some of  the dimensions of  such an enquiry. This section opens by 
remarking the combination of  physical, physiological and psychological genesis in the human and 
animal word and the question is raised how to think about children acquiring a “life of  the soul,” 
through which, for Husserl, access to questions of  meaning arrives. The relation of  animal to human, 
of  child to adult and of  self  to other as ‘generative problems of  birth and death and the generational 
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context of  animality’ are all invoked in the course of  a pair of  paragraphs. The move from lived world, 
to world as object of  the natural sciences, and then back to a notion of  a world, as primordially given in 
transcendental constitution, is sketched, and Husserl then remarks:
We may then also describe this exceptionally large complex of  enquiries connecting to the 
primordial world (which makes up a distinct discipline) a ‘transcendental aesthetic’ in a very 
much expanded sense, whereby we take over the Kantian title, because the space and time 
arguments of  the critique of  reason evidently, when also in an exceptionally limited and not 
clarified manner, aim towards a noematic Apriori of  sensuous intuition, which, broadened 
into a concrete Apriori of  pure sensuously intuited nature, indeed as primordial, demands a 
phenomenological transcendental expansion through a connection to a constitutive 
problematic.(6) 
  Husserl indicates that on this basis, as a first level of  enquiry, there is under development a theory of  
experiencing otherness, both of  other people and of  the objectivity of  the world. 
   There are then three possible routes into this enquiry into the specification of  these noematic and 
concrete Aprioris. There is first the route set out by the text of  Experience and Judgment: towards a genealogy  
for logic, as the text for which Formal and Transcendental Logic is designed as an introduction. This puts the 
emphasis on the meaning constraints within which such an enquiry might be developed. The second is 
the development of  the methodological problems with which Fink and Husserl wrestled in their 
incomplete attempts to write a Sixth Meditation, as a doctrine of  method. The third route is marked 
out by the considerations developing in the writings going into the last publication; The Crisis of  the  
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Between these three lines of  enquiry, there are to be 
found the elements for this transcendental aesthetic, as a theory of  the temporality, distinctive of  
human existing, in which attempts are made to make sense of  what appears. The reactivation of  this 
insight is the destiny of  phenomenology. The questions raised by the theologising and the naturalising 
strands of  appropriation of  Husserl’s writings throw into high relief  the manner in which, by contrast 
to naturalised and divine time, Husserl explicitly thematises the temporalities specific to human 
thinking and activity, in meaning intending and in fulfilling intuitions. These questions intensify the 
need to revisit the thinking of  horizons for enquiry, and their reinterpretation, in a reactivated 
transcendental aesthetic.
Notes
(1) HUA 2: 1950.
(2) HUA 16: 1973.
(3) 1929: HUA 17, 1974.
(4) 1931: HUA 1, 1950.
(5) 1929: HUA 17, 1974, pp. 291-292.
(6) HUA 1, 150.
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Reeling Phenomenology Away from Theology
Rajiv Kaushik 
 
  Especially in various circles of  current European thought, the readings of  Husserl by Jean-Luc 
Marion are becoming of  more and more interest. Marion’s work appears to be the latest in what 
Dominique Janicaud has diagnosed as “the theological turn” from Husserlian phenomenology. (1) His 
main thesis does not seek to confront Husserl’s phenomenology with a theology of  exteriority so much 
as it seeks to re-read Husserl’s phenomenology as a propaedeutic for a revealed theology. I see this 
direction in phenomenology as dangerous because it leads phenomenology into something that the 
latter sought to overcome. It introduces phenomenology to a justification for a religious dogmatism 
that is antithetical to the possibility of  pluralism, and religious pluralism in particular. As James K. 
Smith says, it even “colonizes being.”(2)
   My contention is not only that such a treatment of  phenomenology ends in a bad state of  affairs but 
also that in fact the Husserlian analyses of  the temporal being of  consciousness should be read — and 
indeed can be read — with a view towards pre-empting this trend and reeling it back in, away from 
theology. Where Marion reads a thesis of  “donation” into phenomenality that “would reverse the 
condition of  a horizon (by surpassing it, instead of  being inscribed within it),” (3) Husserl at least 
implicitly denies this reading by positing originary givenness in the context of  a logos that is wrought 
with a multiformity underneath thought and thus, as a non-object, that is insuperable. With this in 
mind, the lesson derived from Husserl’s phenomenology could very well be the potential for an onto-
pluralism that is not only the precondition of  thought but that also reveals the wrong-headedness of  a 
univocal metaphysico-theology.
   Husserl’s thought, according to Marion, opens up an avenue for the possibility of  an advent, and in 
that sense it calls for a reversal of  the Heideggerian treatment of  phenomenology in favour of  a non-
ontological, non-representational nature of  Christly love. This is made possible, Marion thinks, by a 
‘negative phenomenology’ that is significant precisely for its sense of  passivity which defies any 
apophantic discourse and representation. Insofar as he argues that the noetic-noematic correlation can 
be immediately transgressed by a hyperbolic ek-stasis, characterizing a total dominance over the subject, 
there breaks into phenomenology a diktat so forcible that it is not contestable but abruptly moral. It is 
indeed true that, as Marion says, Husserl transforms the problem of  a “logical idol,” i.e., the problem 
of  a wholly calculative, rational thinking, into the problem of  an original self-givenness that forces a 
broadened meaning of  the term “evidence.” But, according to Marion, this eventually also means that 
“intentionality is inverted” and that experience is hereby submitted “to the presence of  a call” (4) 
because now givenness “gives life to the reduction as much as to evidence, since it alone gives charge 
over phenomenality.” (5) Which is to say: because of  the transformation of  thought in Husserl to 
include the lived and non-thought, his phenomenology apparently shows that horizonality is not merely 
something which could potentially be reduced. It therefore allows us to see a possibility for “auto-
manifestation,” i.e., the “possibility of  the impossibility,” (6) a non-anthropomorphized and 
unrestricted access to the being itself  that could “give itself  as a self.” (7) Although Marion is clear that 
phenomenology does not prove it, by giving us this notion of  an “unconditioned horizon” 
phenomenology nevertheless creates the possibility of  a theophanical revelation of  Being. 
   This unconditioned horizon relies on the assertion that in Husserl there is a transgression of  all 
possible knowing. What phenomenology succeeds in revealing is thus a specifically post-metaphysical 
characteristic of  the phenomenon that would come to us as a total absence. Such a treatment of  
Husserl reads horizonality as having a “before,” something in which philosophical discourse takes 
place, and an “after,” something beyond which there can no longer be philosophical discourse. If  the 
after is called religious by Marion, it is because he thinks the field of  religion as exclusive from 
philosophy (8) and because, in the Scholastic tradition, he wants to make the hard distinction between 
the “God of  the philosophers” and the “God of  the theologians” (Pascal). Phenomenology, oddly, 
introduces us to the latter. 
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   But if  Heidegger is right that “any true phenomenological chronology has nothing to do with the 
order or success and the science of  established dates,” (9) this should lead us to doubt the validity of  
Marion’s treatment. Although of  course Husserl did not foresee a treatment of  his thought such as 
Marion’s, Heidegger’s reading of  him here speaks of  a ground of  consciousness that tacitly pre-empts 
it. Husserl should see no need to posit an exteriority that transgresses this essential correlation: the 
Vorvergangenheit of  the being of  consciousness, I want to say, even disallows the thought of  an 
exteriority that is pure absence because it is not absent and present in exact diametrical measure but 
both absensing and presencing itself  at once; there is no complete presence just as there is no complete 
absence. 
   This is seen in Husserl’s notion of  the living-present (lebendige Gegenwort) of  the temporal being of  
consciousness that needs to be made true in the sense that it must await veri-fication. We will 
understand something, according to this thesis, only on the basis of  what has already-been, in which 
case there is a retroactive movement of  truth. Whatever is true is in constant movement, and the 
movement it makes is towards the archaic. It is thus more proper to say that in Husserl truth has a 
“temporal fringe” in which the primordial production of  experiences cannot be situated on a time axis 
of  earlier or later but rather in the context of  an “anterior past” (Vorvergangenheit): “this now 
apprehension is, as it were, the head attached to the comet’s tail of  retentions relating to the earlier now 
points of  the motion.” (10) Husserl’s concern is so thoroughly with the birth or originating of  an 
understanding in being that he denies the potential for anything that does not belong to that very 
process. Instead of  thwarting its possibility, for Husserl thought is bound to an always already ongoing 
relation. In which case he affirms Heraclites’ saying that “the upward and downward paths are the 
same,” (11) where the downward path is complex of  being that perpetually re-asserts itself  anew. For 
instance, in order to cause aspects of  my environment to be given to me, I have to constantly adjust my 
living-body (kinesis) to perceive (aesthesis) things qua indissoluble unities. Thus, indispensable to the 
definition of  my cogitations is my ability to move about in the midst of  a complex of  being that offers 
itself  up in a variety of  ways. 
   If  we can also read the transformation of  a notion of  evidence in this light, then the following theses 
about religious experience, I contend, can be understood with a new clarity about pluralism. Of  a 
theologico-metaphysics, Husserl writes in the Cartesian Meditations that it is undermined: truth, he 
writes, “has gained a new significance” because it now excludes “every naïve metaphysics that operates 
with absurd things in themselves” by providing a distinct opening into the investigation of  “ethico-
religious problems.” (12) Phenomenology can even break open an investigation of  the “problem-
motivates that inwardly drive the old tradition into the wrong line of  inquiry and the wrong method.” 
(13) Just what these “motivates” are according to Husserl is not quite clarified until a lecture given in 
the 1930’s: they are certain “horizons of  knowledge and feeling” so that any phenomenology of  
religious experience is really a matter pertaining to “Existenz.” (14) If  Husserl is employing the term in 
the sense that Karl Jaspers employs it, phenomenology can include an exposition of  what Jaspers calls 
“limit situations,” e.g., death, sorrow, anxiety, etc., which, because they transgress intentionality, are not 
initially begun with pure reflexivity. 
   The question of  a human relation to the theophany is thereby transformed by phenomenology into 
an inquiry in which the question grounds itself  not on theology but on certain meta-noetical and 
factical modes of  being in which the world is always already meaningful for the human when that 
human reflexively or intuitively turns to it. When we bring these comments connection with the above 
paragraph, the consequent Husserlian position is not merely that there are inner, temporal motivations 
of  the religious life but also that these motivations are premised on a certain understanding of  the 
present of  consciousness which allows for a more sophisticated pluralism of  the religious life. After all, 
here we have a temporal ground of  consciousness that relies neither on a claim to the absolute nor on a 
naively relativistic understanding of  thought. What we seem to encounter in Husserl is a rejection of  
absolutes that is not, on the other hand, a rejection of  all understandings of  grounds. 
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  In undertaking their studies of  the social world, sociologists who carry out research at the “micro” 
level have looked for guidance to Husserl’s investigations of  intersubjectivity and the lebenswelt; 
especially, they have taken their direction from Husserl’s “principle of  all principles” (1) — that no 
theorizing should intervene between reflection and what directly presents itself. Husserl has re-taught 
sociologists how to take the world seriously. Unfortunately, in arguing for his program, Husserl sought 
formulaic grounding, generally in idealistic terms (by which sociologists mean the reduction of  
complicated social behavior to the concepts that people use). Husserl’s insights can be applied 
effectively beyond a strictly conceptual analysis, and so these sociologists seek ways to implement what 
is vital in Husserl’s program and to retain what is essential to his rigor, as well as the rigor of  his 
students Gurwitsch, Schutz, Levinas, and Merleau-Ponty. Contemporary social researchers have 
successfully respecified Husserl’s program and in doing so have sometimes been forced to choose 
between Husserl’s phenomenological theories and a fidelity to his deepest insights. The best among 
them have chosen to work with-and-beyond Husserl’s achievements, and they have kept asking 
themselves, what is the role of  phenomenology? What does it study? What is its rigor? 
   Husserl provided an answer for sociologists, which was spread across several of  his works but was 
never developed in specific details. Today, contemporary sociologists undertaking ethnomethodological 
or other social phenomenological research are providing the specification for sociology that Husserl’s 
investigations lacked. Husserl argued that the criticism of  the reason that operates in any scientific 
province should include a “criticism of  the effective performances that remain hidden during the inquiry and 
theorizing directed straightforwardly to the province.” (2) These hidden “effective performances” are 
the in situ acts that Harold Garfinkel and his ethnomethodology have made the focus of  their inquiries. 
Disclosing and describing these “hidden” practices requires taking up the actual site of  practitioners of  
reasoning and their effective performances just-where and just-how the scientists, mathematicians, jazz 
musicians, airplane factory workers, freeway drivers, conversing parties, Tibetan philosopher-monks, 
etc., perform their tasks. These effective performances, which are the proper objects of  
phenomenological inquiry, are not concepts — Husserl understood this — but he had a proclivity for 
turning phenomenology into a body of  formal ideas that occasionally lose their grip of  the real world 
affairs from which they derive their pertinence. 
   In her posting on this website, Elizabeth Behnke recommends that we focus primarily not upon 
those passages where Husserl discusses his method explicitly, but on passages where his methods are 
actually in play. This recommendation is parallel to a policy that ethnomethodology adheres to 
scrupulously — it does not engage in discussions about phenomenology, but restricts its work to the 
description of  actual local activities, just as Gurwitsch explains in his Preface to The Field of  Consciousness, 
“In writing this book, I wanted to make it a phenomenological study, not a book about 
phenomenology.” (3) The reason for all of  these prescriptions is the same, and that is that the most 
fecund insights are to be gained not from concepts alone but from careful scrutiny of  events. This, too, 
is “the principle of  principles.”
   Another contemporary Husserlian commentator, Dan Zahavi, similarly cautions that in rejecting the 
idealism that the theory of  transcendental consciousness can bear, postmodern thinkers have 
overemphasized the problem of  Husserl’s essentialism. This concern, which may have been necessary 
for us to gain clarity regarding how the phenomenological project had to be respecified, has prevented 
us from coming to the fullest appreciation of  Husserl’s phenomenology. Derrida seems to solicit the 
promise of  this fuller objective when he comments, “Like most of  Husserl’s texts, The Origin of  
Geometry has both a programmatic and an exemplary value," (4) and it is in the latter that 
phenomenology is to find its “infinite task.” That Husserl may be wrong about some of  his theorizing 
does not mean that he is incorrect about what is most vital in his thinking.
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   Garfinkel, who was a student of  both Gurwitsch and Schutz of  the New School, has described 
ethnomethodology’s debt to Husserl, but also how it has been compelled to think beyond Husserl’s 
program: “Ethnomethodology’s initiatives originated with Husserl’s program; however, it has developed 
its own rival program for investigating the lebenswelt origin of  the sciences, and this program is one of  
ethnomethodology’s central research areas. Unfortunately, while these “origins” are mentioned and 
described by Husserl, they witnessably escape Husserl’s formal descriptions of  his program.” (5) That is 
the crux of  the problem — Husserl’s inquiry into the effective performances of  the life-world is only a 
“mention” of  the problem and not a comprehensive inquiry into lived praxis. 
   Sociological practitioners of  Husserl’s method are determined to move the inquiries further, but their 
more local interests differ from the concerns of  Husserl’s postmodern critics. They do not wish to 
build further upon phenomenology’s conceptual structures by adding more concepts and distinctions. 
Instead, they wish to subvert the conceptualizing by attending to the actual practices of  persons who 
are engaged in social activities, i.e., how they organize their practices and the understanding that 
emerges as their indigenous work. As Merleau-Ponty has suggested, “Our effective involvement in the 
world is precisely what has to be understood.” (6) Instead of  engaging in any theoretical revisions of  
Husserl’s project, these social researchers wish to do Husserl’s project.
   There are moments when Husserl recognizes the social aspect of  his inquiry: “In the unity of  the 
community of  communication among several persons the repeatedly produced structure becomes an 
object, not as a likeness, but as the one structure common to all.” (7) This implies that there is an 
intersubjectivity that is greater than the sum of  its parts, a recognition that Husserl does not seem to 
fully appreciate since he falls back into the egological and logocentric language with which he conceived 
the phenomenological project. Levinas is critical of  Husserl about this: “The intersubjective reduction, 
based on the other, wrests the ego from its coincidence with self  and with the center of  the world — 
even if  Husserl continues to conceive the relationship between the ego and the other in terms of  
knowledge.” (8) What more is there to social interaction than word-meanings, and that would exceed 
constitutional phenomenology?
   By way of  illustration, organizing the intelligibility of  a matter (Sinnbildung) is a practical concern not 
only for individuals or for analysts but also for parties who are working to gain an understanding about 
something and to communicate that understanding. Parties actively work toward accomplishing an 
understanding-in-common. It is not as though each one has their understanding in advance of  the others; 
rather, the understanding proceeds as a common project, sustained by the objective articulation of  what 
they have assembled so far. The intelligibility orders the attention and work tasks that a collection of  
people faces. The coherency of  a social group is dependent upon their maintaining the common 
intelligibility of  an affair, and this maintenance of  order is the practical concern of  all. Sociological 
phenomenologists treat understanding as the public event it usually is. They offer inquiries that search 
beyond how an individual understands something to how a collective does so.
Intersubjectivity was one of  Husserl’s greatest theoretical contributions, and one that naturally led 
philosophers into the region of  the social, but Husserl did not get intersubjectivity perfectly right. 
Ethnomethodology offers an additional perspective in which persons are not treated as monads, as self-
contained receptacles for concepts, and the intelligibility it studies is not egocentric or logocentric. The 
ideal objective meanings to which philosophers are mostly addressed must be related not only to the 
synthetic operations of  consciousness, as Husserl taught us, but to the interconnections of  sense 
synthesized in and by the social congregations in which people usually find themselves. That is, the 
temporality of  the synthetic interconnections of  sense must be identified, witnessed, and described at 
what some may wish to still call the intersubjective level.
   While it may be said that throughout his life Husserl acknowledged the importance for his sense-
investigations of  events at the intersubjective level, and also that intersubjectivity is given ever 
increasing value as Husserl’s thinking matured, he never recognized how originary to sense-production 
intersubjectivity was. Instead, at the end of  his career in “The Origin of  Geometry,” Husserl still speaks 
of  the “primary intrapersonal origin” of  ideas. He asks, “How does geometrical ideality (just like that 
of  all sciences) proceed from its primary intrapersonal origin, where it is a structure within the 
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conscious space of  the first inventor’s soul, to its ideal objectivity?” (9) Who is this imaginary inventor 
who works all alone late at night in his basement? Husserl has not posed his question correctly. When 
he asks, “How does the intrapsychically constituted structure arrive at an intersubjective being of  its 
own as an ideal object?” (10) it is not that the intersubjective emerges from the intrapersonal; rather, the 
intrapersonal can emerge from the intersubjective life of  a concrete community. The ego is not the only 
thing that is “concrete.” (11)
   In this passage from “The Origin of  Geometry,” Husserl writes:
In the contact of  reciprocal linguistic understanding, the original production and the product of  one 
subject can be actively understood by the others. In this full understanding of  what is produced by the 
other, as in the case of  recollection, a present coaccomplishment on one’s part of  the presentified 
activity necessarily takes place; but at the same time there is also the self-evident consciousness of  the 
identity of  the mental structure in the production of  both the receiver of  the communication and the 
communicator; and this occurs reciprocally. (12)
   Husserl mischaracterizes the situation when he offers such an inter-monadic model of  linguistic 
communication. Instead, meaningful signs produced by a local cohort concerned to concert their 
interaction in an orderly manner provide the mechanisms with which the intelligibility is developed and 
displayed. It is not like recollection (although some reinterpretation of  signs may be involved) because 
the activity is social, not individual. This work does not take place inside the heads of  each monad; 
rather, the effective work takes place in the public space between persons, and each party has oriented 
his or her gaze to the public sphere in order to learn what the signs mean, including the meaning of  
their own utterances. 
   Such social inquiry is faithful to the instability of  concepts as they move from experience to 
articulation and to reinterpretation; however, these phenomenological sociologists do not just offer a 
“mention” of  this phenomenon but study it where it occurs, as it occurs, as part of  the local social 
tasks of  communicating parties. As Garfinkel has phrased it, this is an inquiry into “embodied, situated, 
congregationally concerted practical action and practical reason.” (13) “Meaning-fulfillment,” an 
eminent topic of  Husserlian studies, is captured as an embodied social activity undertaken in situ, i.e., in 
and as some local affairs. People are not left as monads, and intersubjectivity is not John Locke on 
steroids. The phenomenon that was Husserl’s very own discovery is thereby being investigated in a way 
more radical than Husserl had imagined, but in keeping with the vital directions of  his own thinking. As 
Levinas has suggested, “Phenomenologists are not bound to the theses formulated by Husserl;  they do 
not devote themselves exclusively to the exegesis or the history of  his writings. It is a way of  
proceeding that they have in common.” (14)
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What I consider phenomenology to be
  Phenomenology is a specific attitude towards the world. The purpose of  taking this attitude is 
twofold. First, it is meant to recover human experience on a very large scale, i.e., to disclose so-called 
original phenomena or (to use a Husserlian coinage) to go back to the things themselves. By means of  
doing so phenomenologists, secondly, critically reflect on the basic concepts and general frameworks of  
our usual ways of  representing, conceptualizing and practically modelling human reality. In particular, 
they claim to gain a new grasp of  commonly known philosophical issues (e.g., the mind/body-
problem). It is clear from this that phenomenology’s first task is to explain what original phenomena 
(or things themselves) are and how it happens that we tend to lose sight of  them in the course of  our 
daily life and scientific work. It is true that, since the origins of  a phenomenological movement at the 
beginning of  the 20th century until today, there has been no agreement among phenomenologists on 
how to introduce the term “phenomenon.” 
  However, there is a common conviction among adherents of  different phenomenological approaches, 
for instance, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. This 
conviction amounts to the idea that original phenomena are not immediately accessible. As long as we 
assume our everyday-attitude towards the world they are in a certain sense hidden. Therefore we require 
a specific attitude to go “back to the things themselves.” Depending on what specific idea of  
phenomenological philosophy we are ready to follow, the characterization of  this attitude significantly 
differs. (1) It differs, among other things, with regard to its voluntary feasibility and its ontological 
commitments as well as with regard to the notion of  the subject whom we ascribe the attitude in 
question.
From the point of  view of  a Husserlian-style phenomenology the most important implication of  this is 
to realize that whenever we talk about (original) phenomena we are not straightforwardly directed at 
something which is given (e.g., the newspaper lying on the table which I perceive while sitting in front 
of  my computer). Instead, while talking about phenomena we are, in an entirely non-sceptical manner, 
interested in how things are given, how they appear. (2) We are interested in how special modes of  
appearances are correlated with special modes of  being directed to the things which appear. We cannot 
talk about phenomena without, at the same time, talking about the intentional structure of  our 
consciousness, i.e., about the relation holding between changing appearances and changing attitudes 
towards appearing things. In this sense, doing phenomenology means to focus on the form of  
givenness (whatever it is that is presently given). By analysing the formal structure of  our intentional 
relations to different species of  objects, phenomenologists aim at making explicit the presuppositions 
adhering to different (scientific) representations of  reality. 
   It is due to this peculiar type of  higher-level analysis (compared with all those forms of  scientific 
analysis which immediately refer to certain types of  objects) that Husserl’s phenomenology can be 
rightly stamped as foundationalist, although the term “foundationalism” easily gives rise to serious 
misunderstandings. There is no transcendental phenomenology which is without this foundationalist 
bias which, in my view, simply reflects the metatheoretical approach of  an intentional analysis. This 
analysis, consequently, requires distinguishing different spheres of  objects as well as different levels of  
discourse with pertaining terminologies, attitudes, and experiences, which differ in accordance with the 
former. It is only from this “foundationalist” point of  view that these distinctions present themselves 
as necessary in order not to confuse heterogenous projects of  explanation, (3) for instance, brain 
physiological investigations of  the so-called readiness-potential and a philosophical reflection on the 
idea of  free will. (4) 
   According to the above, it is not really surprising that the peculiar idea of  philosophical reflection 
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which Husserl calls “phenomenological reduction” is meant not to reduce but, on the contrary, to 
release the whole range of  human experience. It is by reflecting and receding from our ordinary way of  
experiencing things (which does not involve any interest in the formal structure of  appearances) that 
we discover the varieties of  givenness and, subsequently, are able to analyse what “human experience” 
means. It is well known that Husserl’s idea of  an impartial observer which is said to be realized by 
means of  phenomenological reduction is widely rejected. This clearly is a methodical ideal which, on 
principle, cannot be fully realized (see, for instance, Merleau-Ponty’s arguments in favour of  an essential 
incompleteness of  the phenomenological reduction). However, we have to acknowledge that it is this 
peculiar philosophical reflection which enables us to save the phenomena. It is due to our ability to 
withdraw from everyday experience that we are able to understand what experience means relating to 
different domains of  objects. In other words, experience can only be understood by means of  
reflection. On the other hand, philosophical reflection represents a new type of  experience which 
operates within the range of  intentional relations, i.e., within the range of  transcendental subjectivity. 
Reflection manifests itself  as a special kind of  experience. It is in this double dimension of  disclosing 
natural experience as well as phenomenological experience that, according to transcendental 
phenomenology, the concepts of  phenomenon, givenness and reflection inseparably belong together. 
(5) 
Phenomenology as Practical Philosophy 
   Recent debates on ethical issues among phenomenologists often focus on thinkers like Ricœur and 
Lévinas (6) or, with a view to approximating phenomenological and poststructuralist or postmodernist 
approaches, on Foucault, Derrida, Agamben, and others who have a strong interest in the intellectual 
genesis and social mechanism of  power and repression. To be sure, these are important projects. 
However, we still lack an overall and deep understanding of  ethics as formal axiology and material 
value theory as it was formulated during the classical period of  phenomenology (roughly speaking, 
between 1890 and 1950). Systematically interpreting the ethical reasoning of  this period (among others: 
Brentano, Husserl, Scheler, Pfänder, Reinach, Hildebrand, Hartmann, and Reiner) certainly would 
impinge on a reconsideration and re-evaluation of  later developments in the field of  ethics like the 
revival of  virtue ethics (e.g., Philippa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse) and its critical attitude towards 
deontology and utilitarianism or the rise of  communitarianism (e.g., Alasdaire McIntyre, Charles 
Taylor). What does it mean to demand “an overall and deep understanding” of  classical 
phenomenology’s approach to ethical theory? It does not only mean to strive for a better understanding 
of  the astonishing variety and dissent on ethics which we, for instance, find among Husserl, Heidegger, 
and Sartre. Much successful work has been done in order to investigate the moral philosophy of  single 
phenomenological authors. (7) Much less has been done to furnish us with encompassing insights into 
a history of  ethics (or specific ethical issues) as part of  a history of  phenomenology, namely in terms 
of  a history of  problems. This systematic work should be done by addressing contemporary concerns 
in ethical theory, e.g., internalism/externalism. The fruitfulness of  a phenomenological philosophy has 
to be proved by showing how such issues can be reformulated and newly appraised in the wake of  a 
phenomenological analysis which lays bare the tacit implications of  commonly accepted approaches to 
ethical issues and ethical reasoning. (8) 
   According to Husserl, a self-reflective and self-critical bias called phenomenology of  phenomenology, 
is part of  a phenomenological philosophy. This being the case, it is obvious that the most fundamental 
challenge of  a phenomenologist’s occupation with practical philosophy lies in finding out whether 
transcendental-phenomenological reflection demands some kind of  practical commitment which, in a 
first step, need not be grasped in terms of  a (new) ethical theory. (9) In a more specific sense, this 
matter has to be considered with regard to a central thesis of  Scheler’s as well as Hartmann’s (and 
others) value ethics which undermines a common understanding of  how descriptive and normative 
aspects interfere with a view to our (scientific) idea of  reality. We may designate this thesis the primacy of  
value-givenness as against the givenness of  facts. Taking this thesis (which actually has to be carefully 
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scrutinized) for granted, we should ask whether it has any consequences with regard to our idea of  
phenomenology as a theoretical philosophy. Is the distinction between theoretical and practical 
philosophy not as basic and as troublesome and questionable as, for instance, the distinction between 
subjective and objective whose refinement undoubtedly is of  prime interest for any phenomenological 
philosophy? 
   What it means to give prominence to either subjective or objective moments is one of  the main 
topics, if  we intend to systematically compare different accounts of  phenomenological ethics. It is 
conspicuous that those ethical theories of  classical phenomenology which centre around the notions of  
person and value mostly refuse Husserl’s transcendental idealism. They are grounded in a more or less 
uncompromising and more or less specified ontological approach. In a rigid sense this is true of  
Nicolai Hartmann, whose philosophy as a whole is not of  an outright phenomenological stamp, 
although his ethics is deeply rooted in a phenomenological attitude. Max Scheler received Husserl’s 
Logical Investigations, especially his conception of  material-a priori insight, with enthusiasm, and never 
ceased to admire this early breakthrough of  phenomenology. He did not sympathize with Husserl’s 
later idea of  transcendental subjectivity. Nevertheless, his ethical work, as far as the juxtaposition of  
subjective and objective moments is concerned, tries to balance these moments by proceeding from 
Husserl’s thesis of  an a priori correlation between the structure of  consciousness and the structure of  
objects. This enables Scheler to avoid a rigidly objectivistic account of  values which had to be spelled 
out in ontological terms, on the one hand, and to include considerations concerning the historical and 
cultural relativity of  values without thereby getting stuck in subjectivism and relativism, on the other 
hand. Wherever subjectivistic and objectivistic tendencies clash with one another, phenomenologists 
will agree that the matter has to be settled by scrutinizing the extent to which these different 
approaches are able to open up the field of  moral experience, to understand our common moral 
practice and, what is more, to help us improve our moral sensibility. Ethics, first of  all, is a matter of  
perception, not a matter of  judgement or principles by means of  which rules of  behaving or judging 
could be justified in a generally valid manner. Correspondingly, it is primarily from the point of  view of  
moral experience that a phenomenological ethics gains its driving question: what is the phenomenal 
basis of  ethical reasoning? Thereto, a phenomenological ethics goes beyond the widely accepted 
starting question of  modern normative ethics, namely: what ought I to do (in order to realise moral 
goodness)? Taking this to be the most basic and most profound ethical question amounts to severely 
narrowing the scope and richness of  our moral experience. In terms of  saving the moral phenomena 
which actually are given, the more comprehensive question is: what kind of  person do I want to 
become? Or: what kind of  person am I?
   It is in the light of  basic conceptual distinctions like theory and practice, theory and experience, 
phenomenological experience, everyday experience, and scientific experience, and with reference to 
contemporary scientific as well as alternative philosophical (e.g., analytic) approaches, that a 
phenomenological ethics should discuss its main topics. Among these are: emotion and cognition, 
autonomy and authenticity, causes and motives (including so-called unconscious motives), the 
fact/value-dichotomy, personal being and personality and freedom of  will. Methodically viewed, doing 
this aims at reconsidering both our common views on ethical issues and our general idea of  
phenomenology from the point of  view of  a phenomenological ethics. 
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  First, let’s distinguish between Husserlian phenomenology and Husserl scholarship. I take Husserl 
scholarship to be analogous to Kant scholarship, Hegel scholarship, or to whoever scholarship. It’s a 
historical approach: you try to figure out what Husserl thought and why he thought it in the 
appropriate historical context. Since Husserl wrote so much, changed his mind not too infrequently, 
and much of  his Nachlass is written in a frustratingly cryptic style, serious Husserl scholarship can be a 
life absorbing endeavor. 
   By the same token, it can be endlessly fascinating connecting the exegetical dots between this 
published departure from a previously published work (e.g., the departure from psychologism, the 
departure from Cartesianism, the genetic revision of  transcendentalism, etc.) and that group of  
unpublished manuscripts, and so on. Exemplary of  this kind of  approach are the works of  Ludwig 
Landgrebe, Klaus Held, Karl Schumann and Donn Welton. To ask after the value of  this kind of  
approach is to ask after the value of  historical scholarship in philosophy in general. I take it for granted 
that it is at least slightly ludicrous to question the value of  the latter. Since unlike, say, Gassendi or 
Baumgarten, Husserl had a huge impact on a hundred years’ worth of  philosophy, I take for granted 
that the pursuit of  Husserl scholarship is prima facie irreproachable.  
   In contrast, Husserlian phenomenology must be a kind of  phenomenology that is defensive of  most, 
if  not all, of  Husserl’s original views against more recent rivals. This kind of  work is actually rarer. Dan 
Zahavi comes to mind as a good recent example of  a Husserlian phenomenologist proper. Just think 
for a moment about what Zahavi’s been up to. He’s defended Husserl against the Frankfurt school (1), 
the Heidelberg school (2), Sartre (3) and Levinas (4), all the while claiming that Husserl remained 
competitive with recent developments in analytic philosophy of  mind and cognitive science. (5) I mean 
that’s got to be what “Husserlian phenomenology” should look like: you haven’t quite understood 
Husserl, so he can’t be wrong for the reasons you mention, and moreover, whatever you may think 
right he’s said already.
   Of  course, not obviously relevant for present purposes is the best-known approach, that approach 
simply co-extensive with the “phenomenological tradition:” namely, the heretical (6) approach. You 
redefine phenomenology by criticizing Husserl’s original views. That’s Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-
Ponty, Levinas, Derrida, Hermann Schmidt, et al. That would render Husserlian phenomenology a 
foregone conclusion, an already obsolete enterprise, a remnant of  a broadly Cartesian endeavor no 
longer viable. 
   But a double-take on some of  these heretics reveals a fourth possibility vis-à-vis Husserl, which I 
want to characterize as “neo-Husserlianism.” What I’m calling “neo-Husserlianism” is analogous to 
what analytic philosophers call “neo-Fregeanism.” Searle, for instance, is a Fregean because he buys 
into Frege’s two-dimensionalist semantics: there is both sense and reference that are irreducible to each 
other. (7) And that’s a recognizably original Fregean position. However, he is not strictly Fregean but 
instead neo-Fregean, since Searle centers his analysis of  sense and reference on intentional 
consciousness, which is a very unFregean thing to do. (8) 
   Similarly, three of  the above enumerated heretics trade in one version of  Husserl in favor of  another. 
But what they buy is recognizably original with Husserl. All three philosophers reject the Husserl 
represented by Ideas I: they reject the internalist, solipsistic and static Husserl, which is the Husserl 
most people mean when they talk about “Husserl.” However, what they wind up advocating (or at least 
wind up advocating at some point) were albeit somewhat eccentric renditions of  the lesser known 
Husserl — which Welton calls the “other Husserl.” For instance, Merleau-Ponty points to the Husserl 
of  the lived body from Ideas II: that’s the non-internalist Husserl of  the first half  of  the book whose 
analysis is conducted before the execution of  the epoché in §49. Levinas points to Husserl of  the Fifth 
Meditation: that’s the non-solipsistic Husserl who thinks intersubjectivity is more basic than subjectivity. 
And Derrida points to the “Origin of  Geometry:” that’s the non-static Husserl who thinks genetic 
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phenomenology and transcendental phenomenology need not be mutually exclusive. 
   Now, I’m not advocating any of  these quasi-Husserlian renditions; I’m just pointing out how “neo-
Husserlianism” may gain some sense and currency. The basic idea is that you point to what you like and 
think right about Husserl, and argue on its behalf. Having done so, however, it would just be dishonest 
to claim that you came up with all this stuff  by yourself  and so owe nothing to Husserl. Instead, what 
you have left over would remain recognizably and, for the most part, uniquely what Husserl would have 
said. So you pay your respects and label yourself  a “neo-Husserlian.” But by doing so, you also admit 
that you’re not entirely faithful to Husserl so, unlike Zahavi, not strictly Husserlian. 
   In this light, as long as you admit it, there should be nothing illegitimate about isolating some subset 
of  Husserlian theses as sound that may be contradicted by some other subset of  Husserlian theses, 
even if  the latter should be considered platitudinously canonical of  Husserl — e.g., that he was an 
internalist or an epistemological foundationalist or whatever. To get a better sense of  such an approach, 
let’s start by recalling an observation made by David Carr in 1973. Reacting to the Fifth Meditation, 
Carr writes:
[I]f  the rigor of  phenomenological analysis requires the apodictic givenness of  the 
subjective to the phenomenologist, then only egological or solipsistic phenomenology can 
be rigorous. If, on the other hand, intersubjective phenomenology is to be regarded as 
equal in dignity, and thus presumably in rigor, to its solipsistic “subordinate stage,” then the 
apodicticity of  the primary given is no longer the standard of  rigor. (9)
   In other words, if  Husserl’s claim about the priority of  intersubjectivity in the Fifth Meditation were 
to be taken seriously, then the claim from the period of  Ideas I of  epistemic infallibility of  the first 
person perspective as the foundation of  transcendental phenomenology must be renounced. And I take 
this to be a straightforwardly correct observation about a basic inconsistency in Husserl. If  that’s right, 
then any attempt to remain entirely faithful to Husserl by retaining both these positions would be an 
incoherent position to take. In contrast, should you favor one of  these two positions, then you should 
admit your renunciation of  the other position. But either way, it’s Husserl’s position — he came up with 
it, and gave you some reasons for advocating it. And to admit both your renunciation of  one Husserl 
while pledging fidelity to the other Husserl — that’s the neo-Husserlian thing to do. 
   Now here’s a list of  positions that are all recognizably Husserlian, and I believe can hang coherently 
together if  a competing set of  positions equally recognizable as Husserlian are renounced. And of  
course I believe a view made up of  these positions to be the most plausible in Husserl. Since it would 
also be the most comprehensive anywhere, it would also be the most preferable tout court.
   (NH 1) The concrete self  sedimented by habituality (10) is personally basic. Accordingly, the notion 
of  an abstract “pure ego” (11) from Ideas I has to be renounced. Consequently, the notion of  personal 
identity in the strong sense must also be renounced in favor of  some version of  the continuity thesis, as 
Husserl recommends in the Fifth Investigation (12), then again in the later development of  genetic 
phenomenology. (13)
   (NH 2) There is no “pure consciousness” not imbued by awareness of  the lived body. And the 
concrete, continuous self, sedimented with habituality, just is the first person perspective imbued by 
awareness of  the lived body. (14) To be conscious is to be conscious of  the limitations imposed and 
perceptual abilities facilitated by one’s own lived body. (15) And to recognize the lived body in this 
sense is not the same as affirming the Körper of  the third person perspective. Against the latter, the 
epoché remains applicable. (16)
   (NH 3) Intentionality must be viewed as externally responsive. When I want an apple, it’s the apple 
itself  that I want and no mere representation of  it. (17) When I look at a photograph and believe the 
woman to be beautiful, I do not mean the photographic image but the woman herself  who is beautiful, 
etc. (18) In light of  the epoché, the analysis of  intentionality thus construed should be kept separate 
from seemingly related epistemological and metaphysical issues, which may be intractable. For instance, 
whether I can know the thing in itself, or whether there is a causal connection between my belief  and 
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what I believe, is what’s “suspended.” Accordingly, questions about whether Husserl was an 
epistemological internalist or a metaphysical idealist, etc., should not even arise. That Husserl himself  
occasionally describes his views as “idealistic” (19) should be regarded as simply misleading.
   (NH 4) By virtue of  NH 3, we should be weary of  Cartesian locutions like “absolute certainty” or 
“apodicticity” or “self-evidence” as signaling strong epistemological or metaphysical views. At best, 
they signal only an asymmetry between the first person and third person perspectives.
   (NH 5) Intentionality in Husserl ought to be given a pragmatist analysis, as Husserl himself  suggests. 
To intend anything is the exercise of  an ability, cognitive or bodily (20), originally acquired with activity, 
then gradually sedimented in habit to become “passive” or effortless. (21) Such know-how, Husserl 
talks about in terms of  the “Ich kann.” (22) So intentionality is not simply given but is an achievement 
of  the individual, in response to her external and social circumstances. Needless to add, it’s also nothing 
inherently representational. 
   (NH 6) Meaning [Bedeutung] is regulative or teleologically governing. (23) No individual possesses 
meaning somewhere in her head, and thus meaning cannot be confused with some internal episode. 
(24) Instead, meaning should be regarded as a token operator or proxy for a prospectively adequate 
scientific theory, which need not yet exist and may never come to exist. Yet, without such a regulative 
view of  meaning, no individual cognitive exercise can be vindicated as correct or dismissed as 
erroneous. Regulatively viewed, meaning is what keeps us from believing “water” to be a sui generis 
element or “whales” to be fish.
   (NH 7) Should meaning be thus regarded, the noema cannot be viewed as the equivalent of  meaning. 
Instead, the conceptual portion of  the noema is that about an individual cognitive exercise that is 
governed by meaning. I believe Husserl points to this kind of  view in both the Logical Investigations 
and the Crisis. Accordingly, to believe that “water is H2O” is to subscribe to a certain theory about 
water, and commit oneself  to the correctness of  that theory. It is to let one’s individual cognitive 
conduct be constrained by extraneous rules of  the right kind vis-à-vis truth and reason.
   (NH 8) If  NH 6 and 7 are acceptable, then we have to draw a corresponding distinction to 
accommodate Husserl’s essentialism about both natural kind terms (e.g., “red”) and artifact terms (e.g., 
“house”). That distinction is between nomological intersubjectivity, as spelled out by Husserl in the 
Crisis, and mere peer pressure intersubjectivity. A part of  our community is involved in genuine 
scientific progress. That’s the part we obey when talking about the molecular components of  a natural 
kind object or the species to which a mouse deer belongs. But a different part of  our community is 
involved in telling us what counts as “furniture” or who’s a “bachelor” — and such pressure imposes 
no nomological constraint on eidetic intution. We simply go with the flow for the sake of  convenience 
and little else.
  (NH 9) But NH 8 also tells us that intersubjectivity must be regarded as more basic than subjectivity. 
At the pain of  confrontation by the private language argument, insofar as thought must be bound by 
public rules of  discourse, the agreements and reasons of  others must precede whatever I think by 
myself. (25) Pedagogy, and not soliloquy, (26) is the model of  thought.
   (NH 10) Finally, let Husserl be a mathematical and logical intuitionist. Formalists more or less 
believed that logical and mathematical axioms were functions of  closed systems and analytically true 
only by virtue of  these closed systems. Psychologists, in contrast, believed that axioms were true only 
because we could not think them otherwise: i.e., axioms are true because of  the way we think, because 
of  psychological facts about us. In contrast, intuitionists like Husserl, Brouwer and Gödel believe we 
intuit logical and mathematical axioms because they are irreducibly true. There is neither proof  that “A 
is necessarily A” nor is “A necessarily A” because we can’t think otherwise; instead, “A is necessarily A,” 
and we grasp this irreducible truth in intuition. And to admit the irreducibility of  mathematical axioms 
and logical principles allows, for instance, constraint by consistency and coherence in our decision to 
subscribe to one theory while rejecting a competing theory. 
   Now if  you look at these positions, what you should notice is that it is a view remarkably competitive 
with more recent views in mainstream philosophy. But unlike the latter, it is also a remarkably 
comprehensive view. Should a more comprehensive view be philosophically preferred, then the 
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proposed neo-Husserlian view should also count as preferable to any contemporary competitor. And as 
I see it, to look at things in this way may very well be the future of  Husserlian phenomenology.
Notes
(1) Zahavi, D., Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2001).
(2) Zahavi, D., Self-Awareness and Alterity (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999), pp. 15-37.
(3) Zahavi, D., “The Three Concepts of  Consciousness in Logische Untersuchungen” in Husserl 
Studies 18 (2002): 51-64.
(4) Self-Awareness and Alterity, op. cit., pp. 195-97.
(5) Zahavi, D., Subjectivity and Selfhood (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005).
(6) A phrase coined by Herbert Spiegelberg.
(7) Cf. Searle, J., Intentionality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 197-198.
(8) Cf. Frege, G., “Der Gedanke” in Logische Untersuchungen, ed. G. Patzig (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 1966): 40-53.
(9) Carr, D., “The ‘Fifth Meditation’ and Husserl’s Cartesianism” in Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 34 (1973), pp. 34-35.
(10) As outlined in the Cartesian Meditations. Cf. Hua I 100-106.
(11) Asserted most famously in Ideas I, but more pronounced in Ideas II. Cf. Hua IV 98, 103, 105, 112.
(12) Hua XIX/1 364-7, 374-5.
(13) Hua XI 117.
(14) Cf. Hua XIV 298-300.
(15) Cf. Hua I 128-30.
(16) A point missed by another neo-Husserlian, Quassim Cassam. Cf. his Self  and World (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), esp. pp. 9, 34-5, 51-61.
(17) Cf. Hua III 78-80.
(18) Cf. Hua III 209-10.
(19) Hua I 118-19.
(20) Hua IV 253-54.
(21) Hua IV 299-300; Hua XXXI 3.
(22) Hua IV 11-13, 152, 253-69.
(23) Hua I 56; Hua VI 165; Experience and Judgment §83a.
(24) Hua XIX/1 38, 49, 110, 137, 660; Hua III 257, 296-7, 331, 347.
(25) Cf. Hua I 110.
(26) Cf. Derrida, J., La voix et le phénomène (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967). 
84
On the Future of  Phenomenology
Ferrarello Susi 
 The Definition of  Good
   A path to resolve our moral quarrels, this is what here I would define as one of  the most important 
contributions of  husserlian phenomenology to the philosophical thought of  our times. Husserl’s moral 
philosophy is a remarkable product of  his phenomenological research and it gives us a definition of  
good which allows us to orient ourselves in all of  the choices of  our lives.
   There are three key words summarizing the husserlian definition of  good: authenticity, duty and 
responsibility. Now I will try to go through the meaning of  these words with the purpose of  clarifying 
the definition itself.
Authenticity
   Looking at the husserlian moral research we can notice how Husserl opens the doors of  the 
transcendental dimension of  human mind and discovers an ancient but deeply actual definition of  
human good. As with the Delphic saying “ghnòthi seaùton,” he refers the personal and common good to 
the idea of  authenticity. He writes: “die Lebensform ‘echter Humanität’” it is born thanks to 
“beurteilenden Menschen sich selbst, sein Leben, sein mögliches Wirken.” (1) The authentic man is he 
who “auf  Grund einer prinzipiell-allgemeinen Selbstbestimmung das praktisch Vernünftige überhaupt 
und rein um seines absoluten praktischen Wertes willen erstrebt, folglich konsequent das praktisch 
Wahre oder Gute als das Beste seiner jeweiligen Sphäre nach Kräften einsichtig zu erkennen und 
danach zu verwirklichen beflissen ist.” (2) According to Husserl the practical good consists in 
everyone’s power to be an authentic man. A man who knows himself  rationally and tries to realize his 
absolute value through the self-determination activated by his rational will. For absolute value Husserl 
means the best telos rationally chosen in relation to practical horizon of  everyone’s possible option. 
Only this absolute value makes life “jeweils b e st m ö g l i c h e s (...) für sein Subjekt” and  
“charakterisiert als das absolut Gesollte.” (3) Thanks to the realization of  this kind of  life, man can 
grasp what Husserl calls the best practical good.
Duty and Responsibility
   As for the concept of  duty we can say that, according to Husserl, the personal good of  everyone is 
not only a personal good but a duty which involves all of  the rest of  society too. “Jeder Mensch steht,” 
he writes, “(…) einem ‘k a t e g o r i s c h e n Imperativ’ unter. Er kann‚ wahrer Mensch’ schlechthin als 
gut zu bewertender nur sein, sofern er sich selbst willentlich dem kategorischen Imperativ unterstellt — 
diesem Imperativ, der seinerseits nichts anderes sagt als: Sei ein wahrer Mensch; führe ein Leben, das du 
durchgängig einsichtig rechtfertigen kannst; ein Leben aus praktischer Vernunft.” (4) Thus the best 
practical good consists in the realization of  a life which can be justified before our rational will. The 
practical good is in the observation of  a categorical imperative which drives everyone to live complying 
with knowledge of  own absolute value. The Husserlian categorical imperative “tue dein Bestes nach 
bestem Wissen und Gewissen!” (5) is itself  the absolute value everyone has to know and to respect. It 
involves not only the development of  our capacity for knowledge but also our conscience, that is our 
sense of  responsibility.  
   For Husserl, every human being should have the personal responsibility (Verantwortlichkeit) of  
knowing and trying to realize his or her own value. “Verantwortlichkeitsbewußtsein der Vernunft” is 
“das ethische Gewissen” (6) itself, considered as the infinite starting and ending point of  every 
responsible act. 
The infinite task of  the acquisition of  good is so for us that “die Sorge einem zeitlich Unendlichen und 
im Zeitlichen dem Ewigen gilt – der Zukunft der Menschheit, dem Werden wahren Menschen gilt (...) 
85
wofür wir uns doch selbst verantwortlich fühlen.” (7) The acquisition of  good is infinite because the 
time when it occurs is infinite and because human nature is opened to infinite possibilities of  choice. 
For that matter every man should contribute to this research to improve the society he lives in. “Die 
einzelnen – in fact – nicht nebeneinander und gegeneinander, sondern in verschiedenen Formen der 
Willensgemeinschaft (willentliche Verständigung) handeln.” (8) Then everyone has the duty to 
contribute to the creation of  a voluntary agreement through the increase of  the common and personal 
good. 
   Thus, if  we want to summarize the main characteristics of  the husserlian definition of  good, we 
might say that: 1)the personal good is not a personal good only but also a moral and social duty; 2) the 
personal good coincides with the idea of  an authentic human being who acts on the basis of  the 
principle of  the best choice considered as the absolute value of  every person; 3) the personal good is 
deeply linked to the concept of  responsibility which represents the infinite task of  every ethical 
conscience; 4) the ethical good can be a personal and common, a theoretical and practical good. 
   Now I will seek to develop one of  the consequences of  this definition of  good by employing it in 
today’s world.
Freedom and identity
   In the previous paragraph I have pointed out the correspondence between common or personal 
good and the man. Now, in order to introduce husserlian definition of  good within our social context, I 
have to clarify briefly husserlian definition of  the subject. 
About the subject Husserl writes: “der Andere ist Spiegelung meiner selbst.” (9) Every subject can be 
deeply in contact with other persons, because every man can live the analogue experience of  another 
man through his perceptions. He says: “Ich habe eine Monade in sich bezogen auf  eine andere Monade 
und habe die andere Monade bezogen oder sich einfühlungsmässig beziehen könnend auf  die erste 
Monade. Und so habe ich eine Vielheit von Monaden in wirklicher und möglicher Kommunikation, 
dann aber in Beziehung auf  sie eine identische Natur, eine intersubjektive, allen zusammenseienden 
möglichen Monaden als möglich gemeinsame.” (10) Husserl affirms: “I am a monad” and “the other is 
simply a pure modification of  myself.” The other lies in me due to enthropaty, that is through my 
capability to perceive the other and to live the analogue feelings of  mine. We are linked to each other 
and this link is absolutely pure because it derives from my original structure. Everyone is born in fact in 
a family or in a specific environment, surrounded by parents or friends. Everyone  grows up in a 
particular educational context with precise habits and rules. His history, his personal character and his 
way of  living are the result of  all these interactions. No one is born in solitude and in a totally isolated 
place. His behaviors and a big part of  himself  are the sum of  all this. His corporeity is already 
constituted by other monads. Like Husserl says: “Ich erfahre einen Leibkörper dort, und in eins mit 
dieser Erfahrung ist, und durch die Analogie mit meiner Leiblichkeit motiviert, eine zweite Monade 
appräsentiert.” (11) Even the experience of  my pure corporeity as monad includes, through my 
enthropatical or analogue experience, the representation of  a second monad. 
   Then, according to Husserl’s thesis, Rousseau’s famous sentence “l’homme est né libre, et partout il 
est dans les fers” (12) seems to stress a theoretical situation that is difficult to justify. For Husserl 
freedom from society and from the others is, often, an illusion because we are the others and society. 
From the theoretical point of  view the passage from a state of  nature to a state of  law and order is 
difficult to explain because everyone from the moment of  his birth is in a particular form of  society. 
We can not say that there is a moment when we get into a political society and we give up our freedom 
because we are politics, we are the society. So our freedom is in society and, first of  all, in our identity; 
it consists in our capability to find new legal solutions to express our identity which change over time. 
We can be free in time if, as Walzer writes (13), we make possible “the escape.” Women’s rights or the 
right to divorce are an example of  this specific connotation of  freedom. All the rights and the rules 
which are in society are results of  our evolutionary struggle: we are formed by them and we create 
them. Our identity changes, our needs change and so our duties and rights have to change too. The 
86
freedom consists in this struggle for being what we want to be. “Freiheit ist,” Husserl write, “ein 
Ausdruck für das Vermögen und vor allem für den erworbenen Habitus kritischer Stellungnahme zu 
dem, was sich (…) als wahr, als wertvoll, als praktisch seinsollend bewusstseinsmäßig gibt.” (14) The 
absolute value of  every person consists just in this capability to put into practice our freedom through 
the correspondence between duty and will. Our freedom considered as the expression of  our identity is 
the “Gesollte” that everyone has to respect.
   When we talk about freedom, we are talking about an effort that everyone has to make to express his 
identity. Freedom consists in the possibility for everyone to choose rationally and voluntary to be what 
everyone is, according to his rational will. So the freedom of  a man, who is at the same time “the 
other,” consists in this capability to struggle in order to acquire new forms of  expressions of  identity 
which are more and more true. Human rights are the results of  this struggle because they are at the 
same time the expressions of  everyone’s freedom and moral, social and political duties. They are the 
perfect contemporary expression of  the husserlian idea of  good applied in a social, ethical and political 
context.
The method
The method to understand the distinction between good and bad can be understood always within the 
phenomenological description of  the human being. According to the characteristics which came out 
during the analysis, for Husserl the subject is a monad originally connected to others and to the world it 
lives in. Husserl writes: “die objektive Welt als I d e e, als ideales Korrelat (…) ist wesensmäßig bezogen 
auf  die selbst in der Idealität endloser Offenheit konstituierte Intersubjektivität (…). Danach gehört zur 
Konstitution der objektiven Welt wesensmäßig Harmonie der Monaden.” (15) The world is described 
as an idea correlated and referred to the inter-subjective life of  every monad. The harmony of  the 
world depends on the inter-subjective harmony between monads. From the ethical point of  view, as we 
already know, this harmony can be generated by the effort of  every monad to reach its good. “Es 
gehört also — Husserl writes — zu meinem echt menschlichen Leben dass ich nicht nur mich als 
Guten, sondern die gesamte Gemeinschaft als eine Gemeinschaft Guter wünschen und, soweit ich 
kann, in meinen praktischen Willens-, Zweckkreis nehmen muss. Ein wahrer Mensch sein ist ein wahrer 
Mensch sein wollen und beschließt in sich, Glied einer ‚wahren’ Menschheit sein wollen oder die 
Gemeinschaft, der man angehört, als eine wahre wollen, in den Grenzen praktischer Möglichkeit.” (16) 
The good of  every man corresponds to everyone’s authenticity, and every man hopes to live in a 
community formed by authentic and good people.  Surely “eine jeweilige Gemeinschaft ist (…) eine 
Vielheit von Menschen, die teils von egoistischen, teils von altruistischen Motiven und meist passiv 
geleitet sind, Menschen, unter denen manche Selbstzucht haben, freie Überlegung, freie Entscheidung 
üben und manche dabei einen ethischen Lebenswillen.” (17) In this context the possibility of  an inter-
monadic harmony can be only approximately reached through the rational will of  every monad. “Die 
ethische Besinnung (…), dass die ethische Form unseres individuellen Lebens diesem nur einen sehr 
beschränkten Wertgehalt geben kann und dass wir, wie alle gut Gesinnten, dahin wirken müssen, die 
Gemeinschaft nach Möglichkeit der Idee einer guten Gemeinschaft anzunähern in dem oben 
bezeichneten Sinn.” (18) 
   The method (that‘s meta-odòn, the path) that Husserl shows in order to pursue this idea of  good 
community is the epoché. The epoché consists in the neutralization of  all empirical reality, fulfilled with 
the aim of  understanding the original nature of  the man. “Vollziehe ich aber die phänomenologische 
epoché, verfällt, wie die ganze Welt der natürlichen Thesis so ‘Ich, der Mensch’ der Ausschaltung, dann 
bleibt das reine Akterlebnis mit seinem eigenen Wesen zurück.” (19) Through the epoché we can 
change our ethical attitude toward ourselves and toward the world we live in. Namely, the epoché 
applied to the mundane man allowed to activate the responsible research of  his own absolute value.
   Consequently, in this phenomenological context, the bad derives from the incapability or lack of  will 
of  a man to express and to know his “good and bad parts.” In fact, everyone can be dominated by 
passion or egoism. The man “steht nun im täglichen Kampf  und übt immer neue Entscheidung und 
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fühlt sich in ihr verantwortlich. Leidenschaften überrennen seinen guten Willen, er wird zu 
Überlegungen motiviert, wie sich dagegen versichere (…). Er irrt sich auch tief  in der Beurteilung 
maßgebender Umstände, er vergreift sich in den Mitteln und wählt statt des Nützlichen das Schädliche, 
statt eines edleren Wertes einen minder edlen. Oder er beurteilt andere Menschen falsch, und auch wo 
er von keinen egoistischen Motiven geleitet ist, sondern in wahrer Menschenliebe lebt (...). Alle solche 
Erfahrungen zeigen ihm, dass er unvollkommen ist, dass er lernen muss, sich vor Irrtum zu hüten, 
seiner Erkenntnisfähigkeit zu besinnen. So hat er neben der Verantwortung der Entscheidung im 
einzelnen Fall auch verantwortliche Sorgen für die Vorbereitung von Fähigkeiten von einzelnen 
Entscheidungen für Klasse von Fällen sichern könnten.” (20) The man can learn from the experiences 
of  his past and can avoid repeating all of  his mistakes derived from his irrational part. Every man is a 
whole constituted both by rational and irrational characteristics. Everyone has to know also his 
irrational, impulsive or usual aspects because only in this way can he better control himself  and better 
understand the surrounding world. Our explication of  the world is the result of  the comprehension of  
ourselves; if  we were able to explain and to manage our irrational part we could comprehend better the 
irrational part of  the world. Then, the task of  every person is to pursue his identity, changing his 
attitude toward himself  and the world. The world is the product of  our experience and we can improve 
it only through acting responsibly.
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Naturalizing Intentionality? 
A Husserlian Contribution to the Internalism/Externalism Debate
Thomas Szanto 
 
  The philosophical and cognitivist project of  naturalizing the mind represents undoubtedly one of  the 
most pressing challenges Husserl’s transcendental theory of  consciousness is facing today. It is my 
contention that the future of  Husserlian phenomenology is largely dependent on its success in 
contributing to the epistemological clarification of  the very metaphysics underlying contemporary 
debates on naturalism in philosophy of  mind.
   Now, if  there is minimal consensus within the highly diverging naturalist camps, it is the assumption 
that the naturalization of  intentionality will in the long run provide the least troublesome or most 
plausible route to a full-fledged naturalistic theory of  the mind. Recent attempts to naturalize 
intentional consciousness dominantly center upon two lines of  argumentation: namely, (semantic) 
internalism and externalism.
In what follows I propose to face the issue of  naturalizing intentionality by laying bare the common 
metaphysical implications of  these two prima facie opposed positions from the perspective of  Husserl’s 
phenomenology. The guiding idea of  my paper is that both internalistic and externalistic accounts of  
intentionality work on the common background assumption of  scientific realism. I shall argue that 
Husserl’s transcendental theory of  intentional consciousness undermines the metaphysical legitimacy 
of  scientific realism and, by the very same token, the cognitivist standard opposition of  internalism and 
externalism in view of  intentional content.
Internalizing or Externalizing Intentional Content?
  To begin with, there is not only a notorious discord concerning the question of  how to specify the 
verificational-criteria for determining whether the entity to be naturalized does at all constitute an 
epistemologically autonomous property; even amongst those who endorse a realistic stance towards 
intentional states (1) there are fundamental disagreements on what a successful naturalization of  
intentionality would exactly amount to. Does it suffice to naturalize intentional content? If  so, what 
would a naturalistic theory of  intentional content have to explain? Or, is there actually more to the 
problem of  naturalizing intentionality than intentional content alone?
I believe that in the context of  the internalism-externalism debate the issue typically comes down to the 
problem of  how to adresss the following two correlative concerns: 
1) How is the very constitution of  intentional states possible? Or to put it in the manner of  intentional 
realism: how could the epistemic reality of  intentional states possibly be captured within a naturalistic 
ontology, conceived as a continuous matrix of  causal-fuctional interactions? 
2) What determines the contents of  these states? Accordingly, what (internal and/or external) 
properties are responsible for the individuation of  intentional states?
   Following common usage, roughly, what internalism holds is that the relation that intentional states 
entertain to their objects is determined by the internal function of  the contents of  these states. Thus, 
according to this view, the individuation of  intentional states (their being about this or that specific 
object) is due to the intra-mentally fixed representational structure of  their contents. To make things 
more complicated, internally construed contents are said to be narrow, if  their reference to an 
intentional object is solely determined by the functional organization of  an individual. On this picture, 
semantic internalism can be regarded as a position either entailing epistemological realism or anti-
realism, depending on how one conceives of  the relation between mental representations and external 
reality. One possibility is to construe this relation as merely epistemic; the other is to adhere to a 
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logical/conceptual or a foundational/causal dependence. But in either case, internalism is intrinsically 
bound to hold what H. Putnam has critically labelled “methodological solipsism.” (2) Methodological 
solipsism is the assumption that all one need grasp in order to know the properties of  the state of  
affairs to which an individual subject refers to is the organization of  the inner mental representations 
mirrored on the functional level of  the brain of  that individual subject. Roughly, this is the view 
adopted by prototypical internalists like J. Fodor (3) as a heuristic research strategy for a computational 
modelling of  the mind. 
   Externalism, in contrast, can be conceived in one of  the two ways: first, as the view that narrow, 
intentional contexts are not sufficient for fixing intentional objects, for reference is essentially co-
determined in the intersubjective/social process of  constituting meaning. Meaning in this construal is 
usually termed broad content. Alternatively, one can — à la McDowell (4) — define externalism in a 
more radical line of  interpretation (and perhaps in a way more sympathetic to a Husserlian perspective 
(5)) as the view that content, construed narrowly, has no functional role in determining reference 
whatsoever. For the radical externalist, meaning, conceived as broad content, is originally embedded in 
the (real) world to which it refers, just as the subject, the bearer of  broad content, is embedded in the 
intersubjective world of  which it is a constituent. Both externalist accounts of  broad content imply a 
version of  epistemological realism, couched basically in a common-sense realist ontology. In a nutshell, 
although meaning is intrinsically related to the divergent conceptual sets of  the referring subjects 
(socially, environmentally, etc.), reference in terms of  the extension of  meaning is ontologically not 
dependent on the respective conceptual frameworks at a given time.
   What follows from these accounts for the project of  naturalizing intentionality is this: if  only we can 
reach a purely naturalistic description of  intentional content (i.e., to a description which makes no 
reference to the intentional idiom, be it causal, functional, teleological, etc.), then the distinctive feature 
of  the mental, namely, its “epistemic perspectivity” (6) subsequently can be fixed in naturalistic terms. 
   Given this brief  outline of  internalism and externalism, it is clear that both ways of  characterizing the 
role meaning plays in determining reference share the assumption that the representational content of  
intentional acts is key to ascribing semantically and epistemologically evaluable intentional states to an 
organism at all. The point I wish to highlight here is that both models of  the intentionality reduce the 
problem of  the constitution of  the epistemologically relevant properties of  intentional states to the 
question of  how to spell out the representational function of  intentional content. (7) The 
epistemological idea that lies at the heart of  this reduction might thus be called representational 
verficationism. It is the idea of  representational verificationism that overtly or covertly governs all 
naturalistic attempts to explain the intentional correlation between mind and world in terms of  
empirically determining the objective properties of  reference. Yet, as far as I see, the very possibility of  
representational verificationism is based on the ontology of  scientific realism (8) — an ontology whose 
legitimacy was convincingly challenged by transcendental phenomenology about a hundred years ago.
The Phenomenological Test for Naturalizing Intentionality
The general epistemological task of  phenomenology is to elucidate the conditions of  possibility of  the 
very givenness of  an objective entity for a subjective being. For Husserl, intentionality marks the basic 
first-personal epistemic structure of  this givenness. Hence, intentionality is not an internal property of  
consciousness amongst its other cognitive properties (like, e.g., attentiveness), but the hallmark of  its 
very phenomenal mode of  being. Intentionality is the overall dispositional state or feature of  
consciousness as such. 
   On the phenomenological account — in contrast to the cognitivist paradigm — the question 
concerning the constitution of  intentional states is not: “what makes a representation to an internal and 
consequently to a mental representation?” In fact, within the metaphysical framework of  Husserl’s 
transcendental idealism, this question is, strictly speaking, nonsensical. For Husserl, the question of  the 
constitution of  intentionality cannot be a matter of  determining which properties (internal or external) 
give consciousness the very function of  referring to a transcendent object. A phenomenological theory 
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of  the constitution of  intentional consciousness is not to be confused with the quasi-inductive method 
of  explaining the constitution of  intentional states by determining the representational function of  
intentional contents. Just as for Husserl the referential function of  a meaningful expression is 
descriptively not deducible from any single property of  consciousness other than its intrinsic 
intentionality, (9) so also the function of  being intentional is a descriptively ultimate property of  being 
conscious of  something. In short: intentionality constitutes the openness of  the mind to the world of  
meanings. Or more properly: intentional consciousness is nothing but the phenomenological title for 
this openness. The fact that the world appears to the mind means that the world bears objective sense 
for a subject. 
Phenomenologically viewed, there are two levels to the immanence of  mental states, which must be 
distinguished: namely, the intentional immanence of  — broadly speaking — objectifying 
representations and the real (reell) immanence of  non-representational phenomenal states. According 
to Husserl, when performing an intentional act or simply being in an intentional state, we are not 
directed to the intentional act nor to the intentional — sensual, perceptual or signitive — contents the 
acts bestow with objective meaning, but to the intentional object itself. (10) It is only by virtue of  
performing the phenomenological reflexion that the real immanent field of  the noetic act-components 
of  intentionality is unfolded. So we might well say that the “intentional stance,” that is the ability to 
reflect thematically on the intentional object as intended by the act, is first brought to the fore by the 
transcendental-phenomenological reduction. However, the core of  the the phenomenal aspect of  
intentional consciousness, the living through the experience of  something functions unthematically and 
prereflectively in every conscious act — independently of  whether we perform the reduction or not.
   Thus, what has to be markedly distinguished within every intentional state is the relational mode of  
object directedness and the non-relational mode of  performing this relational direction. The latter 
mode of  intentional consciousness, the experiential practicing of  intentionality, is an intransitive 
consciousness of  one’s being in an intentional state. Its intrinsic subjective character cannot in principle 
be totally captured by a third-personal description. It is true that every consciously performed 
intentional act can be reflectively turned into an intentional object of  a succeeding higher-order 
intentional act. But what is thus objectified are solely the properties of  the relational contents of  the 
act, not the phenomenal aspect of  actually performing the intentional relation. (11)
   The crucial mistake of  both semantic internalism and externalism is to separate the two intrinsically 
co-relative aspects of  intentional consciousness. What has to be emphasized in connection with the 
internalism-externalism debate is that intentional content must not be internalistically conceived as the 
result of  a merely formal and syntactical interplay between the different “noematic levels,” (12) but 
rather as the result of  the interplay of  the experiential horizons in which the experiencing subject is 
constitutively embedded. (13) 
   In the given context, Husserl’s transcendental-idealist stance is then best captured as the 
epistemological position alternative to the two extremes of  either – externalistically – naturalizing (14) 
or — internalistically — “over-intentionalizing” the phenomenal “region of  sense.” (15) Husserl shows 
not only that the very attempt to naturalize the phenomenal level of  intentionality is fundamentally 
flawed; he is also well aware that this does not mean that the objective space of  sense in which the 
subject is embedded is exhaustedly characterised by being purely intentional. For, as Husserl succinctly 
points out: “The being of  living through an experience is not the being of  an object.” (16) Yet it is 
precisely this fine-grained phenomenological distinction that the fundamental epistemological 
distinction between first- and third-person-perspective is based on and which in turn represents the 
very test for naturalizing intentional consciousness. 
   To conclude, the lesson to be drawn from the phenomenological account of  consciousness for the 
specific project of  naturalizing intentionality is this: if  naturalizing means to provide an explanatory 
framework of  the relation between mind and world capable of  a complete integration into the realistic 
ontology of  the natural sciences, then the naturalization of  intentional consciousness must fail in 
principle. One can neither naturalize consciousness by simply internalizing the properties of  intentional 
objects nor by simply externalizing the properties of  phenomenal experiences. So if  there is more to 
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the concept of  intentional consciousness than what is contained inside or outside the head — that is, if  
there is more to intentionality than intentional content — we had better stick to results obtained by 
transcendental phenomenology thus far, instead of  taking the project of  naturalizing consciousness for 
granted. (†)
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The Body of  Phenomenology; Unforeseen Phenomenological Outcomes of  
Biotechnologies
Martin G. Weiss 
 Preliminary Remark
  Just as rationalization, with its tendency to objectivity, in the end leads to the destabilization of  any 
kind of  substantialism (at least for Nietzsche), the biotechnologies, which were originally intended as an 
extreme method of  bodily control, are becoming the most blatant example of  how this domination is 
not possible. That is to say, there can be no totally autonomous subject completely cut off  from 
whatever historical-bodily determination. The desire to absolutely control human animality by way of  
reason, as expressed in the biotechnologies, transforms itself  into the inconfutable demonstration of  
humanity's constitutive finitude and of  the unsustainability of  the dualistic mind-body-concept. So 
biotechnologies paradoxically became a hint for the up-to-datedness of  the phenomenology of  the 
body established by Edmund Husserl and developed further by Jean-Paul-Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, 
Hermann Schmitz und Bernhard Waldenfels.
The Body-Nature-Equation and its Dissolution by Biotechnologies
   Starting with Plato and enforced by the Christian tradition, on the one side the body has been 
opposed to the mind and on the other side identified with “nature.” In the history of  philosophy it is 
possible to identify three main concepts of  nature: First, the word “nature” designates the “essence” of  
things. Second, the term “nature” is used to indicate the realm of  the inorganic given death matter, 
which results from itself  and cannot be ascribed to human acting. Third, the term “nature” is used to 
designate the realm of  live, of  the beings which have the principle of  their motion in themselves, as 
Aristotle puts it, whereas Aristotle's concept of  motion includes local movement as well as becoming 
and dying. All these traditional meanings of  nature, essence, matter and life, coincide in one aspect: 
what is natural is independent of  the human subject. Nature is objective, the other in relation to the 
human being, that which resists the human will, which again is the essential attribute of  reality at least 
for Schelling, one of  the fathers of  German Idealism.
   Now the contemporary Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo (1) identifies “reality” with power, or with 
violence, and this in turn with the kind of  speech that allows no contradiction. By reality, Vattimo 
means the violent immediacy of  the “direct force of  the given, an incontestable self-obtrusion of  the 
an sich [‘as such’ or ‘in-itself ’].” (2) This reality is violent, as violence is definable only as the evident 
ground that excludes all contradiction. Vattimo identifies violence with naked actuality, with an ultimate 
“resort, which one does not transcend and which silences all questioning, as it terminates the 
conversation.” (3) Here, Vattimo does not locate violence in the dominance of  the general over the 
particular, as existentialism had, but in the rendering impossible of  free contradiction in the widest 
sense of  the word. According to Vattimo, this non-questionable, and therefore by definition violent 
real, i.e., the objective, is being increasingly weakened by the findings of  modern science: “Modern 
science, heir and completion of  metaphysics, is that which transforms the world to a place where there 
are no (more) facts, but only interpretations.” (4) 
   The same dissolution of  objectivity is currently occurring in anthropology, because new 
biotechnological practices are undermining the concept of  a stable and given human nature (i.e., the 
body) as biological basis for human ratio.
   Defined as animal rationale, or rationabile as Kant puts it, the human being is considered as the 
animal, which is not yet what it is, but has to become what it is. Up to now this process was limited to 
the ratio, whereas the natural side remained untouched. The human being was manipulable, but never 
producible; and this because the biological nature remained untouchable. But with the rise of  
biotechnology, also this last constant term is no longer something fixed. In the age of  biotechnology 
the expression “human nature,” in the sense of  “biological substratum” as well as in the sense of  
“essence,” has lost its meaning. What consequences does this loss of  “essence” have for the human 
93
self-conception? When the difference between grooving and producing becomes unclear, then it's 
impossible to consider the human nature as something given. Is this the beginning of  posthumanity? 
   Concerning this question, the actual philosophical discourse offers two different approaches. The 
first could be described as “conservative,” driven by the fear of  losing the “essence” of  what is human. 
The exponents of  this approach try to maintain the concept of  human nature as some sort of  
unchangeable norm. This concept is very similar to the old-fashioned metaphysics of  substance and is 
therefore not very satisfying. The “progressive” position instead embraces the dissolution of  human 
nature as ultimate liberation and emancipation from the biological boundaries, which obstruct human 
freedom, which for this position is the very essence of  man. In this view the human animal represents 
only a transitory stage in the evolutionary history of  this species, which has not yet reached its end. The 
human animal is not yet what it has to be, but must achieve his very essence by enhancing his proper 
nature. This thesis, commonly labelled as “Posthumanism” is surprisingly also the core of  the classical 
Humanism, which identifies man as the animal whose specific essence consist in not having a given 
essence at all. Man is the only being, which is not what it is, but, as essentially free, has to decide by 
himself  what to be. In his “Oration on the Dignity Of  Men,” a sort of  humanist manifesto published 
in 1486 Pico della Mirandola writes:
Finally, the Great Artisan mandated that this creature who would receive nothing proper to 
himself  shall have joint possession of  whatever nature had been given to any other 
creature. He made man a creature of  indeterminate and indifferent nature, and, placing him 
in the middle of  the world, said to him: ‘Adam, we give you no fixed place to live, no form 
that is peculiar to you, nor any function that is yours alone. According to your desires and 
judgment, you will have and possess whatever place to live, whatever form, and whatever 
functions you yourself  choose. All other things have a limited and fixed nature prescribed 
and bounded by our laws. You, with no limit or no bound, may choose for yourself  the 
limits and bounds of  your nature. We have placed you at the world's center so that you may 
survey everything else in the world. We have made you neither of  heavenly nor of  earthly 
stuff, neither mortal nor immortal, so that with free choice and dignity, you may fashion 
yourself  into whatever form you choose. To you is granted the power of  degrading 
yourself  into the lower forms of  life, the beasts, and to you is granted the power, contained 
in your intellect and judgment, to be reborn into the higher forms, the divine. (5)
   Whereas the conservative faction tries to save a normative concept of  nature, risking thereby falling 
into the naturalistic fallacy which deduces norms from facts, the posthumanist or genuine humanist 
position forgets the constitutive contingency of  the human being and is based on the latent idea that 
the human body is only the accidental substratum of  human freedom. This is because only if  one 
thinks that the free subject is something different from his physical incarnation, is it possible to identify 
the control over the body as liberation of  the subject. 
   So both positions are problematic. The first one because it tries to maintain a concept, which risks 
being overruled by the developments of  biotechnologies; the other because its concept, standing in the 
tradition of  Descartes and the Enlightenment, is subject to the “dialectics of  enlightenment” described 
by Adorno and Horkheimer: What started as liberation from the boundaries of  the biological nature of  
man turns into reification of  the human being. So the pretended liberation from nature results in a new 
form of  manipulability, as the alleged liberation of  the subject from its corporal limitations finally 
proves to be a new sort of  suppression of  the human being, who thus tragically learns that the body is 
not the grave of  the soul, to quote Plato, but the only mode in which the mind exists. Given that, 
perhaps there is a third way to read Biotechnology. 
   In fact, the dissolution of  human nature, which is an effect of  pharmacological, prosthetic and 
genetic manipulations of  the human bios, can be read as an aspect of  the weakening of  being 
diagnosed by Vattimo. In this view, the dissolution of  human nature caused by biotechnology 
corresponds to the general tendency toward a weak ontology. In this view biotechnologies would only 
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realise in the field of  philosophical anthropology the same dissolution, which already has taken place in 
epistemology. But this weakening also of  the biological nature of  man, which on the one hand leads to 
a new form of  oppression, could on the other hand, according to Vattimo, also be interpreted as 
another sort of  liberation: not as domination of  nature through reification but as liberation from 
unquestionable objectivity. This is because the paradoxical effect of  the technical attempt to control 
human nature through reification operated by biotechnologies finally results in the intuition of  the 
essential “Unverfügbarkeit,” i.e., “unavailability” of  the human “physis,” as Heidegger puts it. The 
effort of  biotechnology to manipulate human nature, which represents the acme of  reification, leads 
paradoxically to the insight that this ultimate reification, which aims at total control of  the objective 
nature by the human subject, is not possible, as the alleged liberation of  the subject through 
domination of  nature (the classical program of  the enlightenment), shows that in the case of  
biotechnology it is not a subject to take control of  a mere body, but that what here is manipulated is the 
human being as a whole. So the unintentional effect of  biotechnology, which is based on the uncritical 
assumption of  a dualistic model of  man — which defines man as connection between objective nature 
and subjective ratio — consists in the demonstration that this dualistic model is no longer suitable. 
Begun as consequence of  the mind-body-dualism, biotechnology finally leads to the conclusion, that 
the human being is an indivisible unity, which also means that the aim of  total control over the human 
bios ends in the demonstration of  the constitutive “unavailability” of  human nature, here in the sense 
of  human essence. What becomes evident is the fact that biotechnologies cannot be seen as a sort of  
manipulation of  the mere body perpetrated by a pure subject, because biotechnologies show that the 
object of  manipulation is always the human being as a whole. 
Two Concepts of  Body-Mind-Relation. Materialism vs. Phenomenology
   Even if  one concedes that biotechnologies undermine the traditional dichotomist mind-body-
concept, forcing us to conceive the human being as a mind-body-unity, still we do not know how to 
describe this unity, as both a phenomenological and a naturalistic description are possible. A strong 
version of  the naturalistic conception can be found in the “Identity-Theory,” which stresses the identity 
of  “mental states” with biochemical processes of  the brain. (6) From a phenomenological point of  
view this naturalistic position is not very satisfying because it is not able to explain the fundamental 
psychic activity, i.e., “intentionality.” “Intentionality” here means the “Korrelationsapriori” of  “noesis” 
and “noema,” i.e., that psychic acts always refer to an object. To think means always to think something. 
The materialistic theories are not able to do justice to the mental, because all they can do is detect a 
concomitance of  mental phenomena and certain biochemical processes. The mental as such can’t even 
be detected in this model. Maybe, someday, Physiology will be able to describe exactly what 
biochemical processes happen, when I see something red, but this information doesn’t say anything 
about what it means for me to see this color. The phenomenon as such remains outside this 
description.
  “Intentionality” and “Phenomenality,” the two aspects the naturalistic model of  the mind-body-unity 
is not able to explain, are at the core of  the phenomenology of  the body, that represent a more 
convincing concept of  mind-body-unity. Phenomenology of  the body, inaugurated by Husserl and 
developed by Jean-Paul Sartre, (7) Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Hermann Schmitz and Bernhard Waldenfels, 
(8) does not try to reduce the mind to an epiphenomenon of  the body, like the materialistic theories, 
but conceives the “living body” (Leib) as the way in which the human being exists. From an 
phenomenological point of  view the body is the medium of  our existence, i.e. “in-der-Welt-sein.” The 
body is both the medium of  human acts and the place where the World appears. The description of  the 
Body as medium of  existence also clarifies how it is possible to be a body and at the same time to have 
a body. (9) 
   If  biotechnologies have paradoxically resulted in undermining the tradition mind-body-dualism, the 
question arising of  how to conceive the newly discovered unity of  man shows the importance of  the 
phenomenological approach to the mind-body-problem, especially because the naturalistic model of  
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the mind-body-identity is not able to explain all aspects of  this unity.
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Does (Husserlian) Phenomenology have a Future?
Dan Zahavi 
 
  Husserl is the founding father of  phenomenology, but it has often been claimed that virtually all post-
Husserlian phenomenologists ended up distancing themselves from most aspects of  Husserl’s original 
program. It has consequently been claimed that phenomenology is a tradition in name only. It has no 
common method and research program. It has even been suggested that Husserl was not only the 
founder of  phenomenology, but also its sole true practitioner. I think the latter view, which for 
opposing reasons has been advocated by ardent Husserlians and anti-Husserlians alike, is wrong. It 
presents us with a distorted view of  the influence of  phenomenology in 20th century philosophy, and 
it conceals the extent to which post-Husserlian phenomenologists continued the work of  the founder. 
Although phenomenology has in many ways developed as a heterogeneous movement with many 
branches; although, as Ricoeur famously put it, the history of  phenomenology is the history of  
Husserlian heresies; (1) and although it would be an exaggeration to claim that phenomenology is a 
philosophical system with a clearly delineated body of  doctrines, one should not overlook the 
overarching concerns and common themes that have united and continue to unite its proponents. 
   Many still tend to think of  Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and Heidegger’s and Merleau-
Ponty’s hermeneutical and existential phenomenology as excluding alternatives. The argument given is 
frequently that only the latter introduced the topics of  intersubjectivity, sociality, embodiment, 
historicity, language, and interpretation into phenomenology and that this led to a decisive 
transformation of  the Husserlian framework. Thus, according to the received view, Husserl’s 
commitment to a Cartesian foundationalism made him conceive of  phenomenology as an investigation 
of  a detached transcendental ego for whom its own body, worldly things, and other subjects were but 
constituted objects spread out before its gaze. If  this standard interpretation had been correct, it would 
indeed have been difficult to maintain that Husserl’s phenomenology had much in common with 
Merleau-Ponty’s or Heidegger’s phenomenology. But we are dealing with a pejorative caricature that 
recent Husserl research has done much to dismantle. The continuing publication of  Husserliana has 
made an increasing number of  Husserl's research manuscripts available, and a study of  these has made 
it clear that Husserl is a far more complex thinker than the standard reading is suggesting. He 
frequently anticipated and formulated many of  the critical moves made by subsequent 
phenomenologists.
   Steven Crowell recently claimed that the future prospects of  phenomenology will depend on the 
talent of  those who take it up. (2) As I see it, it will also depend upon their ability to articulate and 
strengthen what is common to the phenomenological enterprise instead of  getting involved in the 
sectarian trench warfare that has regrettably plagued much of  its history. A first step in this direction 
would be for phenomenologists to recognize and embrace the Husserlian heritage. This is in particular 
so, given that there are core features of  the Husserlian methodology that remain indispensable to 
contemporary phenomenology, the most prominent one being the transcendental reduction.
   But how can one today argue for the indispensability of  the reduction? It is well known that already 
Heidegger criticized it. In truth, however, Heidegger didn’t consider the reduction per se to be a 
problem, rather he argued that Husserl didn’t think it through in a sufficiently radical manner. This 
objection has been repeated frequently by Heideggerians ever since. Let us take a closer look at a more 
recent version of  this criticism, the one espoused by Marion.
   According to Marion, Husserl is to be praised for his focus on various modes of  givenness, but 
unfortunately, as it has been put, he “laiss[e] ininterrogée la donation dont il a pourtant accompli 
l’élargissement.” (3) In other words, Husserl fails to pose the fundamental question concerning 
givenness as such. What does giving mean, what is at all at play in the fact that something is given? This 
failure has wide-ranging implications. Rather than letting his investigation orient itself  in accordance 
with the things themselves, Husserl is instead led by traditional, or to be more specific, Cartesian 
presuppositions and decisions. This is why Husserl’s phenomenology ultimately remains 
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unphenomenological, (4) or at least not wholly phenomenological. (5) The phenomenality of  the 
phenomena is reduced to the certitude of  actual presence; (6) it is reduced to objectivity understood as 
an assured permanence. This focus on objective subsistence goes hand in hand with Husserl’s inability 
to consider the nonpresent and absent. (7) This is why the Husserlian phenomenon – defined as and 
confined to presence for consciousness – is a flat phenomenon, a phenomenon without any depth. (8) 
But it is not sufficient simply to thematize the phenomena – which Husserl managed to do quite well - 
we also need to thematize their phenomenality. (9) Such a move will bring us from a surface 
phenomenology to a depth phenomenology. This move which might be considered the second 
phenomenological breakthrough (after Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen) was accomplished by 
Heidegger insofar as he calls for an investigation of  the Being of  beings. (10)  Thus, another way of  
describing Husserl’s fundamental mistake is by saying that he never understood that the true and 
innermost destination of  phenomenology is to provide ontology with its proper method. (11) Of  
course, it could be, and it has been, objected in Husserl’s defence, that Husserl does in fact speak 
repeatedly of  the ontological dimension of  phenomenology in works such as Cartesianische Meditationen, 
Ideen III, Erste Philosophie II, and Formale und transzendentale Logik. But the reply should be obvious. 
Although Husserl even prior to Heidegger maintained that phenomenology had ontological 
implications, this in no way signifies that he meant the same by ontology as Heidegger. (12) In fact, 
Husserl’s ontology is and remains an ontology of  objects. Beings are only in the measure that a 
judgment persists in determining them. His investigation of  formal ontology, for instance, aims at 
articulating the general substratum of  predication. (13) But for the very same reason, Husserl’s 
ontology prevents or prohibits him from understanding the question of  Being that Heidegger had 
posed. Despite Husserl’s frequent emphasis on the cardinal difference between reality and 
consciousness, he never really understood that this difference amounts to an ontological difference, a 
difference in Being; rather he consistently took consciousness to be a region that could be objectively 
determined and failed to realize that its mode of  Being differs radically from the mode of  Being of  
worldly entities. (14) To summarize the criticism, Husserl’s transcendental reduction “équivaut à une 
constitution d’objets. (a) Elle se déploie pour le Je intentionnel et constituant. (b) Elle lui donne des 
objets constitués, (c) pris dans des ontologies régionales toutes conformes, à travers l’ontologie formelle, 
à l’horizon de l’objectité. (d) Elle exclut ainsi de la donation tout ce qui ne se laisse pas reconduire à 
l’objectité, à savoir les differences principielles de manières d’être (de la conscience, de l’ustensilité, du 
monde).” (15) 
   Let me summarize the main points: 1) Husserlian phenomenology doesn’t thematize the very 
phenomenality of  the phenomena. 2) It privileges an active constituting. 3) It doesn’t do justice to the 
specific mode of  being of  consciousness since it consistently interprets it as a form of  object being. 4) 
Finally, due to its emphasis on objective subsistence, Husserlian phenomenology has only an eye for 
presence; it fails to consider the givenness of  the absent and non-present. 
   If  this criticism holds true, I think it is fair to say that Husserlian phenomenology is beset with severe 
limitations, and that post-Husserlian phenomenology has had no choice but to break out of  such a 
framework. But is the criticism valid? I don’t think so. In my view, Husserlian phenomenology has the 
resources to tackle all four issues: It has investigated the very dimension of  phenomenality, rather than 
merely different types of  phenomena. It has repeatedly emphasized to what extent intentional activity 
presupposes passivity. It has analysed the non-objectifying mode of  Being of  consciousness, and it has 
discussed the interplay between presence and absence in extenso. To put it differently, I think that 
Husserl himself  most certainly passed beyond what might be called a flat, surface phenomenology. If  
there is anything that lacks depth, it is not Husserl’s phenomenology, but the standard criticism of  it.
   It can be conceded straight away that there is an important and decisive difference between an 
investigation of  object-intentionality, i.e., an investigation that explores the difference between 
perception, empathy, imagination and pictorial consciousness for instance, and the ontological question 
posed by Heidegger, but it is highly problematic to look for a possible parallel to this radicalization in 
Husserl’s writings on formal ontology. Rather the obvious and natural place to look is of  course in 
Husserl’s writings on time. To put it differently, any serious attempt to gauge the radicality of  the 
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Husserlian enterprise must necessarily discuss Husserl’s writings on the deepest layers of  constitution. 
It must discuss his writings on time and passive synthesis. It is in these writings that Husserl’s most 
profound reflections on the structure of  phenomenality, the nature of  subjectivity, and the interplay 
between presence and absence is to be found. 
   Time, or rather space, will not permit me to account in detail for Husserl’s sophisticated analyses of  
time-consciousness, self-consciousness, constitution, passivity, facticity, alterity, and intersubjectivity. 
Nor is it necessary, since all of  these areas have already been discussed at length by numerous Husserl 
scholars in recent years. Thus, there is an extensive corpus of  research readily available that any serious 
criticism of  Husserl must take into account. So what I will do instead is simply to present a few key 
passages from different works of  Husserl that speak directly against one of  the frequently repeated 
criticisms, namely the claim that Husserl consistently conceived of  the being of  subjectivity as a form 
of  object being.
   Already in Logische Untersuchungen we find Husserl resisting this suggestion. In the 5th investigation, 
for instance, Husserl writes that the intentional experiences themselves are lived through, but he denies 
that they appear in an objectified manner; they are neither seen nor heard. They are conscious without 
being intentional objects. (16) This is not to deny that we can, in fact, direct our attention towards our 
experiences and thereby take them as objects of  an inner perception, (17) but this only occurs the 
moment we reflect upon them. In contrast to Brentano, who famously held that our experiences are 
conscious by being taken as secondary objects, Husserl does not seek to identify the (self)givenness of  
our experiences with the givenness of  objects. As he explicitly states in the 6th Investigation: 
“Erlebtsein ist nicht Gegenständlichsein.” (18) Or as Husserl was to write 17 years later in the Bernau 
manuscripts: “Sein sein ist aber ein total anderes als das aller Objekte. Es ist eben Subjektsein...” (19) 
   We find Husserl occupied with a similar question in his 1906/07 lecture course Einleitung in die Logik  
und Erkenntnistheorie.He begins by observing that we are aware of  the perceptual object when we are 
engaged in a perception. But what about the sensations and the perceptual experience itself ? They are 
also conscious, but are not given as perceptual objects; they are not perceived? (20) We know that we 
can turn our attention away from the perceptual object and towards the perceptual experience. In this 
sense, it is possible to reflect upon the experience. To repeat the question, how is the perceptual 
experience given prior to reflection; how is it pre-reflectively present? (21) In 1906/07 Husserl answers 
the question by distinguishing between consciousness in the sense of  experiential being and 
consciousness in the sense of  intentionality. Whereas the latter involves directedness towards an object, 
i.e., object-consciousness, the former does not. As Husserl explicitly writes: “‘[E]rleben’ bedeutet dann 
nicht ein Gegenständlich-Haben und auf  das Gegenständliche in dieser oder jener Weise ‘Beziehung 
haben’.” (22) And as he then continues a few pages later:
Nicht verwechseln darf  man das Bewußtsein vom gegenständlichen Hintergrund und das Bewußtsein im  
Sinn des Erlebtseins. Erlebnisse als solche haben ihr Sein, aber sie sind nicht Gegenstände 
von Apperzeptionen (wir kämen ja sonst auf  einen unendlichen Regreß). Der Hintergrund 
aber ist uns gegenständlich, er ist es durch den Komplex von apperzeptiven Erlebnissen, 
die ihn gleichsam konstituieren. Diese Gegenstände sind unbeachtet [...] aber etwas ganz 
anderes für uns als die bloßen Erlebnisse, z.B. die sie objektivierenden Apperzeptionen und 
Akterlebnisse selbst. […] Das attentionale Bewußtsein des Hintergrund und das 
Bewußtsein als bloßes Erlebtsein ist ganz zu scheiden. (23) 
   Husserl’s position is, consequently, relatively unequivocal. An intentional experience is conscious of  
something different from itself, namely the object intended. At the same time, the experience also 
manifests itself. Thus, apart from being intentional, the experience is also characterized by what Husserl 
occasionally calls its “Urbewußtsein.” (24) This notion of  Urbewußtsein, which Husserl already used in the 
1906/07 lecture course, is not meant to denote a particular intentional experience. Rather, the term 
designates the pervasive dimension of  pre-reflective and non-objectifying self-consciousness that is 
part and parcel of  any occurring experience. (25)  
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   Much more could be said, but I think it should at least be clear that I find the Heideggerian criticism 
of  Husserl unsatisfactory. Marion is of  course right in saying that Husserl frequently comes to us 
through Heidegger. But is there any reason to assign Heidegger’s Husserl interpretation a privileged 
status? Is there any reason to consider Heidegger’s account of  the limitations of  Husserl’s 
phenomenology a particularly reliable source? I don’t think so. Not only because of  its own limited 
textual basis – Heidegger is by and large only referring to Logische Untersuchungen and Ideen I, but 
certainly also because Heidegger had his own agenda, his own reasons for wanting to emphasize his 
own originality vis-à-vis his old teacher.
   Coming back to the issue of  the methodology, why did Husserl insist that we have to perform the 
reduction if  we want to do phenomenology? The ultimate aim of  the reductive procedure is not to 
enable us to describe objects or experiences as precisely and meticulously as possible, nor does it aim at 
an exhaustive investigation of  the phenomena in all their factual diversity. No, its true task is to 
investigate the phenomena qua phenomena, that is, it is concerned with understanding the dimension 
of  phenomenality and to explore its innermost structure and very condition of  possibility. This task is a 
transcendental philosophical task. It is a move from a straightforward metaphysical or empirical 
investigation of  objects to an investigation of  the very framework of  meaning and intelligibility that 
makes any such straightforward investigation possible in the first place. Contrary to widespread 
misunderstandings this methodological step is per se neither committed to Cartesian internalism, to a 
naïve metaphysics of  presence, nor to the privileging of  an active and controlling I. In my view, 
Husserl’s notion of  reduction is the original breakthrough. It is the reflective move that once and for all 
opened the field of  phenomenological research. It is an opening that is presupposed in every proposed 
radicalization by subsequent phenomenologists.
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The Possibility of  Husserlian Phenomenological Practice
Elizabeth A. Behnke
In 1988, Margaret van de Pitte issued a challenge: have we indeed mastered the distinctive methods of  
phenomenology in a spirit of  “resolute cooperation” (1) and carried Husserl’s project forward through 
original phenomenological investigation, or do we merely write “about” phenomenology instead of  
doing it? (2) It is true that there have been many appropriations and extensions of  phenomenological 
method in areas beyond philosophy (notably in the human sciences), although many of  these 
approaches take their cue from existential or hermeneutic phenomenology rather than appealing 
directly to Husserl’s own writings. However, we can also point to “a considerable number of  good 
philosophers who know very well what Husserl said, who make ample use of  his research results, and 
who nevertheless show not the slightest interest in plying the distinctive method that is supposed to 
have generated them.” (3) For me, this challenge is still relevant today, and I shall accordingly respond 
to it with a vision for the future of  Husserlian phenomenology that includes not only the 
phenomenological philosophizing currently robustly underway, but also the grand experiment of  
Husserlian phenomenological practice.
       Why an “experiment”? I am assuming that Husserlian phenomenological method is an abiding 
intersubjective possibility (4) irreducible to the philosophical use that Husserl himself  made of  it. (5) In 
contrast, Ingarden, for example, was unwilling to edit Husserl’s Bernau time manuscripts because he 
felt that the research project itself  entailed an idealism that he could not endorse. (6) The only way to 
settle the issue is to test my assumption by putting Husserl’s methods into practice for ourselves. (7) 
But how are we to proceed? What principles must we follow? What style of  investigation is at stake 
here? (8)
     “To deal with these questions would require an extensive and thorough look at what Husserl does. 
This is meant quite literally, i.e., very often we ought not to follow what Husserl says about what he 
does, but what he actually does,” (9) something that requires a number of  shifts in our way of  reading 
him. These include suspending interest in philosophical “positions” in order to attend to dimensions of  
method; deactivating attention to “arguments” in order to bring other methods into view; focusing not 
on passages where Husserl explicitly discusses these methods, but on passages where they are actually 
in play; tracing the results of  these investigations back to the specific type of  practice that produced 
them; and testing these results by reading in a thoroughly participatory way, consulting the appropriate 
experiential evidence in each case. (10) 
        I find that when I read Husserl in this fashion, I “see what he means” with far greater clarity, 
precisely because in order to consult the relevant phenomena for myself, I must take up a certain 
attitude, make certain sorts of  distinctions, and follow him experientially at every step. When I do this, 
the words leap off  the page in a new way. At the same time, however, I am “practicing” assuming these 
attitudes, making these distinctions, and cashing in these words for the fulfilling evidence, just as 
musicians and athletes “practice” their craft and hone their skills. The result is twofold: I am able both 
to take a critical stance toward Husserl’s own findings, (11) and to put his methods into practice on 
themes that he himself  did not address.
       It is true that other authors’ explications and demonstrations of  Husserlian methods can be 
enormously helpful. (12) But there can be no substitute for attempting to take up phenomenological 
practice for oneself  and on one’s own, engaging, leibhaft, in the lived experience of  doing original 
phenomenological investigation. And as I have already indicated, taking Husserl’s own descriptive 
analyses as musical “scores” that I must “perform” in order to make full sense of  them—where the 
“performance” consists of  giving his claims an appropriately phenomenological “realization” (13) —
can be a very effective way of  tuning in to Husserlian phenomenological practice and making its 
possibilities my own. (14)
    Of  course, I do indeed want to acknowledge that there can be many possible directions for the 
future of  Husserlian research, encompassing not only the ongoing labor of  editing and exegesis, but 
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also the work of  clarifying (or seeking to systematize) his philosophical position; unearthing the traces 
of  his assistants’ concerns in the writings he gave them to edit; (15) using his approach to address 
problems arising within philosophical traditions outside of  phenomenology; (16) defending him against 
various “post-phenomenological” (mis)understandings; and so on. But for me, it is equally crucial to 
maintain a permanent place for Husserlian phenomenological investigation as well, as a continually 
open possibility of  taking up the powerful yet protean theoretical practice that is Husserl’s distinctive 
legacy and bringing it to bear in original investigations of  the emerging problems of  our times. (17)
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Phenomenological Concepts: An experimental essay in phenomenological practice,” Focus Pragensis 4 
(2004), 9–39, especially 25ff.
(9) Elisabeth Ströker, The Husserlian Foundations of  Science, 2nd ed. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1997), 32.
(10) Husserl emphasizes that it is not enough merely to read “attentively”; rather, one must adopt an 
attitude of  “unprejudiced cooperation” and consult the phenomenon under discussion for oneself  in 
order to co-perform the analyses and descriptions (20-1/319, 326), “cashing in” or “redeeming” the 
words for what fulfils them, i.e., bringing what is emptily intended in them to the mode of  itself-
givenness appropriate to the type of  experiencing/experienceable in question (cf. 19-1/10; 2/62; 16/9; 
25/32; 3-1/41). This style of  reading is not only necessary in order to understand Husserl’s 
investigations as “investigations,” but also supplies a criterion for distinguishing which passages are 
actually examples of  phenomenological description and analysis: if  a given passage will not support our 
efforts to cash in the words for the Evidenz, it is likely that the passage in question is a text of  another 
sort (e.g., a summary of, or polemic against, a certain philosophical position) rather than a report of  the 
results of  phenomenological investigation. Note also that this style of  participatory reading must be 
eidetically attuned: I need not have access to the very same example Husserl was describing—e.g., the 
brown beer bottle he was looking at in Seefeld during the 1905 summer vacation (see 10/237ff.)—but 
can consult another example of  the style or structure in question, following a principle of  “appropriate 
substitutability,” a locution coined to complement Robert Sokolowski’s important notion of  
“appropriate sensibility”; see his Husserlian Meditations (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 
1974), 108–109. 
(11) Consulting the appropriate experiential evidence for myself  can allow me either to confirm or to 
challenge Husserl’s analyses; being motivated to cancel his findings outright (which implies being 
unable to corroborate them in any respect) would appear to be rather rare, but in many cases, it may 
well be possible to correct his descriptions and to carry his investigations further or to contextualize his 
results (e.g., by showing that they hold good at a different degree of  universality than previously 
thought). Thus the rigor and radicality of  Husserlian phenomenological practice may require the 
retroactive revision of  results already achieved. However, my critical evaluation of  these results must 
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take into consideration the type of  experiencing that is at stake in the investigation (e.g., transcendental 
rather than mundane) and the type of  account that is being offered (e.g., static rather than genetic), as 
well as the larger context of  motivation guiding the research at any given moment (e.g., the task of  
working out the correlational a priori rather than that of  addressing the question of  being or providing 
a metaphysics of  the lifeworld). On the latter, cf., e.g., Gerhard Funke, Phänomenologie—Metaphysik 
oder Methode? (Bonn: Bouvier, 1966). Note, however, that the very fact that Husserlian research can 
be, and has been, transposed out of  its original context of  motivation and into other philosophical 
contexts of  relevance supports the distinction between “Phänomenologie” and “phänomenologisch 
fundierte Philosophie.”
(12)  See, for example, Richard M. Zaner’s early papers on issues of  method, e.g., “Examples and 
Possibles: A Criticism of  Husserl’s Theory of  Free-Phantasy Variation,” Research in Phenomenology 3 
(1973), 29–43; the editorial introduction to Edmund Husserl, Die phänomenologische Methode. 
Ausgewählte Texte I, ed. Klaus Held (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1985); Harry P. Reeder, The Theory and 
Practice of  Husserl’s Phenomenology (Lanham, MD: University Press of  America, 1986); J. N. 
Mohanty, Transcendental Phenomenology: An Analytic Account (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), ch. 1; Fred 
Kersten, Phenomenological Method: Theory and Practice (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1989); Lester Embree, Reflective Analysis: A First Introduction into Phenomenological Investigation / 
Análisis reflexivo: Una primera introducción a la investigación fenomenológica, trans. Luis Román 
Rabanaque (Morelia: Jitanjáfora, 2003). Natalie Depraz has also contributed to a number of  texts on 
the lived experience of  phenomenological method—see, e.g., Natalie Depraz, Francisco J. Varela, and 
Pierre Vermersch, “La réduction à l’épreuve de l’expérience,” Études Phénoménologiques Nos. 31–32 
(2000), 165–84. Newer works not yet available to me as of  this writing include C. Lobo, Le 
phénoménologue et ses exemples. Étude sur le rôle de l’exemple dans la constitution de la méthode et 
l’ouverture du champ de la phénoménologie husserlienne (Paris: Kimé, 2000); Denis Seron, 
Introduction à la méthode phénoménologique (Bruxelles; De Boeck Université, 2001).
(13) 19-1/24
(14) I find that this also helps me to recognize and value descriptive phenomenological analyses 
conducted within other methodological horizons—e.g., the newly available work of  Romanian 
phenomenologist Alexandru Dragomir, who studied with Heidegger. See Studia Phaenomenologica 
4/3–4 (2004) for a special issue devoted to his work.
(15) See, e.g., Marianne Sawicki, Body, Text, and Science: The Literacy of  Investigative Practices and the 
Phenomenology of  Edith Stein (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), 73–89, 153–62, on 
Stein’s editorial work on Ideen II, carried out under a commitment to Ingarden’s position in general and 
to a non-idealistic conception of  “constitution” in particular; Ronald Bruzina, Edmund Husserl and 
Eugen Fink: Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology 1928–1938 (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2004), on Fink’s efforts not only to systematize, but to shape the direction of  Husserl’s later 
work, efforts carried out under the influence of  Heidegger’s question of  being and Hegel’s speculative 
thinking.
(16) This is, for example, one of  the aims of  the working group “Phénoménologies” (Liège), who—as 
the plural form of  their name indicates—also draw upon other methods besides Husserl’s; see their 
new e-journal, Bulletin d’analyse phénoménologique.
(17)  A network has recently been formed under the title of  an “Initiative in Phenomenological 
Practice” to further this aim in a context of  disciplinary as well as methodological pluralism.
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The Future of  Phenomenology. Naturalization and Phenomenology of  
Perception
Carmelo Calì
One of  the most hotly debated issues, from where the discussion about the features and the usefulness 
of  phenomenology for contemporary scientific and philosophical research has evolved so far, has been 
the naturalization of  phenomenology. The underlying assumption is that to settle the debate is to 
define to what extent phenomenology is suitable for the framework of  the actual cognitive sciences and 
philosophy of  mind paradigms. The debate, involving phenomenologists, post analytic philosophers, 
psychologists, cognitive scientists and neuroscientists, unavoidably represents a wide range of  positions. 
  Thus, I am going to outline some of  these positions and then argue that Husserlian phenomenology 
does not have to wait for a radical theoretical reconstruction in order to be taken as able to integrate 
actual research, though it necessarily demands to let some of  its claims drop or at least being 
reinterpreted in the light of  current theoretical, experimental needs.
The Naturalization Problem Continuum
  To discuss some implications of  the naturalization problem, I am going to see whether a few 
positions can be mapped onto a continuum ranging from the most favourable to the less consonant 
ones. It must be noticed that I am going to take into account neither the claims that phenomenology is 
something which might be directly ascribed to some brain mechanisms or to some properties of  
physical matter adequately arranged at the right level of  low energy scales, nor the claims that state an 
absolute skepticism about the possibility of  relating phenomenology to contemporary scientific 
research. I don't aim at covering every position in this controversy, but only to discuss some issues and 
objections to the naturalization position.
  At one end, we have the Petitot & Varela & Pachoud & Roy (1999) proposal. They claim that 
Husserlian phenomenology might be used to close the explanatory gap which affects the cognitive 
sciences, thanks to the descriptions and analyses Husserl carried out, often found to be supporting 
recent findings. The accounts provided by Husserl of  the perspective dependence of  the phenomenal 
world, of  consciousness, of  intentionality and time-space ordering of  experience are supposed to be 
rich enough to give a satisfactory answer to the question about what kind of  relationship holds between 
a computational and a phenomenological mind raised by Jackendoff  (1987). But this could be the case 
only if  Husserlian phenomenology is properly fitted to the explanatory framework of  contemporary 
science, which stands on the claim that every property at stake must be continuous with properties 
admitted by natural sciences. This claim entails what is dubbed "naturalization of  phenomenology" and 
requests that Husserl's anti-naturalism must be refused, the alleged impossibility of  a mathematical 
formulation of  phenomenological descritpions must be abandoned. In a nutshell, the transcendental 
dimension of  phenomenology as it covers the descriptions and analyses with a philosophical 
interpretation unfit to integrate with those sciences which could turn them to profit must be dropped. 
  On the other hand, we have Zahavi (2004) who points out, very clearly, some objections. He maintains 
that there are meaningful philosophical reasons for Husserl's (1987) antinaturalism to be upheld. 
Husserl stressed the difference between phenomenological psychology and transcendent 
phenomenology, because phenomenology doesn't simply contribute to positive knowledge but 
investigates its basis and possibility. The need for phenomenological reduction would be justified, for, it 
avoids any confusion with a natural and objectivist investigation, which would be to blame for treating 
consciousness as one object among the others in the world, whether it be taken as a psychical or a 
physical one. Hence, it is not possible to part the transcendental interpretation from phenomenology, 
because it not only prevents phenomenology from the "natural attitude", as is the case with the non-
reductionist phenomenological psychology, but it also lets consciousness be the condition for any 
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meaning, truth, validity, appearance. 
  Thus Zahavi questions that a mutual exchange between phenomenology and cognitive sciences could 
result in a closure of  the explanatory gap, and that a mathematical reconstruction would be of  any 
profitable sense at all or that there might be a way to explain how experiences could be properties of  
the brain.
  Both Petitot & Varela & Pachoud & Roy (1999) and Zahavi (2004) recognize many kinds of  
relationships between phenomenology and cognitive sciences that could instantiate their own points of  
view. So, from the naturalization point of  view, the instances amount to (a) the reductionism of  the sort 
involved by the Identity Theory; (b) the "as if" strategy formulated by Dennett in his 
heterophenomenology; (c) the mutual constraining-variety. This ranges from (c1) the bridge locus 
argument, supporting the research of  linking propositions between explanatory neural properties and 
phenomenal properties where the link is provided by a to be specified looking like-relation, to (c2) the 
isomorphist thesis, wherein the phenomenological descriptions are relevant in indentifying the right 
physiological mechanisms which in turn explains them, and finally to (c3) the operational generative 
thesis which allows for phenomenology and, say, neurobiology to share a common abstract and formal 
definition of  properties that could belong to both at the same time, if  considered at the right level of  
emergence. From the transcendentalist point of  view, there is room for (d) the phenomenologists and 
scientists refusal of  making their researches interact because of  alleged independence for the former 
and the discredit of  phenomenology by the latter; (e) one way relation from phenomenology, which 
would lay bare the foundation for other sciences, to empirical science, whose findings are not able to 
affect phenomenology; (f) the sharp distinction between a phenomenological psychology, which could 
contribute to empirical science, and the untouched transcendental phenomenology; (g) the mutual 
exchange between phenomenology and science only if  transcendental phenomenology will change the 
very concept of  nature and accordingly of  naturalization.
A Mutual Constraining Isomorphism: The Case of  Phenomenology as Formal Theory of  Perception
  Exploiting the points above mentioned, I will argue that some difficuties stem from not considering 
phenomenology already as a descriptive science dealing with the structures of  different kinds of  
appearances and providing a model of  the various types of  phenomenic manifolds from a 
phenomenological explanatory stance. Husserl (1973) provides a striking example of  the way 
phenomenology can explain the laws ruling the visual world by appealing to concepts that are fit to a 
mathematical modelling. These analyses employ widely Riemann's concept of  the n-dimensionality 
continuum and Weierstrass' concept of  field, which prove to be profitable both in mathemathical 
analysis and in physical science. 
  On the one hand, the visual object, with its aspects and phenomenal properties, is considered as a 
whole made up by parts being its variables varying along defined dimensions, corresponding to the 
visual and objective field multifariousness (Vielfältigkeit). Thus, the whole object is functionally 
equivalent to a manifold (Mannifältigkeit) constituted by groups of  appearances which are ordered 
spatio-temporally by their positions and variations as to an inner manifold (the object field glanced at a 
current scrutiny), and a wider manifold (the neighbouring object fields). The relationships holding 
between these two manifolds are described then in terms of  coeherent connections (Zusammenhänge) 
among the appearances and various kinaesthetic manifolds.
  On the other hand, the very concepts used by Husserl to designate the operations and the 
interconnections obtaining in the manifold system of  vision have an intrinsic mathematical or 
geometrical meaning, such as congruency (Übereinstimmung), overlapping (Deckung), overlaying 
(Bedeckung), or admit a formal characterization, such as independence and non-independence. These 
observations make clear that it is neither necessary nor is it maybe desirable to narrow Husserlian 
phenomenology down to a mere philosophy of  consciousness. Even though as an eidetic material 
science, as opposed to an eidetic formal one, phenomenology provides in a clear specifiable way the 
objective laws ruling a particular phenomenic dominion, giving the set of  what pertains typically and 
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generally to it. The possibility of  a formal, even mathematical, formulation of  the laws described by 
Husserl's analyses does not imply Computational Mentalism, according to which mental contents 
consist of  mathematically definable operations on symbolic representations. It amounts only to saying 
that it is possible to build a mathematical model endowed with compelling phenomenological features, 
accordingly to what as been stated as the argument (c). In fact, this model might correspond to specific 
and non trivial organizational laws of  the visual world and possess an explanatory or predictive power 
on its own. An example is the concept of  double object elaborated by Husserl (1980) which has been 
given a great explanatory value in picture perception theory as Niederée & Heyer (2003) attest.
  This interpretation leads to the refutation of  argument (d) and the assessment of  argument (f) in a 
different way. To be sure, there remains in Husserl's view a difference between phenomenological 
psychology and transcendental phenomenology. However, one might assume a quite deflationary view 
about this distinction. If  phenomenology is also a descriptive science of  the phenomenal objective side 
of  experience, then phenomenological psychology might be dealing with the phenomenal subjective 
side of  it, thus contributing in psychophysics to relate phenomenological (how things look) and 
physical properties as Horst (2005) points out. The importance of  phenomenological data for the 
psychophysical study of  the Craik-O'Brien-Cornsweet effect plays against naturalization form (a) and 
(b). At the same time, the anti-objectivistic side of  transcendental phenomenology could be rephrased 
in a more contemporary flavour as the compelling request for a pure theory of  consciousness or 
perception, that is an abstract theory which employs only concepts derived from analyses of  the 
intrinsic structure of  perception. The reasons Mausfeld (2002) expounds for such a theory sound 
strikingly similar to those supporting Husserlian transcendentalism: phenomena must be studied in a 
non reductionist way. Therefore, a theory of  perception must be formal in that it must not borrow its 
fundamental concepts primarily from physics or physiology, thus avoiding what Mausfeld calls the 
physicalistic trap. It is a pure theory of  perception with the concepts mirroring the way the observer 
parses the world to specify the level and extent at which physical and physiological concepts might play 
an explanatory role.
  These considerations make the position (c) look like a plausible one, because they exclude an 
incommensurability between Husserlian phenomenology, mathematical modelling and the needs of  a 
modern scientific perception theory. But how to fit phenomenology as a formal theory of  perception 
with a mutual isomorphism constraint? The general principle could be shaped as the strong (c3), taking 
as example works such as Petitot (2003), Smith (1993), Petitot & Smith (1997), but for the time being it 
seems better to assume a balanced version of  (c2), while admitting a variety of  cross-talk cases between 
phenomenology and contemporary sciences. Overgaard (2004) challenges this possibility by requesting 
that the constraining must be fully reciprocal. I think this condition could be met. Phenomenology 
constrains cognitive sciences with its rich descriptions, fully specifiable at the desired formal level, thus 
letting models be built up and collecting richly defined data in order to find neural correlates which 
match the structure of  appearances, as Todorovic (1987) suggests, whose claim makes room for a 
structural reinterpretation of  (c1). Cognitive sciences constrain phenomenology in such a way that a 
phenomenologist is not forced to change her description only because a new brain area is found to be 
causally involved, but she does have to feel compelled to do that if  a neurobiological study finds that 
some binding relations, structurally corresponding to those dependence relations held as fundamental 
ones, are a by-product of  more fundamental ones.    This means that the isomorphism constraint must 
be kept at the relevant matching level, which causes a change in the phenomenological explanation of  
phenomenal relations. This last specification narrows a bit the (c2) argument and rests upon the 
conviction that phenomena are neither theoretical posits nor subjective qualia, but instead immediate, 
reproducible, undeniable facts of  experience and hence a prime source of  scientific investigation, as 
Ehrenstein & Spillmann & Sarris (2003) argue. Finally, this makes the (g) assumption unclear and 
unnecessary.
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The Future of  Husserlian Phenomenology
David Carr
Here are a few loosely related topics that come to my mind when I think of  the future of  Husserlian 
phenomenology:
Future and Past
    In his early years Husserl was one of  those thinkers who believed in a sharp distinction between 
“doing” philosophy and doing its history. In this he was like his admired predecessor, Descartes; and 
many philosophers who came later, notably in the analytic tradition, have shared this view. Such 
philosophers often share another belief, that the key to “doing” philosophy is to be found in a method: 
the Cartesian method, the phenomenological method, the method of  “linguistic analysis,” and the like. 
To solve or dissolve philosophy’s problems, we need only to find and apply the right method. The 
history of  philosophy can be left to historians of  ideas. Critics of  the phenomenological tradition, from 
within and from without, often express their irritation that so many books are written about Husserl, 
about Heidegger, about Merleau-Ponty, and so few are devoted to “doing” phenomenology. Isn’t this a 
betrayal of  Husserl’s spirit? And given the many volumes of  pedantic scholarship and trivial 
philological interpretation, these sentiments are understandable.  
    When we indulge these sentiments, however, it is useful to remember that in his later years Husserl 
somewhat changed his view on this matter. What he realized was that the problems of  philosophy, our 
idea of  “doing” philosophy, our ideas of  method, do not simply hang there in the air, waiting for us to 
take them up; they come to us from the tradition, whether we are aware of  it or not. To be fully 
conscious of  what we are “doing,” we need to be aware of  where it comes from. The history of  
philosophy and of  phenomenology can be done badly, to be sure; but then “doing” phenomenology 
can be done very badly too. And both can be done very well. Like the future in general, the future of  
phenomenology cannot be cut off  from its past.
 
Where is the future? 
    Phenomenology has its roots in central Europe, and in European philosophy. For many years it has 
been a vital part of  philosophical life in North and South America. In the fall of  2001 a large 
conference was held at Peking University to commemorate the 100th anniversary of  the publication of  
Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen. This conference, which was also attended by philosophers from Japan, 
Taiwan and Korea, also marked the founding of  the Research Center for Phenomenology at Peking 
University. A similar Research Center also exists at the Chinese University of  Hong Kong. The Chinese 
Society for Phenomenology has existed since the early 1990s. The practice of  phenomenology by Asian 
scholars, apart from its intrinsic interest, raises questions about the connection between culture and 
philosophy. Speaking in geopolitical terms, people often say that the future lies in Asia, and in China in 
particular. Perhaps the future of  phenomenology lies there too. 
Mind and Brain 
    Meanwhile, back in Euro-North America, the topic of  the day is the mind-brain relation. For long 
time, philosophers in the positivistic-analytic tradition thought that if  we just learned more about the 
brain, the problem of  consciousness, and maybe consciousness itself, would just go away, an 
appearance whose underlying reality would fully account for it. Curiously, as many of  these 
philosophers now recognize, while our knowledge of  the brain and its functions has grown 
enormously, understanding its relation to consciousness has become more and more elusive. More 
knowledge about the complex physical events of  the brain has not provided us with a clear-cut account 
of  how these relate to such phenomena as awareness, thinking, feeling, imagination, and the like. One 
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problem here is the reigning assumption that we all already understand all there is to know about 
consciousness, and what’s needed is yet more knowledge of  the brain. But in fact the understanding of  
consciousness, even by philosophers who sometimes use the term “phenomenology” to refer to 
subjective experience (Dennett is one), is very naïve. It is not uncommon to find psychologically very 
dubious notions like stimulus-response, the reflex arc, and the constancy hypothesis being employed by 
contemporary philosophers to describe conscious experience. Causality is routinely conflated with 
intentionality to produce the kind of  confusion that could be easily cleared up by reading some 
passages from Husserl or Merleau-Ponty. The future of  phenomenology might lie in part in the 
discovery by these philosophers that phenomenologists in the Husserlian tradition have developed 
some very sophisticated concepts and descriptions for dealing with consciousness from the first-person 
point of  view. If  we want to understand the relation between consciousness and the brain, our first-
person approach to consciousness has to be at least as conceptually sophisticated and refined as our 
approach to the brain. 
I and We 
    Speaking of  the first person, it is often forgotten that this grammatical position has a plural as well as 
a singular form. The first-person singular has been explored richly in Western philosophy since 
Descartes, and Husserlian phenomenology is often thought of  mainly as a continuation and 
improvement of  this tradition. And so it is. But the emergence of  an interest in the we-subject occurs 
already in Hegel’s notion of  Geist, and Husserl, of  course unaffected by Hegel, begins to develop ideas 
of  a plural subject in many of  his manuscripts on intersubjectivity. The concept of  the communal or 
plural subject is related to but different from the problem of  intersubjectivity. The latter explores how I 
experience the other, and is focused on what Alfred Schutz calls the face-to-face relation and Buber the 
I-thou relation. Levinas’ critical response to both Buber and phenomenology is still concerned with this 
one-on-one encounter. The sense of  membership in a community, and the manner in which the “we” 
functions as the proper subject of  experiences, actions, memory, expectation, and of  a form of  
existence which outlives that of  its individual members, are topics deserving of  future 
phenomenological attention. These topics are important for developing the phenomenological 
contribution to the philosophy of  history, but also for connecting phenomenology to ethics and 
political and social existence. 
The phenomenology of  the future 
    Part of  the future of  phenomenology should be devoted to the phenomenology of  the future. By 
this I mean the phenomenological description of  protention and expectation. Husserl somewhat 
neglects these topics in his treatment of  time-consciousness, even though he gives us some useful hints; 
but it is obviously as important as the phenomenology of  retention and recollection. Heidegger, of  
course, argues for the priority of  the future, but the phenomenology of  the future needs a much more 
detailed description than the one he gives us. Investigations in the Husserlian style would complement 
and correct the undue influence held by Heideggerian thought in this domain. 
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Practice as the Epistemology of  Phenomenology 
Natalie Depraz
“In fact, we are all pragmatists, but we figure out that we are theoreticians, just to be considered as 
'serious' by a community of  philosophers which in reality is quite mythical.” Nietzsche could have 
written such a sentence; as a matter of  fact, it is by William James, who identifies pragmatism 1) as a 
method of  the freeing of  the conscious mind and 2) as a quality of  transformation of  our relationship 
to the phenomenal reality.(2) Now, these two features remarkably coincide with Husserl's revolutionary 
method of  the épochē 1) as a move of  freeing oneself  from the alienating resistance of  the world-
pregivenness and 2) as a resulting radical change of  attitude of  the subject with regards to the 
appearing objects, the emerging events and the other subjects one may encounter in given situations.
    Hence my contention about phenomenology: It is not primarily a (new, that is, post-Cartesian or 
post-Kantian) transcendental theory of  knowledge, even though it intrinsically contains an inherent 
dimension of  knowledge of  the phenomena, in the sense of  a noetic intuition of  invariant essences. 
The intuited essence, however, is not a universal representation of  an object; it is a movement into a 
specifically directed action. The process of  reflecting upon one's own conceptual elaboration therefore 
amounts to nothing else than to the practicing of  how we are involved as subjects in what we are 
elaborating. In short, there is no rational knowledge before acting: Knowing is knowing-how to handle 
what appears in a particular and concretely individuated situation.
    The failure of  rationalist philosophy is to enclose knowledge within itself  without developing it 
further into a practice: It creates concepts that are abstract closed-up totalities instead of  insisting on 
their relatedness to each other. On the contrary, pragmatism invents a method for what is just being 
done, not for what is already done or has to be done. Whereas the theoretical point of  view relies on 
the fact that knowledge contains in itself  its own aim, the point of  view of  practice considers 
knowledge as intrinsically incomplete, indeterminate, open to multifarious possibilities of  the future. As 
a practician, the philosopher works at freeing us from the theoretical closedness. Hence the 
requirement of  alterity as an exemplary structure of  openness, being as such the leading thread of  the 
philosophical research. In this respect, alterity is endowed with a double and correlative aspect, either as 
a self-alterity (one may think here of  the many forms of  consciousness as a dynamical relationship to 
oneself, well illustrated in the methodologies in the first person), or as the alterity of  others (the 
interaction with other disciplines as well). Now, such a method founded on alterity as openness is best 
revealed in the priority given to praxis. Indeed, praxis corresponds to the exemplary “otherness” of  the 
philosopher, which he often does not dare acknowledge, since he or she is most frequently closed up in 
theoretical arguments and rational contentions.
    However, straightaway I would like to do away with a remnant misunderstanding concerning the 
distinction between theory and practice. Such a misunderstanding could easily lead to a founded 
objection of  the philosopher in favor of  the defense of  reason. From my point of  view, theory and 
practice are not opposed as if  they were two different activities carried out in the field of  science and 
speculation theoretically and in the useful and technical field practically. On the contrary: They both 
indicate kinds of  attitude or ways of  doing, the first one being always “retrospective,” that is, arising in 
the aftermath (as a reflection upon the action once the latter is completed and achieved), the second 
one being “prospective,” appearing within the coming action itself, literally coinciding with it. The 
attitude of  the philosopher as a practician therefore amounts to using the concepts as so many guides, 
or again, as leading instructions, as orienting panels for the action in the very course of  its 
development, rather than considering these concepts as closed-up a priori representations of  action. In 
this respect, the phenomenologist is such a practician: He or she relies on philosophical texts and 
categorial arguments as so many accurate supports of  the description of  his or her experience (not as 
goals in themselves). In fact, lived-experience remains the unique criterion of  the lived truth, that is, of  
the interest of  the subject for “evidence” (where we find the echo of  the Latin “videre”: to see) in the 
elaboration of  a philosophical problem.
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    If  the concept brings us to action (to living, thinking, dreaming, speaking, etc.), it means that we do 
not conceptualize for the sake of  conceptualizing. At the very least, we build up concepts in order to 
build others, that is, in order to produce new ideas and to renew our way of  thinking. Conceptualizing 
therefore is an activity, a process, which means that we do not control what is going to happen: It might 
be that we produce or construct a concept that was not expected or foreseen first. Thinking, like any 
other activity, has to do with the risk of  not obtaining what was to be expected, but of  welcoming 
something else that could be referred to as the surprise inherent in any undertaking: The risk of  action 
is the risk of  indeterminacy, that is, of  not knowing apodictically where the running of  thoughts are 
going to lead us. Such a risk has to do with the immersion into and the merging with the “other,” this 
being other than what we usually identify as ourselves. Now, such a risk intrinsically belongs to life: It is 
also an essential part of  philosophical research, which is then hardly identifiable with the idealistic 
security of  conceptual closure.
    In short, the very process of  knowing amounts to a remarkable practice: How is it that knowledge is 
made of  constructed series? How is it that an idea without ceasing brings about other ideas which are 
linked to each other in a mostly unexpected way? Of  course, we may “explain” in the aftermath, in 
short “rationalize” the kind of  connection at work between these ideas, but such a reconstruction does 
not account for the dynamics of  the continual emergence and relations of  the thoughts between them. 
If  the thoughts, as so many actions, if  the acts, as so many emerging ideas, follow an unceasing process 
of  producing each other and renewing each other, one may think that the dynamic transition between 
them is the very concern of  the phenomenologist as a practician. Reflexion and rationality as closed-up 
models of  thinking are unable to account for such a plastic dynamics. We need something else. Another 
such thing than the rational closure is what radically modifies the meaning of  truth by putting it to 
work in the framework of  the very practice of  the subject.
    Now, phenomenology quite uniquely paves the way for such a putting to practice of  truth and 
reason.
    First, Husserl himself  calls for such a priority of  practice over theory: “Die Praxis steht überall und 
immer voran der ‘Theorie’.”  (Hua XIV, p. 61).(3) Now, the core of  Husserl's method, the reduction, is 
to be seen entirely under the light of  its praxis, and not of  its theoretical a priori justification of  
knowledge.(4)
    In this respect, the phenomenological reduction amounts to operating thanks to three different but 
related gestures: 1) a suspension of  preconceived beliefs; 2) a conversion of  my way of  looking at the 
objects; 3) a variation of  the different features of  the object in order to discriminate its invariant 
structure.
    Suspending one's own beliefs amounts to observing one's natural tendency to judge and to contend 
without questioning what is judged and contended. In order to make such an observation, one needs to 
stop the inner flow of  thoughts and to look at what is going on. It does not mean that I will not judge 
anymore but I will develop the ability to look at my judgements in a different way; in fact, such a 
conversion of  my way of  looking at things corresponds to the second correlative gesture of  the 
phenomenological reduction: in order to do so, I redirect my attention from the object as I see it in its 
content and in its objective properties to the lived act through which I am intending it. In short, I 
achieve a double inner move (both proprioceptive and kinetic) of  putting away (the object in itself) and 
of  coming back to the lived act. In other words, my modality of  attention changes radically, insofar as I 
do not intend the object any longer but the subjective way I am looking at it; in order to situate such 
gestures of  suspension and conversion at a universal level, one still needs to achieve what Husserl calls 
a “variation”: It literally consists in the procedure of  discrimination between the intrinsic properties of  
an object (an armchair necessarily has “arms”) and its contingent ones (an armchair is not necessarily 
made of  wood). The more features you produce (while using both imagination and perception), the 
more you are able to refine the inherent quality of  the object. While so doing, you are able to lay out 
the stability of  the object (both universal and necessary).
    Now, one further step will aim at embodying such a phenomenological praxis of  épochè in a more 
radical way. It is our thrust toward in On Becoming Aware: An Experiential Pragmatics,(5) where we lay 
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out a threefold dynamical structure of  the épochè. The three principal phases are the following:
epoche




A0. Suspending your “realist” prejudice that what appears to you is truly the state of  the world. This is 
the only way you can change the way you pay attention to your own lived-experience. In other words, 
you must break with the “natural attitude.”
A1. Redirecting your attention from the “exterior” to the “interior.” 
A2. Letting-go or accepting your experience.
    We call épochè the organic whole of  the three phases, because phases A1 and A2 imply that the 
phase A0 is always reactivated at each step. Moreover, this gesture of  suspension is also at work, albeit 
with different qualities, at each of  the other steps of  the reflecting act (i.e., evidence, expression and 
validation, which are discussed in the following chapters of  the book).
Notes
(1) About this issue, see the coming book by Armand Colin, La phénoménologie comme pratique 
(Paris, 2006).
(2) W. James, Pragmatism (1907), Indianapolis, Cambridge, Hackett Publishing Compagny, 1981, 
Lecture II: "What pragmatism means", pp. 25-43, and Lecture VI: "Pragmatism's Conception of  
Truth", pp. 91-109.
(3) A first step in this direction was taken by N. Depraz in "La phénoménologie, une pratique 
concrète", Magazine littéraire, Numéro spécial "La phénoménologie", octobre 2000.
(4) See N. Depraz, "The Phenomenological Reduction as Praxis", in: Journal of  Consciousness Studies, 
The View from Within, N°2/3 (F. Varela & J. Shear eds.), 1999, pp. 95-110.
(5) About this pragmatical renewal of  phenomenology, see On becoming aware. An Experiential 






   Phenomenology is a century-old planetary tradition initiated, and still chiefly influenced, by the 
investigations of  Edmund Husserl. The future development of  this tradition is best approached by 
characterizing some of  the core Husserlian positions and methods that have stimulated further 
developments in so many different directions (1) (including traditions now seen as standing outside 
phenomenology per se (2)), and then by sketching how the work continued at the New School by 
Dorion Cairns, Aron Gurwitsch, and Alfred Schutz, who are the mature Husserl’s closest disciples, is 
not only true to Husserl’s own life-long project, but can still show ways for phenomenology to address 
continuing and emerging issues. 
    The present writer studied with Cairns and Gurwitsch during the 1960s and has published on their 
work as well as on that of  Schutz, so the fact that the opportunity for the present essay comes from the 
Husserl Archive at the New School, where he was himself  the secretary in 1968–69, is a particular 
delight for him.
    There now exist over 125 phenomenological organizations across the planet. Besides the extensive 
continuing activity in North America and in Western Europe, there are recently established regional 
organizations in Central and Eastern Europe, in East Asia, and in Latin America. Moreover, a 
worldwide Organization of  Phenomenological Organizations was founded in Prague in 2002 and has 
met for the second time in Lima in August 2005.
    Space is not available to list all the archives, book series (especially posthumous editions like 
Husserliana), centers, graduate programs, journals, newsletters, and other support institutions for the 
planetary tradition. But it must be mentioned that phenomenology is a tendency not only in philosophy, 
but also in such disciplines as architecture, communicology, economics, film studies, geography, music, 
nursing, pedagogy, political science, psychiatry, psychology, and sociology. 
    Although phenomenology may still not be adequately appreciated in the former British Empire—the 
United States of  America included—by virtue of  its long-term multidisciplinary spread across the 
planet, as well as its vast wealth of  results, it is nevertheless arguably the most significant non-
positivistic intellectual tradition in the 20th Century. Given the rich heritage to date, then, how can it 
continue?
What, Briefly, Is Phenomenology?
The definition of  phenomenology has often been discussed within the tradition. Space is available for 
very few remarks.     
    To begin with, phenomenology can be contrasted with two other positions, notably 
representationalism and naturalism. While indirect experiencing via indications, depictions, and 
linguistic expressions is recognized in phenomenology, representationalism is rejected where 
perception, recollection, expectation, and the seeing of  ideal objects are concerned. In these cases, no 
image is reflectively discernable between the mental process and its object. Then again, rather than 
being modeled in its metaphysics as well as epistemology on naturalistic science, phenomenology, be it 
mundane or transcendental, is fundamentally concerned with sociocultural life, something returned to 
below.
  Phenomenology itself  is better characterized as an approach than as a set of  doctrines. The method is 
not straightforward, but reflective, and thus it thematizes things-as-encountered as well as 
encounterings of  them (Husserl spoke of  “noema” and “noeses”). Concrete encounterings include 
components of  experiencing, believing, valuing, and willing in broad significations. Moreover, although 
many in non-Continental traditions may find it incomprehensible, the approach is not argumentative, 
but rather descriptive or interpretative, and thus more like comparative anatomy than theoretical 
physics. Far more can be said about the approach, such as how it is chiefly eidetic but also sometimes 
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empirical and thus able to describe particular cultural phenomena, but this characterization of  it as 
reflective and descriptive may suffice here. (3)
Have We Lost Our Way?
    There is a strong and clear emphasis in Husserl and other major phenomenological figures on the 
species of  research best called investigation, yet the vast majority of  soi disant phenomenologists today 
engage instead in a species of  research that some call philology and others call scholarship. The latter 
species includes editing, interpreting, reviewing, and translating, and its methods are no different from 
those used in scholarship on other traditions of  philosophy and science. Scholarship is extremely 
valuable because the works of  many are difficult to understand, but it is not an end in itself. It is 
essentially instrumental. Its purpose is to assist investigation, which is where phenomenology is 
phenomenology.
    Yet during their lives, that vast majority of  “phenomenologists” seem not to get beyond scholarship. 
Why? Perhaps it is easier and safer to produce texts that can be judged in relation to other texts than to 
stand behind the results of  one’s own reflective analyses of  some “things themselves.” Devoting 
oneself  to scholarship is understandable early in a career, when much remains to be learned and it is 
important to communicate with non-phenomenological colleagues. Then, perhaps established research 
habits are difficult to transcend, especially if  “everybody else” does just scholarship too.
   However, such explanations do not excuse the failure to continue one’s tradition by pursuing actual 
investigations. Some, of  course, say that what seems to be mere scholarship is actually phenomenology 
because they are constantly seeing the things themselves through the texts they are interpreting. If  this 
is so, however, why are there so few objections to and corrections of  the errors by predecessors, who 
certainly disagree in many respects, and why are there so few descriptions of  new things? It is not as if  
there is nothing left for phenomenologists to investigate.
Some Exemplarism
The three teachers of  the New School are exemplary for continuing phenomenology. They began from 
knowledge gained in part directly from their master, but even though they made valuable contributions 
to scholarship, it was not at all the focus of  their efforts. Cairns prepared crucial translations, but 
fundamentally developed a critically revised account of  intentionality on the basis of  reflective 
observation in his famous New School lectures, copies of  student notes from which have long and 
widely circulated; (4) Gurwitsch influentially wrote “The Last Work of  Edmund Husserl,” but 
produced above all The Field of  Consciousness; and Schutz published major critiques of  Sartre and 
Scheler as well as Husserl on intersubjectivity, but more fundamentally created the phenomenological 
theory of  the social sciences single-handedly. These were not accomplishments in scholarship on texts, 
but required genuine original investigation.
    In this situation, it might help if  some writings were sometimes shown by their footnotes, etc., to be 
entirely scholarship; others were shown to be purely investigative by lacking footnotes, quotations, and 
references to authorities other than the things themselves; and yet others could be seen to have a mixed 
structure, with the work of  some others critically discussed in a first part and then the results of  
original investigation distinctly expressed in a second part. Most importantly, the obligation today of  
those well versed in the literature is to show through example how phenomenology is done and not just 
talked about. Delightfully, there are promising signs of  late. (5)
What to Investigate?
    The three teachers of  the New School were also exemplary with respect to Husserl’s own research 
focus. Under the influence of  Martin Heidegger, Eugen Fink, and Ludwig Landgrebe, most 
phenomenology in Europe after World War II has a metaphysical emphasis, while the focus in what 
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Husserl published in his lifetime was on Wissenschaftslehre, especially in the theory of  logic and 
mathematics, but also in the theories of  the naturalistic sciences and even to some extent in the theory 
of  the Geisteswissenschaften. Along with the distinctive interests of  Realistic, Existential, and 
Hermeneutical Phenomenology, the many volumes of  Husserliana now available may obscure the 
conscious focus of  Husserl’s considered opinions for some scholars.
    But Cairns’s reflections on psychology will be published soon, Gurwitsch’s Phenomenology and the 
Theory of  Science is widely known, and Schutz reflected on and/or taught about economics and 
political science and even linguistics, as well as sociology, in a phenomenological perspective during his 
twenty some years at the New School. Provided one come to know something about other disciplines, 
the phenomenological theory of  science can be continued further. (6) 
    The cultural, formal, and naturalistic sciences and the technologies based on them cannot be 
ignored, not only because they are foundational for the modern world, but also because they are among 
humankind’s greatest achievements. Gurwitsch taught a course on the mathematization of  nature that 
went beyond Husserl but still did not exhaust that topic, particularly where the use of  mathematics in 
the cultural sciences is concerned. What about the good as well as bad influences of  so-called 
technoscience on sociocultural life? The focus continued by the New Schoolers is not a species of  
scientism, but rather the ongoing development of  a critique of  science most clearly present in Husserl’s 
Krisis. Further work in this respect is needed now more than ever.
    Interest in disciplines beyond philosophy has been continued by students of  the New School’s 
golden age, e.g., Lester Embree on the cultural sciences, Maurice Natanson in relation to literature, 
Gilbert Null with respect to formal ontology, Osborne Wiggins with respect to psychiatry, and Richard 
Zaner in relation to the body and medicine. Robert Jordan does phenomenological ethics. And Fred 
Kersten has carried on the interest of  his three teachers in method, also something relatively unusual 
for phenomenology in Europe after World War II.
A Fifth Stage?
    But the recent expanding thematic scope of  phenomenology is not confined to New School 
students. In fact, a fifth tendency and stage of  the phenomenological tradition seems to have begun 
internationally in the 1990s, emerging, for example, with reflections on religion in France and on 
interculturality in Germany. The latter in particular stem from reflections by Husserl in the 1920s and 
the former revive a theme that was not only of  interest to his disciples in that time, but can now be 
seen, on the basis of  his manuscripts, to be part of  his ever growing interest in society and history.
    Other restored or new areas for investigation within this fifth tendency include the body, dance, film, 
ecology, gender, interspeciality, and politics. Beginnings have been made regarding generational 
differences and social class. Efforts to recollect a century of  work in aesthetics (7) as well as the 
phenomenological tradition in moral philosophy (8) are being made. In all these cases, there has been 
learning from the past—from Husserl to begin with—but new knowledge has been sought as well 
through reflective description with respect to encounterings and things-as-encountered. 
    In other words, although the exact method may vary, the fifth phenomenological stage and tendency 
is characterized both by a focus on investigation (rather than on scholarship) and by a breadth of  vision 
that encompasses various novel lifeworldly themes and issues (rather than solely on traditional 
philosophical problems).
What to Call This New Stage?
    In view of  the concern with, for example, acquired attitudes of  valuing and willing toward such 
things as ethnicity and gender that are sedimented in secondary passivity and thus part of  the 
constitution of  the sociocultural world, such a fifth stage might be called “cultural phenomenology.” 
But “lifeworldly phenomenology” might be an even better name because it alludes to well-known 
developments in phenomenological philosophy as well as in the other cultural disciplines. 
117
Must It be Transcendental?
    There might seem to be a problem concerning how the transcendental phenomenology might square 
with such a lifeworldly tendency also focal in the mature Husserl (this seems less a problem with the 
realistic, existential, and hermeneutical tendencies developed from his philosophy). The other cultural 
disciplines naturally remain in the natural attitude. Yet this would seem less of  a problem than once 
thought, now that it is known that transcendental intersubjectivities as well as subjectivities for Husserl 
are embodied, gendered, social, historical, and otherwise cultural, and may even occur in nonhuman 
species, jellyfish included. (9)
    The mature Husserl posited a parallelism between “mundane” and “transcendental” phenomenology. 
Again where New School phenomenology was concerned, Schutz always found the “constitutive 
phenomenology of  the natural attitude” sufficient for his philosophical purposes; Gurwitsch 
recognized this; and while Cairns never hesitated in his commitment to transcendental phenomenology, 
his lectures were deliberately kept in the perspective of  a pure phenomenological psychology because 
that is easier to understand and provides the best preparation for transcendental epochē, reduction, and 
purification. 
    Whether phenomenological philosophy must ultimately be transcendental or can suffice as mundane 
in philosophy as well as science will no doubt continue to be productively discussed within the 
planetary and multidisciplinary tradition that Husserl inaugurated and continues chiefly to influence. 
Notes
(1) The major philosophical tendencies and stages can be termed Realistic Phenomenology, 
Constitutive Phenomenology, Existential Philosophy, and Hermeneutical Phenomenology; see Lester 
Embree et al., eds., Encyclopedia of  Phenomenology (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997). 
Cf. Herbert Spiegelberg with Karl Schuhmann, The Phenomenological Movement, 3rd revised and 
enlarged edition (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982) and Dermot Moran, Introduction to 
Phenomenology (New York: Routledge, 2000). The question of  a fifth stage and tendency within the 
tradition will be considered below, but see my “The Continuation of  Phenomenology: A Fifth Period?” 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of  Phenomenology (www.ipjp.org) 1 (April 2001) and Escritos de Filosofia, 
La Fenomenologia en America Latina (Universidad de San Buenaventura, Bogatá, 2000).
(2) Lester Embree, “Husserl as Trunk of  the American Continental Tree,” International Journal of  
Philosophical Studies 11 (2002), 177–90.
(3) Cf. Lester Embree, Análisis reflexivo. Una primera introducción a la investigación fenomenológica / 
Reflective Analysis. A First Introduction into Phenomenological Investigation, bilingual edition, trans. 
into Castellano by Luis Román Rabanaque (Morelia: Editorial Jitanjáfora, 2003).
(4) Lester Embree, Fred Kersten, and Richard Zaner are currently preparing a multivolume edition on 
the basis of  Cairns’s lecture scripts and manuscripts.
(5) E.g., Thomas M. Seebohm, Hermeneutics: Method and Methodology (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2004).
(6) Interest by phenomenologists in cognitive science has followed from interest by cognitive scientists 
in phenomenology. But one can wonder if  the phenomenologists in this case are seeking to continue 
phenomenology or are joining the naturalistic and explanatory psychology that is interested once more 
in mental life. In contrast, the major hermeneutical phenomenologists seem to have benefited from 
Greek philology but not to have become philologists, Merleau-Ponty drew on psychiatry and 
psychology but did not become a psychiatrist or psychologist, etc. Additionally, it can also be wondered 
if  bridges built across the gap with analytic philosophy will carry more than one-way traffic.
(7) Cf. Hans Rainer Sepp and Lester Embree, eds., Handbook of  Phenomenological Aesthetics 
(forthcoming).
(8) Cf. John J. Drummond and Lester Embree, eds., Phenomenological Approaches to Moral 
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Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002).
(9) For Husserl on jellyfish, see, e.g., Husserliana 14, 113ff., 135 n. 1, 175; for Husserl on seeing others 
as transcendental even if  these others do not recognize themselves as having this status, see Husserliana 




Globalization: The Phenomenological Consequences
Lennart Heerwagen
According to Husserl, we can understand the distinction between home and alien as a distinction 
concerning accessibility: Normally we live in our homeworld, or better, in a surrounding world, which 
truly is a familiar world to us (although not familiar in all particularities), which is to be truly realized for 
us through intuition. In the mediate horizon there are alienlike humanities and cultures. They belong to 
this horizon as alien and alienlike, but alieness means accessibility in the genuine inaccessibility, in the 
mode of  incomprehensibility. (1)
    Thus, on the one hand we have our homeworld, a world of  familiarity, an accessible world. Following 
Husserl, we can examine the acquisition of  this homeworld. As far as we can remember, Husserl 
explains, we have been rooted in this world of  well-known sense. In our childhood it did perhaps not 
possess the same sense for us as it does now, but nonetheless it had, and maintained to have, a unity as 
the one and familiar world. (2) As we grow older we become more and more aware of  the richness of  
our world. It takes on new layers of  sense in a development that can be described as “ring-shaped”. (3) 
At first we have a relatively confined, familiar world, perhaps restricted to our local area, our local 
people, family etc., but later on we gain an insight in an even more embracing world which we come to 
consider as familiar. This familiarity could overall be said to concern our world as a cultural world, 
which occupies its own cultural space as a “territory” [Territorium]. (4) A constitutional feature of  our 
cultural and familiar world is our language. (5) Through our language we can communicate with the 
people we share our world with, our “homefellows” [Heimgenossen], and make it a world common for us 
all, for our special intersubjectivity. Our language points to yet another constitutional basis. Our past, 
our traditions and history become known to us through narratives, and we can see that our world has 
been formed through a far-reaching chain of  generations. Our present world, with its familiar customs, 
its well-known objects and so forth, is in other words the result of  generativity, of  the shaping and 
continuation of  sense by precedent generations. And we, ourselves, become a part of  this generative 
process when we as “co-bearers” [Mitträgern] of  our world, that is, as subjects constituting exactly our 
familiar world, are able to pass it by. In this manner, a world is given to us as ours, as a world in which 
sense is accessible for me and you in our “homefellowship” [Heimgenossenschaft].  
    On the other hand, we also encounter worlds that are different from ours, alienworlds, which are 
neither familiar nor accessible to us. Surely, we have previously experienced matters in our world that 
seemed unusual or surprising, and in this way diverted from what was familiar. But there is a difference 
between these anomalies and the encountered alieness. The anomalies, the apparent “unfamiliarities”, in 
my familiar world, refer to what is normal. When we meet people who act surprisingly, who speak our 
language in a funny way, who wear strange clothing, this all connects with what is normal behavior, 
language, clothing and so on, in our world. In this manner the anomalies of  our own world are only 
“modifications” of  the familiar normality. (6) When we encounter the alien, however, we experience 
that the “anomaly” of  the alien does not refer to the normality of  my world. The alien, for example the 
concrete alien subject, behaves in a way that seems strange to us, speaks a language we do not 
understand and wears odd clothing, but this cannot be reduced to mere modifications of  the normality 
we are familiar with. The alien claims a normality of  its own; a normality that is not dependent on our 
normality. In other words: the alien refers to its own familiar cultural world. (7) The alien world has its 
own language, its own traditions, its own histories and myths that take on a familiar sense for the alien 
subject. We can thereby speak of  the constitution of  the alienworld, but also of  the constitution of  our 
own homeworld as such. Before we encountered the alienworld, before it became thematic for us, we 
could not know that our world was homeworld. Only in the confrontation with the alien we become 
conscious that our world is not the only one, but nevertheless privileged in the sense of  home. (8) The 
alienworld is to be sure a homeworld as well, but in the sense of  an “alien homeworld”. In contrast to 
the accessibility of  our homeworld, the alienworld is given to us as inaccessible. This is not merely 
because of  the appearing differences in language and customs, but because of  the generativity of  the 
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alienworld to which these appearances refer. As a homeworld the alien homeworld exhibits “a different 
historical totality” (9) that we cannot grasp. Being such a totality, we are not able to encompass the 
appearance of  the alien into our own understandable normality, and so it becomes incomprehensible to 
us. 
    The structure “home- and alienworld” describes how the world is pregiven to us as a cultural world, 
and how this world receives its proper meaning in relation to other cultural worlds. It shows each of  us 
the meaning of  our being as “subject of  a cultural world” [Subjekt einer Kulturwelt]; that is, as a subject 
living in a intersubjective world with familiar traditions and conventions that is inherited, kept, shaped 
and passed on, with a common language, and a common cultural space. However, my question would 
be: how important is this? This is not a question which concerns the truthfulness of  the constitution of  
home- and alienworld as Husserl identified it. Rather, it is a question of  relevance, and relevance is 
determined by the particular situation of  the questioner; following Alfred Schutz we could say her 
“biographically determined situation”. (10) If  we fashion this biographical determination in a more 
intersubjective manner we could perhaps say: How important is this for our time, how can this help us 
understand the world we live in?
    Since this question depends on the definition of  “our time” and “our world”, let me provide a 
possible leading clue. The sociologist Zygmunt Bauman has recently discussed the somewhat blurred 
social phenomena of  “globalization”. Not so much what it actually means as its consequences. 
According to Baumans line of  thought, a major consequence of  globalization is a social stratification 
focused on the concept of  mobility. In the top of  this stratification we have a social segment that lives 
“in time”. Of  course they must in every moment be situated in a particular location, but this location 
has only little significance to them. They are not bound to any special geography, and travel as they 
please either in reality or virtuality for the sake of  entertainment, work or other reasons.  In the bottom 
of  the stratification we have a social segment that lives “in space”. Not because they necessarily wish to 
do so, but because they do not have any other alternative. They are bound to a specific location, and are 
forced to bear any change that may happen to this place. They too live in time, but they have no use of  
it. “Nothing ever happens”, where they live, and time looses its significance. In this way we have, 
according to Bauman, two sorts of  worlds: “the world of  the globally mobile” and “the world of  the 
locally tied”. (11)
    As Bauman also emphasizes, we do not choose the society we are born into. (12) We have a familiar 
world, a cultural homeworld with its generative sense, pregiven to us. However, the process of  
globalization, as Bauman states, “divides as it unities”, (13) and, we may add, does so across cultural 
homeworlds. There is the world of  the global elite of  businessmen, leaders and academics with its 
privileges, wealth, resources, power and freedom and the world of  a restgroup with its deprivation, 
poverty, impotence, powerlessness and constraint. (14) We could say that the process of  globalization 
creates two fundamental types of  practical horizons where the generative density, the original language 
and familiar normality of  the cultural homeworld seems less significant. Perhaps we could even say that 
globalization makes familiar “homeworlds” in a new sense of  which some are accessible to us and 
others are not. If  so, there seems to be a challenge in explaining not how, for example, generativity 
matters for the constitution of  an accessible homeworld or an inaccessible alienworld , but how it does 
not matter. 
     A development like “globalization”, could obviously be of  no concern to Husserl, but it should be 
of  concern to us if  transcendental phenomenology is to explain social aspects of  our age. And this 
concern should raise new relevant questions for transcendental phenomenology in regard to the 
constitution of  accessible and inaccessible worlds. 
Notes
(1) "Wir leben normalerweise in unserer Heimwelt, oder besser, in einer Umwelt, die für uns wirklich 
vertraute (obschon nicht in allen individuellen Realitäten vertraute) Welt ist, die für uns wirklich durch 
Anschauung zu verwirklichen ist. Im mittelbaren Horizont sind die fremdartigen Menschheiten und 
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Kulturen; die gehören dazu als fremde und fremdartige, aber Fremdheit besagt Zugänglichkeit ind der 
eigentlichen Unzugänglichkeit, im Modus der Unverständlichkeit." (Edmund Husserl: Zur 










(10) E.g., Alfred Schutz: Collected Papers I. The Problem of  Social Reality. The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1973, p. 9.




(14) Ibid., p.70. Text
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The Future of  Phenomenology. Towards a Philosophy of  Translation Inspired by 
a Phenomenological Hermeneutics
Domenico Jervolino
   Within the methodological perspective where I place myself, there is no gift of  the phenomenon 
except in the gift of  language, nor any gift of  language outside the plurality of, or better said, the 
diversity of  languages. The diversity of  languages constitutes the presuppositions of  the work of  
translation. Language, languages, translation therefore enter into the very heart of  the constitution of  
sense. 
    The word “gift” – in its most general meaning, taken from ordinary language – is suitable to be used 
in at least three meanings in our discourse: the first with respect to phenomena or, if  you prefer, to life; 
secondly with respect to language, where phenomena manifest themselves as capable of  being said; and 
thirdly with respect to the plurality of  languages, where language itself  becomes real.
    Language is a gift because we find ourselves alive, open to the appearance of  the world. It is a gift 
because phenomena appear capable of  being said, in that they are already said and can be expressed in 
a different way. It is a gift because they appear in their capacity to be said in many languages we can 
understand; they show themselves in their possibility, even in their effectiveness, which we can only 
very partially achieve, starting from our own language, which was given to us for free. 
    I believe we can talk of  a ‘gift’ in all three of  these cases, just as we can say that life is a gift. This 
note can be further specified and deepened – it implies in all forms, even in the most ordinary use of  
the term, the notions of  gratuity, of  passivity, of  receptivity.
    If  the giving of  phenomena can never disregard language, this does not mean one should close 
oneself  to the characteristics and peculiarity of  every language; it means realising that language 
expresses and that all languages, even if  different, have the power to translate one into the other. This is 
therefore not a pure phenomenology but a hermeneutical phenomenology, a linguistic phenomenology 
that interprets the gift and the giving. These three forms of  giving – life, language and languages – refer 
one to the other and sustain themselves reciprocally.
    It is important to stress that the third form presupposes and clarifies the former two: the gift of  life 
(which is the essential openness to the world as phenomena, as it appears) and the gift of  language as a 
logos, thanks to which we are living beings with the capacity of  speech. In the gift of  the mother 
tongue these two aspects (to have a world and to have the ability of  describing it) converge, but our 
being within a world which is common to all speaking beings is also implicit, thanks to the fact that 
every different ‘tongue’ belongs to the universe of  language and thanks to the translatability, in 
principle, of  all languages.
    Here are topics regarding the linguistic and anthropological problem of  translation within the 
context of  an open philosophical debate: language as an inescapable characteristic of  the finite and 
bodily condition of  man, the constitution of  sense in the phenomenon-language relationship, the 
tension between universality and finitude that comes out of  this constitutive duality of  what is human, 
and, finally, translation as a moment in which it is possible to dissipate that tension and as a paradigm 
of  the different forms of  interaction and communication among people.
    In this way, translation becomes a privileged moment of  a reconstruction of  the plural unity of  
human discourse that opens the way to an ethics of  hospitality and of  conviviality. The gift of  language 
and of  languages becomes a paradigm of  gratuity that corrects the contemporary obsession towards 
the general commodification of  lifeworlds and it gives a glimpse of  a possible foundation for the social 
bond, in a perspective of  solidarity and of  solicitude for people. 
    The modern paradigm of  politics, grounded on the idea that the monopolistic use of  strength 
concentrated in the hands of  the sovereign, could generate the collective advantage of  peace, security 
and social order, must today be called into question. It seems unable to fulfill the needs of  humanity in 
the age of  globalization.
    The challenge, instead, is to think of  a nonviolent ground for the social bond. Following Ricoeur’s 
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Parcours de la reconnaissance,(1) the idea of  linking the great Hegelian theme of  the struggle for 
recognition of  subjects to that of  the economy of  the gift seems to me to be potentially seminal. The 
struggle among subjects does not necessarily fall under the sign of  an irreducible aggressiveness; from 
the conflict a reciprocal recognition can arise.
    This Hegelian theme is well-known (it is the famous theme of  the dialectic of  master and slave). The 
master needs the slave and depends on him to satisfy his need, so that at the end there is no difference 
between the two consciousnesses. 
The search for identity and recognition is inescapable, but the conflict between subjectivities is not the 
last word. Reciprocal recognition can be sought somewhere else, in the gift. In fact, as the extensive 
literature of  anthropological studies has made evident, starting with Marcel Mauss, in primitive societies 
the gift and its return generate a complex net of  social relationships. Why must the gift be returned? 
The anthropologists’ answer is that the gift symbolizes a magic power that has to be circulated. This is 
an insufficient answer that would condemn discourse on the gift to remain in the sphere of  pre-
modernity. What must be sought, instead, is a non-magical sense of  the gift, which is neither more nor 
less than reciprocal recognition. I give a gift because I give something of  myself  and I expect to be 
recognized by the one I give my gift to. The gift is still a symbol, but not in a magical sense, rather it is a 
symbol of  a humanity that is expressed in the other and myself, in our reciprocal relationship.
    Then, we could also say that what constitutes the social bond is the gift of  languages that allows us 
to become part of  the human consortium in the twofold form of  the gift of  the mother tongue and 
the reciprocal gift of  languages (these two forms are strangers each to the other) that becomes real 
through translation, thanks to the practice of  linguistic hospitality.
    It is an original gift, in that it is given for free, before any social contract, the moment we enter into 
human existence: it is evident that to establish a contract we need to understand each other. We are here 
talking of  something that comes first in a transcendental sense, as an a priori condition of  possibility. 
This coming first an equal dignity – in principle – of  all human beings, giving foundation to the 
possibility that speech can oppose violence and dominion.
    This original gift is given to us in the form of  a mother tongue. The mother tongue is the place 
where consciousness is born; it is no mere set of  instrumental signs. In the mother tongue words 
embody reality itself; through it the world is born into our conscience. Nevertheless, we cannot stop 
here. The relationship between consciousness and language, the same metaphor of  language as a verbal 
body of  thought used by Husserl and the French existential phenomenology of  language allows us to 
go deeper. 
    In fact, we are and we are not our body, we conform to our mother tongue, but at the same time it 
has its own relative autonomy. Language is placed between the world and us, with everything that this 
implies, i.e. to say and not to say, the possibility of  equivocation and deception, a world of  implicit or 
hidden meanings that need to be reactivated and rediscovered. This ambiguity of  language, which has 
its roots in our mother tongue, makes it possible for us who are born to the world thanks to it, to also 
take stand back from it. We always can and have to distance ourselves. Our consciousness of  the world, 
and of  ourselves, is not only a given but has to be re-conquered. There is a space here, I think, for the 
work of  interpretation but also for an ethic of  answering to the gift we have received.
    The mother tongue, which is my verbal body, does not shut me in. Rather, it opens me to other 
languages, to humanity and to history. 
    On the basis of  the considerations I have presented, I think we can affirm that translation helps us 
to reconsider the phenomenological method.
    The three fundamental theses of  phenomenology are:(2)
1. Meaning is the most comprehensive category of  phenomenological description;
2. The subject is the bearer of  meaning;
3. Reduction is the philosophical act which permits the birth of  a being for meaning.
    These three theses, as presented above, are listed in the order of  their discovery. If  we read them in 
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the opposite order, they follow the order of  their founding.
    My hypothesis is that all three of  these theses can be clarified when we test them against the diversity 
of  languages and against translation.
    Let us start from the third one, reduction. If  we consider that every language is like a world, then to 
reduce or distance ourselves from a language, methodologically neutralizing it, is exactly what happens 
when one deals with a foreign language (and with every other language considered as a language of  
otherness). When reduction is meant in this way, is loses its potential as a fantastic and impossible 
operation of  exiting the world. It becomes possible and necessary to reach that particular level which 
enables the understanding among different people. It thus becomes possible to reach that 
transcendental humanity that is the basis of  people speaking a language in which they were born to 
consciousness, but we also are able to understand other human beings speaking different languages. 
    This has clear influence on the conception of  the subject that is always embodied in a world through 
the mediation of  a language; but all the particular worlds eventually belong to a common world and our 
subjectivity exists in the communion with all the real and possible subjects, recognized in their essential 
and peculiar identity. 
    The subject of  a hermeneutical phenomenology is never an isolated ego but is the self, as a 
contingent, finite, bodily being that coincides with our concrete condition of  suffering and acting 
human beings. We are required to realize ourselves in the praxis of  a whole life, in the reciprocity of  the 
intersubjective relationship, and to find a place in the world and in history. Then, the essential core of  
our life and our search for an identity in which our struggle and desire to live are expressed, which 
Ricoeur calls the “original affirmation,” must undergo an enormous and never final process of  
translation and translations, of  all sorts, which is tantamount to the telling of  our own stories, with the 
infinite web of  our actions and passions, with the work of  mourning and memory that such a work 
requires, with its always renewed challenges and the joy that it can bestow on us.
    Finally, meaning is neither the will to say, belonging to a subject without relationships, nor the access 
to a world of  separate essences. It is, on the contrary, the space opened by translation in order to 
compare and let our perspectives on the world be communicated.
    In this way a phenomenological hermeneutics of  translation can help us to realize that humanity, just 
like language, exists only in the plural mode.
Translated into English by Angelo Bottone
Notes
(1) Cf. Paul Ricoeur, Parcours de la reconnaissance, Stock, Paris 2004, pp. 221-355.
(2) Cf. Paul Ricoeur, Le conflit des interprétations, Seuil, Paris 1969, pp. 242-257 (English trans., 





The Well-Founded World:  On a Possible Rapprochement of  Phenomenology 
and Logical Analysis
Jonathan Kim-Reuter
What is the future of  Husserlian phenomenology?  In proposing this question, the Husserl Archives at 
the New School for Social Research has taken upon itself  that most difficult of  reflections, namely the 
value of  a legacy.  Such actions as this usually come at a time when a tradition, and particularly a 
research tradition, has begun to feel its age.  It is both the privilege and price of  maturity.  Every 
archive is an infinite resource and a finite recollection, an unstable mixture of  intellectual transcendence 
and material permanence, and where the chief  energies of  thought mobilize themselves around the 
latter to the detriment of  the former, there is the very real danger that the tradition has ceased to be 
relevant but to those who only ever heard the call of  the master.  Is this the situation facing Husserlian 
phenomenology today?  Does Husserl matter to more than just we Husserlians?
     To take up and test this provocation I want to consider one of  the most severe critics of  
phenomenology. (1) In the long and distinguished career of  the analytic philosopher John Searle, the 
concept of  intentionality has emerged as perhaps the most basic feature of  conscious life.  Searle’s 
efforts, in this respect, would be a boon to Husserlians, were it not for the fact that intentionality is 
explained almost entirely on naturalistic grounds.  Intentional states of  consciousness are simply higher 
level expressions of  what is at bottom a neuronal configuration or biological system. (2) There is an 
“underlying structure” of  consciousness, and this “structure” is located inside the brain. (3) 
Phenomenology, of  the Husserlian type, is for Searle exclusively a descriptive research project:  it 
portrays how things outwardly seem to us. (4) As such, it is methodologically and epistemically useless 
when compared with logical analysis of  consciousness.  The latter, Searle’s chosen mode of  knowing, is 
not content with merely staying close to the surface features of  phenomena.  Logical analysis, as he 
describes it, looks to “dig deeper” into the constitutive origins and conditions of  intentional life. (5) 
When compared with its logical competitor, as Searle writes, “phenomenology is largely, though not 
entirely, irrelevant.” (6) Exactly where Searle makes good on this gesture of  acceptance is not at all 
clear.
       For Searle, then, Husserlian phenomenology is largely a relic.  If  it retains any interest, it is only as 
an archival document from the period before modern science and neurophysiology began to map the 
causal frontiers of  the mind.  Phenomenology is and remains tainted with the older traditions of  
philosophical idealism. Husserl’s critical defense of  the phenomenal character of  human existence 
against the reductivism of  the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften), so Searle’s thinking goes, left him 
without any engagement with the real world, the world, that is, in which it matters whether our 
perceptions are veridical or illusory.  The first principle guiding the phenomenologist is the directive to 
ignore “all relation to empirically real existence.” (7) This is the source of  the assumed priority of  
logical over phenomenological analysis.  Without any concern over the objective reality of  the world, 
Husserl left himself  unable to account for the way in which the world presents itself  to the subject 
within specific parameters of  normalcy and familiarity.  This ontological oblivion of  naturalistic being 
may have been necessary in light of  the value given to the first-person account of  perceptual 
experience.  From Searle’s point of  view, however, it drastically ignores the very real fact that the 
perceptual contents of  consciousness come with conditions of  satisfaction, which in turn can only be 
studied if  it is granted that intentional states have a determinate content whose “underlying structure” 
is reflective of  the biological, constitutive bases of  mental phenomena.  Without anything more to add 
than the static analysis of  intentionality, phenomenology is doomed to remain a merely a curiosity, a 
“first stage,” (8) a rest-stop, as it were, on the road of  discovery already well-paved by science.
     To put Searle’s point another way, what is absent from Husserlian phenomenology is an inquiry into 
the “Background” for all conscious states, whether intentional or not. The notion of  the “Background” 
is one of  Searle’s most original and fundamental contributions to the theory of  intentionality.  
Originally, it was introduced to explain how the semantic content of  propositions can be meaningfully 
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grasped. (9) Searle writes: “The Background is a set of  nonrepresentational mental capacities that 
enable all representing to take place. Intentional states only have the conditions of  satisfaction that they 
do, and thus only are the states that they are, against a Background of  abilities that are not themselves 
Intentional states.” (10) It is “nonrepresentational” or “preintentional” inasmuch as it is only on the 
supposition of  the “Background” that the intentional object is meaningfully grasped. (11) Perceptual 
reality comes to have a coherent, structured organization, which is grasped throughout the variety of  
empirical appearances and sensory distortions, on the basis of  the “Background.”  Logical analysis is 
able to ferret out this operational existence of  mental capacities because it seeks to discover how it is, 
prior to phenomenological description, that there is at all a determinate object or state of  affairs 
present to intentional consciousness. (12) The “Background” provides what Searle calls “enabling 
conditions”:  they are not part of  the descriptive content as they permeate that content and establish 
the foundations for perceptual reality, (13) precisely that domain of  concern evacuated by Husserl from 
his original research program.
     So it appears that with the idea of  the “Background” firmly in place, logical analysis is able to 
explain how descriptive phenomenology is at all possible, thus rendering it “largely irrelevant.”  
Husserlian phenomenology, like the history of  science itself, ceases to any longer play a formative, 
active role in determining the future direction taken by research in cognitive and consciousness studies. 
However, despite appearances to the contrary, Husserl never considered any of  his theoretical positions 
to be beyond questioning or critique.  There is the orthodox purity and formal discipline of  
phenomenology as a “rigorous science” of  essences; yet, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty so shrewdly 
observes, in his last works there emerges for Husserl a more direct, “factical” investigation of  the pre-
reflective world, an inquiry whose overtly “genetic” scope takes into account the constitution of  
perceptual reality. (14) The second volume of  Ideas and the text of  the Crisis (15) introduce an account 
of  intentionality no longer divorced from the lived world.  This arguably radical turn in Husserlian 
phenomenology takes up the world in its intimate proximity to the subject.  The reluctance to account 
for the givenness of  perceptual reality is dropped in favor of  a closer inspection of  the manner in 
which the world (the “lifeworld,” Lebenswelt) originally acquires a primordial familiarity, such that I 
always find myself, prior to reflection, in a world that is always present “for me,” not “in itself,” (16) 
and never without a constant sense and perceptual certainty.  “To live,” Husserl writes, “is to always 
live-in-certainty-of-the-world.” (17)  
    The return to the world is not a journey back to the consciousness of  the world as an object like any 
other.  If  the world is not originally a simple multitude of  things but is instead characterized as the 
world for the subject, (18) if  the world is grasped through a “wakeful certainty” that is prior to all 
cognitive, third-person perspectives, (19) then we can understand how Husserl came to re-evaluate the 
former and formal primacy of  the theory of  intentionality.  Intentionality now stands as a phenomenon 
conditioned by and grounded in a thoroughgoing and irreducible “background” familiarity with the 
world.  The latter constitutes that “world-horizon” within which objects appear in their concrete and 
meaningful givenness. (20) Phenomenology ceases to be any longer an exclusively descriptive 
enterprise:  it acquires a “genetic” or “constitutive” dimension.  Henceforth, and this is the focus of  the 
studies that one finds in Ideas II and in the Crisis, phenomenology maps out a new ontological 
landscape for itself.  The phenomenologist, Husserl writes, is to turn toward that background of  
intentional consciousness, toward “how, that is, there arises in us the constant consciousness of  the 
universal existence, of  the universal horizon, of  real, actually existing objects.” (21) The actual being of  
objects, not merely their possible being, becomes the focus of  Husserl’s research.  His interest turns to 
the question of  how it is, taken in a universal sense, that the world is at all a place wherein the 
phenomenon of  objectivity not only appears but is the very precondition for all practical and 
theoretical activity—as revealed through the first-person perspective and its basic experience of  
perceptual- or world-familiarity. (22)
    It would appear, then, that far from being “largely irrelevant,” Husserlian phenomenology is in fact 
an ongoing mode of  inquiry—within and co-extensive with logical analysis itself.  Like logical analysis, 
it too seeks to understand how basic features of  the world-experience—“the solidity of  things, and the 
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independent existence of  objects and other people” (23)—are constituted for us as meaningful unities 
possessing determinate sense.  Searle would like to do without Husserl, but given his own attempts to 
make explicit the pre-intentional, operational work of  the “Background,” it seems he would do so at his 
own peril.  If  Searle paid closer attention to the evolving nature of  Husserl’s reflections on 
intentionality, he would find much that is very relevant. Both philosophers seek out the pre-reflective 
— “lived” — foundations of  perceptual reality.  They no doubt differ ultimately on the ontological 
status of  the “Background.”  But since neither Searle nor Husserl is interested in jettisoning that which 
makes consciousness a subjective experience, (24) it is clear that far from being merely an historical 
artifact, Husserlian phenomenology remains a vital program and prospect for research.  As such, in 
inviting the phenomenological community to assume the burden for its own future, the Husserl 
Archives enjoins us to think evocatively, and to look beyond the surface disparities of  contemporary 
debates for that turn of  thought which offers new differences and therein, perhaps, also new moments 
of  rapprochement.
Notes
(1) For a much broader treatment of  the points made in this paper, the reader would do well to consult 
the article “Background Ideas,” by David Woodruff  Smith, originally published in Italian as “Idee di 
sfondo,” Paradigmi, XVII, 49 (Rome, 1999), pp. 7-37. 
(2) John Searle, “The Limits of  Phenomenology,” Heidegger, Coping, and Cognitive Science:  Essays in 
Honor of  Hubert L. Dreyfus, volume 2, eds. Mark Wrathall and Jeff  Malpas (Cambridge:  The MIT 
Press, 2000), p. 90.  See also Searle’s comments in The Rediscovery of  the Mind (Cambridge, MA:  The 
MIT Press, 1992), pp. 85-93.
(3) Ibid., p. 91.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid., p. 76.
(7) Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J.N. Findlay (New York:  Humanity Books, 2000), p. 
537.)
(8) This point is made in a quotation from Husserl’s disciple, Eugen Fink.  The quotation appears in 
Ronald Bruzina’s Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink:  Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology, 1928-
1938 (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 2004), p. 197. 
(9) See, for example, the discussions of  the “Background” in Intentionality (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1983) and The Construction of  Social Reality ((New York:  The Free Press, 1995).
(10) Searle, Intentionality, p. 143. 
(11) Ibid.
(12) In a significant point of  agreement with Husserl, and Heidegger as well, Searle rejects the idea that 
the object of  an intentional state is a mental representation.  Since what is most revolutionary about the 
phenomenological theory of  intentionality is precisely its abandonment of  all traces of  a mental 
representation that is supposed to mediate between consciousness and our knowledge of  the external 
world, Searle, on this point, is more phenomenologically relevant than he is perhaps willing to admit.  
Consider, for example, the following observation by Searle on the nature of  the intentional object, take 
from his work Intentionality (p. 16):  “To call something an Intentional object is just to say that is what 
some Intentional state is about.  Thus, for example, if  Bill admires President Clinton, then the 
Intentional object of  his admiration is President Carter, the actual man and not some shadowy 
intermediate entity between Bill and the man.”
(13) Ibid., p. 158.  Searle’s commitment to realism is a logical outcome of  the functioning of  the 
Background:  our practical life would be incoherent if  there were not already in place a real world—not 
a hypothesis—on the basis of  which all of  our questions and inquiries acquire their meaningfulness 
and determinate value. 
(14) Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of  Perception, trans. Colin Smity (London:  Routledge & 
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Hermeneutic Phenomenology and the Constitution of  the Intercultural Sense
Dean Komel 
   Contemporary philosophy is conspicuously broken into numerous areas. A certain part of  
contemporary philosophy deliberately renounces the possibility of  rational argumentation, another part 
reduces philosophical argumentation solely to logical analysis. Beside this, we are witnessing constant 
redefinitions of  the historical possibilities of  philosophy. In such a situation, it is more than justified to 
raise the question of  whether we can still put forward a philosophical claim for the constitution of  
intercultural sense.
    Deconstructivism, as a philosophical basis of  the post-modern age, claims that all that is available is 
the reduction of  sense, and not reduction to sense. However, constitution is not reduction to sense, and 
even less construction of  sense. Constitution points to the ongoing event of  sense, which can also 
include its own negation, as Hegel pointed out. Hegel, however, together with counter-Hegelian 
deconstructivism and critical theory, in principle fail to grasp the constitutional problem, because they 
all state it within the world, rather than on the level of  the worldliness of  the world itself. And by doing 
so, they also overlook the boundaries of  philosophical consideration of  interculturality as a possibility 
of  an encounter within a culture, as well as among cultures.
    The philosophical presuppositions of  interculturality can be discussed in several ways. We can take 
philosophy as it has developed in its two-and-a-half-thousand-year-old history for the traditional 
ground of  the intercultural sense of  Europe and the West. Then it is possible to consider how we can, 
on this very ground, philosophically handle intercultural phenomena. And finally, we can detect the 
influence of  mutual intercultural understanding in the way that contemporary philosophy understands 
its sense and purpose. Since the first line of  thinking about the philosophical presuppositions of  
interculturality is fairly far-reaching, we can focus only on its delineation.
    To consider how interculturality can employ philosophical thinking anew implies that we already 
know what constitutes interculturality from the philosophical viewpoint. We thus find ourselves caught 
within a hermeneutic circle, in which both the philosophy of  interculturality and intercultural 
philosophy seek a way out for each other. Although this circle most probably cannot be totally avoided, 
we shall try not to get completely caught up in it and lose our stance. It is our standpoint that the path 
of  thought which is trying to establish itself  as an intercultural philosophy – as far as it is not merely 
some type of  comparative culture studies – in principle overlooks the essential intercultural sense of  
philosophy which has been present since its very beginning and which contributed essentially to the 
foundational idea of  European humanity, and can in the future help bring about its redefinition. Such a 
redefinition does not imply a repetition in the sense of  historical restoration with a renewed return and 
recourse to origins. The redefinition differs from repetition in the same way that constitution differs 
from construction: it does not accept the historicity as a past identity, but rather re-establishes it in the 
openness of  its future difference. 
    Within the philosophy of  the twentieth century, this foundational idea of  European humanity, as 
well as the need for its redefinition, was especially emphasized by Edmund Husserl, the founder of  
phenomenological philosophy. Among his followers, we should also mention Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
and more recently Klaus Held and Bernhard Waldenfels. Since Husserl’s reflection on the worldliness 
of  the world is being acknowledged by diverse critics, such as Habermas, Luhmann, Levinas or 
Derrida, it can serve as an example of  a special hermeneutic problem of  contemporary philosophy in 
general. It is related to the question of  whether and how philosophy should mediate a unified 
understanding of  the world without disregarding the differences which determine it and the exteriority 
it verges on.
    The question is pointed interculturally in a specific way, such that it makes culture an agent of  
mediation, insofar as it opens its middle and mediates itself  interculturally. And it is here that the 
philosophical issue of  the constitution of  this mediating middle of  the inter-dimension of  inter-
culturality appears. This mid-dimension is not given per se, but demands our involvement. We are 
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justified in claiming that such philosophical involvement, already sketched by Husserl, contributes to 
the acknowledgement and recognition of  a common world experience, in that it does not set up a 
culture as “ours” or “yours,” but rather in the mediation between “own” and “alien.” It does not take 
possession of  the alien in order to achieve its own acknowledgement; nor does it exclude the alien in 
order to defend its own essence. The “essence” in the sense of  “identity” as a mode of  existence 
preserves itself  only in the prospect of  its own mediation, otherwise it becomes alienated and is seized 
by fear of  annihilation. The annihilation of  the life-world is deeply related to the question of  the 
foundational redefinition of  European humanity, as is evidenced by Nietzsche’s designation of  
“European nihilism,” Scheler’s “age of  reconciliation,” Husserl’s “crisis of  European humanity,” and 
Heidegger’s “oblivion of  being,” not to mention literary examples.
    It is this very mediating sense of  culture as interculturality that may reveal that the alienation of  the 
modern world does not imply only negativity, which should be overcome, but also a certain 
positiveness, which calls for the constitution of  sense, and which primarily implies that a dimension of  
the world goes on “among” us, also between “us and us.” Even though in truth it can never be reduced 
solely to us, it is accepted by us already through opening the questions, what is and what is not real. 
This is even a basic “lesson” given by philosophy – namely, that we cannot commune with the world as 
something private, not even when we ask for it to change.
    The philosophy of  culture today cannot rely, for example, on a critical theory of  society which would 
transform into a revolutionary practice, nor on any “pure theory” which shows no interest in the world 
and its alienation. The global development segregates “us” and “them,” but in this special way that both 
“we” and “they” remain unacceptable in what is genuine as our own. The Other cannot be accepted if  
we do not first accept and even change ourselves; and here a pure philosophical question arises: who 
are we?
    In what way can we say that philosophy, since its very beginnings, has been interculturally effective, 
and that, on this basis, it historically affected the foundational understanding of  European humanity? 
Philosophy stems from wonder about what is, about Being as such and as a whole. We thus roughly 
referred to Aristotle’s definition of  philosophy. It is obvious that such a question cannot persist in the 
closed environment of  one’s own culture, but has to be open in and for itself  towards a world in which 
various cultures meet, transcending themselves as ordinary environments. The world means the 
opening up of  one’s own culture. In this trans-cultural sphere, philosophy manifests itself  in the 
opening up of  the world’s horizons, in which various cultures find themselves as if  within a certain 
whole or even a universe of  sense. It started raising questions as to what is the meaning of  this and that 
and what is the sense of  it all. This cannot prevent one culture from outrunning another, nor can it 
directly enable one culture to cross into another. The primary effect of  this loosening of  global 
horizons is that culture as such becomes a question, that there arises the need for its definition, and that 
on the basis of  this, a culture itself  transforms into its constitutionality, which is the main criterion of  
its acceptability. A testimony of  this first transformation of  the sense of  culture into a foundational 
sense, which makes culture meaningful for us, can be found in Cicero’s sentence “philosophia cultura 
animi est,” insofar as it explicitly co-defines culture and philosophy. Before that, the word cultura had 
the sense of  “cultivation” and “growing,” but not its own foundational sense, which was 
philosophically indicated already by Protagoras: “Of  all things, the measure is man – of  the things that 
are, that they are; of  the things that are not, that they are not.”
    Precisely in the manner it is defined in its foundational sense, the world cultura from the beginning 
points to the crisis of  its own definition, which in the late condition of  European culture, in the work 
of  Georg Simmel, turns out to be a “tragedy of  culture.” This crisis of  culture is also connected with 
philosophy within the framework of  mutual definitions. Culture does not presuppose only one, binding 
philosophy in the form of  a worldview, and philosophy itself  does not include only one, but more 
cultures. No doubt that certain conditions had to be fulfilled for Cicero to be able to articulate the 
definition of  culture in philosophical terminology; first and foremost, philosophy at its very beginning 
had to comprehend itself  as an elucidation of  mind.
    What is the philosophical elucidation of  mind? For the Greeks, the soul does not mean only human 
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life, but living beings in general. However, only the human soul can be elucidated. It is precisely because 
of  this “fact” that the elucidation of  mind leans towards the education of  the spirit, as is shown in 
Plato’s metaphor of  the cave. The elucidation of  mind and education of  spirit mean the search for the 
unity of  different aspects of  life. This search for Unity in Diversity is a concern for that which is, 
inasmuch as it is becoming and passing away, staying and leaving, growing and fading away. That the 
world shows itself  in its diversity is an announcement of  the freedom in which life fulfils itself  as 
praxis, and at the same time, this life experiences the revelation of  a world. Life and world are different, 
but nevertheless unified. Human beings grow at the locus of  this unity in difference by simultaneously 
yearning for it. A magnificent indicator of  this yearning is Greek art, which makes sense – and not 
without reason – of  our culture in general. This is why culture is up to this very day a synonym for life 
with a higher, excellent, and differentiating sense.
    Since philosophy defines being as such and as a whole, which opens up a kind of  global horizon, it is 
necessary that there arises the issue of  the relationship between diversity and unity, between the One 
and the Many. Philosophy is thus searching for “unity in difference,” in which differentiation itself  is 
understood as ascending to something higher, which perfects the very human essence. In his novel 
Hyperion, Friedrich Hölderlin writes: “The great Heraclites’ saying hen diapheron heauto (the One 
differentiated within itself) could only be discovered by a Greek, because it is the essence of  beauty, and 
before it had been discovered, there was no philosophy…The Egyptian was incapable of  doing it. He 
who doesn’t live with the sky and the earth in the same love and counter-love, he who doesn’t live in 
harmony with this element, in which he moves, is by nature in himself  disharmonious and doesn’t 
experience eternal beauty, at least not as easily as the Greek.” (1) This “One differentiated within itself,” 
hen diapheron heauto, if  we follow Hölderlin’s notes, therefore proves a lot harder nut to crack than it 
might at first appear. Where do the difference and the differentiated stem from? What is the sense of  
the One and Unity in this difference? This question leads to the disclosure of  being as such, the 
comprehension of  the world within Unity in Diversity, which reveals a special type of  the good, the 
true and the beautiful.
    The actuality of  this issue is shown by the fact that intercultural philosophy directs its primary 
attention to diversity rather than unity. This attention should, of  course, be critically questioned, since 
the advocacy of  diversity, and not unity, is not as simple as we would want it to be. Difference and 
diversity are not to be considered as things “in themselves,” but rather as things “in relation”; if, 
however, we would like to consider difference outside the relation, we have to think of  it as the 
differentiating One, as something that is beyond comparison, which also holds for Derrida’s differânce. 
However, this “differentiating One” is already pondered by Heraclites. Would it not be more 
appropriate to open-mindedly reconsider this original beginning of  the One in Diversity, rather than 
forcefully – and at any cost – prefer diversity to unity? If  we make such a decision, there instantly arises 
the question of  the coordinates of  our own starting point.
    “Unity in Diversity,” magnificently epitomized in the Greek logos, is the founding event of  
European and Western humanity; it is not intra-cultural (i.e. an ancient Greek and then Latin event), it 
is emphatically intercultural, provided that it forms the ground for the development of  European 
history and Western civilization. It enables contact and permeation among cultures, as is obviously the 
case in early Christianity which would later ground its sense only in logos, understood in the unity of  
the universal, individual and particular. With Christianity, we can detect the formation of  a specifically 
individual attitude to the world on the one hand, and that universalistic supremacy of  the West, which 
in its eschatological pretensions often directs its destructive power against other cultures, if  they are 
thought worthy of  this designation in the first place. This is where the problem of  freedom comes into 
play, with its particular and universal senses, provided that a human being has to acknowledge the 
freedom of  all human beings in order to attain their own freedom. The cultivation of  this freedom can 
be understood as the development of  humanity, which is no doubt a fundamental feature of  the 
spiritual history of  Europe; it is particularly characterized by the phenomenon of  the Enlightenment, in 
which the human essence sets itself  apart as something unique; the fact that human beings have free 
use of  mental abilities, gives them the assurance that they can have at their disposal whatever can be 
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rationally represented. The modern human of  the Enlightenment is as self-reliant as the emancipated 
conqueror.
    With humans placing themselves, through their mental faculties at the base point of  all knowledge 
and practice in the world, the understanding of  Unity in Diversity changed at its very core. The world is 
in principle and primarily no longer grasped as a place in which life fulfils itself, but rather as something 
that is at our disposal already. Unity in Diversity is set up systematically, be it arithmetical, geometrical, 
transcendental, dialectical, or a positivistic model of  systematics. This aspect of  systematics is not 
traceable only in the field of  philosophy and science; it is effective also on the intercultural level. 
European nations also establish themselves systematically as countries cultivating and enabling 
international relations. The basic positive heritage of  this systematic regulation of  international 
relations is the United Nations.
    The systematic regulation of  Unity in Diversity nevertheless suffers from exclusionism, in that the 
One of  the system remains outside all the differences, while on the other hand diversity in the system 
can never be entirely subjected to the One if  it is to remain diverse. Thus we are losing touch with the 
initial understanding of  the world as Unity in Diversity. Within the framework of  philosophy, this issue 
was tackled by Leibniz, who found his historical adversary in Voltaire; taken historically, systematically, 
the best possible world can also be the worst possible world. More far-reaching than this, however, is 
that we can methodically strive for history and nature taken as a system. This methodology of  
mastering history and nature each day turns more and more into a method of  power, which can no 
longer be satisfied with acquired power, but desires to manipulate this power and become more and 
more empowered in this management of  power, in ruling, mastering and prevailing.
    Where systematics subjects historicity to its rule, we are faced with the disastrous consequences of  
this method of  power, and the distinction is put into force between historical and non-historical 
nations, not on the grounds of  historically manifested culture, cultural tradition, but on the grounds of  
systematically enforced power. The systematic regulation of  history establishes itself  as a historical 
world order and as that which even transcends this order with its power. Directly or indirectly, this 
inflames historical revolutions “from below,” and restorations “from above,” all of  them culminating in 
the first half  of  the 20th century. They are not declining even today, at the beginning of  the 21st 
century; quite the contrary, they are gaining strength, even though we are inclined to talk about the end 
of  history after the establishment of  the system of  liberal democracy. We too easily forget that even an 
abolished history can strike back, not only in various aspects of  traditionalism or even more threatening 
radicalisms and fundamentalisms, but also in the barely noticeable annihilation of  the world.
    The second half  of  the 20th century, the period of  the so-called cold war, already saw the 
consequences of  such self-assurance in the power of  the system, which is rooted in subjectivist views 
of  the modern age, inasmuch as they seek to develop the ability of  traversing from the unified to the 
diverse, the universal and individual, and the reverse. Undoubtedly, one of  these is the positivism of  the 
19th century, which dared keep its “positive sense” even in the midst of  contempt, annihilation, and the 
destruction of  European humanity. Positivism is necessarily accompanied by ideologies which seek to 
enforce upon the world a historical sense on the basis of  a dogma, in which differences between ideas, 
ideals and idols are sooner or later lost.
    Two world wars, totalitarianisms, the age of  the cold war, the deepening gap between developed and 
undeveloped nations, and the present general threat of  terrorism are a living proof  that the positions 
and counter-positions of  power can pass over, through the “formal emptiness” of  systematic 
regulation, into a destructive history, also annihilating the political as such. “Formal emptiness” here 
means primarily operating with empty values, forgetting the loss of  the unified value of  life and 
diversity of  its evaluations, enforcing supremacy instead, by continuously proving that everything can 
be regulated by being controllable. What is essential here is to keep on the virtuality of  power, since this 
is supposedly the only means of  retaining the aspect of  Unity in Diversity.
    Although in a modified version, Nietzsche’s discovery of  European nihilism is still relevant, 
inasmuch as it calls our attention to the possibility of  a historical spirit turning into a phantom, which is 
especially dangerous today, when this is far more efficiently achievable by using the power of  system. 
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According to Nietzsche, nihilism stems from the incapacity of  power to acknowledge differences. 
However, he did not become fully aware of  the nihilism of  power regulating all the differences. What is 
the sense of  nihilism in the sense of  traversing from identity to difference and back? Firstly, this 
traversal gives the appearance of  power, and secondly, as power it leaves behind both the unifying One 
and differentiating diversity, circling self-contentedly within itself. This means that in the unconditional 
enforcement of  power there falls a question concerning the sense of  that which empowers this power. 
It is to the great credit of  Husserl and other philosophers of  the phenomenological and hermeneutic 
tradition that they warned us of  the self-sufficient enforcement of  the power of  science as a system, 
which shows itself  in the form of  modern technology. Can, perhaps, a philosophical constitution of  
interculturality help form an alternative by taking culture as its mediator? 
    This is a question of  a possible future sense of  European humanity and of  humanity in general, as 
far as it establishes itself  in the values of  “science,” “politics,” “freedom,” “management,” and 
“solidarity”. Particularly from within the midst of  interculturality, culture can mediate between these 
sectors in that it mediates Unity in Diversity in their worldly activities. This, of  course, implies newly 
establishing culture in the direction of  interculturality, which would sensibly build upon tradition rather 
than reject it. The perspective of  this culture is as yet undetermined, but its horizon has already been 
revealed to us on the ground of  the tradition of  European humanity in its philosophical, artistic, 
religious, political, scientific and other aspects. On the one hand, it is supported by the complexity of  
the contemporary world dispersing into numerous worlds, and on the other, it has become quite clear 
that this complexity cannot be simplified on the grounds of  a unified worldview, be it political, 
scientific, artistic, philosophical, or economic. The world is not one on the grounds of  an enforced 
worldview, the world is not dispersed into a multitude of  unrelated worlds, the world is common to us 
all in the encounter of  differences. It is individual for everybody, and yet common to us all. Its 
counterpart is exclusionism, limiting the shared world, interwoven with the own and the alien, solely to 
what is “ours,” eventually reducing it to mere nothingness. This is perhaps one of  the most difficult 
constitutive problems of  the intercultural grounding of  Europe, although its sense is strengthened by 
the fact that European culture has not constituted itself  solely by defending its own essence, but more 
often in the element of  crucial mediation between the own and the alien.
    The direction towards philosophy of  interculturality is not limited only to the European internal 
sense; it has become, as it were, global, in that it acknowledges the Earth as a community of  existence. 
The redefinition of  European humanity points not only to the inner, but also to the outer dimension, 
in that it delineates to itself  the fate of  the whole planet, not only in the usual ecological aspect, but 
rather in the cultural, “inhabiting” aspect, already implied in the former. This sets the problem of  
interculturality in a much larger context of  confronting Europeans with “Outer-Europeans,” which also 
requires a changed concept of  culture; it is no longer possible to cling solely to the notion of  our own 
culture, not even the European one – every cultural self-representation comes to light in intercultural 
openness. “Leftist” theoreticians in particular detect in this nothing but the expansion of  “Europ-
centrism” and “hegemony and imperialism” by other means, directed by the power of  the capital. 
However, we have to distinguish between the “economic propaganda” of  multiculturalism and 
potential perspectives of  interculturality, since we have no other starting point for confronting the most 
topical issues of  contemporary society, including those compelled by the logic of  capital. The 
possibility of  encountering in the same world
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On the Future of  Phenomenological Sociology
Nam-In Lee
1. Applied phenomenology is one of  the fields in which the phenomenology of  the 21st century has to 
advance. This paper will deal with the possibility of  developing applied phenomenology with respect to 
phenomenological sociology. There have been some debates on phenomenological sociology in the 
second half  of  the 20th century. In 1965, Tiryakian proposed a list of  phenomenological sociology that 
includes the different aspects of  sociology developed by Viedrkandt, Mannheim, Gurwitsch, Scheler, 
Weber, Durkheim, Thomas, and Parsons. (1) Some scholars such as Kolaja, Berger, Heap/Roth have 
criticized Tiryakian’s view, and Tiryakian himself  attempted to defend his position. (2) However, 
unfortunately no agreements have been reached in regard to the proper definition of  
phenomenological sociology. Heap/Roth proposed another list of  phenomenological sociology that 
includes hermeneutic sociology, Schutzian sociology, reflective sociology, and ethno-methodology. By 
assessing these debates, I will attempt to clarify what phenomenological sociology is about and 
furthermore to show that there are abundant possibilities of  developing it.
2. Even though Tiryakian and his critics have contributed a great deal for the clarification of  
phenomenological sociology, their researches have fundamental limitation that have prevented them 
from understanding the proper meaning of  phenomenological sociology. Focusing mainly on empirical 
sociology, most of  them did not attempt to clarify the field of  phenomenological sociology with 
respect to the general context of  phenomenology as a whole. To understand the proper meaning of  
phenomenological sociology, one, however, has to take into account the whole context of  
phenomenology in which phenomenological sociology takes a place. Concerning this context, we have 
to pay attention to the two following facts. First, Husserl conceives of  phenomenology as an organic 
whole that is comprised of  not only the various dimensions of  the philosophical phenomenology such 
as the transcendental phenomenology, formal ontology, and regional ontology, but also of  empirical 
science that is founded on the philosophical phenomenology in various ways. Second, 
phenomenological sociology could be developed on the various dimensions of  phenomenology, 
namely on the dimension of  the transcendental phenomenology, that of  regional ontology, and that of  
empirical science, since the sociological facts could be investigated on three different dimensions of  
phenomenology mentioned above. (However, we cannot develop phenomenological sociology on the 
dimension of  formal ontology, since formal ontology is a formal science that is empty in its contents.) 
Correspondingly, we have to make a distinction among three different dimensions of  
phenomenological sociology: the dimension of  the transcendental phenomenological sociology, that of  
the ontological phenomenological sociology, and that of  the empirical phenomenological sociology.
a. The empirical phenomenological sociology is a kind of  empirical science and, as empirical 
science in general aiming to describe and to explain various kinds of  empirical facts, it attempts 
to describe and explain the sociological facts in terms of  empirical facts. 
b. The ontological phenomenological sociology is a kind of  regional ontology, and as regional 
ontology in general aiming to clarify the essential structures of  the facts, it seeks to elucidate the 
essential structures of  sociological facts. 
c. The transcendental phenomenological sociology is a kind of  transcendental phenomenology 
and, as transcendental phenomenology in general aiming to clarify the condition of  the   
possibility of  something, it attempts to explicate the condition of  the possibility for the 
constitution of  sociological facts. 
3. These three dimensions of  phenomenological sociology are called phenomenological, insofar as they 
use the various kinds of  the phenomenological method. But they do not need the same kind; rather 
they need different kinds of  phenomenological method.
135
a. In order to develop the empirical phenomenological sociology, we have to carry out, first of  all, 
the sociological phenomenological reduction. The sociological phenomenological reduction is 
the method that enables us to go back to the sociological facts as empirical ones. From the 
phenomenological point of  view, various kinds of  sociological fact are the products of  
intentionalities. Therefore, in order to clarify the sociological facts, one has to go back to the 
various kinds of  intentionalities. In fact, Husserl developed the phenomenological method, 
namely the method of  phenomenological psychological reduction, (3) to go back to the 
intentionalities. In this sense, the sociological phenomenological reduction is the variation of  
the phenomenological psychological reduction, namely the phenomenological psychological 
reduction applied to the sociological facts. The ethno-methodological reduction used by some 
proponents of  ethono-methodology is a kind of  sociological phenomenological reduction. 
Various kinds of  the sociological phenomenological reduction should be elaborated, since there 
are different kinds of  sociological fact that have different ontological structures. For example, 
the sociological phenomenological reduction required for ethno-methodology should be 
distinguished from the requirement for sociology of  knowledge. 
b. In order to establish the ontological phenomenological sociology, we have to carry out the 
sociological phenomenological reduction first, and then the eidetic reduction must be added. 
The eidetic reduction is a necessary component of  the method in the ontological 
phenomenological sociology, since the latter aims to clarify the essential structure instead of  the 
empirical structure of  the sociological facts. 
c. In order to develop the transcendental phenomenological sociology, we have to perform the 
transcendental phenomenological reduction and eidetic reduction. The transcendental 
phenomenological reduction as the method of  transcendental phenomenological sociology 
aims to grasp the plurality of  transcendental subjectivity that provides the condition of  the 
possibility for the constitution of  various kinds of  sociological fact. We have to examine which 
of  the various kinds of  the transcendental phenomenological reductions developed by Husserl 
are relevant for this purpose. The transcendental phenomenological sociology is a kind of  
essential science, and the method of  eidetic reduction is an essential component of  its method. 
4. We have to lay emphasis on the fact that the essential characteristic of  phenomenological sociology is 
the explicit or implicit use of  the various kinds of  the phenomenological methods. Phenomenological 
sociology is distinguished from those concepts of  sociology that do not use the method of  the 
phenomenological reduction at all. Therefore, it is distinguished from those concepts of  sociology that 
are bound up with natural science or are quantitatively oriented. The distinction between the 
phenomenological and the non-phenomenological sociology should be dealt with in more detail.
    Some scholars participated in the debates on phenomenological sociology also consider the use of  
the phenomenological method to be the essential characteristic of  phenomenological sociology. 
However, they do not make a clear distinction among different kinds of  the phenomenological 
reduction. Most of  them simply assume that there might be only one kind of  the phenomenological 
reduction, namely the transcendental phenomenological reduction. According to them, in order to be 
called phenomenological, empirical sociology has to use the method of  the transcendental 
phenomenological reduction. But this position contradicts the basic tenet of  phenomenology. 
According to phenomenology, science has to conceive its method of  research on the basis of  the 
matters that it is dealing with, and it should not borrow its method of  research from another science 
that is dealing with another kind of  matter. The empirical phenomenological sociology could not 
borrow its method of  research from the transcendental phenomenology, since its proper domain of  
matter is not the matter of  the transcendental phenomenology. If  empirical sociology uses the method 
of  the transcendental phenomenological reduction, it becomes an anti-phenomenological science, 
since, being totally blind to the empirical sociological facts, it could not investigate the latter properly.
5. The fact that three different dimensions of  phenomenological sociology have to use different kinds 
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of  the phenomenological method should not motivate one to imagine that they do not have any 
relationships with each other. Contrary to what one might believe, there are foundational relationships 
among them.
    In the debates on phenomenological sociology, most scholars, implicitly or explicitly, paid attention 
to the foundational relationship between the “transcendental phenomenology” and the 
“phenomenological sociology.” However, they did not understand the proper meaning of  the 
foundational relationship in this context. According to them, the foundational relationship between 
them implies that the latter has to use the same method as the former, which contradicts the basic 
phenomenological tenet as mentioned above.
    Properly speaking, the foundational relationship between among different dimensions of  
phenomenological sociology means something totally different from what they have in mind. For 
example, the foundational relationship between the empirical phenomenological sociology and the 
ontological phenomenological sociology means that the former has to be guided by the latter in its 
method of  research. The reason for this lies in the fact that the essential structures of  the sociological 
facts clarified by the ontological phenomenological sociology could give us a norm that has a direct 
implication for the research method of  empirical phenomenological sociology. In this context, it should 
be noted to the fact that “a certain method […] is a norm which arises from the fundamental regional 
specificity and the universal structures of  the region in question” (Hua III/1, 161). As the ontological 
phenomenological sociology could show, it is the essence of  the sociological fact that it is the product 
of  intentionalities. In this case, the essence of  the sociological fact could give us a methodological 
norm for the empirical phenomenological sociology, namely the norm that the empirical sociology has 
to use the sociological phenomenological reduction, because it has to investigate the sociological facts 
from the perspective of  intentionality. Thus, the foundational relationship between the empirical 
phenomenological sociology and the ontological phenomenological sociology consists in the fact that 
the former gets a direction for its method of  research from the latter, it does not mean that the former 
has to use the same method as the latter.
    As shown above, the foundational relationships among three dimensions of  phenomenological 
sociology are much more complicated than one might imagine. That is, the transcendental 
phenomenological foundation means something other than the ontological foundation. The various 
kinds of  foundational relationship should be examined in more detail.
6. In order to develop phenomenological sociology systematically, it is necessary to make a clear 
distinction among three different dimensions of  phenomenological sociology. However, in the debates 
on phenomenological sociology, this distinction has not been investigated sufficiently. When closely 
examined, one can see that each dimension of  phenomenological sociology has abundant possibilities 
to be developed in various directions.
a. The empirical phenomenological sociology is the discipline that could have a great impact on the 
empirical sociologists. Among the different concepts of  sociology mentioned above, there are some 
kinds of  sociology that could be classified under empirical phenomenological sociology. For instance, 
Mannheim’s sociology of  knowledge, Weber’s religious sociology, Thomas’s sociology, Garfinkel’s 
ethnomethodology, and reflective sociology can be regarded as kinds of  empirical phenomenological 
sociology. In this context, one has to keep in mind that, in dealing with sociological facts as products of  
intentionality, it is necessary to use the method of  the sociological phenomenological reduction. Yet 
besides these concepts of  sociology, there are more possibilities to develop the empirical 
phenomenological sociology. Sociology conceived by A. Giddens is a good example for the further 
development of  the empirical phenomenological sociology which concerns the process of  the social 
construction of  reality.
b. The ontological phenomenology also has abundant possibilities to be developed in various 
directions. There are examples of  the ontological phenomenological sociology among various kinds of  
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sociology mentioned above. For instance, one can find the ontological phenomenological sociology in 
Weber’s theory of  social action, since he attempts to clarify the essential structures of  social action as 
the basic category of  verstehende Soziologie. In this sense, one could say that, developing his theory of  
social action, Weber is carrying out the sociological phenomenological reduction and the eidetic 
reduction implicitly. Weber’s theory of  social action as the ontological phenomenological sociology is 
the fundamental ground for his religious sociology, which, as verstehende Soziologie, is developed on 
the empirical dimension. The other examples of  the ontological phenomenological sociology are 
Vierkandt’s formal sociology, Parsons’s general theory of  action, and Schutz’s phenomenological 
sociology. Husserl, as a founder of  phenomenology, also attempted several times to elaborate the 
ontological phenomenological sociology; however, to the best of  my knowledge, he never sought to 
develop the empirical phenomenological sociology. Various kinds of  the ontological phenomenological 
sociology that have not yet been conceived could be developed as the ontological foundation of  
various kinds of  empirical phenomenological sociology, for example, the ontological sociology of  
knowledge as the ontological foundation for the empirical sociology.
c. There have been no attempts to develop the transcendental phenomenological sociology in the 
debates on phenomenological sociology. However, there are also abundant possibilities to develop the 
transcendental phenomenological sociology in various directions. Husserl’s theory of  intersubjectivity 
articulated from the perspective of  transcendental phenomenology is a good example of  the 
transcendental phenomenological sociology. As an empirical sociologist, one might not have any 
interest in the transcendental phenomenological sociology, but one should not forget that it has a great 
significance for the empirical phenomenological sociology, since it deals with the transcendental 
phenomenological foundation of  the latter. The transcendental phenomenological sociology could be 
developed in various directions, for example, it could be developed in as a static as well as a genetic one.
Notes
(1) E. A. Tiryakian, “Existential Phenomenology and the Sociological Tradition”, in: American 
Sociological Review 30(1965).
(2) J. Kolaja, “On Existential Phenomenology and Sociology(I)”, in: American Sociological Review 
34(1966); P. L. Berger, “On Existential Phenomenology and Sociology(II)”, in: American Sociological 
Review 34(1966); E. A.. Tiryakian, “Reply to Kolaja and Berger”, in: American Sociological Review 
34(1966), J. L. Heap/P. A. Roth, “On Phenomenological Sociology”, in: American Sociological Review 
38(1973).
(3) Here phenomenological psychological reduction should be understood as a procedure that does not 
include the process of  eidetic reduction. does not necessitate in advance imperialist global supremacy. 
On the contrary, this is what the philosophy of  interculturality should demonstrate in reconsidering the 
concept of  the world in a permeation of  unity and diversity, without ideologically overthrowing the 
power of  the One and suppressing diversity under the supremacy of  the One. 
    “Encountering” is thus understood as the key word of  the philosophy of  interculturality, which has 
not only a methodological, but also a relational sense. Within encountering, we encounter someone or 
something, while we also encounter someone or something for the sake of  the encounter itself.
Translated from Slovenian by Janko Lozar.
Notes




 Working With Husserl
Sophie Loidolt
   This brief  outline on the future of  Husserlian phenomenology is rather a commitment with a few 
thematic references than a typical academic text. To point out how we can encounter and account for 
Husserl’s legacy, I would like to refer to the methodological aspect which is so essential to 
phenomenology. Therefore I am not going to develop any special motifs that are to be engaged in 
future philosophical debates but simply try to highlight the always striking benefits of  working with 
Husserl. Whatever issue we engage in, whatever questions we ask, we can try to think our way through 
with the directives and tools Husserl consigned to us: a carefully developed way how to work with 
phenomena as such insofar as they are regarded without any methodological precondition; thus, a 
method that is committed to its object to such an extent that it coincides with it and tries to become 
the non-method par excellence or the method without any content but that what is ‘given’; and, most 
important, the understanding of  the given as meaning (Sinn) for a consciousness that has to be 
investigated in its structure and genesis. It is the last point I would like to build my argument on with 
the aim to show what makes a phenomenological approach so fruitful. This includes the thesis that the 
future of  Husserlian phenomenology still lies in the unique perspective on phenomena as meanings for 
a consciousness – a perspective in which numerous issues have not been considered yet or need to be 
reconsidered in the future.  
To Look at Something as a Meaning: Reduction and Consciousness
    To look at something as a meaning means to go back to the most elementary category of  human 
understanding. Everything appears in the horizon of  meaning (which thus includes absurdity as the 
borders of  meaning) and to take this apparently so trivial fact seriously into account is a unique quality 
of  the phenomenological approach. What turns meaning into meaning? Meaning is always meaning 
for . . .  . In the broadest sense, meaning is for a consciousness. May it be ‘anonymous’ (as for the early 
Husserl) or the consciousness of  a transcendental ego, in any way we need a conception of  
consciousness to be able to speak of  meaning at all and vice versa. To speak of  meaning or of  
consciousness as consciousness of  something leaves the subject/object divide behind and focuses on 
the correlation which marks the very essence of  consciousness. If  we take a step back and look at 
consciousness itself  we find that it is that correlation und thus the domain of  meaning. We can also see 
that this ‘step back’ is not a step out of  the world but consciously into it with the realisation that 
everything we can mean by ‘world’ is already conscious and thus within consciousness. In short: It is 
not consciousness that is within the world, but the world itself  is conscious. This view opens up a 
whole new sphere where the accomplishments of  consciousness that make our world a meaningful 
world can finally be visible – and these accomplishments go to the very basic point of  perceiving and 
thus constituting the category of  ‘reality’ itself. The eidetic structures and correlations Husserl has 
sketched out, work as a perfect ‘map’ of  that normally hidden sphere of  consciousness which is mainly 
a sphere of  accomplishments. For philosophical and other investigations this field of  building-up of  or 
generation of  meaning (Sinnbildung) cannot be neglected, if  a theory is intended that takes the basic 
structures of  experience (Erleben and Erfahren) into account. Neither the basic tools nor concepts can 
be neglected that Husserl developed for this purpose, such as ‘consciousness,’ ‘intentionality,’ 
‘correlation,’ ‘act and content’ etc. 
To Look at the Structures of  Sinnbildung: Intentionality and Constitution
    Husserlian phenomenology renders the possibility to take a close look at the different stages and 
structures of  ‘Sinnbildung.’ The key term of  intentionality allows a systematic differentiation between act 
and content and more elaborated, between noesis and noema. On the one hand, the investigation of  
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‘noesis’ is an investigation of  the intentional ‘Erlebnis’ (e.g. the Erlebnis of  ‘judging’ in judgement: das  
Urteilen im Urteil) that looks at it like an object and thus makes those accomplishments visible which 
produce meaning. On the other hand, the intentional ‘Erlebnis’ is consciousness of  something: this 
noematic correlate now contains all the layers of  meaning in the aspect of  the given (the Perceived, the 
Judged, the Intended…) as such. This twofold analysis developed by Husserl grasps the eidetic 
structure and essence of  consciousness as Bewusstsein von… and makes its apriori of  correlation 
(Korrelationsapriori) clear. The insight that all reality is through Sinngebung within this correlation leads 
to the transcendental turn in Husserl’s philosophy. However, the activity of  the transcendental ego is 
not necessarily an all over sovereign that is the only ‘competent authority’ of  the building up of  
meaning. Especially Husserl’s style of  investigation and devotion to the phenomena (Zu den Sachen 
selbst!) has led him to diverse explications in the complicated structures of  Sinnbildung – I will only 
mention a few aspects and exemplary approaches: Husserl’s concept of  passivity as well as the aligned 
modalities of  sedimentation and habitualisation show, how meaning is produced, stored, modified and 
reproduced without the direct participation of  an ego. At the same time, the core analysis of  time that 
touches the deepest layers of  consciousness possible, fleshes out the thesis that this ego is not a mere 
construction but a living ‘nunc stans’. Furthermore, the analysis of  the body leads to the recognition of  
a passive intentional drive (Triebintentionalität) in kinaesthesis; it engages phenomena like severe pain that 
turn around the structures of  normal experience and make a subject visible that is constituted by its 
openness. All these differenciated approaches that include so many aspects, will make Husserlian 
phenomenology indispensable also in the future. Its enormous potential lies in highlighting the multiple 
dimensions and modalities of  Sinnbildung – even if  Husserl himself  emphasizes sovereign achievement 
of  experience. This has to do with his preference for the capacity of  self-preservation of  the subject 
and a certain tendency to harmonize experience. But what is the case for Husserl is not necessarily the 
case for Husserlian phenomenology: there are numerous developments and radicalisations of  themes 
and indices that were raised by Husserl himself  – this is why working with Husserl still starts from a 
very fruitful ground, where many issues are still in question. It is important that with Husserl it is 
possible to come to an edge of  experience where some philosophers have chosen to speak of  counter-
intentionality instead of  intentionality, where Sinnbildung turns into Sinnereignis and where the 
sovereignty of  constitution is deeply in question. But at the same time, subjectivity is never out of  sight 
or out of  question but appears as the indispensable core of  self-affection and self-awareness that 
ensures the possibility to have experiences at all. Given this possibility of  a balanced analysis, it is 
possible to talk about the generation of  meaning in terms of  intentionality, motivation and acts of  a 
transcendental ego, without ignoring the impact of  the body, of  intersubjectivity or of  the mundane 
structures of  the social and historical world. Husserl’s phenomenology thus is a transcendental 
philosophy that engages the fundamental structures of  sensuality and acknowledges their right and role 
in the process of  Sinnbildung.
To Look at the Genesis of  Sinnbildung
    One of  Husserl’s most successful concepts is that of  genesis or genetic phenomenology. This 
includes another dimension of  Sinnbildung: while static phenomenology deals with validities, genetic 
phenomenology investigates the genesis of  these validities. Again, the transcendental perspective is 
crucial because the genetic structure reveals the conditions of  the possibility of  experience by starting 
from experience itself. Investigating the fundamental conditions of  consciousness in the genetic 
perspective renders the key features how to think and conceptualize a core form of  subjectivity. It gives 
an outline of  the most passive layers of  fungierender Intentionalität and shows the importance of  
association, affection and succession in Sinnbildung not only on a psychological but on a 
transcendental level. The striking characteristic feature of  Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is 
the elaboration of  a prepredicative sphere which in itself  already shows structures of  receptivity that 
have a preparing character for the entry of  spontaneity. As Husserl has demonstrated this for logical 
categories, the whole life of  reason with its justifying features could be newly understood from the 
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prepredicative sphere. Husserl offers a possibility to speak about reason without the exclusion of  
sensibility or, more precise, to speak of  reason within a subject that is also determined and pre-
structured by its receptivity. This also allows a comprehensive approach on intersubjectivity that 
embraces all dimensions from the affective to the reasonable in ethic and social life. 
    Through the genetic question the issue of  Sinnbildung reaches a profoundness that cannot be 
neglected in future philosophical discussions on any question that concerns subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity and its constitution of  a meaningful world.
How to Work with Husserl: The Idea of  Arbeitsphilosophie in the Future
    The aim of  this brief  sketch was only to give a short idea about the richness and profoundness of  
topics in Husserlian phenomenology viewed under the core term of  Sinnbildung. Concerning the 
future significance of  Husserlian philosophy it is very probable that Sinnbildung as a term and a whole 
issue has the potential to engage in all sorts of  discussions: be it a classical philosophical question on 
the role of  the transcendental, be it a dialogue with the cognitive sciences on the question of  
consciousness as such, be it a new phenomenological approach in the social sciences, be it an effort to 
engage in the analysis of  phenomena like violence and war that touch the borders of  meaning and 
understanding. To achieve this wide range of  subject matters, it is however, important to reflect on 
what it means to work with Husserl. Of  course it does not mean that we regard his writings as a 
‘system’ that is completed – not only the style of  Husserl’s work but primarily his own concept of  
phenomenology would prohibit that perception. It is known that Husserl thought of  phenomenology 
as methodische Arbeitsphilosophie: he regarded the new ground of  experience (Erfahrungsboden) that 
was opened up through the phenomenological reduction as an infinite field where all kinds of  
philosophical questions could be newly posed and decided on. 
    The way how to work fruitfully with Husserl’s phenomenology has been practiced in the past and 
will also guarantee the future of  Husserlian thought: To a high extent it was French philosophers who 
opened up Husserlian phenomenology to its own more radical potential. They demonstrated that 
looking for the dissonances and fractures in Husserl’s opus was often more productive for 
phenomenology than keeping an orthodox reading. Phenomenology is after all, a method that coincides 
with its object. The fact that phenomenological reflections have kept and will keep phenomenology in 
motion, even unorthodox modifications or alterations cannot run contrary to Husserl’s intentions and 




Prospects of  Husserlian Phenomenology
Algis Mickunas
To articulate the prospects for Husserlian phenomenology first we must suggest briefly the points of  
contention his work has provoked in major trends which, as a matter of  fact, are aspects of  and 
inspired by his opus. In this sense one current requirement of  Husserlian phenomenology is to take to 
task the various attacks on his work, not to demonstrate by arguments that they are wrong, but to 
investigate the undisclosed prejudgments in awareness that such attacks contain. We know that from 
Heidegger through various hermeneutical systems, to deconstruction and post-modernity, Husserl’s 
thought was the main target for criticisms on whose basis the careers of  such attacks were made. Thus, 
the first claim suggests that Husserl’s understanding of  Being is impoverished in contrast to his 
epistemic focus of  establishing a domain of  absolute awareness founded on transcendental ego. In this 
sense, his phenomenology is not a presuppositionless science, but a Cartesian reduction of  Being to 
being known. Another aspect that supposedly discredits Husserl’s claims is the impossibility to obtain 
apodictic evidence of  retentional dimension of  temporal experience and the radical difference of  the 
other’s experience. Unable to eradicate these difficulties, Husserl attempts to support his claim to 
absolute evidence by accepting, uncritically, the language of  presence that pervades the metaphysical 
legacy of  the West. Finally, and despite his discovery of  the life-world, both his method and content of  
his researches are Western, and even epistemically imperialistic. After all, all cultural and historical 
differences are subsumed by him under the claim that phenomenology is the secret longing of  the 
Greco-European man. These contentions require a brief  response and above all an opening to the 
future tasks for Husserlian phenomenology.
    Husserlian phenomenology has one pervasive and general characteristic: analytic precision. It 
demands that all claims be demonstrated precisely in awareness accessible to everyone. Moreover, it 
demands that any philosophical position must include and explicate the awareness required for the very 
grounds of  such a position. Lacking such an explication, a position remains dogmatic and speculative. 
It is therefore essential to disclose the transcendental awareness that comprises the very condition for 
attempts to depose this phenomenology. Such an awareness is reflective and demands that any 
philosophical or even anti-philosophical venture take into account its own reflection as a condition on 
which it differentiates itself  from other positions. This sort of  reflection is a vast field for 
phenomenological researches leading to precise eidetic insights into philosophical positions and what 
sort of  awareness such positions require. For example, while Kant proposes to account for all 
knowledge on the basis of  his a priori structures and the manner of  their transcendental deduction to 
explicate the empirical domain, he does not account for the mode of  awareness required to access the a 
priori domain. Such an awareness is required if  the a priori, or any other epistemological, ontological, 
or even metaphysical claims are to become legitimate. Anyone making such claims will also have to 
show the manner in which they are accessible to awareness. Only such awareness will be able to 
decipher what is essential in each claim. This is one major venture that faces phenomenological work.
    Given this state of  affairs, first contention concerning the lack of  attention to Being is grounded on 
an initial insight that the entire tradition had hidden the meaning of  Being through metaphysics and 
hence it is the task of  hermeneutics to secure access to it.  But this is precisely Husserl’s point: one 
assumes an awareness of  the concealed status of  Being’s meaning prior to the demand for 
hermeneutical method. This is a transcendental insight into an eidetic invariant that is seen as a ground 
of  all Western metaphysics.  While the explication of  this invariant has been accomplished, the modes 
of  awareness correlating to it is the task of  Husserlian phenomenology. Another task, following the 
question of  Being is the notion that as being in the world, the human is bound by his situation, history, 
facticity, temporality, etc. which must equally assume a status of  transcendentally accessible eidetic 
invariant that transcends any situation, history and temporality. After all, the claim is made that in 
principle all humans live within this invariant and thus becomes unbound from factual contexts. Only 
transcendental phenomenology is in a position to explicate all sorts of  variants while maintaining the 
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eidetic invariant as a correlate of  direct awareness. The domain of  this awareness is still outstanding for 
phenomenological research. Similar tasks are involved in the claims that Husserlian phenomenology 
cannot have access to retended past, because it assumes presence as if  it were the sole given to 
awareness. This claim assumes an ontological, sequential notion of  time with points following one 
another. Yet this claim does not include the exposition of  awareness of  such a time such that past-
present-future is not given one after another, but is present as a total field of  mutual differentiations. It 
is precisely the transcendental time awareness that allows the co-presence of  the three phases as 
transparent one through the other in their differences. Indeed, the deconstructive notion of  difference 
assumes this time awareness as its unstated ground.  Once again, the future task of  Husserlian 
phenomenology opens up with precise research into time awareness at this level of  transparency.
    Husserlian phenomenology has to concern itself  with various other major themes: philosophical 
anthropology, civilizational-cultural studies in the context of  life world problematic, history, sciences 
and world horizon. Philosophical anthropology is called for by modern philosophical, cultural, and 
historical relativity. Within the latter, two claims have been preeminent: (a) different cultures, historical 
periods and societies offer various, and even clashing interpretations of  human beings. It was 
mentioned above that Husserlian phenomenology was accused of  being bound by Western prejudices 
and hence could not deal with other cultural worlds, (b) modern scientific and technological thinking 
offers the means to “make” the human into something “new” or even radically different from what has 
been previously considered to be the case. Phenomenology has to explicate such views and proposed 
transformations of  the human in order to disclose a tacit “essence” at least as far as awareness is 
concerned, that allows the different views to be of  a presupposed invariant human. Without the latter 
no sense could be made of  the claim that what humans are depends on cultural, historical, social and 
even technical definitions and constructs. All these constructs seem to be different from one another.  
Yet simple differences would allow only the claim that at different times and in different places there 
were descriptively different creatures resulting in a catalogue of  various depictions differing one from 
the others. Yet even those who claim that there are radical differences in cultures, societies and 
histories, still insist in using the phrase “different interpretations of  what it means to be human.” 
    Husserlian phenomenology must be at the forefront of  phenomenological philosophy insofar as 
various new trends in research make awareness their point of  departure. For example, there is a 
temptation to point to cognitive psychology as if  it were scientific affirmation of  phenomenology. Such 
a psychology is both empiricistic and speculative. Neither empiricism, emphasizing contingency of  all 
facts, nor speculative rationalism, stressing conceptuality and universal necessity, are adequate to 
account for human concrete awareness. The former, with its “internal faculties” as psychological facts 
cannot account for the continuity and unity of  experience. The latter can account neither for the unity 
of  experience without positing the “I think” accompanying all representations, nor for individuality 
wherein such representations could be attributed as “mine.” In terms of  philosophical anthropology, 
for empiricism the human would be a “factum brutum,” while for rationalism, the factual human would 
be an instance of  a universal concept. Hence another task of  Husserlian phenomenology consists of  
precise delimitation of  what comprises an individual experience without it becoming solipsistic. Here 
the prospects for intersubjective awareness and dialogical phenomenology is an open field for research 
and philosophical grounding without reverting to transcendental idealism. At this level some of  the 
Husserlian inadequacies will have to be admitted, above all the concept of  “intentionality” that 
correlates to any objectivity but cannot account for the world horizon.
    Husserlian phenomenology is in an excellent position to investigate the pragmatic domain that has 
been alluded to, but never concretely disclosed, by “reconstructive pragmatism” and even the critical 
school. Here the researches into the domain of  the primacy of  “I can” or “I cannot” perform 
something, build and make are most suggestive.  This domain opens the concrete architectonic of  
social life in action. Intersubjectivity is primarily formed at the level of  bodily abilities such that we 
recognize ourselves and others on the basis of  activities. The latter, in turn, are not arbitrary, but are in 
correlation to things that make their objective demands on such activities. This means that the world is 
not in doubt and is not our construct. Being Euclidean beings, we must move around and not through 
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things. Yet this claim must not be confused with any kind of  realism or naturalism. The natural 
presence of  the world still requires an explication of  the processes of  awareness that are structurally 
distinct from the composition of  things. Here Husserl opens up the unexplored understanding of  
corporeal activities in their essential generality that ground analogization and even technology as an 
extension of  bodily abilities.
    This level of  primal awareness also opens up horizons founded on the “I can.” One may be aware 
that in one’s own region there are hills, and more hills, but the horizon does not close; it is possible that 
beyond the hills there are deserts, lakes, flatlands, forests, cities, and strangers who “do things 
differently.” This horizon extends into indefinite possibilities which I can concretize by going from my 
region to that region “then” and discover whether my intentional orientation toward the “that and 
then” region say, as a possible desert, is concretized or disappointed. I expected a desert and there 
appeared a lake. It needs to be said that at the level of  movement formation of  horizons of  awareness 
there is a shift from direct perceptual fulfillment to an open world horizon of  possibilities that can only 
be concretized in direct awareness partially. Hence, the more in this awareness is “consciousness” that 
suggests perceptual fulfillability, but at the same time is experienced as a transcendental condition for 
the experience of  the world as totality, although never completely accessible to a singular subject in her 
engagements with the world. This leads to phenomenological explication of  theoretical and 
experimental sciences which, in their practice of  forming hypotheses open possibilities some of  which 
will be fulfilled in awareness and some of  which will remain empty, although available for future 
fulfillment. Sciences could not function without such a horizon consciousness.
    Historical awareness is a horizon of  past achievements of  others and how current inhabitants of  the 
life world appropriate and vary such achievements. At this level a question concerning our experience 
of  historical past arises. The task is to replace Hegelian dialectics, Marxian materialism, and empirical 
research. None can travel to the past, except symbolically, and none can account for such would be 
symbolic understanding. Apart from that, these metaphysical “accounts” of  history assume a 
continuous theoretical time and have not offered any justification for such a continuity.   In this sense, 
we cannot think of  history as if  it were a succession of  events “in time” as if  ruled by causes, or a 
deduction from “eternity,” such as “laws of  dialectics” either of  Hegelian or Marxian brand. Rather, 
history is an active engagement of  making and building, of  concrete projects based on what we can do 
and what others have done. What they have done is present to us in architecture, texts that signify the 
world in a particular way and reveal that we too could have acted and performed similar tasks, but we 
no longer do them in this way. We have acquired different abilities and hence have no necessary 
continuity with our predecessors. The discontinuity does not imply that we are not open to the 
understanding of  how they made things, what purposes are present in their buildings, implements and 
comportment. We may learn some abilities from what they did, but also vary them in order to perform 
our tasks. As was the case with the horizon of  awareness, history comprises a horizon of  what others 
have accomplished, thus extending our own horizon to the possibility of  transforming and varying our 
own abilities. This means that the historical others extend my perception and abilities thus forming a 
poli-centric field of  understanding. Our own perceptions would be quite limited without the others 
from whom we “borrow” perceptions and abilities and thus recognize our limitations and possibilities. 
And indeed are open to the future. This view prevents to speak of  a singular historical aim. Some tasks 
are completed and discontinued, the accomplishments abandoned; others are taken up in part after the 
builders and makers have long since disappeared, and still others are postponed for the future. The 
historical horizon of  possibilities cannot be concretized in totality and hence this openness precludes 
any claim to history as having a singular purpose. The prospect of  rethinking history that does not rely 
on contingency nor does it imply necessity is still outstanding.
    There is another level of  historical awareness that has to be investigated:  transcendental. This type 
of  awareness comprises a way to access the modes of  perception that others assumed in their 
understanding of  the world. Thus, while we may not have any knowledge of  Aristotle’s psychological, 
social, political and personal life, we can say, from his writings, that Aristotle regarded the world as 
composed of  substances. Each substance could be regarded under specific categories accessible to 
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Aristotle as well as us. In this sense, historical awareness of  others is not regarded psychologically or 
internally, but as a mode of  awareness that comprises transcendental orientation toward the world 
accessible to anyone.  Even when we disagree with Aristotle or Plato, we also must be aware of  the way 
Plato or Aristotle regarded the world. This type of  awareness is already intersubjective and is a 
condition for the claim that our own awareness is limited and in turn extended through others. We can 
“borrow” Aristotle’s mode of  awareness and enhance our own. Once again, we comprise a field of  
poli-centric awareness that has historical depth prior to specific temporal locations. From this vantage 
point we can avoid various theoretical dilemmas. If  some social philosophy claims that all social life, 
including theoretical thinking, is a result of  material conditions, then previous historical views would 
not be accessible to us, since we do not live under those conditions. In turn, the very view that all 
theories are based on given material conditions is itself  one theory that reflects current material 
conditions and cannot make a universal claim.  The same holds for theories of  history that are 
premised on the notion that history is a contingent fact and all necessary truths, even in logic, are a 
result of  “historical development.”  A contingent fact cannot be posited as a ground of  necessity. 
    Finally, there is a question whether there is a presumed one life world as a ground of  various 
societies and cultures, or do such societies and cultures comprise distinct and, at times, incompatible life 
worlds. If  there were one life world, and we were completely immersed in it, then we would not 
recognize our immersion. If  there were more than one, then we would either belong to one or another 
and thus would interpret the other in terms of  our own and hence fail to recognize the distinction 
between them. If  we can access both, then we cannot belong to either and must have an awareness of  
both and their differences. This awareness is taken for granted in all such comparative studies of  
cultures and civilizations. The prospects for Husserlian phenomenology in this domain are vast, since 
the current cultural researches are at a loss concerning what methodology is appropriate and whether 
the current approaches are, in fact, bound by specific cultural prejudgments. The very notion of  
comparative cultures, as it relates to the issue of  life world(s) requires a level of  awareness that includes 
itself  as its own methodological condition. The awareness that engages in comparisons must open the 
possibilities of  accessing the others in terms of  their awareness in order to note similarities, identities 





Husserl and the Being of  Time
Anna-Lena Renqvist
In his investigations on the intricate relation between time and consciousness from1907-08, Husserl 
proposes a conception of  time in which the “now” –in line with the Aristotelian analysis of  time – is 
the fundamental category. Time is thought of  as something rooted in the the original object of  
consciousness –  the object of  perception –  since, as it is percieved, will always be presently percieved, 
that is, percieved in a “now”. As Husserl says: “perception (Wharnemung) constitutes the now”. (1) 
Being in time is being percieved, and vice versa, because being percieved is being present, and being 
present is a temporal quality. 
     Due to the significance attrubuted to the perceptive act within the phenomenological project – 
“consciousness is nothing without an impression” (2) – the investigations will subsequently be circling 
around a clarification of  the nature of  this “now”. With Husserls own words, “all objectivation takes 
place in time-consciousness, and no clarification of  the identity of  an Object in time can be given 
without a clarification of  the identity of  temporal position.” (3) As opposed to the Aristotelian physics, 
and more in line with the Agustinian approach, the called for identity of  the temporal position will 
henceforth (by art of  memory as “retention”) be understood in terms of  temporal extention, of  
duration. It will furthermore be of  such a kind that it stands forth as a quality inherent in the percieved 
object itslef; or with Husserl, “duration is before us as a mode of  objectivity”. (4) This means that even 
though the “now”, in one sense, is subordinated to the law of  constant modification – known as the 
flux of  time – it can also appear as objectively the same (due to the continuity of  apprehension). (5)     
    Ten years later the Husserls investigations have taken on a slightly different course. When they reach 
us in the Bernauer Manuscripte (1917-18), the focus is placed upon the underlying conditions of  
possibility of  what is presently percieved in such a way that it indicates a former time. (6) As Husserl 
puts it: “How are we to understand the conditions of  possibility of  perception of  an immanent object 
in general. (7) When the object is percieved, it is obviously percieved in a constituting process, and here 
it is (esse est percipi). But must it not also be without being thus percieved? (8) 
   In as far a this pre-intentional object is a constitutional part prior to the constituted Cogito, the 
question arises as to the eventual time of  that which is prior: is it to be considered a timeless stratum of  
the ego, prior only in a material or logical sense, or is it to be considered prior in the sense of  time? (9) 
If  the “prior” is to be understood in terms of  time, we would be witnessing a sliding operation such 
that the fundamental category of  time may no longer be understood as the present dimension but 
rather as the past. 
   The question of  time and time consciousness stands forth as a key question, and will so remain. 
Husserl never finds the conclusive answer regarding the intricate nature of  time, of  its relation to 
consciousness and to the genesis of  its object, though in his search for clarification he brings us 
insights of  a lasting kind, inspiring and illuminating. In order to get an idea of  the profundity of  the 
issue at stake, I would like to repass some of  its clue remarks as they appear in the BM, and to interpret 
them in the light of  a similar proposal, posthumely elaborated some 75 years before Husserls own 
intent, in the doctrine of  time of  F.W.J.Schelling.
   Is there such a thing as a non conscious (unbewusste) perception (Vorstellung)? Is there such a thing 
as a life of  the I (Ichleben), which is not itself  conscious, or even that is not itself  perceived? (10) In the 
BM, Husserl formulates the hypothesis of  an original process (Urprozess) of  such a kind that it is, in 
principal, percievable even though it is not actually percieved. Herupon follows the disitinction between 
perceptions that can be conceptionally grasped, and perceptions that can not. (11) And, as Husserl 
observes, does not an original process necessarily belong to every perception as a process that 
constitutes the givenness of  the temporal object (Zeitgegenstände) but is not itself  percieved? As a matter 
of  fact, is not the constituted object quite unthinkable without the being of  this constitution (Sein der 
Konstitution) which, as such, would be prior to the object thus constituted? In other words, does not 
every grasping conception (Erfassen) presuppose a former (Vorgängiges)  non-grasping percieving 
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(Wharnemen ohne Erfassen)?  Doubtless! (12) 
    Within the framwork of  phenomenology, where it would be correct to speak of  “constitution” (of  
intentional objects) only in a following reflection over the original process, it seems inadmissible to 
understand the original process as a constitutional process of  timeobjects (13) and, so, to consider it as 
a kind of  intentional consciousness. But then again, when we pay attention to the way in which it is 
given (die Gegegenheitsweisen desselbe), this line (Reihe) is a temporal line. (14) As Husserl says: “Must 
not these Lebensreihen, in some sense or another, remain either we pay attention to them or we do 
not? In other words, does not the process remain (verharrt) in its time?” (15) If  the latter is the case, we 
would have to admit something prior to the reflection of  the first stage (erster Stufe) of  immanent 
experience, understood in terms of  an unconscious process as a series (Urfolge) of  ‘hyletic’ moments 
which, again, would not themselves have the structure of  a “consciousness-of ”. (16) Given that the 
field assigned to the phenomenological investigation is precisely the objects of  consiousness, this would 
suggest, furthermore, two quite different orientations within the transcendental reflection: the one that 
turns to the constituting stream, and the one that turns to the constituted line of  events. (17) But – as 
Husserl exclaims – is it really possible for the immanent events (Ereinisse) to be (to have being) through 
a constitution based on a comprehension (Auffassung) of  a mere potential kind? (18) The confusion 
thus expressed, which runs through the BM, is linked to the presumptive independence of  such an 
original process, that is, understood as an autonomous stage within the selfsame intentional 
consciousness.  Such an admission would threaten the very bases of  phenomenology: that the object is 
what it is through an act of  consciousness. The question of  whether the relation between the original 
process  and the temporal events (Ereignis) is a matter of  a constituting relation. 
(Konstitutionszusammanhang) (19) remains a question that will never be completely solved. 
  According to the Husserlian postulate that the constitution of  an (intentional) temporal object is due 
to an act, and given that the power to act is a function exsclusively found in consciousness, or that it is 
originated in the “ego based conception” (”ichlichen Erfassung”) as an act of  reflection, (20) the question 
of  the constitutive function of  the pre-consious original process turns out to be a semi-question as 
much as a key one. At the same time as the independent and intentional character of  the original 
process must be denied, the original process itself  cannot be denied. Any alternative determination of  
the original process remains hopelessly entangeled with the problem of  the consciousness here 
involved. Because how is this prior („Voraussetzen“) to be understood if  not in terms related to 
consiousness? As Husserl puts it in a marginal note: On the one hand the impression (Auffassen) is not 
to be considered an art of  Attention (Aufmerksamheit), yet on the other hand it is “a spontaneous act 
of  the I” (Spontaneität des Ich). (21) Or as he goes on clarifying: What would the existence of  an event as 
time event (Ereginisses als Zeitereignis) mean “vor der Zuwendung und eigentlichen Konstitution”? Nothing else 
than the ideal possibility for the I to exercise its spontaneous functions, based, that is, on the original 
process prior to the objectivation (auf  Grund des der Objektivation vorauslegenden Urprozessus, bwz. In der  
Wiedererinnerung). (22)
   A suggestive complement to the Husserlian ambivalence regarding the temporality of  the original 
process is found within the so-called “real- idealism” elaborated by the German philosopher Schelling 
(1775-1854). Well rooted as he was in the idealist tradition, Schelling shares the husserlian point of  
departure. The beginning of  knowledge is to be found in an act of  consciousness, and this act has a 
“before” of  a generically different kind. What is brought to knowledge through a reflective act, is 
bound to have a pre-conscius material or, with Husserl, its hyletic stratum. They furthermore coincide 
in the idea that this something (=x) prior to consciousness may not be constituted as such until grasped 
in reflection, through the reflective act.    
   The difference between these two, in many ways closely related, German philosophers, in my view 
illuminating, is to be found in the place – and time – assigned to the act in question. While acording to 
Husserls thinking, this place is a reflective act, in Schellings philosophy it is a pre-reflective act; an act, 
that is, apt to offer what Husserl is searching for and can not find: a “Halt” in the stream of  
“unconconsiouss life-moments” through which the “Uremfindungsdatum” could be given to 
apperception. (23) In other words, both Husserl and Schelling presuppose the hyletic process in terms 
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of  what is potentially (not actually) as a “nacheinander” or a flow – all according to Aristotelian 
dynamics – and both of  them claim the reflective act as the beginning of  knowledge, but while Husserl 
thinks of  this step as an immediate step leading from what is potentially knowable to the reflective act, 
Schelling proposes an intermedium, a metaxy in the form of  a pre-reflective actualisation.
     In Schellings conception of  the dynamics underlying the reflective act, we have not one but two 
stages: on the one hand we have the hyletic “urprozess” in terms of  what is potentially – as a non-
constituted, though potential “being”, with its lack of  unity and identity –, on the other hand we have 
the actualisation of  this scattered, manifold  being as a unified, selfidentical all. In the philosophy of  
Schelling, this all is understood by way of  the old image, reintroduced in modern philosophy by 
Spinoza and operating as a key concept within the romantic and german idealistic tradition, “hen kai 
pan”, one and all.
    The prereflective act is an all inclusive act in the precise sense that it includes the subject and the 
object. Since there is nothing – no subject and no consciousness – outside this relation, there is no eye 
in which this unity could be reflected, thus differentiated and judged (teilen, “ur-tailen”). As a matter of  
fact, in this act we have the genesis, the conception or creation of  two things: of  the consciousness 
itself  (and the consious self) in the precise sense of  a becomming conscious (here Bewusst-sein is 
above all Bewusst-werden), and of  the object (Gegenstand) in relation to which this consciousness stands 
forth. 
    This pre-reflective, all-inclusive act offers the material for – a later – differential act proper to 
reflection; here we find the unity on the basis of  which knowledge is possible and scientific system 
could be edified.
     As for the question at stake: time and the constitution of  time, Schelling and Husserl coincide in as 
far as they consider the act of  consciousness as the outcome of  a process prior to the act itself; either it 
would be called an original process, an original life or a pre-history which, moreover, is not yet as such. 
It is not, nor could not be as such, since it is not yet constituted. Though according to Schelling, and as 
opposed to Husserl, it could become constituted as what it was. In other words, it is surly not 
constituted in its own potential time, though through the act, afterwords so tho speak, it may become 
what it was and remain what it is: a potential time in the key of  the past.
    My proposal is that this very intuition is present within Husserls own work., at the same time as he is 
forbidden to draw the conclusion of  his own insights. Due to the postulate of  the cartesian cogito, of  
the “absolute consiousness” and the “identical, “über-zeitliche” I, Husserl can not admit a time that is 
not conscious time, and with that he lacks the categories to think an original life (Urleben) in terms of  
temporal life, or of  such a kind that it would bring temporal objectivity into consiousness. (24) 
Meanwhile he is well aware that the intentional object requires a pre-conscious “stratum” which is – in 
some way or another – before the constitution of  the object in consiousness and, in so far as “before” 
is a temporal quality, it is also due to be considered, in one way or another, as a timly event.
   Given Husserl’s many references to such a time he leaves us with the inspiring target to develop a 
phenomenology of  time based on Husserl’s own writings which would not, necessarily, coincide with 
the conclusions drawn by Husserl himself. As he himself  shows us: If  we consider a process which 
itself  is unpercievable (unwahrgenommenr), a perception of  it must still be thinkable (according to the 
principle that everything that is, have its origial possible apperception, its possible “Wahrnehmung”). 
Furthermore, this latter process must be a new kind process, different from the one appercieved”. (25) 
Notes
(1) E. Husserl, The Phenomenology of  Internal Time Consciousness, 1905 – 10 82.
(2) Ibid. 131.
(3) Ibid.  88.
(4) Ibid. 90.
(5) Ibid. 89.
(6) Already in the earlier work this problem is announced in relation to tha absoluta consiousness. How 
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is the Wesensbestimmung of  the “absolut” consiousness as “urprozesses” to be understood relation to 
the therin known (bewussten) “immanenten Zeitgegenständen” or “Ereignissen”? (See BM XXXVI).
(7) Bernauer Manuscripte, 1917-18, 191.
(8) Ibid. 191.
(9) In the last case it is bound to have a time quality of  its own – and in that case it will put into 
question that the foundation of  time is to be found in the “presentification” of  the thing perceived. It 
is not coherent with the decribtion, or the view, of  the subject as the absolute: “an absolute timeless 
subject”. 
(10)  Ibid. 205, note 1.
(11)  Ibid. 191.
(12)  Ibid. 191.
(13)  Ibid. 203.
(14)  Ibid. 196.
(15)  Ibid. 204.
(16)  Ibid. 200.
(17)  Ibid. 262.
(18)  Ibid. 200.
(19) To put it otherwise: does the Ereignisse in the original process, understood as an (immanent) 
object, really reach (gelanen) the Abhebung und Erfassung? (See text 10 and 11).
(20) The Aufmerksamkeitsstrahl ist Richtung des Ich auf  den Gegenstand und setzt hier das 
Gegenwartsbewusststein voraus. (BM, p. 255).




(25) Ibid. 206. 
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The Future of  Phenomenology: Applications
Lanei Rodemeyer
We are finally now seeing attempts to bridge the philosophical divide that began somewhat around 
Husserl’s time. Interestingly, the moves to span the chasm between what are usually called “continental” 
and “analytic” philosophy often hearken back to the works of  Husserl. And this, I think, is neither a 
mistake nor a matter of  happenstance.  Husserl’s phenomenology, by its very nature, is an attempt to 
bring opposing philosophical positions together, for the very reason that it is meant to be applied. The 
phenomenological method is an approach that blends both theory and praxis, demanding both highly 
rigorous abstract thought and an acute awareness of  the philosopher’s embedded existence in the 
lifeworld. For this reason, it makes sense that, as the philosophical world attempts to repair its own 
internal schism, we would look very carefully at, and employ, Husserl’s philosophy.
    But it is easy for one to claim that Husserl’s work might provide the antidote to philosophy’s current 
rift. Instead, in the true spirit of  Husserl’s phenomenology, I wish briefly to examine his body of  work 
for evidence that it has always already been involved in both maintaining and resolving philosophical 
tensions. Some of  this evidence will clearly be obvious to my colleagues in Husserlian phenomenology, 
and some may simply be my own, situated interpretations. But I believe that, as we look to the future 
of  Husserl’s phenomenology, a systematic approach that lays out the flow of  phenomenology as an 
active methodology will also highlight for us where this stream is taking us—and where we can take it.
Modernism and Postmodernism
    It is my firm belief  that Husserl opened the door to the postmodern movement, although he 
himself  did not step through. Husserl’s work, especially in Ideas I, provides descriptions and arguments 
that sustain both the groundedness of  essential structures and the multiplicity and relativity of  
appearances.  On the one hand, the object of  our perception is always given—and taken—as the same 
thing. On the other hand, though, Husserl’s very description of  the noema gives us the radical 
philosophical insight that this object is also consistently and necessarily given in varying modes of  
givenness. Thus we have, in the same object, both a stable core and a necessarily fleeting nature. 
Likewise, the essential structures of  consciousness—Husserl’s primary goal of  investigation in Ideas I, 
the details of  which, however, are laid out in his On the Phenomenology of  the Consciousness of  
Internal Time—maintain a similar tension:  The forms of  temporalizing consciousness, i.e., the living 
present with its primordial impression, retention, and protention, are essential structures of  
consciousness that remain ever constant. Meanwhile, however, the contents of  conscious experience 
(which, in a way, are the conditions of  possibility for these structures’ existence—although this could 
be debated, as Husserl himself  made problematic claims in this regard), are by definition continually 
passing away. Consciousness itself, therefore, is necessarily both a stable force and a flowing away, a 
standing and streaming. These fundamental definitions for phenomenology, therefore, exhibit both the 
essentialism of  modern philosophy and the relativism of  postmodernism. And not only that, but they 
require that these two philosophical paradigms, which seem anathema to one another, work together to 
describe our existence phenomenologically.
“Nature” and “Discourse”
    Strains of  this debate can be seen not only in the differences between modernism and 
postmodernism, but also in the attitudes of  analytic versus continental philosophers. For the layperson, 
it appears to be what distinguishes the sciences from the humanities. This discussion plays out in an 
extremely pertinent way, I believe, in the area of  the philosophy of  the body. On the one hand, we have 
a presumption of  the body as material, and subsequently, consciousness is only a physiological by-
product upon which we humans have laid too much value. On the other hand, the body is seen as 
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constituted by language itself, appearing only through the discourses that make it possible. The body, 
for example, could only be seen as “sexed” once the discourse of  sexuality arose, and it is only through 
discourse that it is further “raced,” “gendered,” etc. It would seem that these two paradigms are 
antithetical, to say the least, but Husserl’s phenomenology makes possible their coexistence. In his Ideas 
II, Husserl argues carefully for two manifestations of  the body: The first is the body’s inner sense, 
which identifies the senses of  the body as immanent to my consciousness, and as not perceivable by 
anyone else. Thus he validates my experiences of  pain, pleasure, and all of  the senses, identifying them 
as viable material for phenomenological investigation.  The second manifestation of  the body is as a 
physicalistic thing, an object perceivable not only by myself  (at certain, limited angles) but also by 
others. This second manifestation gives us the object of  the sciences and the subject of  discourse—and 
it is this body which finds itself  in the philosophical (and scientific) debate. Husserl’s insight, however, 
of  the body as both inner sense and physicalistic thing, mediates this dialogue: The body both is 
constituted through worldly and social engagement, and it (usually) is associated with a sense of  
“ownness,” i.e., it is individual to me. And it has a “voice” that arises from its “inner sense,” I believe, 
that can, to some extent, influence the discourses that surround it.
Philosophy and Psychology
    As has been well established, phenomenology provides a valid critique of  a psychology that tries to 
answer all its questions through a scientific method limited to the physical realm. While we certainly can 
do tests of  our responses to stimuli or the effects of  various influences on our cognitive abilities, it is 
clear that we are driven by more than our mere physiological structures, and a science that includes a 
discussion of  intentionality is able to address those questions that exceed what biology can answer. 
From this phenomenological perspective, we can talk about the “motivations” of  an intending 
consciousness, and how the meaning of  a perceived object is essentially involved in its constitution. 
Husserl introduced the notion of  motivations from a phenomenological perspective in his Ideas II, but 
he addressed these and several other key notions in his Analyses Concerning Passive and Active 
Synthesis and even in the Cartesian Meditations. For example, since we cannot intend anything but 
noemata, i.e., we can only intend meanings, then psychology needs to allow for our activity of  
constitution in our perceptions, and from there, we can examine how and why we make the 
“associations” we do. Husserl analyzed associations carefully in his Passive Syntheses, and, interestingly, 
this led to his introduction of  the notion of  “affectivity,” which describes how we can be called by an 
object to bring it into the foreground of  our perception. Tied in with these discussions are Husserl’s 
notions of  “habitualization” and “sedimentation,” which also arise in the Cartesian Meditations. Here 
we can describe how repeated behaviors, both in our thought processes and in our kinesthetic 
movement, become part of  embodied consciousness, even when we are not directly aware of  them, or 
how individual, meaningful events can remain central to consciousness. All of  these, of  course, tie into 
Husserl’s understanding of  the structures of  temporalizing consciousness.  And thus, a psychology that 
includes a phenomenological model of  consciousness, or at least attends to how consciousness 
constitutes its objects—and its temporal existence—is able to address a broader set of  questions while 
still remaining linked to a physiological science.
Philosophy and the Sciences
    Husserl’s Ideas II offers us a brilliant distinction between the different “attitudes” that the scientist—
now understood in the broadest sense possible—can maintain, and he provides us the insight that, 
depending on the attitude held at the time, we may draw completely conflicting conclusions. These 
conclusions, however, are usually directed at very different goals, goals identified by their attitude.  Thus 
the naturalistic (physicalistic) attitude will conclude that the material body is required as the condition 
of  possibility for consciousness, a logical conclusion based on a position that examines the physical and 
causal interrelations of  bodies in the world. On the other hand, the phenomenological attitude 
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identifies consciousness as the condition for the possibility for the world as the whole of  meaning for 
consciousness. The personalistic attitude, similar to the natural attitude we learn about in Ideas I, is our 
everyday relation with the world that makes possible the above more theoretical and focused attitudes. 
In this way, Husserl validates both the scientific and phenomenological paradigms and gives them a way 
to negotiate—not on one turf  or the other—but on the ground of  our everyday dealings. But Husserl’s 
claims about the sciences are more popularly known through his analyses in his Crisis of  European 
Sciences. Mathematics can answer a multitude of  questions, he admits, but if  we try to make the lived 
world as abstract and calculable as formulas of  mathematics, then we miss the most fundamental 
aspects of  experience, and further, we do bad science. His argument, once again, is not to rip 
mathematics from the sciences, but rather to recognize its value—and its limits. His warnings have 
slowly crept into the studies of  nursing, psychology, even medicine, in spite of  Husserl’s honest 
recognition in the Cartesian Meditations that the sciences weren’t exactly leaping over themselves to 
heed a phenomenologist’s analysis. Nevertheless, Husserl provides an avenue where philosophy and 
science can enter into dialogue, where philosophy becomes practical and science is called to be more 
self-critical.
    I have clearly left out a multitude of  references here. Included in these musings are implicit 
indications to the works of  Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, de Beauvoir, Derrida, Foucault, and man
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The Future of  Husserlian Phenomenology
Biagio Tassone
In attempting to restore a notion of  genuine science (Wissenschaft) centre stage to the philosophical 
program, Husserl was following a deep-seated impulse of  the Western metaphysical tradition.  Since 
long before the systems of  Plato and Aristotle philosophers have sought to explain the world through 
necessary concepts or principles. Husserl’s phenomenology took up this very challenge and attempted 
to push the intellectualist impulse of  Western thought to its farthest extreme.  Although, ultimately, I 
think Husserl’s attempted transformation of  philosophy into a strict and rigorous science must be 
deemed a failure, the important point is not that a scientific philosophy is impossible but rather that 
there are real lessons to be learnt from its unfeasibility.  As it seems currently fashionable to disparage 
the quest for ultimate foundations for knowledge or any kind of  essentialism, nonetheless, Husserlian 
phenomenology may gain in credibility upon realization of  the salubrious proposition that it is not at 
all clear how intellectual movements based on principles that move away from truth (at least as a 
transcendent ideal) and from metaphysics in general will leave us with any lasting intellectual 
satisfaction or remove and mitigate the human need for cognitive transcendence. In order to 
understand what propels the above Husserlian phenomenology can provide considerable insight.
This is because Husserlian phenomenology can help to shed light on what we can label, “the problem 
of  cognitive transcendence;” indeed the basic starting point of  transcendental phenomenology is 
nothing less than what Husserl himself  called: “the riddle of  transcendence”. (1) In what follows 
therefore we must attempt to explore and provisionally defend Husserl’s unique contribution to 
philosophical practice: the transcendental phenomenological reduction. The reduction and epoché (that 
leads to it) as Husserl’s self-proclaimed greatest achievements should naturally be viewed as of  central 
importance to any evaluation of  the continuing worth of  Husserlian phenomenology.  As a mode of  
attending to the “eidos,” (the essential properties of  reality) and establishing an ultimate ground for 
their explication, i.e., transcendental subjectivity, the phenomenological reduction is important not so 
much for how Husserl formulates it as for what motivates him to do so. (2) Edward Marbach is 
certainly correct when he claims that: “[t]he distinction between sciences of  fact and sciences of  
essence, which constantly reappears in Husserl’s general deliberations on the theory of  science, is 
rooted in his doubtlessly “Platonically inspired” conception of  the relationship between facts and 
essences”. (3) In Husserl’s case this Platonic conception of  science gets radicalized as the ultimate 
essential insights are claimed not to be of  timeless forms participating in being but rather into the 
ground of  all appearances as they manifest themselves (the self-mundinization of  the omni-temporal, 
self-constituting, inter-subjective flux of  experience, later called the “life-world”).  Husserl’s thought 
dealt persistently with this relation of  consciousness to world and more specifically with the 
constitution of  both meaning and objective knowledge in the intentional correlation of  subjectivity to 
transcendent objects. 
  Intentional analysis begins with the relational structure of  consciousness, which Husserl also viewed 
as the ultimate source of  Evidenz for cognitive transcendence within immanence. This transcendence is 
precisely what the reflective thematization of  consciousness in the reduction was supposed to make 
intelligible. The givenness of  objects to consciousness can be explored naturalistically; (4) Brentano’s 
original reintroduction of  the problem of  intentionality was not opposed to such a treatment. 
However, as a transcendental philosophy, Husserlian phenomenology is ultimately interested in the 
possibility conditions and foundations for justified knowledge (what Kant called the quid juris of  our 
knowledge); not factual, empirical, descriptions of  psychological processes.  Can this approach still be 
of  significance for contemporary thought? 
  At this point let us reflect that modern cognitive science is currently very far from able to account for 
all the properties of  what makes consciousness intrinsically self-aware or provide any purely physicalist 
model to which consciousness can be reduced.      Subsequently, some analytic philosophers are 
becoming interested in the irreducible and non-objectifiable aspects of  the first-person perspective 
153
which consciousness provides and are also taking very seriously the possible role that this elusive aspect 
of  mental life may provide in accounting for anything remotely approaching a complete account of  our 
place in the world and [the totality of] our knowledge. (5) It goes without saying that Husserl’s 
phenomenology is an excellent candidate to contribute to this contemporary debate. As we have stated 
above, the relational essence of  consciousness (its intentionality) is explored by Husserl under the 
aspect of  a transcendental reduction to its essential structures on the model of  a noetic-noematic 
correlation of  intended objects in a horizontal manifold.  These intended objects can be directly 
experienced (as emptily intended) or seen as possessing a further potential, i.e., that of  being intuitively 
given. The mode of  givenness with or without evidence, within their horizons, is the ultimate ground 
upon which, for Husserl, ontological questions are formulated. These insights, which were the fruits of  
Husserl’s phenomenological intentional analyses, also lead to many still relevant studies on the nature 
of  internal time consciousness. (6) The popular, static conception of  Husserl’s phenomenology, 
therefore, betrays (as many contemporary studies have made explicit) the actual sophistication of  his 
methodology and the viability of  his phenomenological epistemology. (7) 
    In effect, within Husserlian thought we are presented with an elaborate reformulation of  earlier 
representationalist models of  perception and cognition. The sense datum theories of  mental life, 
postulating transcendent “objects” (somehow) out there beyond our immediate awareness and entering 
into consciousness [the latter viewed as a private inner space] is not the Husserlian model of  cognition.  
As a non-natural phenomenon, Husserl views consciousness as incapable of  spatial extension, and, 
therefore, unable to be reduced into a causal relationship with natural entities. Husserl’s intuitive 
method on the one hand expands on an earlier modernist, Cartesian project of  absolute enquiry and 
the subsequent status of  philosophy as a foundational (rigorous) science however this balanced, on the 
other hand, by Husserl’s transcendental Kantian project of  securing an ultimate epistemic ground in 
experience. In effect, Husserl reformulates Kant’s idealism as a teleological metaphysics of  inter-
subjectivity. Furthermore, building on the (originally) Kantian project of  transcendental idealism, 
Husserlian phenomenology helps to clarify Kant’s ambiguous transcendental deduction (8) 
    The above accomplishments aside, however, we gain a first intimation into why Husserl’s project is 
problematic when we investigate his methodological strategy in detail. The relation that is characteristic 
of  the intentionality of  consciousness to the worldly structures it manifests, as Levinas has pointed out, 
leads Husserl to a new conception of  being. (9) The phenomenological conception of  being is nothing 
less than a determination of  all being by the transcendental structures of  conscious life.  This relational 
structure of  being –said by Husserl to be constituted ultimately by a multiplicity of  intersubjective 
monads in the “life-world”- is supposed to disclose (in immediate intuitive fullness) the structures of  
transcendental subjectivity but breaks down both conceptually and metaphysically when we inquire into 
the ultimate ground for the intentional relation of  transcendental (inter-) subjectivity to world itself.  
The ground for the being of  intentionality must be a more general being, and must be conceived as 
existing beyond the being of  any singular ontic terms even as they are presented in the reduction. (10) 
The evidentially disclosed ground for beings (the noetic-noematic correlation precisely as it is disclosed 
within the transcendental phenomenological reduction) can never be intuitively given in the way a 
proper ground or foundation, in accordance with Husserl’s own theory, should be. The transcendental 
ego, as the consciousness within which all objectivity is constituted and upon which experience of  all 
temporality and thus of  constitutive analysis itself  is founded cannot be made explicit to subjectivity. 
(11) Husserlian phenomenology therefore is revealed to have certain limitations inherent to it within its 
own conceptual framework. 
    While some may take the above conclusions as a confirmation that Husserlian phenomenology is a 
relic from the past and of  (at best) merely historical interest, it is the present writer’s contention that 
Husserl’s thought, with its philosophically rich view of  the proper use and limits of  objective or 
scientific knowledge, despite its shortcomings, is still of  considerable contemporary relevance.  I 
contend that the main value of  Husserl’s writings today lies precisely in the very approach they offer to 
understanding scientific or positive knowledge as knowledge of  contingent entities constituted vis-à-vis 
their relation to a subject in the world. Without accounting for the constitution of  knowledge for a 
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cognizant subject, the problems of  meaning and reference necessary for a philosophically valid 
epistemology may never move forward. Phenomenology was one attempt, a fruitful if  unsuccessful 
one, within modern philosophy to restore a viable framework for our justification of  knowledge of  the 
absolute.  Husserl’s approach to the theory of  knowledge is one that can still serve as a viable 
alternative to any merely naturalist or conventionalist and pragmatic approach to epistemological 
problems and philosophy of  science. Husserlian phenomenology is also (in the present writer’s 
opinion) an advance, in many respects, on earlier neo-Kantian and positivist approaches to the same 
problems.  Essential to the continuing influence of  Husserlian phenomenology on contemporary 
thought will be the acknowledgement of  its failure as a presuppositionless propaedeutic method to a 
“truly scientific philosophy,” and an incorporation of  the Husserlian project into the broader tradition 
of  transcendental philosophy. As a philosophy of  reflection, Husserlian phenomenology still has much 
to offer.
Notes
(1) Husserliana II. Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Fünf  Vorlesungen. Edited by Walter Biemel, 
(Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1950), translated by Lee Hardy as E. Husserl, Collected Works VIII: 
The Idea of  Phenomenology (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), p. 43. 
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Untersuchungen [Husserliana XVIII. Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Teil. Prolegomena zur reinen 
Logik. Text der 1. und der 2. Auflage. Halle: 1900, rev. ed. 1913. Edited by Elmar Holenstein. (The 
Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1975).Husserliana XIX. I-II,  Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Teil. 
Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. In zwei Bänden. Edited by Ursula 
Panzer. Halle: 1901; rev. ed. 1922. (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1984)] period into his mature 
phenomenology of  genetic reconstruction; teleological sense of  history and explorations of  the 
Lebenswelt in Die Krisis der europäischen  Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie.  
As a non-causally explainable phenomenon, Husserl maintained that the main form of  motivation for 
consciousness is the process of  association and the subsequent laws that distinguish this process from 
the causality that typifies the behaviour of  natural phenomena. (cf., Husserliana XI: Analysen zur 
Passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten 1918-1926. Edited by Margot 
Fleischer (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers, 1966, for details). The above aspect of  Husserlian 
phenomenology, i.e., its recognition of  the strong and irreducibly normative nature of  conscious 
thought is also certainly an aspect that deserves greater recognition by contemporary philosophers-
however it is a subject unfortunately beyond the context of  the current essay to explore in any detail. 
(3) Bernet, Rudolf, Kern, Iso & Marbach, Eduard. An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology 
(Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1993), p. 81. 
(4) In this way Husserl’s thought can even be made compatible with the linguistic turn, where a 
psychological model is made the ultimate ground for meaning and where the “hard problems” of  
consciousness are avoided or declared not worthy of  serious consideration.  I would maintain that the 
lasting legacy of  Husserlian thought however (one developed from his early writings onwards), will be 
his insight that norms cannot be naturalized and reflection in itself  cannot be reduced to an act of  
theoretical self-objectification. 
(5) Cf., Nagel, Thomas. The View From Nowhere (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986), Chalmers, 
David J. The Conscious Mind: In Search of  a Fundamental Theory (New York & Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1996), Shoemaker, 1996, & Pihlström, Sami. “Recent Reinterpretations of  the 
Transcendental”, in Inquiry, 47 (2004), pp. 289-314. 
(6) That is, Husserl’s intentional analyses lead him ultimately to the insight that all intentional 
experience [intentionale Erlebnisse] is essentially a modification of  temporal intentionality, cf.,  Husserliana 
X. Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstesens (1893-1917), Edited by Rudolf  Boehm (The 
Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), Translated by John Barnett Brough as Collected Works Vol. IV. On the 
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(7) Contemporary studies have done a great deal to emphasize the genetic, historical as well as the 
transcendental developmental aspects of  Husserl’s thought (See for example: Bernet, Kern & Marbach 
1993, Bernet 1994, Steinbock, Anthony J. Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl 
(Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1995), Welton, Donn. The Origins of  Meaning: A Critical 
Study of  the Thresholds of  Husserlian Phenomenology (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff  Press, 1983) & 
The Other Husserl: The Horizons of  Transcendental Phenomenology (Bloomington, Indiana 
Uuniversity Press, 2000), and  Zahavi, Dan. Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity: A Response 
to the Linguistic-Pragmatic Critique, Translated by Elizabeth A. Behnke (Athens, Ohio University 
Press, 2001) & Husserl’s Phenomenology (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2003), to list only a few. 
(8) Cf., Kant, Immanuel. Critique of  Pure Reason, translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998) A 250-251. 
(9) Cf., Levinas, Emmanuel. The Theory of  Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology (Second Edition) 
(Evanston, NorthWestern University Press, 1995). p. 17. 
(10) Here we follow a Heideggarian criticism cf., Heidegger, Martin. Sein und Zeit (Tübingen, 
Neomarius Verlag, 1927), Translated as: Being and Time, by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson 
(New York, Harper & Row, 1962). §§ 7, 27, etc., however the actual relation between Husserl’s 
transcendental and (the early) Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology is a complicated one to which 
most   comparative studies do not do full justice, cf., Crowell, Steven G. “Husserl, Heidegger and 
Transcendental Philosophy: Another Look at the Encyclopaedia Britannica Article” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, Vol. L, No. 3, March 1990.  Also, “Does the Husserl/Heidegger Feud 
Rest on a Mistake? An Essay on  Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology” Husserl Studies 
18: 123–140, 2002.
(11) Cf., Husserliana XI. Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und 
Forschungsmanuskripten, 1918-1926. Edited by Margot Fleischer., (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 
1966), Translated by Anthony J. Steinbock as E. Husserl Collected Works Vol IX: Analyses Concerning 
Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2001), pp. 377-381. y others, including my esteemed, contemporary colleagues in Husserlian 
phenomenology. But my point is not that Husserl created a world of  phenomenology that keeps to 
itself, as these names might indicate; rather, Husserl’s phenomenology opened the door to critiques of  
psychology, medicine, patriarchy, race and gender, sociology, anthropology, history, criminology, and 
even of  itself. And for this reason, phenomenology has been the perfect choice to enable the 
beginnings of  a dialogue between the analytic and continental “traditions,” for example, by entering 
into discussions with cognitive psychology and neuroscience. My goal, however, has been to show that, 
beyond the theoretical squabbles of  contemporary philosophy, phenomenology is able to apply itself  to 
any area, bringing not only critique, but also an extreme philosophical rigor as well as a method of  
conceptualization and application.  Phenomenology can transform those theories it encounters, and not 
only that, but it also forces them back into the lived world. For this reason, then, I believe that the 
future of  phenomenology lies in its ongoing application to both theoretical and practical realms, and, in 




Husserl's Phenomenology of  the Life-World
Andrina Tonkli-Komel
The one-hundredth anniversary of  the publication of  Husserl’s Logical Investigations, which helped 
phenomenology pass on into the 20th century philosophy, was a new opportunity for reconsidering the 
basic elements and goals of  phenomenological investigations as well as its future perspectives. In his 
letter to Levy-Bruhl from 11 March 1935, Husserl promised that, by applying the phenomenological 
method, he would succeed in “grounding some sort of  transrationalism that would overcome the old 
and insufficient rationalism, and at the same time justify its innermost intentions.”
      The limited condition of  the old, i.e. modern rationalism, which Husserl mentions there, does not 
refer to the reason’s capability of  self-restriction but rather to its incapability of  encountering at its 
outer limits anything else than sheer irrationalism. To oppose such leveling is the true meaning of  any 
genuine transcendentalism. “Transrationalism” could be conceived of  as the new transcendentality 
without any absolutist pretensions of  absolving all transcendent being of  the world; as 
transcendentality, which cannot be adverse to the transcendence as absolute relativity. Just as 
transcendentality cannot simply abolish transcendence, transcendence cannot abolish transcendentality. 
A special movement is set free in-between the two, a course of  history, the life-world.
      We should take into account two absolute qualities; the absolute validity of  being as evidenced by 
reason, and relative being in the world of  the revealing life. The correlation between the flowing life 
and the becoming world is not identical with that of  reason and the permanent being of  the world. 
This identification is possible only on the ground of  life in full critical responsibility, i.e. life’s attitude to 
the ultimate truth. Insofar as this ultimate validity of  truth in its absolutistic pretension is in constant 
opposition to the only absolute relative flux, the rational critical responsibility finds as its correlate the 
permanent crisis of  the life-world. It is but the insight into the crisis intruding between the reason and 
life and correlatively, between being and the world, that can radically change the character of  
phenomenological criticism or the transcendental criterion of  this criticism. It does not suffice to 
persist in the name of  strict science in the correlation between reason and being, and in the 
directedness of  life as a whole toward the unconditioned truth secured by science as an infinite task of  
life fulfillment, or unification of  life and science. What is needed is a critical distinction between the 
transcendental in terms of  permanent transcendence of  life striving for ontic fulfillment in the world, 
and the transcendental in terms of  reflective grasping of  the identity of  life and the being of  the world 
evidenced as the life of  reason. Insofar as the reflective critical bearing – as witnessed in Husserl’s 
phenomenological philosophy – is attainable and has already been attained on the basis of  reductionist 
and corresponding constitutional methodical procedures, this distinction needs a methodical indication, 
especially if  phenomenology is to be understood primarily as a method. This opens up the possibility 
of  distinguishing between the transcendental reductive-constitutive methodical procedure and the 
movement of  phenomenological epochē, which don’t exclude each other but rather set each other free. 
In other words, the initial and final moment of  living in critical responsibility (of  the method) is 
freedom. In what way does this become evident from the phenomenological viewpoint?
     The rudimentary crisis of  the unity of  life and science compelled Husserl to seek a renewal of  
rationality, which as transrationality, bridges and overcomes the oblivion of  the life-world in the 
ultimate validity of  the scientific criticism of  being as evidenced by reason. However, exactly in this 
respect it becomes evident that the phenomenologically concealed and thus forgotten unity of  the life-
world is even more genuine than the constructed unity of  life and science, inasmuch it includes a 
distinction between the world and life, which in turn enables the aforementioned separation of  life and 
science as well as all others. Getting a word in edgeways, the “unity of  difference” of  the life-world also 
grounds critical responsibility, which is perhaps even freer than the historically inherited freedom of  
critical responsibility. It is a momentous freedom as the most important achievement of  
phenomenology in general.
     The momentous starting point of  phenomenology also establishes the historical distance between 
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us and the origin of  Greek philosophy and science, which can be compared to both Heidegger’s 
destruction and Derrida’s deconstruction; moreover, destruction and deconstruction are even made 
possible by epochē; Derrida explicitly states that without the “time of  epochē” “deconstruction is 
impossible.” (1) Epochē simply gives evidence of  the movement of  the structure. The advantage of  
Husserl’s momentous structuring (phenomenological analytics) lies in excluding neither corporality, as is 
true of  Heidegger, nor spirituality, as is true of  Derrida. The momentous beginning and the transition 
are marked by the fulfillment of  a life freed in itself, displaying its views as the unity in diversity.
     Despite all this, it seems that already at the starting point such momentous phenomenological 
transition “overtakes” the leap to strict science. The life fulfillment in critical self-responsibility is thus 
felt as some sort of  “overbearing” of  the rational mind bridging the void between life and science. At 
the same time, however, it cannot be denied that in Husserl we are likely to encounter a certain 
structuring which genuinely makes possible “filling” and “emptying”. A radically different outlook on 
his philosophy might open up if  we, from the very beginning, distinguish between the scientific 
reduction to the transcendental consciousness with its rationally constituted ontic correlate, and the 
movement of  phenomenological epochē, which is not reductive but, according to Husserl, re-pro-
ductive, revealing to life the unity of  the world; and it is also pro-re-ductive, giving evidence of  the 
heterogeneity of  life in the world. In the “intermediate being” of  the life-world, which is not the being 
in the objective transcendent or in the subjective transcendental sense, there opens up a dis-tinction of  
life and the world which cannot be unified by way of  transition to strict science, and homogenized by 
way of  rationally evidenced being. As the evidencing of  phenomena, it could be understood as a dis-
play, which both opens the world for life to provide it with meaning, and empties life so that it can find 
fulfillment in the world. This “game” of  the life-world is perceivable in any moment of  our everyday 
life. However, there is a possibility that, for a short moment, it can be momentously displayed. Such 
momentous reconstruction is in itself  productive in terms of  what we may justifiably call the 
phenomenology of  the life-world.
     Undoubtedly, such phenomenology of  the world has important ethical and cultural implications. Is 
there something like an ethos of  phenomenology, or even a phenomenological culture? Husserl’s 
ethical and cultural considerations seem to sum up in an alternative: “Either a collapse into spiritual 
hatred and barbarism or a spiritual rebirth arising out of  the heroism of  reason that will ultimately 
overcome naturalism.” If  we reproach Husserl for his farsightedness, we can, retrospectively, reproach 
numerous contemporary ethical stands for their short-sightedness. The fear of  heroism of  reason is all 
too often an evidence of  turning the blind eye to numerous forms of  barbarism we are faced with 
today – as Europeans!
     Moreover, we need to ask ourselves whether barbarism as a threat perhaps takes its main source 
from where it should be successfully overcome – from the power of  science, which comprises political, 
artistic and religious fields. In Husserl’s criticism of  the modern science movement, a particular 
emphasis is laid on two instances of  oblivion: at the beginning, it’s the human being standing behind 
science and in the end the world extant before science. Science forgets itself  both over its background 
and foreground, and revolves only in itself. It has thrown out both the excellence of  the human being 
and the excellence of  the world. The modern identification of  the world with the mathematically 
calculable nature has moulded the calculable nature of  man.
      The ethos of  phenomenology cannot be reduced to man’s taking part in this world as a 
disinterested spectator, or to letting ourselves be led by some special interest after its change, either out 
of  rational heroism or servile revolt. What can be expected, however, is some sort of  momentous intra-
esse reaching also into the inter-esse of  what Husserl thinks as intersubjectivity. This ethos of  
phenomenology, which acts “from within”, can be joined “from without” by a certain culture of  the 
life-world. Of  course, at this point there also opens up, in a largely modified form, a certain 
momentous possibility of  excellence and extraordinariness joined by manifoldness and multi-
layeredness. 
      The experience of  the (everyday, scientific, artistic etc.) actuality is formed in interpretative 
capabilities, which can be historically concealed or yet unconcealed, overcome, unattained or even 
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unattainable. This dynamic openness of  possibilities characterizes the life-world as such. The 
phenomenology of  the life-world cannot principally stick only to (fundamentally-ontological) speaking 
in favor of  possibility rather than actuality, but has to first of  all carry out a transformation of  critical 
reason into creative one. This transformation is necessary primarily because it is impossible to limit 
reason to critical evaluation of  life practices. The criteria of  reality making possible such an evaluation 
are directly formed in life practices themselves. The main task of  phenomenological rationality is thus 
an explicit unfolding of  basic tendencies of  human life in order to be able to form the world through a 
network of  meaningful identities and differences.
Notes
(1) Derrida J.: Gesetzskraft. Der »mystische Grund der Autorität«, Frankfurt/M. 1991, p. 42 (“Force of  
Law: The Mystical Foundations of  Authority,” Cardozo Law Review: Deconstruction and the 




Francesco Saverio Trincia 
One of  the main features of  Husserlian phenomenology is its opening to an infinite task of  research. It 
should be added that this task is not in any case conceived as systematic. The ethical interpretation of  
the “beginning” is an original commitment and a very clearly spelled out feature of  Husserl’s thought. 
This interpretation, or self-interpretation, has been confirmed after the publication of  the Krisis der 
europäischen Wissenschaften. It is also the result of  the fact that the Krisis has been correctly seen as 
containing the idea of  the possibility of  a rebirth or of  a rethinking of  a philosophical humanism free 
in itself  of  any metaphysical meaning, and intrinsically alien to the tradition of  the idealistic historicism. 
(1) Associated with this general observation is the central role played by the activity of  the evaluating 
and deciding subjectivity in the Husserlian ethics of  1914 (2): a role that is played within the schema of  
the correlation in which both the relationship to the axiological objectivity and to the universality of  the 
practical reason are at stake. This is not without relation to the necessity of  a deep understanding  of  
consciousness and of  subjectivity in what could be called the Husserlian “ideology,” that is the extra-
theoretical use that can be made of  phenomenology as a more o less hidden ethics of  an immer wieder 
returning commitment to begin the phenomenological investigation without any presuppositions. 
There is no doubt that the end of  the 1914 Vorlesungen  and the role there assigned to the “evidence” 
of  a “living” ethical judgement, in which the evident rationality of  the willing subject meets the sphere 
of  values, in some way  prepares the notion of  the universal humanity to which Husserl’s attention in 
the “Kaizo” articles of  the twenties is devoted, and the rational hope of  a new humanity coming out of  
its “crisis” and based on the birth of  a  new kind of  man, being no more a “factual man.” It can be said 
that the distinction sketched in the last pages of  the 1914 Vorlesungen, between an ethical judgement 
based on the statement of  an observer who remains external to the ethical Erlebnis and can pronounce 
itself  only on its Richtigkeit, on the one side, and the “evident  judging” where  the subject who judges 
“lives his authentic duty,” on the other side, is the expression in the  formal vocabulary of  the 
phenomenological ethics of  the distinction between the objective man  of  the scientific, empirical 
psychology (the man in the world), and  the man constituted by the transcendental Ego (the man for 
the world) presented in the Krisis.
    Jocelyn Benoist (3) has very well seen that one of  the meanings of  the “paradox” of  subjectivity in 
the Krisis consists in the form of  the correlation, which permits to “transform in poem” its inheritance 
and to build up a sort of  “invented” history in which subjectivity “meets the possibility or the question 
of  the most extreme universality.” Benoist points out with some irony the orientation of  the 
phenomenological subjectivity to universality. It is interesting to observe that this ethical subjectivity is 
oriented to universality in a “poetic” way, but also through an “invention” of  history which recalls the 
idea of  the “apriori history” (this is the expression used by Hussserl in the famous text of  the Origin 
of  Geometry). This kind of  history may be able to host an ethical subjectivity oriented to universality, 
just because it does not depend on the contingency of  empirical existence – where only “factual men” 
may live.
    Help can be found by an interpreter of  Husserl’s ethics in Rudolf  Bernet’s last book. (4) Bernet very 
well shows which is the general “sense-horizon” within which the evaluating and deciding intentional 
consciousness is to be understood. From the point of  view of  the correlation-relationship between 
consciousness and existence, it appears very clearly that transcendental consciousness also is “already 
contaminated by the same illness that corrodes human existence.” We have remarked that at least the 
surface of  Husserl’s attitude towards ethics (the one that is not expressed in phenomenology’s technical 
vocabulary and is rather a “spiritual atmosphere” of  it) is conditioned by a sort of  humanistic, ethical 
ideology.  If  the hypothesis can be advanced that the building of  a “pure ethics” through Husserl’s pure 
theoretical arguing cannot avoid referring to human existence and to the “persons” that are to be met 
there, we have to recognize that the so called “ideological” side of  Husserlian ethics cannot be put 
aside. It is certainly true that the notion of  “person” which is important in the lectures of  1920-24 (5) 
should not be considered as the expression of  the man “in the world,” that is, of  an empirical subject: 
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the “person” is in any case something “constituted,” and not a natural human being. It is therefore true 
that the “existence” of  which we talk when we say that Husserlian ethics is existence-related is not the 
natural and objective existence. But this does not mean that the phenomenological ethics does not meet 
the phenomenological existence and does not work for the orientation of  (not factual) subjects. This is 
one of  the main differences between the notion of  “pure” ethics as thought by Immanuel Kant, and 
the same notion thought by Husserl. In the first case, but not in the second, “purity” means the 
exclusion of  all content of  the ethical choice, and the isolation of  every influence of  the sensible 
objects on it. This point drives us to say that what could be called  a “care for the world” is one of  the 
main features of  Husserlian ethics – and that  this “care,” in some way unknown to Kant, has to be 
seen as the not paradoxical result of  a  not content-excluding “formality” which is in itself, again, 
different from Kantian “formality.”
    On the one side, in fact, Husserl’s ethics refers to “values” which are seen as “material apriori” (this 
is the side of  the content, which does not lack in it, and which is the way by which Husserl’s ethics 
takes care of  the world and aims to build a certain kind of  human being, not simply a rational being 
acting “by duty”). But on the other side, an equal emphasis should be put on the way in which Husserl 
presents the role of  the subjectivity in ethics. The possibility to fix the degree of  the “utility for the 
world” of  the phenomenological ethics depends on the role of  the subjectivity who “lives through” his 
or her evaluating judgement and in this way meets the duty that is “ready” for the rational and evident 
will, as Husserl points out in the 1914 lessons. It could be said, even more radically, that it is the role 
plaid by the phenomenological subject that allows us to speak of  phenomenology as a “philosophy of  
ethics” and to realize an “apology” of  it which does not accept the charge of  its being an ideological 
construction in contradiction with its main epistemic inspiration. It should be remarked also that the 
“apology” of  phenomenology as philosophy of  ethics does not simply mean that phenomenology 
gives a solid philosophical foundation to ethics – a foundation which is supposed to be stronger than 
others. Were it so, we would obtain the not wanted result of  losing the aspect for which 
phenomenology is not to be reduced to a mere theoretical construction. In any field of  the range of  
action of  the intentional consciousness, and in a very particular way in ethics, phenomenology is not 
the way of  the reduction of  the philosophical content (here the ethical will, and the activity of  
evaluation and of  decision connected to it) to its mere theoretical form.
    It is not easy to find  the right way to express this point, but  one could try to say that 
phenomenological ethics offers the possibility “to live from within” the ethical experience and that  the 
harshness with which Husserl  again and again in the 1914 Lectures explains the  connection and the 
difference between  formal logic and formal ethics, that is between what Kant calls “pure reason” and 
“practical reason,” is the  hidden signal that  his main concern is that of  “saving” the practical reason, 
and the entire sphere of  ethics, form the double risk of  psychologism and of  intellectualism, both seen  
realized, according to him, in Kant’s ethics. Husserl’s aim is similar to Kant’s, but it is not reached at all 
in the same way. And the role of  subjectivity within the formal working of  ethics is no less important 
point of  difference. No subjectivity is necessary in Kant’s ethics. To say that, as a consequence of  both 
being “formal,” logic and ethics are at the same time “parallel” and “interwoven,” means that they meet 
only because the logical judgement offers its voice to the ethical judgement, otherwise destined to 
remain mute. This allows Husserl to build the sphere of  ethics as such that the main link with logic is 
to be seen in their being both “modes” of  the intentional consciousness. The peculiar way in which 
subjectivity works in ethics refers to the common source in the intentional consciousness of  both 
judging and evaluating and deciding, with the theoretical judgement only giving voice to ethics. But the 
opposite is also true: the common intentional source is the basis of  a difference that just by its 
appearing as a “parallelism” must be conceived in such a way that the difference between logic and 
ethics is connected with the feature of  the correlation of  the evaluating and deciding subjectivity with 
its peculiar objects – those objects that, being values, can not be equal to the objects of  the “parallel” 
logical intentionality. It is very clear therefore that no peculiar role of  the ethic subjectivity could be 
admitted, if  the difference between logic and ethics has no assumed the radical feature of  the 
“parallelism.”
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    Jocelyn Benoist gives a definition of  a “subject or rather than of  subjectivity” which is important for 
our argument. He writes that the subject is located “dedans et dehos: il est ce témoin  implicite situé au 
point aveugle du champ visuel, comme aussi bien ce qui se montre en lui à chaque transition qu’il 
ménage.’’ (6) Something crucial for the specific feature of  the ethical intentionality is very well 
expressed in this formulation of  the  problem of  subjectivity: The phenomenological idea of  the  
Doppelseitigkeit, of  the bilaterality, of  the correspondence and of  the correlativity which connects the 
subjective and  the objective side of  intentionality also in its  ethical mode. What is called by Benoist 
the “blind point” of  the “champ visuel”, is at the same time what is supposed to accompany the steps 
that are made within its objective horizon (better: within its horizon of  objectivation), thanks to the 
activity of  the intentional consciousness. The way in which Benoist  expresses the image of  subjectivity 
is clearly fashioned according to the image which closes the important paragraph 95 of  Formale und 
tranzendentale Logik, (7) where Husserl writes that “subjectivity of  everybody” should be thought as 
“this subjectivity (that) I myself  am, the I  who becomes conscious of  myself, about what is  for me 
and is valid for me.” Husserl adds that “the subjectivity is the primary matter of  fact that I have to face, 
and from which I as philosopher can never divert my glance.” It is true that for a beginner philosopher 
this can be der dunkle Winkel, the dark corner, in which the ghosts of  solipsism, of  psychologism and 
of  relativism bustle around. But the true philosopher will prefer to fill this dark corner with light, 
instead of  being scared by it.”
    Husserl is not talking of  the ethical subjectivity. But this description concerns also the ethical 
subjectivity, of  which one must say the same that has been said of  the phenomenological subjectivity in 
general. The circumstance that we understand subjectivity as the blind point of  the “champ visuel” and 
as the “dark corner” on which no light falls, means that we are talking of  a subject that is devoid of  any 
metaphysical and naturalistic consistence. And for what concerns specifically the ethical subject, the 
general feature of  the phenomenological subject forbids us to imagine him as an ethical legislator, 
already present and active in the world. Even if  we admit that the “person” is one of  the last results of  
the Husserlian ethics, we still have to remember that the ethical subject is not a natural person, is not, as 
already said, a man in the world. It is just as important for the subject of  the ethical intentional 
consciousness, as for the subject of  the theoretical intentional consciousness, to accept the task of  
filling the darkness of  subjectivity with light, whose  darkness is the condition of  its not being 
something given in the world – that is of  its phenomenological feature. Light must be thrown on it if  
the risks of  relativism of  the psychological attitude have to be avoided. Therefore, light does not 
transform subjectivity in something natural and worldly. It is discovered that every subjectivity is based 
on his intentional activity on the bilateral structure of  the intentional relationship to the objectivity. 
This is also the structural schema that underlies Husserlian ethics. Husserl’s thought maintains its 
promise of  being the birth of  an infinite research, just because it tries to give the foundation of  a 
formal ethics, which is supposed to be able to “capture” in its formality both  the deciding ethical 
subjectivity and  its intentional objects, the “values.” Also in ethics, as in the whole of  phenomenology, 
the bilaterality and the correlation are formal. It is this peculiar formality that opens the possibility of  
an ethical theory which does not forget the contents of  our ethical activity.
    On the basis of  this interpretation of  Husserl’s ethics (an anti-ideological and anti-idealistic 
interpretation) we can say that the phenomenological discovery of  the phenomenon of  feeling, of  
wishing, of  willing, offers to human beings a new instrument of  an ethical orientation in the world.
Notes
(1) See F.S. Trincia, Che cosa ne è dell’uomo in (e dopo) Husserl e Heidegger?, “Links”, II, 2002.
(2) E. Husserl, Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre  1908-1914.  Husserliana XXVIII, 1988.
(3) See  J. Benoist, L’histoire en poeme, « Recherches husserliennes »,  IX, 1998.
(4) See R. Bernet, Conscience et existence. Perspectives phenoménologiques, Paris 2004, 9.
(5) E.Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920-24, Husserliana  XXXVII, 
2004.
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(7) See  E. Husserl,  Formale und tranzendentale Logik, Versuch einer Kritik del logischen Vernunft, 
Husserliana XVII, 1974,  208-210. 
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On the Radical and Erotic Reductions
Roberto J. Walton
Transcendental phenomenology has considered bodilihood as a constitutive dimension of  
transcendental subjectivity (L. Landgrebe). This has lead on to the assertion, from an epistemological 
standpoint, of  the priority of  consciousness as the mode of  access to the world, and, from an 
ontological standpoint, of  a twofold relationship of  reciprocal nonderivability (or irreducibility) and 
relevance (or conditioning) between the body and consciousness (E. Ströker). In a further step, recent 
trends in phenomenology have drawn a boundary between the body, which is the deep dimension of  
subjectivity correlated with the world, and the flesh, which withdraws from the world. On the one 
hand, Michel Henry has given priority to an original flesh, which, at work in the radical immanence of  
an “I can,” takes hold of  the manifold functions of  the organic body that is intertwined with the world. 
Here self-affection is cut off  from hetero-affection, and this is essential to Henry’s “radical reduction” 
to pure immanence. On the other hand, Jean-Luc Marion has also developed the notion of  flesh, but, 
following Emmanuel Levinas, stresses its intersubjective side insofar as my body attains a “face” and 
becomes flesh when it receives from the Other what I do not possess by myself  and at the same time 
the Other receives from myself  the flesh and the “face” that it does not possess by itself. Here hetero-
affection is separated from self-affection, and this is central to Marion’s “erotic reduction” to what 
comes from elsewhere. My argument in this paper is that the so-called radical and the erotic reductions 
should be considered, in terms of  the transcendental reduction, as an attempt to deal with modes of  
surplus within the intentional correlation with the world disclosed by the latter.
    What seems particularly objectionable is the neglect of  the stratification that underlies the contrast 
between the body and the flesh. For the surplus entailed by the flesh does not amount to the vanishing 
of  the body, as both Henry and Marion put it, but rather to the emergence of  a new level that can be 
understood, in terms of  reciprocal relevance and nonderivability, in the light of  the laws of  
stratification and categorial dependence advanced by Nicolai Hartmann. Applied to our subject, the law 
of  stratification leads to the following formulations: something of  the body returns in the flesh; the 
body does not come back as such in the flesh because it undergoes a variation, the flesh entails a 
novelty with regard to the body, and there is a leap leading from the body to the flesh. One could argue 
that the disappearance of  the body in the radical and erotic reductions is due to the overlooking of  
return and variation as well as to the overstressing of  novelty and leap. Furthermore, the following 
statements issue from the law of  categorial dependence: the body is stronger than the flesh; the body is 
indifferent to the flesh; the body functions as an existential foundation for the flesh; and the flesh is 
free with regard to the body. In this respect, the disappearance of  the body is the outcome of  
forgetting force and indifference and overemphasizing existential foundation and freedom. Again, 
misunderstandings arise when the four contentions are not taken together. 
    According to Hartmann, the upper stratum can emerge as an overformation (Überformung), in which 
the lower stratum comes back entirely as a matter that receives a new form, or as an overconstruction 
(Überbauung), in which it operates only as an existential foundation without influence on the contents 
of  the upper stratum. To acknowledge this dependence in the line of  existence instead of  content both 
makes clear the ontological relevancy of  the lower stratum and preserves the nonderivability or novelty 
of  the upper stratum, and, therefore, renders possible the claim of  an epistemological primacy in the 
case of  consciousness and the assertion of  a new mode of  phenomenalization in the case of  flesh. If  
we focus on the strata involved, flesh and “face” are a novelty with regard to body and visible 
countenance. They are phenomena of  excess that appear as something new on the basis of  a ground 
of  being that must be overconstructed. Accordingly, when their function is restricted to that of  an 
existential foundation, body and visible countenance withdraw in the overconstruction of  flesh and 
“face,” but remain, as concerns their existence, indifferent to the upper stratum and do not break 
down. Were it otherwise, the body would be indeed undermined by the flesh.  
    In an ontological analysis, then, a mediation encompassing return and novelty is necessary between 
what belongs to a given statum of  the world and what transcends it. Correlatively, from the viewpoint 
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of  access, a mediation is also necessary between the givenness of  the visible and the modes of  
phenomenalization of  the invisible. Husserl’s view is that the visible body is the expression of  an 
inwardness that can be explicated in a variety of  levels that correspond to various strata in self-
experience and the experience of  the Other. Hence, the disjunction between visibility and invisibility, 
with an exclusive emphasis on the latter in the radical and erotic reductions, not only disregards 
stratification, but also ignores the phenomenon of  expression in which my visible movements and the 
visible countenance differentiate themselves both from a corporeal surface, because they signify an 
inwardness, and from flesh and “face,” because they are visible. In order to show how visibility and 
invisibility are compatible, because there is a necessary link between them within an overconstruction, 
one must regard flesh and “face” within the larger framework of  the notion of  horizonality, to which 
overconstruction provides a specification. For the body as a given level of  being is a theme that points 
beyond itself, and the flesh is experienced through these references that irradiate from it. Flesh and 
“face” are horizons that cannot come forth to visibility, but this “beyond” must be grasped in such a 
way that it cannot be detached from the visibility that intends to it. Their invisibility can be understood 
as a nonintuitable residuum, i.e., as an irreducible surplus, both in the horizon of  self-affection opened 
out by the experience of  the movement of  my own body, and in the horizon of  the Other revealed by 
the perception of  the alien body. It can be recalled here that Marion examines a paradox of  givenness 
because the given withholds the manifestation of  givenness itself. Thus, every datum must be referred 
to its givenness by unfolding its fold. This does not seem to add much to the explication of  an 
apperceptive horizon that, being intertwined with the perception of  one’s own or the Other’s body, 
cannot be wholly laid open.
    The convergence of  invisible self-affection with visible hetero-affection does not rule out a further 
contraction of  self-affection intermingled with hetero-affection into a pure self-affection as that 
described by Henry, or a further expansion of  hetero-affection blended with self-affection into a pure 
hetero-affection as that outlined by Marion. Only in a second stage can self-affection become unraveled 
from outwardness, and hetero-affection become separated from inwardness. Both processes can be 
construed as an unfolding of  horizonality in which we are directed towards an ideal pole. In addition, 
this analysis does not exclude speaking of  an infinite self-affection or an infinite interpellation of  the 
Other, which would enable our living in the world to surpass its narrow limits. Nevertheless, it avoids 
separating them from our worldly condition, so that, even if  they are not manifest within the world, 
they are at least constructed over it. They can be referred back to a dimension of  horizonality that is 
inexplicable or invisible, but announces itself  in intentional modes of  self-affection, and expresses 
itself  through the visible countenance of  the Other. Since this dimension entails a maximum of  
contraction and intensification of  transcendental life in its relationship with itself, as well as a maximum 
of  expansion and estrangement in its relationship with the Other, it accounts for the possibility of  an 
acknowledgment of, and an answer to, infinite self-affection and infinite interpellation. 
    In contrast to the transcendental reduction, which attempts to show the true significance of  the 
natural attitude as the self-concealment of  the transcendental dimension, the radical and the erotic 
reductions establish a realm distinct to that of  the natural attitude. The pregivenness of  the world is not 
considered from a new angle by showing what is implied in it, but rather an attempt is made to disclose 
a different type of  phenomenalization. This leads to set originary flesh against one’s own body and 
alien flesh against the body of  the Other. On the contrary, an inquiry into the true significance of  what 
is pregiven in the natural attitude shows one’s own body as the indication of  an originary flesh tied to a 
transcendental “I can,” which cannot be separated from its body as an organ of  actualization in the 
world, and exposes the body of  the Other as the indication of  a transcendental Other, which cannot be 
detached from its body as an organ of  expression in the world. Only through contraction and 
expansion as modes of  overconstruction in the horizon of  these two phenomena can we have access to 
a dimension of  invisibility. The upshot of  this argument is that the attempt to think beyond worldly 
Being  "the correlation between world and world-consciousness" amounts, on closer inspection, to the 
extrapolation of  an infinite pole for the unfolding of  the horizons of  inwardness and elsewhere 
sustained by the correlation. 
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Die Phänomenologie der Zukunft: Eidetisch, transzendental oder naturalisiert? 
Dieter Lohmar
Hat die Phänomenologie eine Zukunft? Was heißt es überhaupt für eine philosophische Disziplin, eine 
Zukunft zu haben? Sicher hat fast jede Disziplin der Philosophie eine Zukunft in dem eingeschränkten 
Sinne, dass es weiterhin historische und interpretierende Arbeiten zum Gebiet der betreffenden 
Richtung oder des Philosophen geben wird. Aber dies ist mit der Frage sicher nicht gemeint, denn ich 
glaube, es geht bei der „Zukunft“ einer solchen Richtung des Denkens um ihre bleibende Wirkung, die 
lebendige Aufnahme neuer Probleme und die weitere Ausgestaltung alter Fragen. Mit der „Zukunft“ 
einer philosophischen Disziplin ist also diese Art der bleibenden Lebendigkeit gemeint, die sich 
besonders mit der Aufnahme neuer Themen erweist. Auch in dieser Hinsicht hat die Phänomenologie 
eine Zukunft. 
Ich werde die Frage nach der „Zukunft“ vor allem für die Husserlsche Phänomenologie stellen und die 
verschiedenen Richtungen der Phänomenologie, die sich von Husserls ursprünglicher Gestaltung 
abgewandt haben, für den Zweck des Arguments beiseite lassen. Die bleibende Lebendigkeit der 
Phänomenologien, die sich nur zumTeil Husserls Methoden zu eigen machen konnten, erweist sich 
jeweils auf  andere Weise. Es handelt sich dabei zum Teil um sehr einflussreiche Richtungen des 
phänomenologischen Denkens: So hat Heideggers radikaler daseinsanalytischer Neuanfang eine 
eindrucksvolle und dauerhafte Wirkung in fast allen Ländern der Welt. Die Phänomenologie Merleau-
Pontys besticht durch ihre Leibanalysen, den Versuch der Anbindung an die Psychologie und die 
Naturwissenschaft ihrer Zeit. Die Vertreter des sogenannten „religious turn“ der Phänomenologie in 
Frankreich, wie Levinas, Michel Henry, J.-L. Marion und viele weitere Vertreter der französichen 
Philosophie bemühen sich um eine Einbeziehung religiöser Überzeugungen und Fragestellungen in die 
Phänomenologie. 
Die Phänomenologie Husserls will eine eidetische und transzendentale Aufklärung des Bewußtseins 
und seiner Leistungen aus der erlebten Innenperspektive des Empfindens, Wahrnehmens, Erkennens, 
Wollens usw. sein. Hauptgegenstand der Analysen Husserls sind die Konstitution der verschiedenenen 
Typen von Gegenständen und die zugehörigen Evidenzstile, d.h. die verschiedenen Stile der Erfüllung 
dieser Intentionen. Die beiden wichtigsten Methoden der Phänomenologie sind die eidetische Methode 
und die transzendentale Reduktion.
Husserls Phänomenologie ist eine methodenzentrierte Disziplin. Sie kann daher auch nicht mit dem 
Werk eines einzigen Phänomenologen identifiziert und darauf  beschränkt werden. Phänomenologie, so 
wie Husserl sie versteht, ist in erster Linie eine Methode mit deren Hilfe alle weiteren Mitarbeiter dieses 
Projekts „Phänomenologie“ ebenfalls Beiträge leisten können. Husserl selbst ist in diesem 
methodenzentrierten Projekt nur ein Mitarbeiter, allerdings ein wichtiger Mitarbeiter. Als solche 
Methode und als „Arbeitsphilosophie“ verstanden hat Phänomenologie gute Ausichten auf  eine aktive 
Integration von neuen Fragestellungen. 
Im 1. Teil meiner Darstellung werde ich untersuchen, welchen Sinn eine transzendentale Untersuchung 
im Rahmen der Phänomenologie hat und ob sie auch in Zukunft noch sinnvoll ist. Im 2.Teil soll 
dieselbe Frage an Husserls eidetische Methode gestellt werden. Im 3. Teil stelle ich dann das Projekt der 
„Naturalisierung der Phänomenologie“ vor und diskutiere dessen Sinn und Grenzen. Dabei widme ich 
mich auch der Frage, warum die Zusammenarbeit von Cognitive Science und Phänomenologie gerade 
heute besonders vielversprechend ist.
1. Ist transzendentales Denken noch zeitgemäß? 
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Von Anfang an stellte die transzendentale Reduktion dabei eine besondere Schwierigkeit dar. Schon von 
den sogenannten „Münchner Phänomenologen“ und später auch von M. Heidegger, E. Fink, J.-P. Sarte 
und M. Merleau-Ponty wurde sie abgelehnt. Ein zentrales Problem dabei ist ihre Motivation: Es ist 
schwer vorzustellen, wie wir innerhalb der alltäglichen praktischen Interessen so etwas wie die 
Einklammerung aller Geltungsansprüche der Welt und der Gegenstände in ihr motivieren können. Um 
die Motivation der epoché zu finden, experimentierte z.B. Eugen Fink mit der Vorstellung von 
eingreifenden Grenzerfahrungen, die uns zu einer solchen radikalen, scheinbar skeptischen Massnahme 
veranlassen könnten. Aber nicht nur das Motiv, sondern auch der Zweck dieser Massnahme, d.h. was 
man mit ihr erreichen konnte, blieb für viele Interpreten weitgehend uneinsichtig. Man könnte sagen, 
dass es Husserl nicht hinreichend einsichtig gelungen ist, diese zentrale methodische Maßnahme zu 
motivieren. 
Das bedeutet nicht, dass ich auch der Ansicht wäre, sie sei nicht sinnvoll oder sie sei nicht zu 
motivieren. Im Gegenteil, ich bin von beidem überzeugt und werde kurz die Gründe dafür darlegen. 
Die transzendentale Reduktion ist eine Methode im Rahmen der phänomenologischen Analyse des 
Bewusstseins und seiner Inhalte. Mit ihrer Hilfe können wir von dem Phänomen, d.h. dem Bewußtsein 
wirklicher (oder möglicher) Gegenstände, zurückgehen auf  die Sinnlichkeit und die Operationen des 
Geistes, die es uns ermöglichen, diesen Gegenstand zu haben. 
In den Ideen I soll die epoché das Rätsel lösen, wie wir auf  dem Boden recht schwacher sinnlicher 
Evidenzen und beschränkter Erfahrung zu der Ansicht kommen, daß die Welt im Ganzen und die 
Gegenstände in ihr „wirklich“, „objektiv“ seien, d.h. dass sie nicht nur jetzt existieren, sondern auch in 
Zukunft, dass sie nicht nur in meinem Erleben sondern für Jedermann auf  gleiche Weise sind. Die 
Aufgabenstellung besitzt Parallelen zur sogenannten akademischen Skepsis, denn Husserl will nicht 
bezweifeln, ob die Welt wirklich ist oder nicht. Sondern: Er will lediglich genau wissen, wie und durch 
welche Anschauungsakte, wir dazu gekommen sind, dies zu glauben. Reduktion ist daher auch kein 
Zweifel oder Skepsis, denn wir müssen für die Untersuchung der Frage des „Wie“ immer - sozusagen 
heuristisch - von unseren tatsächlichen Überzeugungen hinsichtlich der Welt ausgehen, aber deren 
Geltungsansprüche radikal befragen. Transzendentale Analysen im Husserlschen Sinne setzen also den 
Vollzug der transzendentalen Reduktion voraus, d.h. sie setzen voraus, daß wir alle Überzeugungen hin-
sichtlich der Wirklichkeit oder Unwirklichkeit der wahrgenommenen Dinge und hinsichtlich der 
Geltung uns bereits bekannter Theorien (z.B. der Physik, Chemie und aller Naturwissenschaften) 
zeitweilig aussetzen bzw. einklammern. Dies dient dazu, die Frage nach dem anschaulichen Ursprung 
der Wirklichkeits-Setzung (und aller anderen Modalitäten, wie möglich, zweifelhaft usw.) auf  einem 
Erfahrungsboden zu klären, der genau diese Setzung, deren Recht wir prüfen wollen, nicht (oder nicht 
mehr) enthält. Es geht also um eine Aufklärung der Konstitution einer Setzung, welche von 
irreführenden Zirkeln frei ist. Dasselbe gilt übrigens auch von den anderen Formen der Reduktion, 
welche Husserl vorschlägt (Primordiale Reduktion, Reduktion auf  den rellen Bestand, die Reduktion 
auf  die lebendige Gegenwart usw.). (1)
Dennoch ist die Methode der Analyse im Rahmen der transzendentalen Reduktion nicht von der 
Erfahrung abgewandt. Im Gegenteil, die Bezeichnung „transzendentale Erfahrung“ ist nicht falsch. Sie 
trifft sogar den Kern dieser transzendentalen Untersuchungsrichtung. Das Residuum der 
transzendentalen Reduktion (d.h. dasjenige, was nach ihrer Anwendung übrig bleibt) ist in erster Linie 
ein Erfahrungsfeld, das der Beschreibung zugänglich ist. Hierbei spielt die Bezeichnung „Feld“ ganz 
bewußt auf  andere Felder der Erfahrung an, wie z.B. das visuelle Feld, das taktuelle Feld usw. Es ist ein 
Feld, in dem alle intentionalen Gegenstände der Wahrnehmung und der Erkenntnis zu finden sind, die 
auch bisher in unserer alltäglichen Welt aufgetreten sind. Es gibt nur die Besonderheit, daß wir jetzt 
nicht mehr den Setzungscharakter des wirklich (von Dingen) und des geltend (von Theorien) 
mitmachen. Dieser Setzungscharakter wird universal außer Kraft gesetzt, sozusagen in Klammern 
gesetzt. Auf  diese eingeklammerte Weise bleibt er noch bewußt, und zwar mit seinem problematischen 
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Geltungsanspruch, dessen Berechtigung es zu klären gilt.
Die tranzendentale Reflexion mit Gebrauch der transzendentalen Reduktion ist also ein auf  die 
Klärung solcher grundlegenden Geltungsansprüche gerichtetes Verfahren. Sie steht daher 
notwendigerweise ganz am Anfang des gesamten Vorhabens der Aufklärung dessen, was 
Wahrnehmung und Erkenntnis ist, und wie diese möglich ist. In diesem Sinne ist sie für eine 
grundlegende Erste Philosophie (prima philosophia) unentbehrlich.
Wie soll es aber auf  diesem Hintergrund möglich sein, dass die Phänomenologie mit empirischen 
Naturwissenschaften oder der Cognitive Science zusammenarbeitet, wie es z.B. die „naturalisierte 
Phänomenologie“ denkt? Dies geht durchaus, denn: Wenn wir mit Hilfe der transzendentalen 
Reduktion die grundlegeden Möglichkeitsbedingungen von Wahrnehmen und Erkennen aufgedeckt 
haben, dann hindert uns nichts daran, im weiteren Fortgang der Aufklärung der Einzelheiten des 
menschlichen Denkens auch die Ergebnisse und Hypothesen der Naturwissenschaften zu 
berücksichtigen.
2. Ist die Phänomenologie wesentlich eidetisch? 
Die zweite wichtige Methode der Phänomenologie ist die eidetische Methode, d.h. die sogenannte 
Wesensschau. Gerade diese Bezeichnung liess viele Philosophen irriger Weise vermuten, dass Husserl 
eine Art Platonimus vertritt. Die eidetische Methode greift jedoch nur eine alltägliche 
Erkenntnisfähigkeit des Menschen auf  und versucht diese methodisch zu verfeinern. Anders als bei 
Platon wird das Allgemeine jedoch nicht zu einem eigenen Existenzbereich hypostasiert, sondern 
lediglich als ein Gegenstand der Erkenntnis präzisiert. Wir sind in der Lage, Gleichheit und gleichartige 
Aspekte bei verschiedenen Gegenständen des täglichen Lebens zu erfassen, d.h. zu bemerken, dass 
diese Stühle, Bäume oder Menschen dort irgendwie gleich aussehen. Auf  der Grundlage dieser 
natürlichen Fähigkeit wird dann das Verfahren als eidetische Methode im Sinne bewusst verfolgter 
Methodenstrenge genauer bestimmt als das aktive und vergegenständlichende Aufnehmen des überall 
Gemeinsamen. 
Die eidetische Methode erreicht 1925 in der Vorlesung über Phänomenologische Psychologie ihre 
endgültige Gestalt. Sie heisst dann „eidetische Variation“. Der zentrale Punkt der eidetischen Variation 
ist die unbegrenzte Erzeugung von Phantasievariationen, die als das unentbehrliche Element der 
Methode herausgearbeitet wird. Ausgangspunkt der Methode ist ein anschaulich gegebenes konkretes 
Beispiel, d.h. ein Gegenstand, der in der Folge auch als leitendes Vorbild fungiert. Von ihm ausgehend 
erzeugen wir unbegrenzt viele mögliche Phantasievarianten dieses Exempels. Jede dieser Varianten ist 
darüberhinaus mit der Meinung verbunden: „Und so weiter!“, Ich kann und ich werde immer weiter 
variieren. Obgleich diese Variation de facto immer nur endlich viele Varianten erzeugen kann, ist es 
doch dieses „und so weiter“ das eine Begrenzung auf  ein zufällig umgrenztes mundanes Gebiet 
verhindert.
In der Durchsicht aller dieser möglichen Varianten „zeigt sich“ dann ein invariantes, identisch 
durchlaufendes Sinnelement. Es zeig sich dabei im Sinne einer Deckungssynthesis von Teilintentionen 
dieser Varianten. Husserl hatte dazu in seiner Theorie der kategorialen Anschauung aufgewiesen, dass 
diese Deckungssynthesen eine Form der Anschaulichkeit darstellen. (2) Wegen der sorgfältigen 
Ausrichtung auf  unbegrenzte Variation kann man sicher sein, dass das gefundene, gemeinsame 
Sinnelement auch in allen weiteren Fällen vorhanden sein wird.
Mit diesem Erkenntnisanspruch, nämlich dass mit Hilfe der eidetischen Methode nicht nur Fakten, 
sondern auch notwendig vorkommende Sinnelemente an allen Einzelgegenständen einer bestimten Art 
von Gegenständen bestimmt werden können, grenzt sich Husserl von der empirischen Psychologie ab. 
Es ist der  spezifisch phänomenologische Begriff  von apriori, der hiermit bestimmt wird. Empirische 
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Wissenschaft formuliert ihre Ergebnisse auch in Allsätzen, die jedoch auf  der immer beschränkten 
Erhebung von faktischen Daten beruhen, die dann mit Hilfe der Induktion verallgemeinert werden. 
Bei aller richtigen und gut begründeten Abgrenzung der eidetischen Methode von der induktiven 
Methode ist doch mit der Bestimmung des phänomenologischen Apriori zugleich eine Bewegung auf  
die empirischen Wissenschaften hin getan: Es ist der Anspruch, eine Struktur festzuhalten, die bei 
„allen“ empirischen und „allen“ weiter möglichen Fällen gleich ist. Dieser Anspruch auf  die 
Bestimmung aller Fälle bildet daher eine „Brücke“ zwischen der empirischen Naturwissenschaft und 
der Phänomenologie. Das heisst: Beide Erkenntnisansprüche sind sinnverschieden, aber es gibt 
Abhängigkeits-Beziehungen zwischen beiden. So darf  z.B. eine eidetische Einsicht nicht der 
empirischen Erkenntnis widerstreiten, umgekehrt können eidetische Einsichten die empirische 
Forschung auf  neue Wege bringen. Husserls auf  den ersten Blick vielleicht etwas altmodisch - oder 
sogar platonisch - anmutende eidetische Methode erweist sich auf  diese Weise hinsichtlich einer 
möglichen Kooperation mit empirischen Wissenschaften als einer der grössten Vorzüge der 
Phänomenologie.
3. Das Bewusstsein im Blick der Cognitive Science - auf  dem Weg zur einer naturalisierten 
Phänomenologie?
Eine Aufklärung der Leistungen des Bewußtseins wollen in den letzten Jahrzehnten auch immer mehr 
die Neurowissenschaften, die Cognitive Neuroscience und auch andere Naturwissenschaften. Die 
Neurowissenschaften untersuchen nicht mehr nur das Gehirn als Organ, sondern versuchen 
zunehmend auch den eigentümlichen „geistigen“ Leistungen dieses Organs näherzukommen. Auf  diese 
Weise gerät das Bewußtsein und seine Inhalte in den Kreis der Themen der empirischen 
Naturwissenschaften.
Auf  diesem Hintergrund ist das Projekt einer „naturalisierten Phänomenologie“ zu verstehen. Es 
handelt sich dabei um den Versuch von Phänomenologen, die Kooperation mit den 
Neurowissenschaften, der empirischen Psychologie und den Cognitive Science zu suchen. Viele 
Einzelforschungen bemühen sich seit langem, die Verbindung zwischen der phänomenologischen 
Untersuchung des Bewusstseins aus der Innenperspektive und der Untersuchung aus der 
Außenperspektive der Naturwissenschaften greifbar zu machen. Eine der deutlich sichtbaren 
Meilensteine dieser Entwicklung ist der 1999 erschienene Band von Jean Petitot mit dem Titel 
„Naturalizing Phenomenology“ und die Gründung der Zeitschrift „Phenomenology and Cognitive 
Science“, durch Shaun Gallagher und Natalie Depraz.
Die Bezeichung dieser Tendenz als „Naturalisierung der Phänomenologie“ und die hier vorgeschlagene 
Bezeichnung einer „naturalisierten Phänomenologie“ weckt allerdings Ängste vor einer damit 
verbundenen Naturalisierung des Gegenstandes der phänomenologischen Untersuchungen, nämlich 
Bedenken vor einer Naturalisierung des Bewusstseins und seiner Inhalte. Eine solche Naturalisierung 
hatte schon Husserl kämpferisch als einen gravierenden Fehler herausgestellt. Eine Naturalisierung des 
Bewusstseins ist aber in der sogenannten „Naturalisierung der Phänomenologie“ nicht beabsichtigt. Es 
geht lediglich darum, eine engere Verbindung und Verschränkung der methodisch ganz 
unterschiedlichen Analysen von Cognitive Neuroscience, empririscher Psychologie und 
Phänomenologie zu fördern.
Allgemein wurde und wird die Einbeziehung empirischer Ergebnisse in die Philosophie schon seit 
Aristoteles‘ Zeiten von vielen Seiten immer wieder und in verschiedener Weise gefordert. In der 
heutigen Situation heisst dies: Philosophen sollten heute nicht mehr eine Theorie des Geistes 
entwerfen, ohne die relevanten empirisch-pschologischen und naturwissenschaftlichen Forschungen zu 
berücksichtigen. 
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So propagieren z.B. George Lakoff  und Mark Johnson eine neue „empirisch verantwortungsvolle 
Philosophie“, die auf  einem kognitionswissenschaftlichen Verständnis des kognitiven Unbewussten 
gründet und den Bereich präreflektiver Kognition umfaßt. Sie sehen in Merleau-Ponty und John Dewey 
Vorbilder dieser Weise philosophischen Denkens und halten eine gegenseitige Befruchtung zwischen 
Philosophie und Kognitionswissenschaften für möglich und sinnvoll. (3)
Wo sind aber die Grenzen der Zusammenarbeit bei den methodisch so unterschiedlichen 
Wissenschaften wie Neurologie und ihrer kognitivistischen Interpretation auf  der einen und 
Phänomenologie auf  der anderen Seite? Worin liegt der mögliche Nutzen einer solchen 
Zusammenarbeit? Auch auf  diese Fragen gibt es verschiedene Antworten.
Shaun Gallagher sieht gute Aussichten für eine gegenseitige Befruchtung und Aufklärung (mutual 
enlightment) von Phänomenologie und Cognitive Science. (4) Da die Aufklärung von 
Bewußtseinsleistungen in der empirischen Psychologie, der Neurologie und der Cognitive Science 
schon weit fortgeschritten ist, kann sie auch eine kritische Funktion für phänomenologische Analysen 
erhalten. Denn: Wenn es empirische Befunde gibt, die den eidetischen Einsichten widerstreiten, dann 
muss sich eidetische Analyse dieser Kritik stellen und gegebenenfalls auch die eigenen Fehler und 
Beschränkungen einräumen. 
Umgekehrt kann die Phänomenologie die Interpretation von empirischen Ergebnissen der 
Neurowissenschaften leisten, denn sie geht von einem genuinen Einblick in die Innenperspektive des 
Erlebens aus, d.h. sie hat bereits den Sinn der Erlebnisse erfahren. Es scheint auch durchaus möglich, 
dass phänomenologische Einsichten neue Anregungen für die experimentelle Forschung geben können. 
Insofern bietet sich hier eine Kooperation zum gegenseitigen Nutzen an.
Man könnte sagen, dass zwei Wissenschaften, die den gleichen Gegenstand haben, d.h. das 
Bewusstsein, irgendwie immer zum gegenseitigen Nutzen zusammenarbeiten können. Doch hier ist 
Vorsicht geboten. Schon ein erster, noch ganz roher Vergleich zeigt, dass die Interessenrichtungen 
beider Untersuchungen sehr verschieden sind. Die empirische Untersuchung aus der 3.Person-
Perspektive will in erster Linie wissen, „Was der Fall ist“, und zwar in der Dimension physiologischer 
Abhängigkeiten, z.B. welche Neuronengruppen wesentliche Informationen an welche andere Neuronen 
geben. Die phänomenologische und transzendentale Fragestellung interessiert sich dagegen für das 
introspektiv gegebene Leistungsgefüge der Tätigkeiten des Bewusstseins, d.h. sie untersucht eher das 
„Wie“ des Zustandekommens solcher Leistungen aus der erlebten Innenperspektive. Schon dieser 
begrenzte Vergleich zeigt, dass der Unterschied in der Fragestellung eine einfache Kooperation im 
Sinne eines Austauschs von Ergebnissen ausschliesst. Aber es gibt andere Formen fruchtbarer 
Zusammenarbeit.
Francisco Varela denkt sich den Zusammenhang von Cognitive Science und Phänomenologie durch 
gegenseitige Abhängigkeitsbeziehungen (constraints) und gegenseitige Anweisungen zu eingehenderer 
Erforschung bestimmter Einzelheiten vermittelt. (5) Auch Varela geht nicht von einer einfachen 
Gleichsetzung oder einer 1:1 Beziehung (isomorphism) der entsprechenden Gegenstandsbereiche aus.
Weiterhin ist auch ein Austausch möglich, der vor allem in der phänomenologischen Interpretation der 
Ergebnisse der Cognitive Neuroscience besteht. Diese Art der Interpretation scheint mir besonders 
wichtig, weil die Phänomenologie sowohl die Inhalte als auch das Subjekt der Intentionalität ernst 
nimmt und eine wissenschaftliche, auf  Anschauung gegründeten Analyse aus der Innenperspektive des 
erlebenden Bewusstseins anstrebt. Oft werden die experimentellen Ergebnisse der Cognitive 
Neurocsience lediglich mit alltagspsychologischen Mitteln interpretiert. Auch die analytische 
Philosophie des Geistes kann, und zwar wegen ihrer überwiegend behaviouristisch motivierten 
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Ignoranz hinsichtlich des erkennenden und leistenden Subjekts (die sich z.B. in dem Jargon der ‚mental 
states‘ ausdrückt) bislang keine geeignete Interpretationsgrundlage für die differenzierten Ergebnisse 
bieten.
Die schwächste Form einer möglichen Zusammenarbeit ist die gegenseitige Anregung zu neuen 
Forschungen. Aber auch diese Art der Kooperation kann sehr fruchtbar sein.
Es gibt aber durchaus Ansätze, die bezüglich der Möglichkeiten der Zusammenarbeit weit 
optimistischer sind. Shaun Gallagher stellt in seinen Aufsatz „Phenomenology and Experimental 
Design. Toward a Phenomenologically Enlightened Experimental Science” (6) die Frage, wie die 
Phänomenologie zur experimentellen Cognitive Neuroscience beitragen kann. Seinen eigenen 
Vorschlag nennt er „’front-loaded’phenomenology“ und charakterisiert sie dadurch, dass diese 
„direkten Gebrauch von der Phänomenologie“ macht, und zwar in dem Sinne, dass die Ergebnisse der 
phänomenologischen Untersuchungen in die Planung der empirischen Untersuchungen (experimental 
design) einbezogen werden. Auf  indirekte Weise fungiert die Phänomenologie dabei auch als Teil des 
theoretischen Rahmens, innerhalb dessen die experimentellen Daten dann interpretiert werden.
4. Warum wird gerade heute die „Naturalisierung“ der Phänomenologie diskutiert?
Warum erscheint uns aber gerade heute das Projekt einer Kooperation zwischen Neurowissenschaften 
und Phänomenologie sinnvoll? Dies hängt meiner Meinung nach mit der Entwicklung der Cognitive 
Neuroscience zusammen: Diese empirischen und experimentellen Wissenschaften rücken immer näher 
an das Phänomen und die Inhalte des Bewußtseins heran. Hierdurch wird auch für die eidetische 
Erforschung aus der phänomenologischen Innenperspektive eine Zusammenarbeit mit der Forschung 
aus der 3.Person-Perspektive immer attraktiver.
Wie nahe sind aber die Neurowissenschaften den konkreten Inhalten des Bewusstseins schon 
gekommen? Wie weit sind die heute gebräuchlichen Verfahren schon dazu geeignet, die Beziehungen 
z.B. eines Musters neuronaler Aktivität und den entsprechenden Bewusstseinsinhalten zu bestimmen? 
Durch die Verbesserung der bildgebenden Beobachtungsverfahren der neuronalen Aktivität des 
Gehirns, wie z.B. PET (Positronen-Emissions-Tomographie) fMR (functional magnetic resonance), hat 
die detaillierte Erforschung der Funktion einzelner Hirnregionen in den letzten Jahrzehnten einen 
grossen Schritt nach vorne getan. So kann man heute im Gehirn kognitive, emotionale und motorische 
Aktivitäten mit verschiedenen Verfahren beobachten, die die Unterschiede in der Stoffwechselaktivität 
und damit auch der neuronalen Aktivität bildlich darstellen können. Aber bisher reichen auch diese 
eindrucksvollen bildlichen Darstellungen für eine zuverlässige Identifikation der genauen Art der 
mentalen Aktivität, d.h. des bewußten Inhalts, aufgrund von neuronalen Aktivitäten nicht aus. Das 
bedeutet: Man kann auf  Grund der Beobachtung der neuronalen Aktivität mit bildgebenden Verfahren 
heute noch nicht sagen, was der Inhalt des Bewußtseins ist, d.h. auf  den Menschen zugeschnitten, was 
jemand wahrnimmt, will oder denkt. So dokumentieren PET-Darstellungen lediglich die Aktivität des 
Stoffwechsels in bestimmten Arealen des Gehirns. Wenn man dann die allgemeine Funktion dieses 
Gehirnareals kennt (z.B. aufgrund von Ausfall-Forschungen), dann kann man auch über die Art der 
jeweiligen Funktion etwas aussagen - aber eben nur sehr allgemein.
Zum Beispiel ist der Motor Cortex für die Steuerung von Bewegungen zuständig, das limbische System 
ist ganz generell an Gefühlen beteiligt, es gibt verschiedene Bereiche des Gehirns, die vor allem den 
Prozess der Wahrnehmung leisten usw. Gibt es z.B. eine erhöhte Aktivität in einem Teil des limbischen 
Systems, dann wissen wir, daß das Subjekt wahrscheinlich ein Gefühl empfindet. Wir können aber 
anhand der erkennbaren Muster der Stoffwechselaktivität nicht genau unterscheiden, ob es sich um 
Angst oder eine Überraschung handelt, und ob es die Furcht vor einem Tiger im Gebüsch ist oder die 
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Angst, den Versuchsleiter zu enttäuschen. (7) Eine solche genaue Zuordnung von Aktivitätsmuster und 
Inhalt der Furcht ist bisher nicht zufriedenstellend gelungen. Natürlich kann man versuchen, die 
Ergebnisse noch präziser einzugrenzen, wenn man die jeweilige Versuchsanordnung experimentell auf  
eine bestimmte Angst (z.B. indem man einen Film über Tiger zeigt) zugeschnitten hat. Letztlich wissen 
wir aber nicht genau, worauf  sich die Angst richtet, weil der erhöhte Stoffwechsel, - selbst wenn er ein 
relativ bekanntes räumliches Muster produziert - keinen Schluß auf  den genauen Inhalt des Gefühls 
erlaubt. Eventuell ermöglichen künftige Verbesserungen dieser Methode oder die Entwicklung neuer 
Methoden aber eine genauere Identifikation. (8)
Man könnte nun sagen, dass dies zwar eine interessante Forschungsrichtung sei, die viel Interessantes 
zum Vorschein bringen kann usw. Aber es gibt gute Gründe dafür, hinsichtlich einer Identifikation 
radikal skeptisch zu sein. Man könnte behaupten: Der genaue Inhalt des menschlichen Bewußtseins läßt 
sich nie mit einem bildgebenden Verfahren abbilden. Er ist zu komplex, es gibt ausserdem die 
prinzipielle Schwierigkeit der Identifikation eines neuronalen Zustandes mit einem Bewusstseinsinhalt 
usw. Man kann auch der Ansicht sein, dass ein Beweis für die „Identität“ eines Bewußtseinsinhalts mit 
einem neurologischen Zustand (oder einer Aktivität des Gehirns) prinzipiell nicht möglich ist. Dies sei 
dann schon eine unzulässige Reduktion usw. --- Aber all dieser hochherzige und manchmal auch etwas 
hochnäsig erscheinende Protest der Geisteswissenschaftler, die auf  der prinzipiellen Unbeweisbarkeit 
der Identität realer Verhältnisse mit bewussten Inhalten stützt, muss sich Gegen-Einwänden stellen, die 
sehr gute common sense Argumente auf  ihrer Seite haben. Es gibt nämlich viele Verhältnisse zwischen 
Gegenständen in der Welt, deren Identität ebenso unbeweisbar ist, an die wir aber sehr fest glauben.
Ich denke hierbei an das Verhältnis von Bild und Ding. Natürlich ist es nicht möglich, ein Bild einfach 
mit einer Sache zu identifizieren, zumal wenn die Bildherstellung theoretisch hochvermittelt oder sogar 
computergestützt ist. Dennoch zeigt unser Verhalten im Alltag, dass wir uns faktisch auf  eine solche 
Identität vollkommen verlassen, und zwar so vollständig, dass wir sogar unser Leben auf  der 
Grundlage dieser Gleichsetzung riskieren werden. - Nehmen sie an, ein Mediziner diagnostiziert bei 
Ihnen mit Hilfe eines Röntgenbildes oder einer Computertomographie eine gefährliche Erkrankung, 
welche einen grossen operativen Eingriff  notwendig macht. Natürlich werden Sie der Diagnose 
vertrauen und den Eingriff  vornehmen lassen, auch dann, wenn die Operation selbst sehr gefährlich 
ist.
Dies tun wir, obwohl die Identität dessen, was das Röntgenbild oder die Tomographie zeigt, mit 
meinem Leib nicht bewiesen werden kann. Es gibt nur einen statistisch verlässlichen Zusammenhang 
zwischen dem räumlichen und zeitlichen Zusammentreffen: Immer - oder zumindest fast immer - 
wenn das Tomogramm ein gefährliche Veränderung aufweist, stellt sich bei dem anschliessenden 
Eingriff  heraus, dass diese tatsächlich vorhanden war. Dieser statistische Zusammenhang weist bei aller 
Zuverlässigkeit dennoch eine gewisse Unsicherheit auf, weil gelegentlich Interferenzen und Artefakte 
bei der Herstellung des Bildes vorkommen, auch hier sind Verwechslungen und Fehldiagnosen möglich. 
Dennoch ist unsere Überzeugung von der Zuverlässigkeit so stark, dass wir unser Leben dafür riskieren 
würden.
Eine überzeugende statistische Verlässlichkeit - wie in dem Beispiel des Röntgenbildes - würde uns also 
im Prinzip auch von der Identität eines Bewusstseinsinhaltes mit einem bestimmten differenzierten 
Muster neuronaler Aktivität überzeugen können. Es muss nur statistisch zuverlässig gelingen, das 
Vorliegen des einen aus der Anwesenheit des anderen erschliessen zu können.
Genau dies kann man heute schon leisten, wenn auch in einem sehr beschränkten Gebiet. Hierzu muss 
ich kurz auf  die Forschung an sogenannten Spiegelneuronen (mirror neurons) eingehen und zwar 
insbesondere auf  das dabei verwendete Verfahren. Es gibt nämlich schon heute weit präzisere 
Instrumente zur Erforschung der Gehirnaktivität als die bildgebenden Verfahren (PET, fMR). 
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Besonders eindrucksvoll ist die Methode des single neuron recording. Hierbei wird die Aktivität von 
einzelnen Neuronen in einer kleinen Region des Gehirns eines Versuchstiers (z.B. Makakken) 
beobachtet. Die Methode des single neuron recording ist jedoch „sehr invasiv“, d.h. es werden dabei 
Mikroelektroden ins Gehirn eingepflanzt. Aus diesem Grund ist das Verfahren wohl auch noch nicht 
auf  Menschen angewandt worden. Mittlerweile kann man mit dieser Methode die elektrischen 
Potentiale mehrerer hundert Neuronen gleichzeitig präzise aufzeichnen, ihre Aktivität dokumentieren 
und danach statistisch auswerten.
Ich beziehe mich nun auf  einige Untersuchungen von G. Rizzolatti und V. Gallese, die diese 1995 an 
der Universität Parma unternommen haben und die sie auf  die Spur der sogenannten Spiegelneuronen 
im Motor Cortex geführt haben. Der Motor Cortex ist für die Steuerung unserer Bewegungen 
zuständig. Die von ihnen verwendete Beobachtungsmethode war das single neuron recording. Diese 
Methode ist so genau, daß man z.B. bei einer Beobachtung eines sehr kleinen spezialisierten Areals des 
Motor Cortex jedem einzelnen Typ von Handbewegung (precision grip) jeweils ein einzigartiges Muster 
der neuronalen Aktivität zuordnen kann. Dieses Muster kann bei der gleichen Bewegung immer wieder 
als dasselbe identifiziert werden. Das heißt: Wenn eine Versuchsperson einen kleinen Gegenstand mit 
der rechten Hand ergreift und dann im Gelenk nach rechts dreht, um den Gegenstand von der anderen 
Seite zu sehen, entsteht ein charakteristisches Muster der neuronalen Aktivität, das in allen weiteren 
Fällen statistische zuverlässig identifiziert werden kann. Es unterscheidet sich z.B. deutlich von dem 
entsprechenden Aktivitätsmuster der gleichen Drehung der Hand nach links (und auch von allen 
anderen Bewegungen). Hiermit konnte also wenigstens in einem sehr kleinen Bereich die statistisch 
zuverlässige Identifikation eines neuronalen Aktivitätsmusters mit einem Inhalt des Bewusstseins 
geleistet werden.
Allerdings könnte man hier einwenden, das eine so unbedeutende leibliche Bewegung eigentlich nicht 
als ein vollwertiger Inhalt des Bewusstseins gelten kann. Manche unserer Bewegungen sind ganz 
unwillkürlich, viele sind so unbedeutend, dass ihre Regelung sozusagen „untergeordneten“ leiblichen 
Instanzen überlassen werden kann, die gar nicht bewusst werden. So denken wir selten über die 
Bewegungen unserer Zehen nach, wir können es aber. Zudem ist es schwer, die Art der Repräsentation 
dieser Bewegung in unserem Bewusstsein zu beschreiben. Sicher ist, dass es sich dabei sich nicht um die 
hochstufigen Gegenstände des Denkens handelt, wie z.B. eine Einsicht in einen Sachverhalt (Die 
Ampel ist grün). Es ist sehr zweifelhaft, ob die kleine leibliche Handlung überhaupt durch Begriffe im 
Bewusstsein vorgestellt wird. Wir können sie aber durchaus bewusst „denken“, und auch imaginativ 
„vorstellen“, und dies zeigt, dass wir auch die notwendigen nicht-begrifflichen Mittel haben, solche 
unbedeutenden Handlungen bewusst vorzustellen. Wir können sie sogar als dieselben leiblichen 
Bewegungen bei Anderen vorstellen, z.B. wenn wir sehen, dass sie ihre Hand auf  die beschriebene 
Weise bewegen. Auch dies zeigten die Untersuchungen von Rizzolatti und Gallese.
Ich will hier jedoch nicht zu sehr auf  die Forschung an Spiegelneuronen eingehen, das ist hier nicht 
mein Thema. (9) Dennoch möchte ich erwähnen, dass die Untersuchung von Rizzolatti und Gallese 
eine überraschende Einsicht in die Art geben, wie wir uns die Bewegungen anderer vorstellen, d.h. wie 
wir sie bewußt haben. Denn es zeigte sich, dass die Neuronen des Motor Cortex nicht nur bei eigenen 
leiblichen Bewegungen ein charakteristisches Aktivitätsmuster hervorbrachten, sondern dass dieses 
Muster auch zu beobachten war, wenn die Versuchstiere lediglich die Bewegungen anderer Affen oder 
auch die des menschlichen Versuchsleiters beobachteten. Dabei war zwar immer nur ein Teil der 
Neuronen aktiv, doch das Muster der Aktivität blieb identifizierbar dasselbe. Diesen Teil der 
Neuronenpopulation nannte man deshalb Spiegelneuronen, weil sie in der Lage waren, irgendwie die 
nur gesehene Bewegung des anderen Subjekts zu simulierten, und zwar so, als ob es seine eigenen 
wären. Dies scheint ein wichtiger Aspekt der Art zu sein, in der leibliche Bewegungen von Affen - und 
vielleicht auch von uns - vorgestellt werden.
173
Wir müssen also folgern, dass in diesem Fall die „Identifikation“ des bewussten Inhalts mit einem 
messbaren neurologischen Phänomen schon statistisch zuverlässig geleistet ist. Natürlich handelt es 
sich um einen relativ einfachen Bewusstseinsinhalt mit geringer Komplexität. Vergleichbare 
Untersuchungen an Menschen wurden mit einer anderen Methode versucht, die mit berührungslosen, 
computergestützen Verfahren lediglich das Niveau der Erregbarkeit (level of  arousal) einer Hirnregion 
untersuchen. (10) Aber dennoch sieht man hier die Richtung der experimentellen Untersuchungen 
schon klar vorgezeichnet. Das Interesse an der Identifikation von Bewußtseinsinhalten ist geweckt und 
die Methoden müssen diesem Interesse noch angepasst und weiter verbessert werden. (11)
Die statistisch zuverlässige Identifikation von neuronaler Aktivität und bewussten Inhalten ist also 
bereits in ganz kleinem Umfang gelungen. Der wesentliche Anstoss dafür, warum uns heute eine 
eingehende Zusammenarbeit von Cognitive Neuroscience und weiteren Richtungen der empirischen 
Psychologie auf  der einen und der Phänomenologie auf  der anderen Seite als sinnvoll und notwendig 
erscheint, ist der heutige Stand und der weiter zu erwartende Fortschritt der neurologischen Verfahren, 
die letztlich den Inhalt des Bewusstseins bestimmen wollen.
Das Motiv der Phänomenologie zu dieser Zusammenarbeit kann aber nicht einfach sein, dass sie diese 
Bestrebungen unterstützen will, sondern nur, dass sie in ihrem genuin eigenen Forschungsgebiet mit 
ihren eigenen Methoden Fortschritte erzielen will. Und hierzu hilft die angestrebte Kooperation sicher.
Dan Zahavi hat in einem kürzlich erschienenen Beitrag den Nutzen hervorgehoben, den die 
Phänomenologie aus einer solchen Zusammenarbeit ziehen kann. Sein Ansatzpunkt ist, dass 
phänomenologische Analysen von empirischen Ergebnissen der Neurologie und der empirischen 
Psychologie „herausgefordert“ werden. Diese Herausforderung verlangt dann jeweils neue, 
eingehendere phänomenologische Analysen des betreffenden Phänomenbereichs. So zeigt die 
Säuglingsforschung wichtige Aspekte des Zugangs zu der Subjektivität anderer Menschen auf. Nicht 
erst seit den Aufsehen erregenden Untersuchungen von Meltzoff  und Moore über die Imitation von 
Mimik bei Säuglingen weiss man, dass die phänomenologische Theorie der Intersubjektivität in 
Konkurrenz mit aktuellen psychologischen Untersuchungen zur vorsprachlichen, sogenannten 
„Protokommunikation“ steht. - Die phänomenologische Analyse der Erinnerung ist immer noch stark 
an der Rekonstruktion von zusammenhängenden Episoden orientiert. In der experimentellen 
Psychologie differenziert man heute dagegen zwischen vielen Formen des Gedächtnisses, z.B. das 
episodische Gedächtnis, an zeitlich vergangene Ereignisse, das Arbeitsgedächtnis (eine Telefonnummer 
kurz behalten), das prozedurale Gedächtnis (Fahrradfahren) und das semantische Gedächtnis. So ist 
auch die Phänomenologie zu einer neuen, detaillierteren Analyse der Gedächtnisleistungen 
aufgefordert. Zudem: Nicht alle Formen des Gedächtnisses enthalten eine Zurückwendung in der Zeit. 
Ausserdem wurde in vielen Untersuchungen die Überzeugung widerlegt, dass Erinnerungen, selbst 
wenn sie subjektiv evident sind, auch immer passive und wahrheitsgetreue Aufzeichnungen der 
Vergangenheit sind. (12)
Bedenken gegen diese Art der Zusammenarbeit gibt es natürlich viele, einige habe ich bereits genannt. 
Es fängt bereits mit dem Problem an, ob die empirisch-experimentelle und die deskriptiv-
phänomenologische Methode in einem unaufhebbaren Spannungsverhältnis stehen. Wir haben bereits 
gesehen, dass die transzendentale Ausrichtung der Phänomenologie im Sinne einer grundlegenden 
Ersten Philosophie hierfür aber kein entscheidendes Hinderniss darstellt.
Husserls Bedenken - die er z.B. in „Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft“ vehement äussert - gegen die 
experimentell-empirische Psychologie richten sich gegen die Naturalisierung des Bewusstseins selbst, 
welche viele Vertreter dieser experimentellen Psychologie auch vertraten. Dieser Reduktionismus, der in 
der ontologischen Gleichsetzung eines intentionalen Bewussseinserlebnisses mit einem elektrischen 
Schaltzustand in den Neuronen liegt, reduziert den Sinn der Inhalte des Bewusstseins auf  physikalische 
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Zustände und ist für Husserl daher nicht akzeptabel. Und dieser Reduktionismus ist auch heute nicht 
akzeptabel, weil hierdurch eine ganze eigenständige Dimension der Erfahrung zu einem blossen 
Epiphänomen herabgesetzt wird.
Aber eine solche Reduktion wird von den kooperationsbereiten Vertretern der Cognitive Science auch 
nicht mehr verfolgt. So betont Vittorio Gallese in einem Beitrag, der den Beitrag der 
Spiegelneuronenforschung auf  dem Hintergrund bisheriger Theorien der Intersubjektivität (von 
Husserl und Merleau-Ponty) würdigt, vor allem den Wert der phänomenologischen Untersuchung von 
vorprädikativen und präreflektiven Leistungen. (13)
Am Ende dürfen wir also für die zukünftige Phänomenologie hinsichtlich aller drei methodischen 
Richtungen optimistisch sein: Sie wird eidetisch, transzendental und auch naturalisiert sein.
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